proper uniform rules.
FALLACIES OF AMBIGUITY
FALLACIES OF AMBIGUITY . In these, the mistaken arguments are formulated in . In these, the mistaken arguments are formulated in such a way as to rely on shifts in the meaning of words or phrases, from their use in the such a way as to rely on shifts in the meaning of words or phrases, from their use in the premises to their use in the conclusion.
so-called authority must have genuine as opposed to apparent expertise in an area (as indicated by professional standing and academic or other qualification) and must be motivated by sci- entific ideals such as objectivity and impartiality. The argument from authority is widely used in scientific reasoning in general and in public health reasoning in particular (see Cummings (2010) for an extensive discussion of the use of this argument during the BSE epidemic). It is not difficult to see why this is the case. The lay reasoner cannot possibly have knowledge of the various scientific disciplines to which public health prob- lems relate. On the single issue of BSE, knowledge of—amongst other areas—human and animal TSEs, veterinary science, neu- ropathology, and zoonoses (human diseases with origins in low- er vertebrates) was necessary to assess the implications of BSE for human health. No single expert could embody this vast range of knowledge, let alone members of the public. The argument from authority enables lay reasoners to defer to suitable authori- ties in forming judgements about public health issues. The heu- ristic value of this argument consists in the fact that the lay rea- soner does not need to have direct knowledge of the disciplines to which an issue relates. 10 Rather, he or she merely needs to accurately identify those factors that are indicative of genuine, impartial expertise, as this particular form of expertise is the ba- sis of the most rationally warranted authority appeals. We will see in section 3 what factors are significant for lay reasoners in their assessments of different types of expertise.
which are fallacious just in case they are deductively invalid. A step removed from this are inductive arguments where, although the structure is identified by uncovering the logical forms of the natural language sentences making up the arguments, analysis must take account both of probabilistic rules of evidence and the epis- temic context of the argument. 54 Further along on the spectrum are inductive arguments whose analysis does not require identifying the logical forms, if any, of the natural language sentences making up the arguments. This is the sense of informal logic captured in Johnson’s claim that the “province of informal logic is argumenta- tion, or as I prefer, the practice of argumentation.” 55 For these in- ductive arguments, the relevant rules are, as Wright notes, rules of conversation “governing moves in a forensic language game sub- serving dialectical goals, notably persuasion.” 56 While such rules may bear some similarity to probabilistic rules of evidence, in fact they may be quite different. 57 Because they serve as broad norms for dialectical systems 58 in which argumentation occurs, such rules are more like what Jaakko Hintikka calls “strategic rules” and much less like the “definitory rules” that characterize much of what we typically think of as logic. 59 Finally, at the far end of the spec- trum relative to valid deductive arguments, are those inductive ar- guments (recalling that an argument is inductive because it is being evaluated according to the standard that the truth of some claims provide non-conclusive evidence for the truth of another claim) in which there is no evidential link between the premises and the con- clusion.
Studying these fallacies as instances of the broader error of jumping too hastily to a conclusion has raised the problem of fallacy inflation observed by Hamblin in his commentary on Aristotle’s analysis of the fallacy of misconception of refutation. It is very easy to analyze not only these three fallacies, but many others as well, perhaps even including nearly all the traditional informalfallacies, as committing the fallacy of misconception of refutation. It depends on how broadly this fallacy is defined. If we define the error of arguing to our wrong conclusion broadly enough, nearly every informal fallacy could be absorbed into this model. The same remark could be said about the general category of jumping too hastily to a conclusion. The danger is that not only hasty generalization, post hoc, and argument from ignorance are fitted under this classification, but many other informalfallacies as well. Thus it would seem that the error of jumping too quickly to a conclusion represents quite a broad and general type of error of reasoning, and precise classifications of which fallacies fall under this type of error is a job that remains to be done. As Hamblin (1970) noted, attempts so far to produce a system of classification of informalfallacies have not been successful. Still, seeing how four distinct types of error are involved can help us begin this task. The analysis of the Little Dog case brought out how the study of the supposed fallacy of suppressed evidence is closely related to, and in some cases inseparable from, the fallacy of argument from ignorance. To begin the task of classifying the different ways the fallacy of jumping to a conclusion can be committed, we review and further analyze the four basic kinds of errors that could be classified under the general heading of jumping too hastily to a conclusion were distinguished in Section 4.
