9. The Commonwealth has made public its long-standing goal and policy, independent of and adopted prior to this Agreement or the Department of Justice’s findings, of transitioning from an institutional model of care to a community-based system that meets the needs of all individuals with ID/DD, including those with the most complex needs, and of using its limited resources to serve effectively the greatest number of individuals with ID/DD. This goal and policy have resulted in a decline in the population of the state training centers from approximately 6000 individuals to approximately 1000 individuals. The Commonwealth has determined that this significant and ongoing decline makes continued operation of residential services fiscally impractical. Consequently, and in accordance with the Commonwealth’s policy of transitioning its system of developmental services to a community-based system, the Commonwealth will provide to the General Assembly within one year of the effective date of this Agreement, a plan, developed in consultation with the Chairmen of Virginia’s House of Delegates Appropriations and Senate Finance Committees, to cease residential operations at four of the five training centers by the end of State Fiscal Year 2021.
Richard and Lillian Anderson (collectively “Plaintiffs”), husband and wife, filed this asbestos personal injury action in the Superior Court of Washington for Pierce County on September 3, 2009, asserting claims against multiple parties including defendant Salmon Bay and Gravel Company, Inc. (alternatively “Salmon Bay” or “Defendant”), a Seattle-area retailer of tools and construction supplies. The matter was removed to the UnitedStatesDistrictCourt for the Western District of Washington and then, on February 8, 2010, transferred to the EasternDistrict of Pennsylvania to be included in the multi-district Asbestos Liability Litigation (MDL 875). (Docs. 1, 2.)
The scheduling order issued by the court in this matter requires the parties to exchange initial disclosures on or before December 12, 2006. Undersigned counsel submitted the initial disclosures on behalf of the Plaintiffs prior to the scheduling conference. Defendants have yet to submit their initial disclosures.
1. The terms “you,” “yourself,” or “your,” as used herein, refer to you, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”), all departments, offices, and agencies of the FRBNY, including but not limited to employees of the FRBNY, your attorneys, and any person acting expressly as your agent, trustee, or representative in any capacity that would give rise to possession of the documents identified by this request, including but not limited to the trustees named under the AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement dated January 16, 2009.
As a direct result of the negligence of the defendants and the unseaworthiness of the vessel, plaintiff, JAMES JOHNSON is entitled to recover from the defendants reasonable and just compensatory, special and general damages as prayed for herein and to be awarded by this Honorable Court in the following non-exclusive respects:
The Federal Circuit has held that district courts may construe claim terms on summary judgment motions as necessary to dispose of the case. Vivid Techs v. Am. Science & Eng. 200 F 3d 795, 803 (Fed Cir 2003). Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Plaintiff could have presented an argument regarding claim construction to this Court. If claim
62. Informal Dispute Resolution. Any dispute subject to Dispute Resolution under this Consent Decree shall first be the subject of informal negotiations. The dispute shall be considered to have arisen when Chattanooga sends the UnitedStates a written Notice of Dispute. Such Notice of Dispute shall state clearly the matter in dispute. The period of informal negotia- tions shall not exceed thirty (30) Days from the date the dispute arises, unless that period is modified by written agreement between the UnitedStates and Chattanooga. The UnitedStates shall consult with the State and the TCWN during the period of informal negotiations. If the UnitedStates and Chattanooga cannot resolve a dispute by informal negotiations, then the position advanced by the UnitedStates shall be considered binding unless, within forty-five (45) Days after the conclusion of the informal negotiation period, Chattanooga invokes formal dispute resolution procedures as set forth below.
52. In 1947, the UnitedStates Supreme Court held that judicial enforcement of racial covenants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but many real estate agents, developers, banks, and neighborhood associations continued to enforce racial segregation. A citywide association of homeowner groups called the Federated Property Homeowners of Detroit created a network to monitor the selling of homes to Black buyers and harassed real estate brokers who sold homes to them. Black residents who moved into white neighborhoods often faced harassment, violence, and acts of racial terrorism such as burning effigies and crosses.
the Court of Appeals. See Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Saurman, 490 Mich. 909, 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich. 2011). The Michigan Supreme Court held that MERS owned an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage, and was therefore authorized to foreclose by advertisement. Id. at 909, 805 N.W.2d at 183 (citing Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.3204(1)(d)). MERS was the record holder of the mortgage in this case; it therefore had the authority to foreclose. Nothing prevented assignment of the mortgage to HSBC, and such an assignment is permitted under the terms of the mortgage. See Am. Compl. Ex. 13 (transferring rights in the property and power of sale to MERS and “the successors and assigns of MERS”).
