seize, which consequently altered the course of history leading China to be a technologically and economically backward country. The lack of pragmatism from the Chinese Imperial leadership, created the opportunity for Japan to develop extensively in technology and military power hence deepening the expansionist appetite of Japan. The past century has been a century filled with injustice, famines, and wars for China. That is, only in the past three decades China seems to have found its way back to attaining the status it used to historically enjoy. It is China’s and every others nations universal right to develop and flourish culturally and economically. The rise of China is an inevitable fact, and seems to be merely a matter of time, however it would be the moral obligation of China to guide the international system toward economic development and peace. It would be of great interest to perceive China as factor of stability and economic growth for the world. But instead, there is a trend of a “silent animosity” regarding China’s rise. Time seems to be on China’s side, and this might be obvious to its neighbors and to the current powers as well. Therefore, incentives to provoke conflicts with China at this time while it still is developing are quiet realistic, since in the future its dominance would dictate another system. This could be demonstrated with the issue of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, where the symbolic value is rapidly outpacing the intrinsic value of the islands, and an armed conflict seems to become more and more feasible. Therefore, to conclude China’s rise cannot be peaceful unless the world leadership will facilitate its further incorporation in the international system and perceives China as part of the solution instead of the problem.
its autonomous status more than six decades and the generation that gushed to the Republic of China is either old or less influential in policy making. It arises question whether China can sustain without Taiwan, which means an independent Taiwan and it will give surge to other regions of strife inside China such as Xingjian and Tibet. It will also provoke weakness of China and inability of it to carry out its basic foreign policy goal of one China. However, there is a tacit sense of cooperation in terms of trade, cultural exchange program and diplomatic engagements. Taiwan stands as the fifth largest trading partner with China (Day, 2014), eventually the issue of Taiwan is more about the legitimacy of rule, not about identity; both the mainland and Taiwan remain in Chinese identity but aspire for legitimacy of rule. The former has proved this legitimacy on the mainland through economic development, maintaining the sovereignty, defending national boundaries and provision of public goods to the masses.
The Canadian trading centre, like the other RMB trading centres that have been established in Hong Kong, London, Paris, Luxembourg, Frankfurt, Singapore, Sydney and, most recently, Santiago, Chile, is essentially a virtual, computer-based financial infrastructure domiciled in Canada. It will enable Canadian-based banks and other financial institutions to develop the expertise and capacity to accept deposits in renminbi or Canadian dollars and use them to purchase goods or services in either country or to invest in stocks, bonds, or other financial assets in Canada or China without having to involve the transaction costs and risks of using an intermediary currency such as the U.S. dollar or the euro. As a result, it will be faster and more efficient than the financial arrangements used in the past in conducting international trade or investment transactions between the two countries. Further, the potential cost of exchange-rate volatility will also be lessened to some extent. Risks for traders, investors, and individuals, therefore, will be reduced somewhat by the existence of the trading centre. Yet the Chinese currency, unlike the Canadian dollar and other fully convertible currencies, will not be completely free to find its own market-based equilibrium: capital controls, at a fixed, albeit frequently adjusted exchange rate (adjustments occurred twice in early August 2015) will remain in place with respect to the RMB, and Chinese monetary policy will continue to remain tightly regulated by the central government. All of this could, and likely will, change over time; the RMB trading centres are only one step towards full internationalization of the currency.
The Western TCC has no such alternative vision of development except maintaining the present transnational status quo. But their ability to do so is being undercut by political disruptions and loss of legitimacy. Consequently, the AIIB and OBOR offer vast new markets for growth and accumulation, without which global capitalism would enter a climatic crisis. Therefore, the US and Western TCC is more than happy to join the project, essentially following Chinese leadership. AIIB loans will be aided by further Chinese loans from CIC, the Export-Import Banks, the Bank of China, and other financial institutions. Besides taking part in loans and debt activity, transnational corporations will obtain contracts, acquire joint ventures, and be active in design, legal, financial and technical consultancies. The Economist Corporate Network has produced a roadmap of infrastructure projects that cover 44 of the 68 countries included in the OBOR project. 40 Pinsent Masons looked at Kenya, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe as three representative African countries. Their study found 21 on-going developments worth about $21 billion, plus another 57 projects in pre-development stage. The key infrastructure project is a $14 billion extension of Kenya’s SGR rail line. The first stage is to connect the Mombasa sea port to Nairobi, and then onto Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan. The China Export Import Bank has extended loans for the first leg with China Road and Bridge Corporation serving as contractor. As Pinsent Masons comments, “The SGR presents a nearly ideal fit for the African component of China’s Belt-Road
It is acknowledged that „sanctions tend to succeed most in the initial years of implementation‟ and IMF data7 reveal that US and EU autonomous sanctions were decisive in the very first years of their implementation. However, the economic sanctions imposed in 2012 also „led to a sharp contraction in economic activity, as well as higher inflation and unemployment‟ according to the International Monetary Fund‟s Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation with Iran, issued on 18 November 2015. It adds that „Much of the contraction in the economy was due to sharp drops in oil production and non- oil productivity‟. This economic contraction, mainly due to economic sanctions, was one of the main causes of the Iranian return to the negotiating table when inflation and unemployment were likely to create severe social tensions that could threaten the Iranian political regime in the long term.