Although Alagozlu did not attempt to examine the patterns of the use of different types of informalfallacies across gender, his study signifies one of the few attempts towards quantitative analysis of informalfallacies in written argumentation of Asian students. His small sample makes the comparison between the findings of that research and ours very difficult. However, Oversimplification was the most frequent informal fallacy in the corpus of EFL Turkish writers, while in the present study, Violation of RSA turned out to be the most frequent type of informal fallacy in EFL Iranian students’ writings of both genders: 66 cases in female students' and 52 in males' writings. Nevertheless, the fallacy of Ad hominem in both studies was found as the least frequent one in both EFL groups of students with a frequency of 1 in EFL Turkish students’ corpus and 3 in the Iranian corpus (1 in females and 2 in males). The pattern for the use of ‘Begging the question’, however, was different in the two studies. Whereas Turkish students showed no tendency to use this fallacy (N = 1), the Iranian EFL students used it quite frequently (17 cases for females and 19 for males). Also, the statistics for the fallacy of Hasty generalization were different across the two studies: Turkish students used it 8 times, arguably a high frequency given the small sample size of the study while the Iranian female and male students used this type of fallacy 29 and 21 times, respectively.
classification, but many other informalfallacies as well. Thus it would seem that the error of jumping too quickly to a conclusion represents quite a broad and general type of error of reasoning, and precise classifications of which fallacies fall under this type of error is a job that remains to be done. As Hamblin (1970) noted, attempts so far to produce a system of classification of informalfallacies have not been successful. Still, seeing how four distinct types of error are involved can help us begin this task. The analysis of the little dog case brought out how the study of the supposed fallacy of suppressed evidence is closely related to, and in some cases inseparable from, the fallacy of argument from ignorance. To begin the task of classifying the different way the fallacy of jumping to a conclusion can be committed, we review and further analyze the four basic kinds of errors that could be classified under the general heading of jumping too hastily to a conclusion were distinguished in section 4.
Although not immediately apparent, this argument involves an equivocation on the word “written.” The error becomes clearer if the conclusion is stated as, “Therefore, the Bible was not written by God.” The Bible was certainly (physically) written by people. But the sense in which it was “written” by God is clearly different.
often inflated. To be sure, juveniles associated with gangs are involved in substantial amounts of crime (Rosenfeld, Bray, & Egley, 1999), and crime may be part of their identity (Tittle & Paternoster, 2000), but most of their crime is petty and very local. In his police problem-solving guide on young offender gun violence, Anthony Braga (2003) concludes, “Even in neighborhoods suffering from high rates of youth gun violence, most youth are not in gangs” (p. 5). He cites researchers in Boston and Minneapolis who have found that gang members represented less than 1% of all youths and less than 3.5% of residents between the ages of 14 and 24, respectively (Braga, 2003). Fourth, different gangs use the same name to create the perception of a larger organization— Bloods and Crips of Los Angeles, California, and Omaha, Nebraska. Finally, gangs are unstable, and often do not survive as a continuous group over time. Just as other teenagers join and leave cliques, so do juvenile gang members.
Although the number of deaths is likely to be relatively small, bird and bat mortality from collisions with wind turbines is an issue that should be considered with all wind farm proposals. However, these risks should be put in perspective as there are numerous other issues that pose a far greater threat to birds and bats than wind farms, including climate change, habitat loss and invasive species. For example, in the late 1990s an estimated 8.5 million birds died each year in Queensland alone as a result of land clearing (Cogger et al. 2003). Similarly, in relation to the Tasmanian wedge-tailed eagle, it has been estimated that 173 eagles are killed each year as a result of human activities, of which only one is likely to be due to wind farms (Bevilacqua 2006). The major causes of human-related mortality are vehicle collisions (50 deaths), poisoning (40), electrocution (32), collisions with wires and fences (30) and shootings (20). Modelling conducted by Biosis Research indicates that the cumulative impact of the eight existing and proposed wind farms in the range of the Tasmanian wedge-tailed eagle is likely to be a 0.001 per cent increase in the mortality rate, which is ‘not significantly different from that indicated for the population in the absence of those wind farms’ (Smales and Muir 2005, p. 39).
