The WTO Secretariat provided a compilation of the different proposals from WTO- member countries for reforming the TRQ system (WTO, 2004). Most of these papers contained the objectives and proposals of each, also the concerns of the Member countries. The United States, for example, proposed that all tariff-ratequotas should be subjected to “substantial increases through progressive implementation of annual commitments over a fixed period” and that “disciplines to improve the functioning of TRQs, including specific mechanisms that trigger when tariffrate quota fill remains below a fixed level” should be established (WTO, 2000b). The ASEAN proposal called for a clarification of the continuation of TRQs, and if this is so, non- discriminatory allocation and administration of tariffquotas must be ensured (WTO, 2000c). The Cairns Group proposal was of a similar nature with the US and they called for “substantial tariff quota volume expansion consistent with the levels which would have been required if the Uruguay Round reform process had continued at the same pace” (WTO, 2000d). The European Community has proposed that a set of rules and disciplines should be defined to increase the transparency, the reliability and the security of the management of TRQs such that the
However scholars and practitioners of international development assistance are more circumspect in declaring that education reforms – including those of AusAID – have indeed been successful. One of the phenomenon that dampens declarations of success is ‘projectisation’. AusAID’s efforts in the Philippines manifests this when a pilot project to support national education reform becomes the most outstanding feature of AusAID’s education program (Cassity, 2010, p. 510). Projectisation becomes problematic when scaling up or sustaining reforms wanes when external support dries up or when the actors involved in the project no longer sustain the implementation after the completion of the project (Malana, 2009, p. 5). In the Philippine case, a more serious criticism of Australian ODA appears when despite AusAID’s policy discourse confirming its commitment to Paris and other processes what happens instead is that a large portion of its education program funds scholarships hinting that the Australian higher education lobby has an undeniable influence in ODA use and the nation’s international education policy (Cassity, 2010, p. 511). For the year 2013/14 for example, education received the second highest allotment (21%) in Australia’s aid framework. A closer examination of the breakdown of this education assistance reveals that for 2013/14, close to AUS$310 million of the AUS$978 million (or 33%) of the education budget went into the Australia Awards programme (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2015). The Awards programme essentially consists of tertiary scholarships at Australian higher education institutions. It is worth noting that for the year 2014/15, education will be receiving the highest allocation (23%) in Australia’s aid framework (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2015). This inquiry argues that the success of the aid programme embodied in STRIVE, as seen from the lens of rural Philippines is complex and needs a more nuanced perspective.
Purchasing: Regarding purchasing policies which are harmful to environment, like Styrofoam, CFC aerosols, oil based paints, fire extinguishers using halons, high phosphate detergents, plastics, and synthetic pesticides, frequent responses of the students and faculty of the three campuses of the University were on level 2 only which is rated “slightly implemented” while the purchasing policy which in general, favored the use or purchases of the following recycled, recyclable, non-toxic, biodegradable, rechargeable, refillable, second hand and reusable is “moderately implemented”, attributed by level 3 frequent responses of both faculty and students. However, some of the respondents in the three campuses indicated “moderately implemented” on item ‘regarding packaging is required from suppliers in bulk packaging and individual packaging when buying in bulk’. Colleges favored the use of products which are not environment-friendly considering that their responses are “moderately implemented”. Generally, the extent of implementation of related aspects in terms of school policy is rated “moderately implemented” which means that the University has strengthened its implementation on this aspect as supported by all environmental policies of the university that were implemented even before 1992. Table 2 presents the summary distribution of the extent of implementation of environmental related aspects in terms of school policy in the three campuses of the University of Eastern Philippines.
Abstract— This study aimed to determine the of level of implementations of poverty alleviation programs in Isabela, Philippines. It includes the determination of social, infrastructure and economic development and implementation programs of Isabela, Philippines. The test of relationship between the perception of the respondents and the profile is conducted to find out the possible association between the type of respondents and the perception. The result of the test is useful in determining what particular recommendations and suggestions can be made for the kind of respondents. Study showed that the assessment noted that status of the implementation of Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), Social Housing Program and Farm-to-Market Roads (FMRs) in Isabela was generally implemented effectively. Accordingly, these implied that the implementation and commitment of the identified programs/projects had positive effects in the lives of the respondents and certainly gave them chance to improve their daily living and their children may attain better quality and secured life in the future. In addition, the findings of the study revealed that on the implementation of 4Ps, the four (4) LGUs had weak result of implementation on “Economic Resources”, substantial efforts could be done to improve the implementation of the program through consultation with the beneficiaries to identify what better and relevant option/s can be executed toward economic resources program; enrichment/reinforcement of the existing capacity/capability building provisions stated in their ELAs; improvement of the One-Barangay- One-Product (OBOP)/One-Town-One-Product (OTOP); strengthen collaboration with academic institutions in the locality; encourage membership in a cooperative; and build up partnership with agencies/NGOs.
