implemented in various sectors, with key target focus in areas such as reducing the demand for coal, setting up de-nitrification facilities, shifting away from obsolete industry capacity as well as promoting clean energy consumption (Chen, 2014). Natural gas being a relatively clean fossil fuel, offer an appropriate alternative to fill the gap, thus potentially affecting future gas demand. In more developed regions, such as the Jing-Jin-Ji (Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei), Yangtze River Delta and Peer River Delta, a mix of scaling down coal fired power plants, restrictions on new coal fired generation capacity, phasing out of small coal boilers and speeding up of coal-to-gas conversion programs are seen (Chen, 2014). In Jing-Jin-Ji and Shandong, the target to reduce coal demand by 85 million tonnes by 2017 is equivalent to adding an approximate 50bcm to the country’s gas demand. When coupled with the actions of other provinces in containing and reducing coal consumption, the aggregated effect on additional gas demand is expected to be significant.
Outlooks, projections, goals, targets, descriptions of strategic plans and objectives, and other statements of future events or conditions in this release are forward-looking statements. Actual future results, including financial and operating performance; the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on results; planned capital and cash operating expense reductions and ability to meet or exceed announced reduction objectives; total capital expenditures and mix; cash flow, dividend and shareholder returns; business and project plans, timing, costs and capacities; resource recoveries and production rates; accounting and financial reporting effects resulting from market developments and ExxonMobil’s responsive actions, including potential impairment charges resulting from any significant changes in current development plan strategy or divestments plans; and the impact of new technologies, including to increase capital efficiency and production and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and intensity, could differ materially due to a number of factors. These include global or regional changes in the supply and demand for oil, natural gas, petrochemicals, and feedstocks and other market conditions that impact prices and differentials; the outcome of government policies and actions, including actions taken to address COVID-19 and to maintain the functioning of national and global economies and markets; the impact of company actions to protect the health and safety of employees, vendors, customers, and communities; actions of competitors and commercial counterparties; the ability to access short- and long-term debt markets on a timely and affordable basis; the severity, length and ultimate impact of COVID-19 on people and economies; reservoir performance; the outcome of exploration projects and timely completion of development and construction projects; changes
Outlooks, projections, goals, targets, descriptions of strategic plans and objectives, and other statements of future events or conditions in this release are forward-looking statements. Actual future results, including business and project plans, capacities, costs, and timing; resource recoveries and production rates; and the impact of new technologies, including to increase capital efficiency and production and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, could differ materially due to a number of factors. These include global or regional changes in supply and demand for oil, gas, and petrochemicals and other market conditions that impact prices and differentials; reservoir performance; the outcome of exploration projects and timely completion of development and construction projects; the impact of fiscal and commercial terms and the outcome of commercial negotiations or acquisitions; changes in law, taxes, or regulation including environmental regulations, and timely granting of governmental permits; war, trade relations, shipping blockades or harassment, and other political or security disturbances; opportunities for and regulatory approval of potential investments or divestments; the actions of competitors; the capture of efficiencies between business lines; unforeseen technical or operating difficulties; unexpected technological developments; the ability to bring new technologies to commercial scale on a cost-competitive basis, including large-scale hydraulic fracturing projects; general economic conditions including the occurrence and duration of economic recessions; the results of research programs; and other factors discussed under the heading Factors Affecting Future Results on the Investors page of our website at www.exxonmobil.com and in Item 1A of ExxonMobil’s 2018 Form 10- K. We assume no duty to update these statements as of any future date.
