MEMBERSHIP NO LHR-29(CM) NAME OF OEP S.Z.SHARAZI COMPANY NAME EUREKA (PVT) LIMITED BUSINESS ADDRESS 5, SADIQ PLAZA, 2ND FLOOR, 69- SHAHRAH-E-QUAID-E-AZAM, G.P.O. BOX # 1809, LAHORE OEP LICENCEMEMBERSHIP NO 0717/LHR VALID UP TO 31-12-2012 NTN OF COMPANY 1354639-2
Given the effect on employment probability it might also be interesting to take a closer look at the income progression that one would expect from joining a TWA. Previous studies usually show that the working conditions in TWAs are worse and that the salaries are lower than those in regular employment contracts (Jahn 2008). The coarsened exact matching technique showed itself useful in the income equation where the process purged out individuals with diverging pre-treatment income trends and reduced the standard errors. A time trend has also been included in the earnings regression apart from the other confounders included in the employment status cDiD. Figure 4 and Table 10 in the Appendix report the estimates. There are no subsequent adverse earnings effects from joining a TWA. In fact the income progression seem to benefit from TWA employ- ment, supporting the descriptive results in Figure 2. When stratifying on gender (Figure 4 and Table 10 in the Appendix), it seems as though the effect is mostly driven by women. Since the parallel trends assumption cannot be empirically supported in the non-western immigrants sample, the estimates are unreliable.
5.2 Results of the legal changes on employment duration
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates for the reform dummies and the observable covariates. Compared to the reference period 1980-1984, the transition rates out of temporary agency work in Model 1, which is our preferred specification, differ significantly and are lower after the first (1985) and second (1994) change in the law. This is in line with our hy- pothesis in section 3. Obviously the prolongations of the maximum period of assignment have increased employment duration in temporary agency work. We take the longer employment duration as an indication that the strict regulation may have dampened the demand for temporary agency workers by the user firms. Although user firms primarily request temps for a short time period there may be a critical time period, until a temp has accustomed herself to the new job and is productive in the user firm. The prolongations of the maximum period of assignment might have improved the chances for the client firms to amortize the initial transaction costs. The transition rate after the reform of 1997 which allowed fixed-term con- tracts and relaxed the ban of synchronization is significantly higher than the transition rate of the previous regime. This result confirms our hy- pothesis in Section 3 as well. It is likely that the temporary work agencies have transferred the risk and the costs associated with periods without assignment to the temporary agency workers and, if they are eligible, to the unemployment insurance system.
assessments are scheduled and according to which they are to be carried out, as well as information on conditions specific to individual locations, processes, the scope of the certification, and the (S&H) risks. In principle, the Phase 1 audit takes place at the temporary employ- ment agency’s premises. The auditor can request the contractor to supply supplementary information. The certification body’s SCT auditor will notify the temporary employment agency of his or her findings following the Phase 1 audit, which findings will form the basis for the agreements on the next stage of the investigation (Phase 2).
We find that the cooperation and communication indica- tor has positive and mainly significant effects on the con- ditional voucher intensity, amounting to approximately 2–3 vouchers per 100 unemployed individuals. The organization indicator shows negative effects of 1.5–2 vouchers per 100 unemployed persons. As stated earlier, the negative influ- ence was not expected a priori but can be explained by an observed negative correlation between internal organization and the assessed quality management systems. Both the avoi- dance indicator and the reform assessment show the expected sign in most cases, but the coefficients are very small with large standard errors. If we focus on policy-style indicators based on answers given by managers, we can use two more indicators, because managers had to answer more specific questions in the survey. The results show that the point esti- mates of the cooperation and communication indicator are smaller and not significant in most cases in this sample. In- stead, the avoidance strategy becomes more important. We find a negative influence of about 2 vouchers per 100 unem- ployed, implying that these agencies award fewer vouchers. We incorporate the information about the assignment practice into the regressions even though this information is not directly related to the implementation of the voucher and quality management systems. The results are presented for all models in column (b). The results are generally not sensitive with regard to this information. We conclude that the influence of policy styles measured by indicators for co- operative and communicative behavior as well as the degree of organization seems to be robust. In the main specifica- tions we find a significant positive correlation between the degree of cooperative and communicative behavior and the voucher award intensity of employmentagencies. The cor- relation between voucher awards and the degree of internal organization is negative.