primary jurisdiction doctrine, which “allows a federal court to refer a matter extending beyond the ‘conventional experience of judges’ or ‘falling within the realm of administrative discretion’ to an administrative agency with more specialized experience, expertise, and insight.’” Arsberry v. Ill., 244 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2001). Now that the FCC has ruled, Performant appeals to the Court’s general power to manage its docket in the normal course of resolving cases. This power is “incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
The cases discussed supra provide little guidance on that specific issue. However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has previously considered the implications of an insured with a “replacement cost” insurance contract seeking an actual cash value payment. In Kane v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 841 A.2d 1038 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), where the policy’s “Loss Settlement” language was identical to that found in this case, the insured challenged the trial court’s holding that when a replacement cost insurance contract does not define actual cash value, the actual cash value payment may include deductions for depreciation. The court found that in a situation where only the timing of the payment was at issue—that is, the insured would receive an actual cash value payment initially, and only needed to contract for the damaged property to be repaired or replaced in order to receive the additional replacement cost of the damaged property—the insurer may deduct depreciation from an actual cash value payment. Id. at 1049-50. In so holding, the court noted that where the insured could easily receive replacement cost by contracting to complete the work, “there [wa]s no concern . . . that the insureds w[ould] not be made whole.” Id. at 1050. We find that the reasoning articulated in Kane justifies State Farm’s bifurcated payment schedule.
On June 15, 2009, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation created MDL 2047 in order to consolidate lawsuits brought in several federal district courts in the Gulf Coast and mid-Atlantic regions of the UnitedStates by property owners whose homes and other properties were allegedly damaged by KPT Chinese Drywall. Plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of KPT Chinese Drywall and other Knauf entities (collectively, the “Knauf Defendants”), as well as homebuilders, developers, installers, realtors, brokers, suppliers, importers, exporters, and distributors that were involved with KPT Chinese Drywall. The Litigation seeks relief on behalf of persons and entities with claims against the Knauf Defendants arising out of KPT Chinese Drywall.
This is a declaratory judgment action. The Plaintiffs’ are requesting that this Court declare that a contract dispute between the parties is not subject to arbitration and enter a permanent injunction. The Defendant seeks a declaration that the mandatory arbitration clause in the contract applies. Currently before the Court are the Parties’ Cross Motions for Summary
obligations under title II not to discriminate against individuals with HIV seeking emergency medical services. The Department also has a substantial interest in ensuring that recipients of federal financing, such as defendant, do not violate section 504's similar prohibition of disability discrimination. Accordingly, the UnitedStates’ significantly protectable interests in ensuring that this case results in clear, consistent, enforceable standards, both substantive and remedial, supports intervention as of right. Cf., e.g., Ceres Gulf v. Cooper, 957 F.2d 1199, 1204 (5 th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases, and finding, in insurer’s suit against employee for reimbursement of advance payments, that the interest of the federal director of the Office of Workers’
Disputes arising from interpretations and application of an insurance policy are matters of law to be determined by the court. McCormack Baron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Mo. 1999) (en banc). “Because insurance policies are designed to provide protection, they will be liberally interpreted to grant rather than deny coverage.” Cawthon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 965 F.Supp. 1262, 1264 (W.D. Mo. 1997); see also Henges Mfg., LLC v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 5 S.W.3d 544, 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
f. Authentication of Documents: If requested by Settlement Class Counsel, Settling Defendants agree to provide written declarations pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 902(11) and (12) with respect to documents produced by Settling Defendants to Settlement Class Counsel. Settlement Class Counsel agree to use reasonable efforts to minimize the burden to Settling Defendants of any such authentication testimony. In the event that such declarations are not sufficient to secure the admission of the documents, the Settling Defendants agree to, if reasonably necessary to Plaintiffs’ prosecution of the Claims alleged in the Action, make all reasonable efforts to secure the cooperation of and produce at trial and/or deposition, one or more representatives of their choice to testify as to the facts related to authentication of any of Settling Defendants’ Documents produced at any time pursuant to this SettlementAgreement or in the course of the litigation of the Actions. The failure of any current or former employee to make himself or herself available for testimony shall not affect in any way the release of the Released Parties.
35. Plaintiffs acknowledge that both the DistrictCourt and the UnitedStatesCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit have upheld the payroll dues deduction prohibition pursuant to Act 10, but assert in good faith that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus, such prior determinations should be re-visited.