As we have noted, part of the movement in terms of trade may have been because of improved possibilities for offshoring. Indeed, the Heckscher-Ohlin variant of our model of offshoring predicts that as the cost of offshoring L-tasks falls, the relative world output of labor- intensive goods should rise, thereby exerting downward pressure on the relative price of these goods. However, the improved opportunities for offshoring are hardly the only—or even the most important— factor that has moved the U.S. terms of trade. For one thing, petroleum prices have risen precipitously during the period under consideration. But as these prices play no explicit role in our model, we can avoid confounding the forces of globalization with those of oil price hikes by choosing a measure of the terms of trade that excludes these prices. Still, movements in the relative prices of goods and serv- ices traded between the United States and the labor-rich economies in Asia and Latin American have moved for reasons having little to do with offshoring. As is well-known, China and India have experienced dramatic growth in recent years as these countries have improved their regulatory environments, removed impediments to investment and entry, and more fully joined the world economy. Both trade liberaliza- tion and productivity growth in these economies could account for an expansion in the relative world supply of labor-intensive goods. Since we cannot separate the part of the terms-of-trade movements because of improved offshoring from that due to productivity growth and trade liberalization in the developing countries, we shall simply lump them together and estimate what combined effect they may have had on U.S. low-skill wages.
Indonesia. The Indian Ocean straddles the most important sea routes that connect the oil producing region of the Gulf with the consumer countries of East Asia. Increase in maritime trade is another reality today. Cooperation between India and these countries is a necessary prerequisite for the 21st century to become the century of Asia. India‟s look east policy starts from North East Asia and not simply the ASEAN region. Yet, India is excluded from APEC as also ASEM. We have, however, a sound framework for meeting the challenges ahead – India has become a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum and a summit partner with the ASEAN. The ASEAN countries themselves have realized the value of engaging India for greater political, security and economic balance in the region. India has engaged in an effort to craft special trade and investment arrangements through an India-ASEAN Free Trade Area to be brought about in 10 years, a BIMST-EC FTA as also bilateral arrangements such as the India-Thailand FTA and India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement. BIMST-EC and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation are other structural frameworks for India‟s “Look-East” policy. We are working on a trilateral highway project between India, Myanmar and Thailand. Connectivity, canalizing resources and policy coordination among India and the countries in the region are the tasks ahead.
• The circle of ASK, AFFIRM, ASSESS, and ACT indicates that this is an ongoing process. Turn the negative effects of moral distress into motivation to create change. You will still encounter distressful situations, but you will have the power to rise above them.
As per our calculation based on fact derived from Govt accounts, inflation rate expected to rise steeply both, on supply side and higher food prices. Governments around the are borrowing exceptional amount of money from the market. As shown in the chart, which is depicting the US Budgetary deficit over the period of decade, the US govt will need to finance its recently approved health care bill which will cost more than $1 trillion, and deficit would amount to 10.3 per cent and 8.9 per cent of the total GDP for the year 2010 and 2011 respectively. As per the US Budget Office estimates, debt held by the public would grow from $7.5 trillion (53 per cent of the GDP) in 2011 to $20.3 trillion (90 per cent of GDP) by the year 2020.
The most widely-used volatility index is VIX (see Whaley (1993)), which is a key measure of market expectations of volatility, and hence also an important barometer of investor sentiment and market volatility. VIX is presently based on S&P500 call and put options over a wide range of strike prices, and hence is not model based. The original CBOE volatility index, VXO, is based on the Black-Scholes implied volatilities from S&P100 index, and hence is model based, though the Black-Scholes model assumes normality, which is typically unrealistic for financial market data. In 2003, together with Goldman Sachs, CBOE updated and reformulated VIX to reflect a model- free method of measuring expected volatility, one that continues to be widely used by financial theorists. The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) introduced VIX futures on 26 March 2004, and VIX options on 24 February 2006. Both VIX options and futures are very highly traded.
An anti-Chinese sentiment has taken hold in the reporting on natural resource production in developing countries. The negative portrayal of the role of non-traditional investors is pervasive in policy reports, the media, and to some extent academic publications, most of which concentrate on China’s role in Africa. The criticism relates to the neglect of human rights, low environmental or labour standards, their links with their home government and the effects on western actors to influence resource-rich countries. These allegations are embedded in a context of criticism of China’s increasing aid and foreign policy muscle, which shrinks the established actors’ leverage in foreign policy and decreases their security of energy supplies. Few observers appear to note that Chinese companies themselves have developed. In the following I will present some of the commonly-held assumptions — which in China are often referred to as the “China threat theory” — and address those that are not closely related specifically to corporate behaviour, but serve to contextualise the rise of China and the internationalisation of its oil and mining companies. Many of these are rooted in the idea that there is a single, well-coordinated strategy devised by the Chinese government to gain access to natural resources abroad, and to do so at all costs.
