The nature of the virtual world, in which members of groups—even ones with a high degree of organization and shared purpose—have no face-to-face contact or connection, compounds the challenges of identify- ing sufficient organization to meet the definition of armed conflict. For example, during the conflict between Georgia and Russia in the summer of 2008, numerous cyber attacks were launched against Georgia. Most of these attacks were initiated using information from a website that provided cyber tools and lists of Georgian government websites and cyber targets. The attacks were not coordinated with regard to timing, target and effect, or in any other aspect. Based on existing analyses of the Tadić definition of armed conflict and the requisite components of the factor of organization, something more than this type of merely collective action would be needed in the solely cyber realm. It has been argued that the determination of whether a group acting for a shared purpose “meets the organization crite- rion should depend on such context-specific factors as the existence of a formal or informal leadership entity directing the group’s activities in a general sense, identifying potential targets and maintaining an inventory of effective hacker tools.” 51
It is difficult to respond to cyber attacks when it is uncertain who or what has engaged in the attack (Murphy, 2011, p.29). 2015 National Security Strategy of the United States says: “We are shaping global standards for cyber security and building international capacity to disrupt and investigate cyberthreats. We are fortifying our critical infrastructure against all hazards, especially cyber espionage and attack. We will defend ourselves, consistent with U.S. and internationallaw, against cyber attacks and impose costs on malicious cyberactors, including through prosecution of illegal cyber activity. We will assist other countries to develop laws that enable strong action against threats that originate from their infrastructure. Globally, cyber security requires that long-standing norms of international behavior —to include protection of intellectual property, online freedom, and respect for civilian infrastructure—be upheld, and the Internet be managed as a shared responsibility between states and the private sector with civil society and Internet users as key stakeholders” (National Security Strategy of the US, 2015, pp.3-13).
At present, many of the issues pertaining to non-international armed con- flicts and cyber warfare remain the subject of some speculation. In particu- lar, the military cyber capabilities that non-Stateactors currently have, or may develop, is unclear. Though it appears highly unlikely that cyber at- tacks by a non-State actor could alone trigger a non-international armed conflict, specific cyber attacks in the course of an ongoing conflict in which traditional kinetic forms of attack are occurring are certainly conceivable. As far as legal issues pertaining to the actual conduct of hostilities are con- cerned, the legal questions raised are generally the same as those that are currently being discussed with regard to international armed conflicts. There is widespread agreement that cyberspace is not a legal vacuum and that internationallaw, including the laws of armed conflict, applies in cy- berspace. But in view of the dual-use nature of the entire cyber infrastruc- ture and the fact that the artificial domain of cyberspace transgresses State boundaries, it seems that an unrestrained application of the laws of armed conflict, especially those relating to non-international armed conflicts, could lead to an unwarranted large-scale militarization of cyberspace. Quite clearly, therefore, the laws pertaining to non-international armed conflicts should be applied cautiously in the cyber domain and, in view of the unique and still insufficiently understood technical features of cyberspace and the possibilities for its military use, the precise parameters of their application need to be worked out more concretely than they have been to date.
This Article examines remotely conducted election meddling by cyber means in the context of internationallaw and asks whether such cyber operations qualify as internationally wrongful acts. An internationally wrongful act requires both a breach of a legal obligation owed by one State to another under internationallaw and attribution of the act to the former. The Article considers three possible breaches related to such meddlingviolation of the requirement to respect sovereignty, intervention into the internal affairs of another State, and, when the cyber operations are not attributable to the Statefrom which they were launched, breach of the due diligence obligation that requires States to ensure cyber operations with serious adverse consequences are not mounted from their territory. The Article then examines the various modalities for attributing a cyber operation to a State under internationallaw. Whether cyber meddling in another States election is unlawful, as well as the severity thereof, determines the range of responses available to the victim State. The Article concludes that the law applicable to remotely conducted meddling in another States election is unsettled, thereby comprising a normative grey zone ripe for exploitation by States and non-Stateactors.
141 This is the (relatively neutral) term used by Le Monde to describe the phenomenon and is also often used by other francophone publications but seldom seen in English publications. It is conceded that the term kamikaze is not entirely neutral as it has some negative connotation with respect to the Japanese in World War II. As an Australian friend and ally however, the once Japanese 'menace' no longer invokes general hate or fear. Other examples of the use of language that may not accord with its everyday meanings include the term 'non-injurious physical contact' to describe water-boarding: Clive Stafford Smith, Bad Men: Guantanamo Bay and the Secret Prisons (2007), 170.] or beatings: at, 201, f—or where minors are not detainees under 18 years of age but 14 years, and the 'imam"/ hodja /Muslim prayer leader allocated to the Muslim worshipers is a fundamentalist Christian: at, 143. See also generally: Bernard K Freamon, 'Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History1 (2003) 27 Fordham InternationalLaw journal 299. Freamon also uses the term 'self- annihilatory violence' to describe the phenomenon (ibid, 308), although he carefully distinguishes the term used in the armed conflict context from fana fil Allah (self- annihilation in God) a term of art used by sufis to describe a state of exquisite spiritual attainment.
