This book is organized around a debatable premise; that it is useful to group to- gether the three very different types of property relations that comprise Federal intellec- tual propertylaw—trademark, copyright and patent. A chart that summarizes their main features is on the previous page. Obviously, trademarks over logos are very different from copyrights over songs or patents over “purified” gene sequences. The rules are different, the constitutional basis changes, the exceptions are different and there is variation in eve- rything from the length of time the right lasts to the behavior required to violate or trigger it. Why group them together then? The answer we will develop depends on a core simi- larity—the existence of a “good”—an invention, a creative work, a logo—that multiple people can use at once and that it is hard to exclude others from. (Economists refer to these as “public goods” though they have more technical definitions of what those are.) Lots of people can copy the song, the formula of the drug, or the name Dove for soap. But the approach in this book also depends on the differences between the goals of these three regimes and the rules they use to cabin and limit the right so as to achieve those goals. The idea is that one gains insight by comparing the strategies these very different legal regimes adopt. The proof of that pudding will be in the eating. Our readings will also deal with the claim that the term “intellectualproperty” actually causes more harm than good. This book is built around six perspectives. Some are introduced as separate chap- ters, while others are woven into the materials and the problems throughout the entire class. The first deals with the main rationales for (and against) intellectualproperty. The second focuses on the constitutional basis for, and limitations on, that property in the United States. The third is the substance of the course; the basic doctrinal details of trade- mark, copyright
Another significant public domain-related development is the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org. 17 U.S.C. § 105 makes clear that works of the United States government (such as the cases and statutes in this book) cannot be copyrighted. But what about works from state and local governments? In this case, the Supreme Court held that under the “government edicts” doctrine, the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (“OCGA”) – both the statutory text and the annotations beneath them – was not copyrightable. These annotations included categorized summaries of judicial and state attorney general opinions, lists of related law review articles, and editor’s notes about the origins of the statutory provisions. Because the OCGA was in the public domain, Public.Resource.Org, a nonprofit organization that provides public access to legal materials, was free to post it online. Here is an excerpt from the opinion.
The TTAB concluded that consumers were likely to believe that health care services and similarly marked printed materials come from the same source or are somehow connected with or sponsored by a common company. The TTAB recognized that, in the context of food products associated with restaurants, the Fed- eral Circuit requires “something more” than the fact that similar or identical marks are used. It asserted, though, that the something-more standard didn’t apply in this case.
the service is very popular also in sixty other coun- tries no one in those other countries is interested in that film. A key issue to determine if the service provider may be held liable with respect to the in- fringement of copyright in Denmark is the standard of diligence applicable to establish if the provider is aware of the infringement (or had knowledge of the activity or information in the terms of Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive). Additionally, under Ar- ticle 14, the limitation of liability does not prevent courts from ordering the intermediary to remove the infringing content. In this context the question may arise: Should the Danish court in such a case disre- gard Danish law (lex loci protectionis) implementing Article 14 of the e-Commerce Directive and apply the law of the centre of gravity to determine the re- levant standard of diligence applicable to that pro- vider with respect to the copyright infringement in Denmark? It can be noted that the service is “very popular” in Denmark and the service provider be- nefits from it (because in practice Denmark will be a relevant market for his advertising services) and it is not rare that users use the service to post cont- ent addressed to Danish Internet users. In cases such as this, it can be argued that the appropriate appro- ach would be to subject the liability of the interme- diary and the possibility to adopt measures against him referred to Denmark not to the law of the coun- try of the centre of gravity, but to Danish law (law of the country of protection) even if the service con- cerned is provided at a global level from the place where such centre of gravity is located.
completed without reference to any other material. However some of the questions deal with legal concepts and other matters that might benefit from some additional explanation. These notes have been prepared to help sellers to understand the information that is being requested. In some cases, examples of what might be included in the answer to the question are provided. Occasionally buyers may find the notes helpful. They are intended to be reference material rather than for use on every transaction.
Having in mind the abovementioned, it can be stated that the intellectualproperty rights have several basic functions. The first function is to stimulate the “production” of creations by providing a possibility of gaining legal monopoly on the economic exploitation of new intellectual creations, such as inventions, plant varieties, topographies of integrated circuits and copyrights. In such a way, contribution is given to the technical and cultural progress of a society. The second function is to reduce the information gap between the subjects which provide and the subjects which demand certain goods and services on the market, by securing an exclusive right for the utilization of distinctive signs (trademarks, geographical indications of origin and in- dustrial designs), which reduces transaction costs, stimulates investments into the quality of goods and services and contributes to the efficiency of the market. The third function is in the facilitation of the trans- action of rights for the use of intellectualproperty assets. The fourth function is the logical outcome of the previous one: intellectualproperty rights facilitate economic implementation of the protected intellectualproperty assets. However, in the cases when the right holder has no capacity or interest to directly utilize a certain intellectualproperty asset, he or she can assign or license that right to the subject which has the ca- pacity and the interest for doing it. In such a way, due to the legal protection of a non-material asset, an in- tellectual property asset finds its way to practical implementation.
