Prior to 2014 groundwater was not regulated by the State. The political power of counties and municipalities to manage groundwater is uncertain, since basins generally do not respect county or municipal boundaries. Even for matters within the jurisdiction of local political entities (regulation of well drilling), counties or municipalities rarely attempt to restrict pumping 9 . In fact, through California’s history, local pumpers are always the primary decision-makers on groundwater issues. The California Legislature has repeatedly held that groundwatermanagement should remain a local responsibility (Sax, 2002). The most recent legislation (SGMA 2014) requires basins to form their own groundwater sustainability agencies, continuing its long stand of letting the users to solve their problem locally. In adjudication, the most prominent path to groundwatermanagement, local pumpers turn to courts to settle disputes over how much groundwater can be extracted by each party. It starts when a suit is brought to adjudicate the basin (e.g. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra et al.), but usually evolves to a situation in which each defendant’s answer to the complaint is treated as cross-complaints against other defendants because of the mutual prescriptive nature of water rights conflict (Blomquist, 1992). The court helps defining the limitation of resource and boundary of water rights community, but it requires the parties to negotiate agreements among themselves. Therefore, each case of adjudication is a fully decentralized bargaining process. The court judgment is in fact a private contract among the water users in the basin, with the court acting as the enforcement agency. In a typical adjudication, the court rules on several matters 10 :
London School of Economics and Political Science Essays in Applied Economics London, September 2019 Giulia Bovini A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics of the London School of Economics fo[.]
The London School of Economics and Political Science Essays in Behavioral Economics Marcus Roel A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics of the London School of Economics for the degree of Do[.]
London School of Economics and Political Science Essays in Economics of Education Andrés Barrios Fernández July, 2019 A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics of the London School of Econom[.]
Essays in Agricultural Economics Appendices Francisco Pereira Fontes A thesis submitted to the Department of Geography and Environment of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the d[.]
On the other hand, all the controversial citizenship laws and constitutional amendments targeting Haitian migrants were undertaken under recent PLD rule. The August 2004 General Migration Law introduced a different registration system for the children born in the Dominican Republic to foreign women who do not have regular migration status. The new law de facto stipulated that children of foreign mothers who had irregular migration status at the time of giving birth could no longer be Dominicans. In 2010 the DR revised its constitution to grant citizenship automatically only to those children born on Dominican soil with parents holding formal legal status. In 2013, the Dominican Constitutional Court issued a ruling retroactively denationalizing Dominicans of Haitian descent whose parents lacked formal residency permits, extending all the way back to 1929. In good part due to the pressure exerted by the international community, a subsequent law was passed in 2014 to provide a way to re-claim citizenship for those affected by the 2013 ruling, but only conditional on being able to prove that parents were in the Dominican Republic legally at the time of birth; a conditionality that is hard to meet in practice (Amnesty International 2015). Further, in both presidential elections under study the ultra- nationalist and most vocal anti-immigration Fuerza Nacional Progresista (FNP) party joined the PLD coalition. The FNP essentially campaigns on a far-right anti-Haitian migration platform. It backed the constitutional amendment stripping Haitian Dominicans of their citizenship rights. The FNP has proposed to build a wall along the border with Haiti. It also advocates putting in place preferential treatment recruitment practices for Dominicans 12 . As a result, if ‘resource-threat’ theories were to apply in the Dominican case,
As noted, my findings are in line with work on the modern theory of the firm, which emphasizes the importance of coordination between employees for intra- firm information transmission. Cyert and March (1963) observe that managerial decisions are lobbied by groups of employees which provide distorted information to the authority. Similarly, Dalton (1959) and Crozier (1963) view an organization as a collection of cliques that aim to conceal or distort information in order to reach their goals. Dalton claims that having cliques as producers and regulators of information is essential for the firm, and provides examples of how central management influences the composition of such groups through promotions and replacements. 4 Group leaders in my model also resemble the internal communication stars identified in the sociology and management literature. Allen (1977), Tuchman and Scanlan (1981), and Ahuja (2000) describe these stars as individuals who are highly connected and responsible for a large part of information transmission within an organization, often acting as informational bridges between different groups.