channels through which China has (and would continue to) impinged upon the global economy. The former would affect other economies by way of changes in terms-of-trade (TOT), while the financial channel can have a wider impact. As China is still a large exporter of labor-intensive light manufactures, the world market prices of this category of products have softened because it became the price setter for this category of tradable goods. The developing economies that were labor-abundant like China and exported labor-intensive light manufactures, and competed against Chinese exports in the third-country markets, fond that their TOT turned against them. This country group suffered due to intense competition from China. In an extreme situation, China’s competitive pressure could even create a price deflation in these countries. Often the same logic is extended further, resulting in fears of extreme deterioration in the TOT for this group of developing countries. It is even argued that competition from China may completely eliminate labor-intensive products of the other developing economies from the global markets, for sure a despondent scenario. This kind of thinking led to some analysts arguing that competitive pressure from China was partly responsible for triggering the Asian crisis of 1997-98 (Parker and Lee, 2000; Loungani, 2000). Conversely, this trend has benefited some developing economies that are net importers of labor-intensive manufactures. These developing economies would benefit from China’s competitive pricing and the resulting improvement in their TOT.
In this research, we examine the popularity of mobile applications across dif- ferent categories by using the measures of monthly active users (MAUs) of each app. It is the authors’ intention to inspect the key characteristics of mo- bile apps and the relationship those characteristics have with market share and growth rate in global markets. The ease of use of mobile apps leads to a subsequent impact on the global users’ mobile behavior in daily life. Mobile apps have flooded the market, however, the acceptance and use of individual apps relies on a combination of the preference of users and the operational strategies employed by app developers. Based on secondary data collected from multiple sources including both publications and online data, the globalmarket growth of mobile apps including China (the world’s largest market of mobile apps) has shown a correlation between apps’ market share and the us- ers’ mobile behavior based on messaging, networking, shopping, video watching, and gaming. This research categorizes users’ mobile behavior in terms of age groups and time spent on certain mobile apps. The objective of this investigation is better understanding of the dominance of leading mobile apps and the future trend of mobile apps designed for the globalmarket.
Estimation results based on the regression equation above is summarized in Table 1. Results indicate that ISE100 index movements have significant positive impact on the share prices of selected Energy companies. High R 2 gives strong evidence with regard to the role of market index on determining the fluctuations in the energy company’s stock prices. However, no relationship has been detected between Stock Returns of the Energy companies and global oil and gas price movements supporting the single index model to some extent.
Outlooks, projections, goals, targets, descriptions of strategic plans and objectives, and other statements of future events or conditions in this release are forward-looking statements. Actual future results, including business and project plans, capacities, costs, and timing; resource recoveries and production rates; and the impact of new technologies, including to increase capital efficiency and production and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, could differ materially due to a number of factors. These include global or regional changes in supply and demand for oil, gas, and petrochemicals and other market conditions that impact prices and differentials; reservoir performance; the outcome of exploration projects and timely completion of development and construction projects; the impact of fiscal and commercial terms and the outcome of commercial negotiations or acquisitions; changes in law, taxes, or regulation including environmental regulations, and timely granting of governmental permits; war, shipping blockades or harassment, and other political or security disturbances; the actions of competitors; the capture of efficiencies between business lines; unforeseen technical or operating difficulties; unexpected technological developments; the ability to bring new technologies to commercial scale on a cost-competitive basis, including large-scale hydraulic fracturing projects; general economic conditions including the occurrence and duration of economic recessions; the results of research programs; and other factors discussed under the heading Factors Affecting Future Results on the Investors page of our website at www.exxonmobil.com and in Item 1A of ExxonMobil’s 2018 Form 10-K. We assume no duty to update these statements as of any future date.
