Soon, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 needed, in turn, to be adapted to the changing nature of armed conflicts. After the Second World War, non-international armed conflicts became more frequent. Some took the form of wars of national liberation. In those asymmetrical types of armed conflicts, guerrilla warfare became the method of choice for the weaker party. As a result, the principle of distinction turned out to be more difficult to comply with and civilians ended up being increasingly the object of attacks. To deal with these and other issues, a diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Applicable in Armed Conflicts convened by the Swiss government n 1974. 16
This article will discuss how economic relations between peoples and coun- tries have developed over time, giving rise to new challenges for the law. Much of international economic law has developed relatively recently in response to the growth in international economic activity. As the expansion of international economic activity increased contacts among people of different nations, this in- teraction had to be regulated by internationallaw. In the early years of the de- velopment of international economic law, the law dealt mainly with the nature of the legal relationship between a state and a foreign company engaged in the exploitation of its natural resources. It is in this context that this article will ex- amine the evolution of select key principles of international economic law. This article will also examine the definition of international economic law, the fun- damental principles of this body of law and developments in other areas of in- ternational law that have influenced the development of international economic law.
refraining from offering clear expressions of opinio juris regarding IHL endures. This is especially so with respect to cyber operations because such operations are typically classified. Thus, there will often be no visible State practice from which to draw even inferences of opinio juris. As non-State actors engage in activities that take the place of State expressions of opinio juris in the development and interpretation of IHL cyber norms, they may well be operating on partial or faulty information as to actual State practice. Whether to announce doctrinal details and clarifications, preserve flexibility through confirmation of ambiguity, or simply reject or confirm the existence of particular norms, such expressions of opinio juris manage important State legal and operational interests. Therefore, State legal agencies and agents, particularly Ministries and Departments of Defense, must be equipped, organized, and empowered to participate actively in the interpretation and development of IHL. States, and specially affected States in particular, must make responses to emerging IHL scholarship, investigations and jurisprudence a regular facet of their opinio juris. Reinvigorating opinio juris would do more than satisfy internationallaw sovereigntists. It would foster the restoration of the pluralistic IHL dialogue that formerly tested, updated, and enriched the balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations that necessarily underpins IHL.
DOI: 10.4236/oalib.1104107 2 Open Access Library Journal gious diversity of the human element that composes these States, the terrorist threat, as well as economic and technological development, underpin and imply an increase in the destructive power of armed conflicts, a cruel and sad reality of the history of humanity. Allied to this fact, the proportion of victims involved in conflicts, whether combatants, ex-combatants, or the civilian population, reached alarming levels in the late twentieth century. Armed conflicts of the twentieth century caused about 90 million fatalities . It is true, however, that the nature of conflicts has been changing since the end of the Cold War, with a progressive decrease in fatalities. If the two Great Wars victimized about 70 mil- lion people, the current conflicts are increasing and numerous, amount to around 3 million . However, in the balance, injuries, mutilations, displace- ments and suffering of people, destruction of the environment and of goods shock the whole world.
Despite the scale and spread of the WannaCry malware, data was re- accessible on most of the affected computers within a few days because of the rapid development and subsequent availability of software patches to decrypt the data. It is not hard to imagine a global, collective sigh of relief that this operation, and others like it, were not more damaging in their ef- fects. One key reason for the relatively small amount of permanent damage was that cybersecurity measures surrounding critical infrastructure in several countries was sufficiently current and robust to prevent the malware’s crip- pling encryption. Here, I do not mean to imply that National Health Service hospitals in the United Kingdom, where data encrypted by the malware was rendered inaccessible for days, do not constitute critical infrastructure. The point I am trying to make is that despite the global reach of the malware, the damage was not as severe as it might have otherwise have been. That fact, however, does not obviate the reality that the virulence of WannaCry and
Under internationalhumanitarianlaw it is prohibited to make the object of attack a person that has surrendered. This article explores the circumstances in which the act of surrender is effective under internationalhumanitarianlaw and examines in particular how surrender can be achieved in practical terms during land warfare in the context of international and non-international armed conflict. First, this article situates surrender within its broader historical and theoretical setting, tracing its legal development as a rule of conventional and customary internationalhumanitarianlaw and arguing that its crystallisation as a law of war derives from the lack of military necessity to directly target persons that have placed themselves outside of armed conflict and that such conduct is unacceptable from a humanitarian perspective. Second, after a careful examination of state practice, this article proposes a three-stage test for determining whether persons have surrendered under internationalhumanitarianlaw: 1) have persons attempting to surrender engaged in a positive act which clearly reveals that they no longer intend to participate in hostilities? 2) is it reasonable in the circumstances prevailing at the time for the opposing force to discern the offer of surrender? and 3) have surrendered persons unconditionally submitted to the authority of their captor?