Resource constraints are frequently observed in the real world. As a motiva- tion, think of the following scenario. Suppose two departments in an organization decide to implement a project that involves contributions from both entities. Fur- ther, let us assume that only one department holds information relevant to the implementation of the joint project, and contributions are substitutable. In this sit- uation, an absence of any constraints (shortage of manpower or financial burdens, say) would enable the two departments to perfectly cooperate its activities, and all private information regarding the project may be credibly conveyed. However, in the presence of resource constraints, the informed department could misrepresent its information for higher states of the world, in order to induce the other to spend more resources on the project. Any information loss could then be viewed as a source of inefficiency in the project. Above results show that in order to improve informational efficiency, it may be in the interest of an informed party to either choose a partner with more aligned interests, or mitigate the burden of constraints imposed upon it by the organization 16 .
Why some countries are poorer than others is one of the most important questions in development economics. The current consensus seems to be that income differences cannot be explained purely by differences in capital and labour, but instead are accounted for to a large extent by differences in total factory productivity, or TFP (Caselli, 2005). At the same time, this difference in aggregate productivity is attributed in part at least to the misallocation of scarce resources. The idea is that mar- ket distortions are causing resources not to be allocated to the firms for which the marginal product is the highest (see for example Hsieh and Klenow (2007) or Restuccia and Rogerson (2013)). Therefore, the study of the constraints and distortions faced by firms in developing countries is key in understanding productivity and hence income differences. It is therefore unsurprising that this topic has sparked a vast literature which investigates how firms are affected by a numerous constraints and distortions in many different settings. The constraints and distor- tions highlighted by this literature range from credit constraints and distorting labour laws to weak institutions (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005, 2012). However, there is still not a clear consensus which factors are the most important in explaining misallocation. This thesis adds to this lit- erature by studying a related question, namely what mechanisms firms and other agents develop in order to (partially) overcome the constraints and distortions they face.
various areas. Skinner (1994) studies the stock market reaction to corporate earn- ings news. Defond and Zhang (2014) examine the bond market reaction to earning news. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) investigate the foreign ex- change market reaction to macroeconomic news. And Soroka (2006) and Barbara and Lanoue (1991) look into attitudes toward economic news and voting behaviour in politics. Secondly, the process behind the asymmetric responsiveness has been explored in both psychology and behavioural economics literature. In psychology, Ronis and Lipinski (1985) propose a possible explanation named perspective theory under which impressions are formed based on an expectation, or reference point. The reference point tends to be slightly positive on average due to generally mildly optimistic individuals, and this leads to a shift in perspective. Fiske (1980) suggests that cognitive weighting creates the asymmetry. Individuals give more attention to extreme information, which tends to be negative. Both perspective and cognitive weighting theories suggest that individuals have an average expectation of a rea- sonable state of economy, which leads to very negative reaction to mildly negative information. In behavioural economics, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose an alternative theory of choice under uncertainty called prospect theory. Under this theory, the value function is assigned to the gains and losses rather than to the final wealth, and its shape is normally concave for gains and convex for losses and the slope is generally larger for losses than for gains. The probabilities of the gains and losses are replaced by the decision weights. Except in the range of low probabili- ties, the decision weights are generally beneath the corresponding probabilities. As a result of the particular designs of the value and weighting functions, individuals react asymmetrically stronger to the negative information than to the good ones, as if they are loss-averse.
The work on fix-price equilibria, appropriately understood, reveals an evi- dent but important intuition: the theorems of classical welfare economics require that prices are the only signals that serve to coordinate economic activity; if, al- ternatively, other parameters such as perceived constraints on trades are allowed to play a role, than even simple Edgeworth-box economies can generate multiple equilibria where, typically, effective and notional demand diverge, and, evidently, Pareto optimality fails. This is indeed true in the construction of Chamley , where a Pareto optimal dynamic equilibrium exists and is selected exactly by not allowing individuals to consider constraints on their choices other than the budget constraint. As a consequence, it suffice for the government to select the efficient equilibrium, as is the case in Cooper and John  where Keynesian effects derive from strategic complementarities.
The purpose of the third paper presented in this Thesis is to apply the results of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis  to the more stylized framework used in environ- mental economics, in order to bring to the attention of environmental economists the more recent developments on market failure theory. This will require us to extend the original results to production economies, while adding much generality to the framework used, for instance, by Sandmo. Importantly, we will also study the case of externalities in an OLG with heterogeneous agents, setting, extending and applying the results of Carvajal and Polemarchakis . We present a benchmark model of an infinite-horizon production economy where production activities generate pollution. After solving for the competitive equilibrium, we show that as in all economies with externalities, the equilibrium is Pareto inefficient. We then focus on the design of the optimal fiscal pol- icy for the implementation of the first-best. We find that a mix of tax on capital and labor, combined with a subsidy on afforestation and lump-sum transfers implement the first-best allocation. The next step is to extend this model to allow for heterogeneous agents and an OLG setup. In such a framework, the lack of information makes the decentralization of the first best infeasible, an argument which has been often used by supporters of no intervention. However, the real question one should ask is whether there are any Pareto improving policies at all. The focus is then on proving the constrained inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium which is to say that although the first best allocation cannot be achieved, a carefully designed environmental policy can still make everybody better off.