Liberalized trade in legal services may be crucial in advancing economic globalization underpinned by the rule of law. This is especially important for developing countries which may suffer from a weaker rule of law, or even where it is present, have not opened their legal services markets to foreign suppliers. Obviously but non-trivially, enlarged trade in legal services also denotes greater professional opportunities for lawyers who practice internationallaw or who practice domestic law but seek to do so in other jurisdictions. This has profound implications for the status and composition of the non-stateactors who set the agenda for much of the technical rulemaking in the international stage. It would seem as though the jurisdiction- specific nature of legal services would likely preclude the principle of mutual recognition from ever becoming a rule of customary internationallaw based on persistent and (near) universal state practice. Yet by extending lawyers’ entitlement to practice across a range of jurisdictions (and in internationallaw itself) through standardized instruments like MRAs, the IBA indirectly sets the agenda of the often highly-influential international organizations in which these professionals work. This work is poised to become important for developing countries in particular as they lack a tradition of pursuing bilateral MRAs at all, let alone in legal services. As the global representative body of the legal profession, the IBA may therefore be accurately characterized as a crucial self-affirming non-state actor in internationallaw, or perhaps more aptly global law in the sense of universally accepted norms arising from a variety of sources including the interactions of non-stateactors.
spouses of Presidents or Prime Ministers of countries are state or non-stateactors is a question that would potentially fill a whole chapter, but the telling question is whether it makes any real difference to whether sanctions may be lawfully imposed on them as well as the legal parameters governing the application of such measures. As has been stated, once internationallaw was supplemented with notions of individual responsibility as well as state responsibility for breaches of internationallaw, there may seem to be no reason to doubt the legality of such measures. However, whereas the vast majority of breaches of internationallaw can give rise to state responsibility there are only specific regimes, such as international criminal law and aspects of others such as international humanitarian law, the violation of which can give rise to individual responsibility. This signifies that if sanctions are imposed on individuals for a violation of internationallaw it can only be for breach of those norms or because the violative conduct of the individual is imputable to the state. It would also have to be established that states or organisations imposing such measures have the right or duty to do so under internationallaw. However, if sanctions are imposed in order to tackle threats to international peace presented by the activities of individuals, or groups of individuals, then there is no need to establish norm violation; the key question is then whether the state or organization imposing sanctions in such circumstances has the right or power to do so.
It follows from the above that only when the State is not implicated at all in the forcible cyber activities of non-Stateactors or when the State is unable to control their activities that the use of force will not be attributed to that State. The immediate question is whether the victim State can take reprisal action against the non-State actor. The fact that the cyber operation was mounted by a non-State actor does not change its character as a use of force and does not remove the injury that has caused on the victim State. However, the crucial question is whether the non-State actor has breached any obligation towards the victim State. In internationallaw, the prohibition not to use force formally applies to the relations between States only. Non-Stateactors are not bound by the obligation not to use force. Consequently, one of the reprisal conditions – that there should be a breach of an international obligation – is not met. It should be recalled that, in contrast to self-defence whose legality as will be explained later is premised on a factual occurrence (an armed attack), reprisals have maintained their normative link to an antecedent illegality. Their legality in other words is premised not on a factual situation – the use of force – but on a legal one: the violation of the obligation not to use force.
Our increasingly globalized environment, typified by the significant role of transnational interactions, raises urgent concerns about the com- mission of grave transnational wrongs. Two main legal strategies— belong- ing, respectively, to public and private internationallaw— offer important directions for addressing these urgent concerns. One strategy extends state obligations under human rights law to some non-stateactors; the other adapts traditional private internationallaw doctrines, notably its public policy exception. Both strategies make important advances, yet both face significant difficulties, which are all fundamentally rooted in what we call “the missing link of privity”— namely, identifying the reason for impos- ing the burden of plaintiffs’ vertical rights on putative defendants. In this Article, we argue that the moral underpinnings of private law provide the relational key to this missing link. We claim that private law’s normative DNA is premised on a profound commitment to reciprocal respect to self- determination and substantive equality. Because this commitment is the jus gentium of our private laws, it can and should be understood as a mani- festation of our interpersonal human rights, which should function both as a premise for criticizing domestic rules and as the foundation of aggrieved parties’ standing vis-`a-vis those who wronged them.