Creating of intellectualproperty product takes time, effort and great commitment. It requires a lot of effort to protect it as well. In a democratic society the protection of copyright is one of its core values, and guarantees cultural heritage, scientific and technological achievement. This article trying to give clear understanding of intellectualproperty importance in Internet Age, while interpreting and analyzing the copyright and its related rights, as: Objects of law regulated by legal norms, which are relatively new. Moreover during applying the historical data trying to describe and give outlook to the world where the intellectual product has been very low known, comparing with the recognition and regulation of other institutes of civil law. To achieve the aforementioned purpose would be used the interpretation and analysis method of data collection as: Norms from International Conventions and Domestic Law, practical cases and other relative material to the article focus. My research findings are that the copyright provides the economic basis for the creation and distribution of musical works, literary, artistic, movies, computer programs and other forms of creative expression. Moreover it protects its holder and determines whether and how to copy, distribute, and transmit their works as well as it stimulates talents to create creative ideas and prompts businesses to invest in them.
UCL has many strengths, among them research excellence in a number of fields for which intellectualproperty and other regimes promoting innovation are particularly relevant. UCL is one of Europe's largest and most productive centres for biomedical science. The environment for clinical translation is exceptional offering unique opportunities for engagement between intellectualproperty lawyers and scientists at the leading-edge of research and knowledge transfer.
The class of Student Member shall consist of persons who are (1) students in good standing enrolled in a law school of the United States of America and having an interest in intellectualpropertylaw and/or (2) mentees actively engaged under the direction of a person qualified to be an Regular Member in assisting such Regular Member in his practice and who are in the course of qualifying for admission to the bar or registration to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office as an attorney or agent. Student Members shall not be entitled to vote or hold office, but shall be entitled otherwise to all the benefits of Regular Membership.
Although the grant of patents takes place at a centralised level – at the EPO – European patent litigation involving European patents (EPs) is actually undertaken on a largely national basis. 74 The reason is that EPs must be validated – and subsequently, litigated – within national jurisdictions. 75 National courts, therefore, have the ability to issue binding rulings concerning patent infringement within their national territories, and they also may consider questions of patent validity – although the EPO retains the final say on validity via its patent opposition service. 76 Nonetheless, it is not uncommon for national patent litigation to take place at the same time as parallel EPO opposition proceedings; and the lengthy backlog at the EPO means that national courts sometimes rule on questions of validity and infringement before the EPO Board of Appeals has reached a final decision regarding validity. 77 This has led in some cases to fragmentation of outcomes on validity and infringement across EU jurisdictions, something that impacts upon the single market and raises competition issues. 78
Information goods are difficult to produce and easy to reproduce. In other words, they are expensive to produce and least expensive or cost nothing to reproduce. The other important feature of Information good is the cost of distribution. It costs very little or nothing to distribute information goods. The distribution of information good has improved due to the invention of Internet and information highways revolution. Another important feature of information good is the high cost of production. Cost incurred in producing the information goods is very high. Unlike the manufacturing industry, it does not produce any tangible good. Due to the non-tangible nature of information goods many at times the cost incurred will remain unrecovered if it does not succeed in market. This in other words called as sunk cost. Another important feature of information good is the utility of these goods will be appreciated only if the user uses them. This concept is called as experience good. Users can appreciate the value of the good only after experiencing them. For an example, a reader can appreciate a book only after reading it, or a person can appreciate music only after listening to it, or a professional can appreciate the value of software only after running it. This is the reason why the books and journals give free access to a few pages, music stores give access to songs and software industries provide demo versions.
The conflict between IP Law and competition Law is less ‘unavoidable’ than it might seem. One reason for this is that the assignment of property rights handles the ‘reward’ and ‘disclosure’ effects discussed in part I by offering an expected reward to the rights-holder. In many cases, this promised reward will not in fact materialise, as the innovation fails to find a profitable market or is rapidly pre-empted by further advances. In other cases, though, the innovation might prove significantly more profitable for a longer period than was initially thought. When investing in innovation, inventors usually do not have a very good idea of where their efforts might lead them on this continuum from bad to good fortune. What matters, then, is the reward that they can reasonably expect to obtain on average. 29 This has two important consequences. Firstly, (intellectual) propertylaw can achieve its goals even if competition law limits the extent to which the rights-holder can benefit from the monopoly power that might be attached to her property rights. This can be achieved by granting stronger (i.e. longer and/or broader) property rights initially if the ex post restrictions imposed by competition law are expected to be strong on average. The only requirement for this approach to succeed is that competition Law does not essentially expropriate every right that results in some market power.