The initial implementation of the K12 curriculum has raised some social concerns. In a paper written by John Mark Burila (2012), he cited some concerns of the community in the implementation of the K12 program like the readiness of the Philippine Government to undergo transitions such as the poverty in the Philippines, availability of technology, teachers training, and even the low salary of the workforce of the academe have been cited. In an online forum, Dr. Flor Lacanilao (2012) of the University of the Philippines Diliman, also presented some critiques on the K12 program where he based his arguments on the stand of Filipino scientists and non-scientists. According to Dr. Lacanilao, scientists do not agree with the
and to gradually eliminate exchange controls in order that competitive forces may be given free play in the economy; (d) a tariff policy aimed at minimizing the adverse effects of the elimination of exchange controls; (e) a fiscal policy that would generate increasing revenue and at the same time induce a greater and steadily growing volume of private productive investment; (f) a production policy that would promote diversification and a price policy that would not only ensure domestic price stability but also reduce if not entirely eliminate windfall profits in the import trade; (g) a commercial policy aimed at the expansion of overseas markets and the enlargement of the domestic market; and (h) a social development policy aimed at the development of skills, technology and research, health, education, labor, and social welfare facilities. The instrumental program called for an investment of P2 billion by the public sector and P3.5 billion by the private sector.
domestic markets where there had been no or very little imports at all before. At the same time, it was to be avoided to cut the already existing access (current access) to the national markets through the implementation of the above mentioned goals. A fundamental part of these efforts was the transformation of all NTB into tariffs and taxes, a process called tariffication (JOSLING, TANGERMANN, WARLEY 1996). The current protection should become more transparent and should constitute a basis for further liberalization efforts. It was also expected that tariffs would be less destabilizing for world agricultural markets than nontariff barriers with a zero price transmission elasticity. The members agreed on a calculation method that should transform all nontariff measures into tariff protection. These tariffs became bound and should be reduced by 36 % on a simple (unweighted) average basis, with a minimum rate of 15 % for each tariff line. The procedure of tariffication was quite simple. Each member should measure the price differences between the internal market prices and world market prices during the basis period 1986-1988 on its own. The degrees of freedom in the calculation method were very high. The chosen reference basis period with high price gaps between internal and external market price and the chosen qualities for calculating were relatively "generous". 3 Economists speak in this context of "dirty tariffication" or "water in the tariff".
The project will deliver three outputs: (i) TFP Summer Institute established; (ii) Online intranet to support TFP Teaching Fellows developed; and (iii) Comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system established. (i) TFP Summer Institute Established. This output will support the establishment of the nine-week TFP Summer Institute, an intensive nine-week training program that includes instruction on progressive pedagogy, Philippines curriculum requirements and ways to maximize use of IT and the internet in the classroom. The TA will ﬁnance the research, development and implementation of the TFP Summer Institute, including setup costs, the training of trainers, the purchase of IT equipment, and the development of IT software for training. It will also ﬁnance the development and implementation of program and curriculum, including development of pre-service training modules in areas such as teaching as leadership, literacy and reading strategies, pedagogy, and subject speciﬁc curriculum content, as well as support the sourcing of expert resource consultants to train selected teachers.