Efforts to clarify the law on the use of defensive force against non- Stateactors are premature. The evident ambiguities and inconsistences in the practice reflect an ongoing struggle over the law’s proper content. This struggle cannot neatly be resolved because the international legal system is, at bottom, decentralized. No actor is charged with settling competing claims on the law or dismissing invalid claims. Unless and until States gravi- tate toward the same claim, multiple claims will continue to circulate simul- taneously. Any one of these claims might be treated as law by only some actors and not others, or in only certain respects and not others. Trying to clarify the law in the face of this contestation thus elides more than it re- veals. It suppresses the underlying tensions that shape how global actors engage with the law in concrete cases.
Starting with the definition of development, I propose to follow Amartya Sen and Wole Soyinka in delimitating, in opposition to cultural relativism, a philosophical concept of development, beyond the limitations of a concentration on material welfare, i. e. a process guided by universal aims of mankind, not related in a competitive manner (as for instance economic growth and human rights often are), but which incorporates corner stones of the raison d' être of the human community, like the guarantee of basic human rights (including the respect of the cultural heritage and poverty alleviation) and democratisation (as a culture of participation or, as Wole Soyinka put it, as democratic tendency) at the same time (cf. Sen, 2002:2-6; Soyinka 1994:7, 9; Hountondji 2001). - This academic definition apparently corresponds, at least in its recognition of universal human rights, with a widely accepted meaning of development in international relations, as reflected in the criteria for official development aid (ODA, e. g. of the German Government): respect for human rights, rule of law, popular participation in political decisions, development orientated governance, - although these criteria have been interpreted and implemented in a highly controversial ethnocentric manner. - On indigenous development concepts, as seen by cultural anthropology in the African context, cf. Ela 1998; Engelhard 1998.
Likewise, a failed cyber operation with the objective of changing the results of an election would be a violation of the non-intervention principle – where, for example, the cyber defences of the target state are sufficiently robust to repel the attack. The International Court of Justice was clear in the 1986 Nicaragua case that there is a violation of the non-intervention principle where a state seeks to interfere in the domestic political affairs of another state, and its actions can be described as ‘coercive’. Behaviour is coercive where one state acts to get the target state to ‘Do X’, including through the deployment of physical force, and the target has no option but to ‘Do X’. In the case of hacking an election, the objective is to change the vote so that P’s preferred candidate is (wrongly) declared the winner. If the hack is successful this will happen: P’s preferred candidate will be declared the winner and there will be nothing that Q can do about the situation. Consequently, an attempt to hack an election is, by definition, coercive, because the objective is to get Q’s computer to ‘Do X’, leaving the Electoral Commission in Q with no choice but to comply.
In general, the academic literature mentions the international monetary and financial regimes, the international trade regime (prior to the WTO) (Finlayson &Zacher, 1983), the American gold-dollar standard (Eichengreen, 2000), the nineteenth century’s British gold standard, the balance of payments (Cohen, 1982), and the international regime of foreign direct investment (Vandevelde, 1997-1998) as those rules/norms that define a framework for the international system directly linkedto the hegemonic status of one or a group of countries. It is precisely this hegemonic condition that favors its stability, that is, power is the independent variable for the creation and continuity of international regimes. When the distribution of power is more diffuse, without a hegemon, cooperation is more difficult to occur. In this case, no country alone has the condition to provide stability to the international system. In the article The Demand for International Regimes, Keohane (1982) defines another 'model' of regime with a functional character and aimed at regulating the international arena. For the author, the ‘complex interdependence’ generates negative externalities that require new forms of cooperation through governance and regulation.
Section 5: The provision of restraining orders: Section 5(1) of the PHA provides victims with further legal protection by giving the criminal courts power to attach a restraining order to any sentence imposed upon the defendant under sections 2 or 4. The restraining order is arguably beneficial to victims as it places restrictions upon the future conduct of the defendant, and contains no limitations as to the nature of the restrictions that can be included in the restraining order other than it must be aimed at protecting victims from further harassment or fear of violence. Pinals (2007, p.95) points out that restraining orders are not always effective on face to face stalkers and arguably cyber stalkers who have major mental disorder or those whom are prone to violence. Chapman (2012) arguably noted that this was evident in the highly publicised case of Clare Bernall who was stalked for 6 months by her embittered ex-boyfriend Michael Pech and then murdered by him whilst at work in Harvey Nichols. The murder occurred despite the fact that Ms Bernall had taken out a restraining order against Mr Pech.