Competition law and IP laws shares similar goals of ensuring consumer welfare and promoting innovation. The TRIPS Agreement administered by the WTO which sets down some standards for many forms of intellectualproperty regulation as applied to Nations of other WTO Members. Therefore, competition law comes into play when the protected rights are used and exploited during the years of protection. Competition law purports to ensure that ex - post IPRs are enjoyed/exploited in reasonable manner or do not extend beyond the protection granted . Intersection of IP and Competition law is observed when there is an imbalance between the exclusivity rights accorded by IP law and anti – competitive practices that the competition law tries to protect, and therefore cases such as Ericson vs Micromax. Where on one hand, Ericsson attempted to enforce its Standard Essential Patents (SEPs), and Micromax on the other hand contended anti – competitive practice by Ericsson based on the nature of royalty practices that Ericsson tried to impose on the Defendant is just one among the growing number of examples where the interface between the two laws is strengthening. 
Against these considerations, this article frames the emerging field of fashion law and synthesizes its substance from an international perspective in order to raise the profile of fundamental areas in which the law and fashion intersect as well as identify key areas for future research. Part II examines the background on fashion law, initially focusing on its origins and then examining IP, traditionally the main area of the field. Additionally, the Article defines, frames, and justifies the emerging field of fashion law. Because an exhaustive analysis of the emerging trends in fashion law is beyond the scope of this Article, Part III only focuses on some of the most active areas to show the relevance and importance of the law in the world of fashion as well as indicates the need for further engagement by the academy, the legislature, and the judiciary. First, the Article explores deficiencies in current IP law, particularly how IP law may inhibit innovation and creativity. Second, the Article examines fashion’s impact on society, including the manner in which fundamental rights and health issues inextricably connect with the fashion industry. Third, the Article analyzes the impact of the fashion industry on labor and weaknesses in the law. Fourth, the Article finally probes the fashion industry’s relationship with environmental and corporate sustainability. Through such analysis, the Article illustrates the importance of the evolving field of fashion law to business and society as well as the rich research opportunities for legal scholars with a sense of sartorial curiosity.
Through this provision, the legislator has tried to reconcile two different points of view put forward by interested parties: on the one hand those who favour the inventor to be granted the exclusive right as a reward for his/her creative and inventive work; on the other hand those who hold the opinion that only the company should be entitled to protection, because the company has in fact hired the employee against a certain salary which – in most cases – already takes into consideration the possibility that the employee will achieve patentable inventions during the term of his employment. Moreover, it is argued that to a certain extent the company’s continuing existence may be dependent on the contents of its patent portfolio.
But, although the preposterous partiality of much pleading in IP cases, and of most public debate when yet greater rights are sought, would hardly lead one to realise it, the interesting literature on IP is already dominated by the realisation that the curtailing of IP rights by fair use exceptions, limitations of time and extent, de facto permission for wholesale violation, etc is essential to maintain any plausibility in the argument that granting those rights enhances welfare. L&P are merely placing these limitations at the heart of their account of the innovation argument. By focusing on partial aspects of the innovation argument and by registering all sorts of caveats about it, it appears that L&P are taking a distance from that argument, but, with respect, they are merely stating the argument in a less than scrupulous manner. They do not defend that argument outright, but they do basically maintain it, and actually shield it from criticism by treating the counter-evidence as caveats which leave the basic argument intact.