First, IHL is not a single, coherent body of law. It had no original designer who thought everything through and tied its loose strands together. Rather, like internationallaw generally, IHL is written on a palimpsest, with layers building upon layers and the new replacing the old, but rarely, if ever, doing so completely. Thus, the Hague law regulating the conduct of hostilities that we still apply today was embedded in the then-customary framework in which ‘war’ was the operative legal concept, rigidly opposed to peace. The various waves of Geneva law then built upon that, with the 1949 Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols in particular redefining the thresholds of IHL’s applicability. And we can then add to this mix the judicial gloss of these thresholds, set out mainly by international criminal courts and tribunals, the developments of customary law that they precipitated, and further developments in state practice in the post-9/11 global arena.
In the elaborate fictional land of the Batari people, an armed conflict is being fought between state armed forces and the Batari Liberation Army fighters. Members of the Batari civilian population are caught in between, and they are in urgent need of life-saving humanitarian services as well as protection from the ongoing violence. It is into this context that the CAMPO trainees are plunged, tasked with designing and implementing an international response to the unfolding crisis. Initially, the trainees are arranged into ‘mixed’ groups of international actors; each group contains a police officer, a peacekeeper, a human rights officer and so on. The groups are tasked with identifying who is a civilian in the land of Batari. Remarks on the haziness of the civilian category fly around the room, as trainees struggle in earnest to come to a consensus. In an earlier training session, the CAMPO trainees have learned that ‘It’s very rough to say “civilians”’, and that the civilian is ‘not that easy to describe’. Now, they wonder: Is it only the members of the local Batari population who are truly civilians under internationallaw? What about individuals belonging to the non-Batari population who also reside in the area? Might some of the Batari Liberation Army fighters who do not carry weapons be civilians? To cope with this complexity, one group establishes different compartments in the civilian category. They differentiate unarmed liberation fighters from members of the local population, labelling them as different kinds of civilians. The other groups mostly arrive at indeterminate answers to this question. At the outset of the next exercise, the CAMPO trainer instructs trainees to leave their ‘mixed’ groups behind and gather in what he jokingly refers to as their ‘single ethnicities’. He tells them to sort themselves into four groups representing four possible categories of international actor: Group 1: humanitarian and development; Group 2: civilian; Group 3: military; and Group 4: police. The civilian group, the CAMPO trainer explains, includes international civilian actors who are ‘political and diplomatic and everything’. Everything, evidently, except for humanitarian (or development) actors. 483 After
Protocols I and II are international treaties that supplement the Geneva Conventions of 1949. They significantly improve the legal protection covering civilians and the wounded, and - for the first time - lay down detailed humanitarian rules that apply in civil wars. In 1977, Protocols I and II were added to the Conventions of 1949. Protocol I increased protections for civilians, military workers and journalists during international armed conflicts. It also banned the use of “weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering,” or cause “widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.”
As early as in 1950s ICRC identified some new developments of means of war- fare, i.e., landmine, atomic, chemical and bacteriological weapons, which had not been covered by the GCs (Maresca & Maslen, 2000). The ICRC was ex- tremely concerned for the development of these new weapons. The Board of Governors, therefore, in 1954, asked ICRC to propose a text to the next “Inter- national Conference of the Red Cross” with a view to protecting the civilians from the dangers of the newly developed weapons. Accordingly, ICRC prepared the draft rules named “Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War” with the help of experts. But it did not come into effect (“Draft Rules” ICRC, 1956). This “Draft Rules for the Limita- tion of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War” was published in 1956 and has become an important document of IHL for the pro- tection of civilians from the dangers of landmines, atomic, chemical and bacteri- ological warfare (Terry & Dieter, 2010: p. 16).