In addition, I find suggestive evidence that the CBT training did not a↵ect the amount of time allocated to managerial on non-managerial tasks. Using cross- sectional data from the second follow-up, I study changes in time use patterns six months after the treatment by aggregating activities into four categories. The first is essential daily functions that could be delegated to employees, such as providing aesthetic services (facials and haircuts) or selling clothes to customers directly. The second is human resources management, and includes training employees and su- pervising them while they are attending to customers or keeping records. The third is strategic planning and includes tasks as varied as revising the business plan or checking sales and profits. The fourth aggregates all other activities, including at- tending business fairs or training programs. I find no di↵erences between owners in the treatment and control groups in the amount of time they spend in each activity type.
My evidence does not allow me to pin down the specific mechanism through which autonomy enhances human capital, but there are rich psychological and sociological literatures that afford plausible mechanisms. The cross-cultural psy- chology literature documents that culture has an impact on psychological and personality traits (Markus and Kitayama 1991; Williams, Satterwhite, and Saiz, 2002; Schwartz, 2004; Heine and Ruby, 2010), 3 while an overwhelming body of research in psychology, sociology, management, and economics, demonstrate that personality traits have an impact on job performance (Barrick and Mount, 1991, 1993; Borghans et al., 2008; Ployhart and Moliterno, 2011). A particular per- sonality trait highlighted in this literature is proactivity (e.g. Griffin, Neal, and Parker, 2007). Proactivity amongst the workforce decreases the need for scarce managerial resources, and potentially mitigates issues related to incomplete con- tracts. Taking on additional tasks is one particular form of initiative found to be strongly positively related to high job performance (Morgeson, Delaney-Klinger, and Hemingway, 2005). Related to role breadth is role choice, or sorting into more or less productive occupations (Holland, 1997). There is also a significant relationship between workplace obedience and workers taking on more routine- based tasks (Campante and Chor, 2017). This evidence suggests a natural and plausible interpretation for the role of a culture that values autonomy in affecting human capital, in that an upbringing emphasizing autonomy is likely to forge more proactive individuals. Consistent with this channel, I find evidence that
A large literature has looked at how information is transmitted to legislators by lobby- ists (e.g. Potters & van Winden (1992), Austen-Smith & Wright (1992), Rasmusen (1993), Austen-Smith (1993), Lagerlof (1997)). The most closely related papers within that liter- ature study how informational lobbying is affected by information already held by policy makers. Felgenhauer (2013) shows that expert politicians are not always better at making decisions than non-experts in the presence of lobbyists. In his model, the expertise of the politician cannot affect the information provided by a single lobby and only has an effect when two lobbies compete. By allowing the information to be concealed, I show that even a single lobby can be induced to provide more information as the politician’s expertise increases. Cotton & Dellis (2016) show that informational lobbying can be detrimental if more information provided by lobbyists shifts the focus of a policy maker towards less important issues and thus reduces the information she collects. This substitution across the two sources of information relies on the existence of multiple policies and the limited capacity of the policy maker to act on these different policies. Substitution arises in my model even with one policy dimension because information can be confidential, so that the policy maker’s choice of information affects the beliefs of lobbyists and the amount of evidence they want to provide. Finally, in Ellis & Groll (2017), the trade-off between acquiring costly information in-house or relying on that provided by lobbyists comes from the difference in resource constraints of these two sources. Information is costless in my model and the interaction between the two types of information relies on whether that information is made public or not. 7 Another closely related paper, Cotton & Li (2018), studies the effect of internal information on monetary lobbying. They show that because a better informed politician might be harder to sway through contributions, politicians might prefer to remain uninformed or to reduce the informativeness of the signals they obtain. While they share some of the implications of this paper, they focus on the effect of internal information on monetary contributions rather than on information provision. Since influence can take both forms, this paper is complementary to theirs. With in- formational lobbying, additional information from the politician can be detrimental even when the politician wants to choose the socially optimal policy rather than to maximise contributions.