According to section 2 of the Canadian Patent Act, an invention “means any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.” Section 27(3)(a) of the Act further provides that the specification of an invention must “correctly and fully describe the invention and its operation or use as contemplated by the inventor.” Thus, similar to the situation in most countries, under Canadian patent law, an invention must satisfy the utility requirement. What is however unique about the Canadian utility requirement is the yardstick that Canadian courts developed over time to determine what satisfies the utility requirement. The Canadian Federal Courts developed the “promise of the patent” or “the promise doctrine” according to which if a patent application (construed as a whole) promises a specific utility, the invention would not satisfy the utility requirement unless that promise is fulfilled. As stated by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in Eli Lilly v Novopharm Ltd,
The Second Circuit addressed most of the ACPA’s bad faith intent to profit factors as well as issues presented in the facts that did not fit within the criteria of any enumerated factor. It determined that there was “ample and overwhelming evidence that, as a matter of law, Sporty’s Farm’s [sic] acted with a ‘bad faith intent to profit’ from the domain name sportys.com, as those terms are used in the ACPA.” 66 Addressing the first factor of the bad faith intent to profit standard, the court found that neither Sporty’s Farm nor its parent company, Omega, “had any intellectualproperty rights in sportys.com at the time Omega registered the domain name.” 67 As the court noted, “Sporty’s Farm was not formed until nine months after the domain name was registered, and it did not begin operations or obtain the domain name from Omega until after [the] lawsuit was filed.” 68 Regarding the second factor of the standard, the court found that the domain name sportys.com failed to bear any relation to the “legal name of the party that registered it, Omega.” 69 The court addressed the ACPA’s third bad faith factor and recognized that Sporty’s Farm had not used the website with the sportys.com name until after the litigation had begun. 70 Applying additional ACPA factors, the court determined that Sporty’s use of the sportys.com domain was never “noncommercial,” or a “fair use of the mark,” and that Sporty’s bought the name from Omega under “suspicious circumstances.” 71
build up an efficient legal regime for IP collateralization. In the theoretical part, the main L&E theories regarding secured transaction law will be re-examined in the context of IP collateralization with taking into account the special characteristics of IP. After this overall examination on the general legal framework for IP collateralization, Chapter 5 addresses a specific legal issue in practice to illustrate and further explore the divergences between IP law and secured transaction law. It looks into the enforceability of anti-assignment or anti-attachment clauses in the IP licenses in the case of IP Collateralization. It is an excellent example of illustrating the case where IP law and secured transaction have different tendencies when addressing the same issues. It shows that the secured transaction law, with the objective of expanding the scope of assets eligible for being used as collateral for provision of low-cost credit, tends to invalidate anti-assignment clauses in IP licenses in order to enable licensees to use the full value of their interests under IP licenses as security to finance their profitable projects. But invalidating the anti-assignment clauses may reduce the licensor’s control over their innovations. On the other hand, with the objective of awarding the innovators and providing incentives for innovation, IP laws tend to enforce the anti-assignment clauses so that the licensors can keep their control over the exploitation of the invention underlying the license and also the license counterparty. However, enforcing anti-assignment clauses could also allow licensors to hold-up its consent in order to drag profits from the licensee’s use of license as collateral. The failure to internalize all the profit of using IP license as collateral would be a disincentive for licensees to borrow and invest. The licensor’s hold-up can change the equilibrium of the lending decision and result in less available credit. This chapter uses a formal debt finance model to show the negotiations among licensors, licensees, and creditors when they make license decisions and lending decisions. The analysis shows how different legal rules, i.e., the UNCITRAL Supplement rule, US UCC-9 rule and Chinese rule, can change the time of negotiation and the bargain powers among parties, and consequently change the equilibrium of the lending decision, and eventually have an impact upon investment decisions and the total social welfare.
The right conferred by the Patent is the exclusive right to make, use, exercise, sell or distribute the invention in India. Infringement consists in the violation of any of these rights. The act expressly provides that use by a person other than the patentee, patentee’s assignee or licensee would be an infringement of the patent and as such illegal. The recent case on the issue of patent is Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd 15 was the first of a series of ongoing lawsuits between Apple Inc. and Samsung Electronics regarding the design of smart phones and tablet computers; between them, the companies made more than half of smart phones sold worldwide as of July 2012. In 2011, Apple began litigating against Samsung in patent infringement suits, while Apple and Motorola Mobility were already engaged in a patent war on several fronts. Apple's multinational litigation over technology patents became known as part of the mobile device patent wars: extensive litigation in fierce competition in the global market for consumer mobile communications. By August 2011, Apple and Samsung were litigating 19 ongoing cases in nine countries; by October, the legal disputes expanded to ten countries. By July 2012, the two companies were still embroiled in more than 50 lawsuits around the globe, with billions of dollars in damages claimed between them. While Apple won a ruling in its favour in the U.S., Samsung won rulings in South Korea and Japan, and the UK. Apple sued its component supplier Samsung, alleging in a 38- page federal complaint on April 15, 2011 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California that several of Samsung's Android phones and tablets, including the Nexus S, Epic 4G, Galaxy S 4G, and the Samsung Galaxy Tab, infringed on Apple’s intellectualproperty: its patents, trademarks, user interface and style. Apple's complaint included specific federal claims for patent infringement, false