From this dictum it may be concluded that international human rights law and internationalhumanitarianlaw are coextensive. An individual's right to life is protected even during hostilities. However, during an armed conflict, the lex specialis of LOAC is engaged and the permissibility of the loss of life must be assessed against that legal regime. While the ICJ was referring to the threat or use of nuclear weapons, this conclusion is equally applicable to targeted killings. Unless IHL is engaged, the deprivation of life caused by a targeted killing will be arbitrary and impermissible. However, as indicated by the ICJ, there must be an armed conflict before IHL can apply. Thus, as a preliminary issue, the legality of targeted killings will depend on the existence of an armed conflict. The judiciary of the two states that acknowledge using targeted killing, Israel and the United States (“U.S.”),  have both determined that their respective nations are engaged in armed conflicts. The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that Israel is engaged in an
Women have played a crucial role in a conflict scenario. Sometimes as participant and most of the time as victims, women are the sole bearers of the devastating effects of a conflict situation. Before the occurrence of World War I, there wasn’t any requirement to create special laws to protect the women sect as their participation was in majority during wars. Post World War 1, a need for protection of women, was felt and this resulted into creation of separate laws for the protection of women in armed conflict under InternationalHumanitarian laws. This did not mean that women lacked any protection earlier. Since the creation of the Internationalhumanitarianlaw, the women had the same general legal protection as men. If they were wounded, they were protected by the provisions of the 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field; if they became prisoners of war, they benefited from the Regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 on the Laws and Customs of War on Land.
164. U.S. L AW OF W AR M ANUAL , supra note 10, § 11.4 (citing J ULIUS S TONE , L EGAL C ONTROLS OF I NTERNATIONAL C ONFLICT 694 (1954)) (emphasis added); see also Charles Garraway, Occupation Responsibilities and Constraints, in T HE L EGITIMATE U SE OF M ILITARY F ORCE 263, 278 (Howard M. Hensel ed., 2008); Hans-Peter Gasser & Knut Dörmann, Pro- tection of the Civilian Population, in T HE H ANDBOOK OF I NTERNATIONAL H UMANITARIAN L AW 231, 266 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013). However, the law of occupation evolved so that that today it comprises obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes, which are relevant for the international community as a whole and all the States parties to the Geneva Conven- tions. See Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 13, ¶¶ 155, 157; L ONGOBARDO , supra note 3, at 84–86.
In short, the US drone program remains largely beyond the reach of any effective legal or judicial oversight. One suggestion to remedy this is the establishment of a Congressional Committee to conduct post-strike reviews, although this writer is of the opinion that such reviews could better be undertaken, and the appearance of political impartiality preserved, by an independent tribunal(s) comprised of senior members of the judiciary, assisted by independent counsel and advised by international lawyers and various relevant NGOs. As to the possibility of US targeting practices being the subject of contentious inter-state litigation before the ICJ, this writer does not hold this to be a realistic prospect. Substantive issues aside, the pertinent consideration is that of jurisdiction, and it must be borne in mind that the jurisdiction of the ICJ is fundamentally based on state consent. 17 It is therefore doubtful that the US would consent to being the respondent state in such litigation, 18 and it is highly doubtful that the US would make any declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ to determine the legality of US drone strikes in any such inter-state litigation. 19 In addition, such litigation would have to be commenced by one or a combination of the key target states, and it is highly unlikely that any of these states would be minded to initiate proceedings against the US, given the evident degree of cooperation between the US and these states in the execution of drone strikes in their territories. It seems more probable, at least to this writer, that any recourse to the ICJ will be at the behest of one of the UN organs, such as the General Assembly, requesting an Advisory Opinion on the legality of US drone strikes. It is unlikely that such a request will emanate from the Security Council, on account of the US’s power of veto. Such a request is more likely to come from the General Assembly, on the basis of a simple majority vote and where the US has no power of veto to block such a request. Although such an opinion from the ICJ would certainly lend clarity to the complex legal issues surrounding the US drone programs, the non-binding nature of the opinion may be of limited value in