A typical shale gas play will contain a number of “sweet spots”, in which methane is more concentrated. Typically, wells will be drilled in the most economic “sweet spots” first [30,31], but sources differ on the future productivity of shale gas plays, particularly as productivity from wells in “sweet spots” declines . (It should be noted that Inman’s article has been criticised by the EIA for the simplicity of its analysis, its perceived mis-portrayal of the relationship between the EIA and the University of Texas, and its presentation of EIA’s scenarios as forecasts . However, the magnitude of difference between scenarios proposed by the EIA and projections presented by University of Texas remains significant.) Hughes suggests that the economic investment currently required to build a higher number of wells to replace declining supply from the most productive wells is not being, and will not be, recuperated at current gas prices . Furthermore, Hughes asserts that drop-off rates of supply from shale gas wells assumed by many in the industry are unrealistically, low and lead to overestimates of ultimate recoveries and economic performance . In a later report, Hughes forecasts “most likely” total production from major shale plays to be approximately two thirds of that projected by the EIA up to 2040 . Other commentators have contested this interpretation, taking recent history of shale gas production in the USA as evidence that future estimates are realistic .
other emerging markets have been expanding rapidly and will continue to be key growth drivers in the near future. Despite some recent moderations alongside dwindling import demand in the advanced economies, most Asian economies still possess solid fundamentals and healthy fiscal positions. In particular, the growth and development of mainland China continue to be impressive. No longer simply the world’s factory, China is also investing heavily to stimulate domestic demand for the sake of sustainable growth over the longer term. China has signalled its intention to relax its tight control of its currency and to internationalise the renminbi. We are seeing a sustained opening up of its economy. There are ample investment opportunities embedded in the vibrant Asian economies, and investors worldwide are closely watching Asia, particularly China.
There is a CNH market which allows free conversion between renminbi and foreign currencies, both spot and forward. With the channels linking the onshore market developed, a plethora of offshore renminbi asset market has sprung up, with products such as renminbi bonds, fixed income funds, insurance, as well as listed securities and derivatives. In June 2013, the Treasury Markets Association of Hong Kong launched the CNH Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate fixing, which supports the growth of the renminbi market by providing a benchmark for the pricing of loan facilities and facilitates the development of a variety of renminbi interest rate products.
The study provides an overview of China’s evolution towards the status of pole of economic power. In this respect, an incursion into the historical past of this state in order to explain its current behaviour has been made. Factors that contributed to the launching of modernization and democratization process have been identified. There has also been determined the position of this state in the world's centres of power through the analysis of economic indicators such as GDP, unemployment rate, imports and exports or foreign exchange reserves. The study is divided into three parts, each of them offering the necessary support to identify premises, factors and effects of China's transition to a market economy. The first part of the study describes the Chinese manner of approaching the international relations in the nineteenth century. The second part refers to China's transition from imperialism to globalChina, and the third part quantifies the effects of this transition through the indicators that were took into consideration.
Almost everybody today seems to be discussing about the US Recessionary trend and its impact on emerging countries, more particularly India Economists, Industrialists and the common man on the streets seem to have been horrified by the very thought of recession in India and that too due to US. Decreasing industrial production, inflation, decreasing job opportunities, cost cutting, reducing purchasing power parity, et al are the aspects discussed among them through every possible mode like articles, talks & walks and places like washrooms, canteens, etc. In this paper we will be looking on these important points: The main reason of crisis in India is Globalization. The Indian banking system has had no direct exposure to the sub-prime mortgage assets or to the failed institutions. Our banks continue to remain safe and healthy. India's recent growth has been driven predominantly by domestic consumption and domestic investment. The contagion of the crisis has spread to India through all the channels –the financial channel, the real channel, and importantly, as happens in all financial crises, the confidence channel. The failure of Lehman Brothers in mid-September was followed in quick succession by several other large financial institutions coming under severe stress. This made financial markets around the world uncertain and unsettled. This contagion, spread to emerging economies, and to India too. There is evidence of economic activity slowing down. Real GDP growth has moderated in the first half of 2008/09 and the projected GDP for 2010 is 7.7%. For the first time in seven years, exports have declined in absolute terms for three months in a row during October-December 2008. The index of industrial production has shown negative growth for two recent months and investment demand is decelerating. All these factors suggest that growth moderation may be steeper and more extended than earlier projected. In addressing the fall out of the crisis, India has several advantages like Headline Inflation. The decline in global crude prices and naphtha prices will reduce the size of subsidies to oil and fertilizer companies, opening up fiscal space for infrastructure spending.