There are obvious differences between Clyde’s argument and Singer's Argument. With Clyde’s argument there may be very few (if any) resources other than Clyde’s say-so by which we can determine whether (5) is true. With Singer's Argument, in contrast, we needn’t accept the premises on Singer’s authority or say-so. We needn’t count on Singer’s honesty or expertise to determine whether it is within our power to give a ten percent of our income to famine relief (P1) and whether in doing so we will sacrifice anything morally significant (P4). Likewise, the claims that suffering is bad (P3) and Singer’s Principle (P5) -- that one ought to prevent bad things from happening if one can do so without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant -- are supposed to seem obvious to us and presumably one needn’t rely on Singer’s testimony in order to see that these claims are true. And even the factual claim that if you give ten percent of your income to famine relief, you will prevent some suffering (P2) is a claim that seems to cohere with other things we know about the world and, perhaps more importantly, it is a claim the truth of which we can investigate without relying on Singer’s testimony. Unlike the case of witness testimony, then, we are not asked to accept the truth of the premises of Singer's Argument on Singer’s authority. Therefore, if biographical facts about Singer are (normatively) relevant they are relevant in a different way.
Introspecting into the score, we have made some ob- servations which we would like to bring to the attention of the cardiology community at large. These observations summarise the inherent fallacies/difficulties with the score and possible remedies, if any. The fallacies are largely a result of the high inter individual variability of the coronary anatomy and not uncommonly this variabil- ity may be so significant that the prefixed arterial no- menclature based scoring, as used by syntax, would not allow the flexibility needed for such wide variations in coronary anatomy. More so to have a computer generated software which would cover for all such variability would certainly not be easy. We have tried to work out the fallacies in some detail and the possible remedies in principle which could help make the score more precise and still maintain reproducibility.
All three fallacies are in essence one. Market, corporations and human beings are perceived as entities with only one goal and that goal is wealth maximization. This approach is based on the hyper rationalization assumption out of which orthodox economics works (see the work of Simon, 1985). A quantifiable and easy to comprehend, and hence rational, goal is wealth maximization. Aristotle’s philosophy considers wealth as an inferior goal and that well-being or happiness is the ultimate goal. Adam Smith thought that well-being may be the result of the pursuit of wealth. The prerequisites for Smith’s and Aristotle’s perception of economy are the existence of perfect markets, socialized participants, implicit political and governance procedures and, finally the Aristotelian notion of order. Politics, ethics and economy are interlaced and interconnected.
Another factor that has to be mentioned and more explained is social and cultural differences. One of the examples of business communication between the Western countries (USA) and Middle countries is negotiating. The main objective for Western countries is working with target in order to reach common agreements and understandings. Shaking hands is pretty common in these countries after the successful agreements of parties involved which lead to new common business work. On the other hand, negotiation in Middle Eastern countries leads to the common agreement; however, the agreement is not accomplished completely though. The more serious and important negotiations are in their early development. This is a fact of cultural differences which is very important while dealing on international market. (Geert Hofstede, 2009).
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) were the ﬁrst to show fewer conjunction fallacies when problems are framed in terms of frequency. They interpreted this result in terms of the nested-sets hypothesis: presenting the options as concrete classes made the inclusion relation between the two sets more transparent. Speciﬁcally, probability frames tend to encourage people to think about events in terms of properties; one naturally considers the match between the properties of Linda and the properties of bank tellers. Probability frames elicit a focus on inten- sional structure, a perspective on events that causes people to rely on the representativeness of outcomes and obscures the set relations between instances. In contrast, frequency frames induce a representation in terms of multiple instances, so that problem solvers can ‘‘see’’ the embedding of one set of instances inside another. When the correct logical relation between categories (all femi- nist bank tellers are bank tellers) is evident, participants are more likely to generate judgments of probability that respect it. Hence, the incidence of the conjunction fallacy