This impressive body of research, however, also has limitations. One is that a wider perspective has been downplayed. After all, in Keohane and Nye’s seminal 1977 book the analysis of regimes was one component - although a major one - in a larger inquiry. The “first major question” on their agenda was “what are the characteristics of world politics under conditions of extensive interdependence?” 38 The central focus was regimes, but the purpose was a wider one: to understand the nature of the changes in world politics resulting from increased interdependence, in other words a research agenda similar to the one addressed here: the political aspects of internationalisation or globalisation. In ensuing years, however, the main body of regime theory has not systematically addressed questions about patterns in regime-formation and the nature of the resulting overall “regime architecture.” One reason, probably, is the strong focus on proving that institutions matter, 39 but another and equally important reason seems to be that the goal has been nomothetic theory, i.e. general statements about regimes, not about the resulting totality of international institutions. The result, in a sense is a body of “micro-theory” of international institutions, whereas the “macro-theory” of global institutionalisation is underdeveloped. This is, by the way, not only a problem from the perspective of the global polity. It also calls into question the possibility of a strong nomothetic general theory of regimes because, as argued by Vinod Aggarwal, regimes are often “nested” in “meta-regimes.” 40 That is to say that their formation and roles can only be understood if their situation in the wider institutional set-up is considered. It probably will be very difficult to develop a strong explanatory theory without taking this into account. When approaching the global polity, the insights from nomothetic institutionalist theory are indispensable, but they are not sufficient because the cumulated results are little explored.
(ii) The real challenge for Cyber Command, as I see it, is to make sure that nobody will be able to turn the tables on the United States, and that the United States—the most advanced in the world, not only in aircraft carriers, F-15s and 16s and cruise missiles, but also in cyberspace—can preserve its military superiority against all actual and potential adver- saries. I sincerely hope that Cyber Command is not mesmerized by en- titlements to intellectual property, but instead is preparing itself— through “war gaming”—for contingencies of real war. For, if you de- lete “war” from the equation of “war gaming,” the only element that you are left with is “gaming.” I believe that Cyber Command should shift its gaze away from the distractions of cyber operations in peace- time. It must focus on averting a future cyber Pearl Harbor.
The best solution to a problem is one proposed by those directly facing it and which addresses its root causes. It is therefore pertinent to unveil inherent solutions from victims of the war in northern Uganda before suggesting anything external. The form of justice to be applied in northern Uganda is now a complicated matter. It is plausibly tempting to add that it has become almost another laboratory similar to that which was in Sierra Leone for experimenting hybrid forms of justice. The analyses of the debates of „peace versus justice‟, „forgiveness versus fatalism‟, as well as „local culture versus justice‟ as analyzed by Shaw (2010), all point to the fact that there is no single form of justice that can provide a conclusive solution. It is in this same vein that it may not be easy to seek peace and justice simultaneously, especially when victims desperately require the former to the latter or at least before it (Suarez, 2006). Neither can it be easy to separate cultural traits from conventional and modern forms of justice. Local cultural justice forms, notably Mato Oput, were highly regarded by locals in the aftermath of the arrest warrants by the ICC (Ochola, 2006, Muto, 2006). Although Mato Oput lacks the ideals of modern justice in many respects, it installs some attitudinal level of confidence from the victims‟ view point. However, attitudes change when victims are exposed to different conditions such as prolonged presence of ICC, sensitization and relative peace.
In this survey paper we highlight about various categories of cyberthreats such as social networking, online transactions ,Wi-Fi threats, cloud computing threats ,mobile malware ,vehicle hacking, software cracking in the section II, in section III we identify the solutions and in section IV the commercial recommendations for the threats. This paper also provides an interesting insights to some very rare and new emerging technologies: vehicle hacking
For this category of fraud an organization needs to use virtual LAN (IEEE 802.1Q) to segregate voice and data traffic (Wei, 2012). Further, there is need to also implement quality of service to give priority to voice traffic over data traffic. This design prevents internal hackers from sniffing voice traffic. The network administrator could also monitor traffic on individual voice ports on the Ethernet switch. If a voice port has unusual traffic spike, it would trigger a security alert for further investigation. Other countermeasures include disabling non-service related ports, restricting international calls to designated phone numbers and constantly monitor call detail records (CDRs) to identify unusual usage patterns (Yu, 2015).