In this work, which is built on that of Álvarez de Toledo et al. (2008) but from a microeconomic perspective 2 , we will try to test by means of the estimation of a duration model for the vacancies managed by the Andalusian Employment Agency (SAE) 3 to what degree their matching process responds to a theoretical model of the stock-flow type as described by Coles (1994). According to this model, a new vacancy can be "good" or "bad". In this way, a "good" vacancy is one that belongs to a segment of the labour market where the vacancies do not accumulate -they are in the “short side” of the market- so that when this type of vacancy is registered, it is quickly filled with some worker from the available stock in this segment. On the contrary, a "bad" vacancy is one that belongs to a segment in which the vacancies and not the workers accumulate in the stock -the vacancies are in the “long side” of the market- so that when the vacancy is registered initially, there are not available workers to occupy it, and the vacancy will have to wait for the arrival of new workers to allow for a job placement. According to Coles (1994), this dynamics of flows and stocks can yield two types of matching: new vacancies (instantaneous flow) with old job demands (stock) and vice versa. Nevertheless, our real data do not show a complete fit to a stock-flow model of partially instantaneous flows, so even a "good" individual can go several rounds without matching. In practice, this fact means that in a certain segment there could coexist vacancies and workers and that we also observe matching between new vacancies and new job demands (flows) and between old vacancies and old job demands (stocks), although these job placements should always be between "good" ones and "bad" ones.
A statement appears in paragraph 184.108.40.206 of the IT Policy (2000) that says ‘The e-Government model for Pakistan is a gigantic task. It may take 5-7 years because of financial constraints as well as inadequate professional know-how to undertake system re-engineering of different government departments and use of I.T. so that use of paper is minimised. Therefore, a modular approach will be adopted to achieve the goal of e-Government’. Some of the reactions from the interviewees were: go send the civil servant for training and employ various IT consultants to develop e-Government model. What happens next? Are they going to use the skills back in the office? Is the technology or system already available? Is there any application for develop model, this will be a complete waste of budget. An identification of training modules related to their working routine and the existence of the technology to be utilised combined together will produce a more positive return on the investment. Although the general problem is identified, the specific problems are not, and neither is there an evaluation of how to solve the problem.
2. Data and Key Variables 2.1. Data
The main analysis uses the Labor Force Survey (LFS) data from 2005/2006. Earlier rounds are also used for the trend analysis. The LFS is conducted every two years, collecting a set of information on various dimensions of a country’s civilian labor force, including socio- demographic characteristics, such as age, sex, marital status, level of education, current school enrollment, and migration status, and employment information. Each round of the LFS consists of all urban and rural areas of all provinces defined in the Population Census. 1 The sampling takes two stages. The first stage is the selection of the primary sampling units (PSU), 2 defined as enumeration blocks 3 in the urban areas and mouzas/dehs/villages in the rural areas. The second stage is the selection of secondary sampling unit (SSUs). A specified number of households--i.e. 12 from each urban sample PSU and 16 from each rural sample PSU--are selected using
Part 2 of the Regulations contains a number of restrictions aimed at both EmploymentAgencies and Businesses. Since the 1973 Act came on to the statute books it has always been unlawful to charge work seekers fees for finding them work. Agencies and Businesses occasionally circumvented this prohibition by charging fees for additional services such as CV writing, training, photographic services or the provision of protective equipment. It is unlawful to make the provision of work finding services conditional upon the work seeker using any of these ancillary services. If however, the work seeker voluntarily chooses to use those services, then the level of fees and the service to which they relate must be set out in the contract.
It has been shown in Sections 3 and 4 that because of the changes in fertility since the late 1980s, the share of youth in the total labour force has increased over time and they are more educated than older cohorts. Youth unemployment rates are generally much higher than overall unemployment rate in all regions of the world [ILO (2005)]. A similar situation is found in Pakistan throughout the 1990s as well as during the more recent periods (Table 9). However, youth unemployment in Pakistan is below the global average. 14 In 1990-91, 11.6 percent of the labour force aged 15–19 was unemployed and it increased gradually to 16.2 percent in 2001-02, after which declining trends have been witnessed. The level of unemployment among 15–19 years old was almost double of the overall unemployment rate during the 1990s. For age group 20–24, unemployment rate increased from 9 percent in 1990-91 to 11.6 percent in 1999-00, while steady declining trends have been observed in 2001-02, 2003-04 and 2005-06. Although the unemployment level among 25–34 year old (5.94) was lower than the overall unemployment level in 2003-04 it has jumped by more than one and half time between 1990-91 and 2003-04 period (Table 10). The levels of unemployment among aged people, 60 years and above, are very high. Both poverty and high dependency burden on working age population have probably compelled the elderly population to remain active in the labour market. However, it could also be a statistical artifact. In the labour force surveys, male enumerators collect information from an adult male about the economic activity of each household member. Availability of the elderly female population for work could be a reporting problem.
where j=0 is in school, j=1 is in school and in labor force, j=2 is in labor force, and j=3 is staying inactive. The relative risk ratios (RRR) are presented.