rticle 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) mandates member countries of the World Trade Organization to negotiate and continue reform in agriculture. Even though farm policy reforms in developed countries have been along the lines of Uruguay Round rules, there has been widespread skepticism about the effectiveness of these reforms (Josling & Hathaway, 2004). Among other measures, tariffratequotas 1 (TRQs) were implemented as a policy instrument in the Uruguay Round, primarily to ensure “minimum” market access for sensitive agricultural products and to safeguard current access levels in the face of high tariffs (Mathews & Dupraz, 2002; Abbott, 2002). At present there are 1425 TRQs notified by member countries of the WTO (WTO, 2004a). Studies, however, indicate that the results of TRQ implementation are not what this number would lead us to expect, and nearly 28-30 percent of the domestic production in developed countries is protected by TRQs (OECD, 2003). This is a matter of concern for developing countries that are potentially large exporters of agricultural products; TRQs are, therefore, widely debated from a development perspective (Abbott & Paarlberg, 1998; Skully 1999, 2001; Boughner & de Gorter 1999; Abbott & Morse, 1999; Hermann, Mönnich & Kramb, 2000; Abbott, 2002; Mathews & Dupraz, 2002; Beghin & Aksoy, 2002; de Gorter & Hranaiova, 2003). There are three main reasons to question the feasibility of employing TRQs as a market access instrument. First, studies show that the choice of administrative method influences the extent of market access afforded to trading partners (Skully, 2001; Abbott, 2002; Panagariya, 2002; de Gorter & Hranaiova, 2003). Second, there has been a persistent low fill of TRQs at the multilateral level (WTO, 2002). Finally, quota rents are often associated with TRQ regimes; these generate costs for both the preferred and excluded countries and in turn distort trade flows of the partner countries (Binswanger & Lutz, 1999; Skully, 2001; Vanzetti et al., 2004). 2
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be a strong belief in a meritocratic system, where the best person gets the job regardless of their gender. Moreover, there is a general reluctance in Denmark to discuss gender quotas politically; if mentioned, people tend to get offended or angry at the possibility of introducing quotas. 1 In fact, in a recent debate about the replacement of a charter for more women in management (which we will explain in detail in the next paragraph), quotas were used as a derogatory term to describe how the country’s 1,200 largest companies were required to set a higher target figure for the gender composition in management if current target figures were met. 2 This requirement has, however, been abolished, and there are no sanctions if the target figures are not realised, as the only requirement remaining is for the companies to have the target figures (Larsen et al., 2015). Interestingly, despite the fact that Denmark has one of the lowest numbers of female top managers in the EU, the widespread public opinion is that Denmark is an equal society and that we are both gender and colour blind (Rennison, 2009; Muhr and Salem, 2013). Equality is therefore taken for granted as a Danish value that pierces through the welfare society (Holck and Muhr, 2017). In that light, the ghost of quotas may appear as a terrifying matter from another world, a spectre from a distant past threatening the egalitarian idyll. According to a recent representative survey by the Confederation of Danish Enterprise (2013), Danes believe that men, to a greater extent than women, want to be managers, while the tendency is for women to choose family life over careers. However, analyses measuring male and female middle managers’ actual career aspirations find no such difference (e.g. Diversity at Work, 2011). The first type of surveys, therefore, dismiss gender inequality in the labour market as merely being a question of men and women having inherently different priorities because of their gender, which is problematic to say the least, given that differences among individuals in either group are much larger than between women and men. They are also very indicative of the strong Danish belief in meritocracy, despite what other analyses might say (Roseberry and Roos, 2015: 57-86).
Several scholars argue that the implementation of gender quotas leads to a higher degree of women represented in national legislatures (Tripp & Kang, 2008; Messing-Mathie, 2011; Freidenvall, 2005). This seems evident, but it shows that gender quotas are not only implemented as a symbolic measure, but also have a real tangible effect. A larger percentage of women in parliament is thought to have a positive influence on politics and law-making, since research shows the increase of female policy makers negatively impacts corruption rates (Kumar Jha & Sarangi, 2018). Although other research opposes these results, attributing the lower rates of corruption to culture instead of gender (Debski, Jetter, Mösle, & Stadelmann, 2018), this is a widely shared belief that is often mentioned as one of the reasons behind the implementation of gender quotas (Towns, 2013). This reduction of corruption is part of the main reason why the implementation of gender quotas would lead to a process of democratization: Gender quotas will lead to more women in legislatures, which will lead to policies that better represent the population (Bush, 2011). This improves the quality of democracy. Mi Yung Yoon (2013) provides empirical evidence for this claim. She uses qualitative data, newspaper clippings and interviews that she conducted with Tanzanian members of parliament to show that gender quotas in Tanzania have had a positive influence on the country’s path towards democracy. It has helped broaden discourse in parliament and has ensured women’s issues are more prominently present in parliament. These results are corroborated by evidence from Niger and Uganda (Kang, 2013; Wang, 2013).
Dahlerup (2006) indicates that one type of quota (i.e. voluntary versus legal) may not be necessarily more successful at increasing female representation than the other. What appears to be important are the possible sanctions resulting from non-compliance and the actual opportunities available for quota implementation within a country. Even if women are nominated, are they in a position where the possibility of their being elected is real and tangible? Quotas can be implemented at any level of government, from federal to local. The actual implementation of quota systems is heavily dependent on the type of electoral system in place (Dahlerup 2006). Sanctions differ in terms of voluntary and legal quota non-
With the exception of the PNB, specialized government banks in the Philippines show the high loan-administration costs typical of government development banks in other countries. As discussed in a previous section, the low administration costs of PNB can partially explained by its large scale operations based on relatively large loans to agribusiness and agricultural trading enterprises. Agricultural loans appear far more costly to administer than non-agricultural loans among these specialized banks, whereas the differences among private banks depend on the type of private bank in question. Agricultural loans are more costly to administer than non-agricultural loan in rural banks, while the opposite is true for commercial banks.