Based on the ESC theory, build-up of a new distributor also requires big sunk costs, such as inventory, warehousing, logistics, IT networking, financial capital, HRM, and etc. In emerging markets, the market growth will be accompanied by a competitive escalation in distributors’ features, so the number of distributors delivered in the specific cities for some brands may change dramatically. Investment in 3C channel may constitute an important part as essential as sunk cost for generating brand sales. The causal relationship between brand share and distribution (Reibstein and Farris, 1995; Wilbur and Farris, 2014) could shed light on our following statistical model building. While modeling distribution intensity, market entry strategies should be referred to as both geographic penetration and market concentration in channel market structure. As far as the penetration of brand levels is concerned, we do not only focus on whether the extent of a large portion of the unit sales volume is created by a small portion of channels, but also propose that the concentration of distribution intensity involved in a product category, which is to measure whether the higher the magnitude of distribution intensity becomes distributed-clustering intermediaries in the specific sites.
Facebook’s business model focuses on tools that allow businesses to reach new and existing customers through Pages and advertising. These tools help businesses – from the least technical to the most – grow their sales, and ultimately employ more people. Marketing effects, worth an estimated $148bn, form the largest share of the economic impact facilitated by Facebook through third parties in 2014. In addition, Facebook developer tools that power and enhance 3rd party apps enabled an estimated $29bn of economic impact. The purchases of mobile devices and connectivity services motivated by Facebook contributed an estimated $50bn of economic impact. Internet‑based businesses such as Facebook facilitate broader economic activity across a series of economic agents. Such broad impact is far greater than these businesses’ own size: in 2014 Facebook – a company with an approximately $8bn cost base – enabled global economic impact of $227bn.
clear masses and binding energies was explored in Ref.  and we showed the robustness of our conclusions under various astrophysical conditions in Refs. [7, 8]. We have since fused the e ﬀ orts of these separate approaches by ex- ploring how uncertainties in unmeasured nuclear masses propagate to all other quantities [9, 10]. By combining the abundance patterns of individual sensitivity studies we were able to approximate error bars on the r process and concluded that root-mean-squared (rms) errors of global mass models should be around 100 keV in order to min- imize uncertainties in the predictions of r-process abun- dances.
There are also many different views on the causes of the crisis, complex financial innovations that made concerted efforts to conceal default risks, weak oversight and regulatory functions and possibly sheer greed manifested blind pursuit of profit and utter disregard for the underlying risks. Some analysts have traced the cause of the global financial crisis to the regime of easy credit in the United State which started during the period of Alan Greenspan; he was vehemently opposed to any regulation of financial instruments known as derivative. This action allowed huge amounts of easy credit backed money to be injected into the financial system and help create sustainable economic boom. However, as long as capital flows and credit expansion grew unchecked, lending expectedly spilt over from financing safe and productive investments to risky and speculative assets, reckless financial innovation leverage, short selling, unsecured credit systems and swaps. At first, it was argued that it has no effect in Nigeria’s capital market. But that initial response was, to put it mildly naive. The country’s dependence on the export sector is very significant: 99% of foreign earnings and 85% of local revenues are directly derived from activities related to export of a single commodity, which is at the center of the current financial crisis: oil. It is estimated that 58.4% of Nigeria’s export are United States’ bound and up to 25% is of Europe zone. 67% of our non-oil exports go to Western Europe, 20% to Asia while ECOWAS accounted for only 11% in 2007. The stock of our foreign earning reserves is kept in European capitals markets where financial markets have tumbled and banks distressed. How can anyone think we are insulated or spared? International financial crises which affect trade and investment flows are Article History:
of RRR and R, it is interesting to find out that the SHIBOR market behaviors are dramatically different between raising times and lowering times of RRR and R. As shown in this table, which is sorted in descending order of the σ , dates where RRR and(or) R are raised ( + ) have the highest σ and spread and on the contrary, dates where RRR and(or) R are lowered ( − ) have the lowest σ and spread . The dates combining all raising and lowering dates are in the middle of the table. In other words, the SHIBOR market also reacts differently to the expectation for a pending monetary policy change. SHIBOR normally shows a larger fluctuation on the raising announcing dates and effective dates while showing a relatively smaller fluctuation on the lowering dates. One reason for this is that for a raising of RRR through which the PBC demands commercial banks to make more reserved money is definitely negative news for banks and the monetary market, with less liquidity and less available money for the market, all banking systems and the economic system will experience a tightened situation and market. Normally, a 50 basis point, i.e. 0.5% is going to absorb about 300 billion RMB or about 45 billion dollars. RRR is a very effective monetary tool used by the PBC in order to control the money supply in the Chinese monetary market. The raising of the benchmark interest rate R by the PBC is also a negative market signal for the market because the raising of R will attract and lock more money from the market back into the bank accounts and make the borrowing from commercial banks more costly. This makes it a useful tool to tighten the money supply and discourage investments and spending. It is also negative news for the monetary market when this is used to tackle the raising pressure of prices when the market is bullish and in great need of money supply for greater investment. On the contrary, a lowering RRR or R can bring more liquidity to the money supply, which provides more available and cheaper money to the market and eventually encourages more spending as well as stimulating aggressive investment in the economy. In other words, this lowering of RRR or R is a positive monetary policy change to the market. From the different levels of fluctuations for the negative and positive changes brought about by the raising or lowering RRR and R, this is very consistent with the effect that negative bad expectations normally bring a larger impact to the market than the positive good expectations. This result from the Chinese SHIBOR market agrees with the findings in the American market reacting to the FOMC news in studies in Refs. [11,12,35], that positive surprises tend to bring much higher volatility to the market than negative surprises.
Despite China’s general favorability around the world and its appeal to the young, half or more of those surveyed in 26 of 38 nations think that China acts unilaterally in international affairs. This concern about Beijing’s failure to consider other countries’ interests when making foreign policy decisions is particularly strong in the Asia-Pacific – in Japan (89%), South Korea (79%) and Australia (79%) – and in Europe – in Spain (85%), Italy (83%), France (83%) and Britain (82%). About half or more of those in the seven Middle Eastern nations surveyed also think China acts unilaterally. This includes 79% of Israelis, 71% of Jordanians and 68% of Turks. There is relatively less concern about this issue in the U.S. (60%). African nations – in particular strong majorities in Kenya (77%), Nigeria (70%), South Africa (67%) and Senegal (62%) – believe Beijing does consider their interests when making foreign policy decisions.
Ocean emissions are also mapped according to biogenic CO emissions from the ocean, assuming a global annual sum of 3000 Mgy −1 of Hg to be emitted from the ocean. A sim- ilar approach has been chosen for Hg emissions due to bio- genic activities and emissions from soils, with an annual sum of 1669 Mgy −1 , following Mason (2008). To take into ac- count not only biological activity, but also the dependence of mercury emission from former deposition, two thirds of the emissions from soils and vegetation was mapped accord- ing to regions with high deposition rates from a previous model run. The remaining third is solely dependent on veg- etational activity and hence mapped with the CO emission from the POET inventory as only one third of natural emis- sions are assumed to be free from anthropogenic influences. The sum of biogenic emissions and ocean emission is illus- trated in Fig. 3. Highest emissions are therefore found from the oceans, and a minimum over desert and polar regions. A more realistic representation of natural emission is required for global mercury modelling, which can be achieved ei- ther through sophisticated approaches of online calculation of mercury emissions dependent on soil, biomass and ocean water mercury content – data that is not globally available, or through improved mercury emission inventories, also in- cluding natural emissions and their temporal variations.