Table 2 presents the results for male youth and female youth activity decisions. Two of the findings are common for male and female youth. First, household heads’ education and employment status play a significant role in determining youth activity decisions. Youth in a family with a better-educated head and/or employed head (in either the agricultural sector or the non-agricultural sector) are more likely to be in school and less likely to be in the labor force or be inactive. Second, the ratio of working individuals to nonworking individuals in a household has a significant and positive effect on youth’s activity decisions, both in statistics and in
Figure 3 presents employment, wage and output trends for the cement industry. The analysis is restricted to firms in the public sector only, because the cement industry was a state monopoly up to 1994. The graphs, however, show a trend different from the one observed for the edible oil sector. Privatisation results in a sharp fall only in case of workers’ wages (Graphs 5), while there is a steady but smooth decline in employment (Graphs 1 to 3), total wages and a rise in both output and productivity (Graphs 7 to 8). Unlike the edible oil sector, the fall in employment is smooth and surprisingly starts from the mid-1980s, when the units were still in the public sector. There is no sharp fall in employment in the post-privatisation phase due to only 36 percent retrenchment in the cement sector against 74 percent for the edible oil industry. A comparison between workers and managers (Graphs 2 and 3) shows that, while the workers steadily lost their jobs, this has not been the case for managers despite some ups and downs in wages. However, this trend is not unpredicted in capital-intensive industries [Majid (2000)]. This means that white-collar employees or those in higher income brackets are not only less likely to lose their jobs, as the Graph 3 shows, but will also continue to get a consistently better pay package, as is evident from Graph 5. This puts managers in a far better position than the workers. The output level also declined at the end due to excess supply and regressive demand [Majid (2000)], but Graph 8 depicts high productivity, which has increased in the last few years.
After independence, Pakistan inherited a very small percentage (9%) of industrial establishments in the Indian subcontinent (Ansari et.al, 2006: 991). The area which constituted Pakistan had also a very low level of union organizing, mostly because a large part of workforce was involved in agriculture. The union membership as a percentage of total labor force was only 0.7 % (in 2000) while if you look at the union density, it is about 2% of the employed labor force. The total number of registered trade unions is more than 7200 but only about 1900 (26%) of these are collective bargaining agents (CBAs) (Ghayur, 2009: 25-47). Labor unions have shrunk both in size and power. The trade unions as pressure groups had emerged again during Bhutto regime (1972-77) but the military takeover in 1977, deregulation and privatization (1991 onwards) and military takeover (again in 1999) diluted their value as a pressure group. Structural adjustment program, which promotes deregulation of the enterprise, started on the advice of World Bank/IMF has led to the weakening of the labor rights movement. Starting from 1991 to February 2009, 167 state owned enterprises (mainly from banking, telecommunication, and energy sector) have been privatized.
According to a UNDP report in 2013, Pakistan had very low employment to population ratio and most of these people were employed in agriculture sector. The report also found that overall la- bor productivity has fluctuating trend in Pakistan and it was lowest -4.4 in 2008-09 and after that it has positive trend but still very low about 1.6 for year 2011-12. PakistanEmployment Trends report in 2011 find out that problem in Pakistan is not of absence of economic activity but presence of low quality and low productive nature of economic activities which is the main cause of low incomes in the country. Pakistan is regarded as lower middle economy as 55 percent of its population has earn- ing below $2 and 43 percent are earning between $2 and $6 (ILO, 2014). That’s why decent and productive employment is at priority in Pakistan’s national development agenda’s documents such as Vision 2030 (PakistanEmployment Trends, 2011).
In spite of being more complex, public monopoly policy was confirmed in the further norms of ILO. Paid EmploymentAgencies Act dated 1933 which was approved following the economic crisis in 1929 brought public monopoly in mediating employment services with the aim of preventing exploitation of the unemployed by private employmentagencies. Wide–scaled unemployment as a result of economic crisis caused the need to expand and improve existing placing services. For this purpose, issues such as unemployment insurance and social benefit programs added to the agenda. In the same way, restructuring of services such as education, placing and unemployment insurance under one body and improvement of relations with the employee and employer organizations by this three–legged body through advisory committees were stressed in ILO’s Employment Services Act with the number 88 which was approved in 1948 (IIBK, 1991, p. 2).
porary agency worker had the right to the same remuneration and equivalent working conditions as comparable employees directly employed at the user firm. The Labor Placement Act was again modified in 2003. 1 Since then, the temporary work agency has been allowed to assign an agency worker without any time limits. The ban on synchronization and the ban on re-employment were abolished. How- ever, fixed-term contracts continued to be regulated by the provisions of the Act on Part-time and Fixed-term Contracts. At the same time, the rights of temporary agency workers were further strengthened as the principle of equal treatment was in effect from the very first day of an assignment. This can be avoided by the agency for up to 6 weeks if the hired employee has previously been unemployed. In this instance, the temporary work agency is permitted to remunerate the worker with a net pay rate equal to the recent unemployment benefits. The contracting parties may also circumvent the principle of equal treatment if a sectoral collective agreement applies. As a result numerous collective agreements were concluded in the temporary work sector during 2003. Consequently, the principle of equal treatment has no practical effect for most temporary agency workers. In addition, the new legislation governing temporary agency work established a new instru- ment of active labor market policy. Starting in 2003, the public employment service has used subsidized temporary agency work as part of its job placement activities. The aim of the so called “Personnel-Service-Agencies” is to get the unemployed back into regular work by transition through temporary work. 2
Our econometric analysis employs up to six characteristics that are observed at the mo- ment of registration of a job vacancy: its public or private character, the type of contract, the sector of activity, the group of occupation, the province of the workplace, and the size of the firm. Table 2 presents the results of the analysis of these covariates together with the durations. By means of considering the total sample, and taking into account that each characteris- tic or covariate is analysed individually, that is, without being crossed with other covariates, it can be observed that the most common vacancy in the SAE is of a public character, is tem- poral, belongs to the public services sector or to that of construction, is aimed at manual workers (above all, those qualified), is registered in Seville, Granada or Jaen, and belongs to a micro or small enterprise. This structure is similar when the vacancies that are covered by SAE job seekers are analysed; the main difference lies in the loss of weight carried by Grana- da in favour of provinces such as Cordoba and Malaga. As regards the vacancies covered with non-SAE job seekers, certain interesting differences exist with respect to the structure shown by the total sample: the majority are private vacancies (52.7%); the group of occupa- tion of the non-qualified non-manual workers carries more weight and surpasses that of non- qualified manual workers; and Seville gains relative importance.
Section 198 of the 1995 amendment to the LRA retained the statement that the labour broker (now referred to as temporary employment services (TES)) was the employer. Section 198 defines TES as “any person who, for reward, procures for or provides to a client other persons (a) who render services to, or perform work for, the client; and (b) who are remunerated by the temporary employment service.” Section 198(4) states that the TES and the client are “jointly and severally liable” if the TES, in respect of any of its employees contravenes a collective agreement of a bargaining council, a binding arbitration award, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) or a wage/sectoral determination. Subsequent sub-clauses provide for TES workers to be covered by bargaining council agreements, but only if these are formally extended to non-parties within the registered scope of the council/s concerned. (Bargaining councils and agreements are provided for by the LRA. Godfrey (2011) estimates that in 2011, close on 2.3 million workers were covered by bargaining council agreements, of whom more than a million were covered by public sector agreements. Workers covered by bargaining council agreements thus account for about 20 per cent of all employees in the economy.)
each year, the Ordre des infirmières et infirmiers du Québec (OIIQ) publishes a statistical report on the nursing workforce, using the registration form from the members entry on the roll. according to this data, the proportion of the nursing work- force in Quebec employed by an institution in the public network has decreased since 2004-2005, going from 86.5% to 84.2% (primary job and second job). according to the OIIQ, this proportion has been constantly decreasing since 2001. Furthermore, the number of nurses practicing for the private healthcare employmentagencies has increased by 44% since 2004-2005. The number of nurses working exclusively for a private agency is the one that has increased the most: 65% since 2004-2005. Followed by the group of nurses whose second employer is a private healthcare employment agency: 30% since 2004-2005.
While earlier studies (Anderson and Braunstein 2013, Seguino and Were 2014, Tejani 2016) focused on the role of macro-economic structures, Kabeer (2016) emphasizes that growth effects on gendered employment are mediated by local structures of patriarchy. Within Pakistan, expressions of gender equality vary on the basis of rural/urban location, ethnicity, women and men’s position in feudal and class hierarchies, in life-cycle as well as by their religious affiliation (Grünenfelder and Siegmann 2016: 2). It has not been possible, however, to further disaggregate growth figures, e.g. by province, in order to connect some of this variation to regional growth. Still, different indicators related to gender (in)equality reveal broad trends over the years as highlighted in section 2 (also see e.g. Mahbub ul Haq Research Centre 2016: 63-104, UN Women 2016). Therefore, in addition to macro-economic variables that are assumed to influence gendered employment elasticities, in model 2, we have also included modelled estimates of maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births as a measure of gender equality (GE). As highlighted in section 2, we consider the high incidence of maternal mortality in Pakistan an expression of women’s inferior status in Pakistani society.