Although the above analysis shows that the rise strategy of central China has promoted the development of Hubei province, is it an accidental phenomenon? Is it not the result of strategy implementation? In order to enhance the effec- tiveness of the research conclusions, the placebo method will be used in this pa- per. Placebo method is from medical experiments: if you want to examine the effects of a new drug, the patients will be randomly divided into two groups, one group of taking drugs, another group of taking placebo (such as sugar pill), and the research don’t tell two groups of people taking the drug or placebo in order to avoid the interference of psychological factors, and then by looking at the condition of the two groups of people to examine the effects of new drugs. In this paper, the basic idea of placebo method is: since 25 provinces outside of Hubei province did not implement the strategy of rise of central China, then choose a province in 25 provinces, assuming that the province implements the strategy of rise of central China in 2006, we use synthetic control method to analyses this province, just like the analysis of Hubei province. The province’s per capita GDP should be similar to the per capita GDP of synthetic province, or synthetic control analysis of Hubei province is only an accidental phenomenon, has no credibility. Referring to the practices of previous researchers , this pa- per selected Jilin province, which has the largest weight in the composition and synthesis of Hubei province, as the placebo. Figure 3 depicts the development path of the logarithm of real and synthetic per capita GDP of Jilin province. We can find that, before 2006, the development paths of the logarithm of real per capita GDP of Jilin province and synthetic per capita GDP of Jilin province bas- ically coincide, indicating that the synthetic Jilin province can well fit the eco- nomic development of real Jilin province. From 2006 to 2013, the per capita GDP of real Jilin province was higher than that of synthetic Jilin province; from
higher than the number of de novo classic and incom- plete MFS mutations (35.3 %, 417/1,181) (Fisher’s exact test, α = 0.05; P < 0.001). Second, at the genome level, the distribution of the two types of mutations differs among FBN1 exons (Pearson’s χ test, α = 0.05; P < 0.001); in particular, most nMFS mutations (86.4 %, 51/59) cluster within exons 24–33 while the distribution of mutations for classic and incomplete MFS is more even with only 17.4 % (221/1274) in the exon 24–33 region (Fisher’s exact test, α = 0.05; P < 0.001) (Fig. 2). Third, at the protein level, 91.5 % (54/59) of nMFS mutations are located in cbEGF domains, which is significantly higher than that of muta- tions for classic and incomplete MFS (71.7 %, 914/1,274) (Fisher’ s exact test, α = 0.05; P < 0.001). Within the domain cluster of cbEGFs 11–19 encoded by exons 25–33, 47 nMFS mutations are located, of which 43 (91.5 %) affect the disulfide bond or Ca 2+ binding site. This compares with only 58.2 % (111/191) of classic and incomplete MFS mutations (Fisher’s exact test, α = 0.05; P < 0.001). An nMFS genotype–phenotype analysis showed that most of the mutations (88.4 %, 52/59) present exclu- sively in patients with nMFS. Further, of all missense mutations associated with nMFS, only 8.1 % (3/37) also
progress note which is required to be completed within 8 hours following admission. Also at the start of the pa- tient stay or during the hospitalization, patient consent forms are printed to obtain patient signatures due to the absence of electronic signature functionality in China. Usually during each hospitalization day, the physician will see the patient and prescribe medications, order tests and procedures, or write a new progress note. The physician is required to write at least one progress note every three days or more if there are changes, until the patient is discharged with a discharge summary. Referrals to special- ists tend to be less common than in the US.
109. See Thomas J. Smith et al., American Society of Clinical Oncology Provisional Clinical Opinion: The Integration of Palliative Care into Standard Oncology Care, 30 J. C LINICAL O NCOLOGY 880, 882 (2012). Other organizations, such as the American Academy on Communication in Healthcare and the Association for Behavioral Sciences in Medical Education, also have developed evidence-based clinical teach- ing exercises designed to improve physician-patient communication about chal- lenging topics such as when to cease therapeutic care or how to convey bad news. See, e.g., A M . A CAD . ON C OMM . IN H EALTHCARE , Mission & Vision, http://www. aachonline.org/About-AACH/Mission-Vision (last visited Sept. 21, 2017); A SS ’ N B EHAV . S CI . AND M ED . E DUC ., http://www.absame.org/dcms/about (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (providing information and resources for medical school and con- tinuing medical education curricula).
State Decisions on Peaceful Picketing SMU Law Review Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 4 1948 State Decisions on Peaceful Picketing E H Botting Follow this and additional works at https //scholar smu edu/smu[.]
Do you remember the telesales team that I talked about in Chapter 2? How I took over an underper- forming team from another manager? I was interviewing one day for new telesales agents and John the ex-manager was aware of what was going on. He let me know his thoughts: ‘You’ve had that person in there for forty-five minutes,’ he said. ‘I used to get them in for an interview and made a decision whether to hire them or not in fifteen minutes, sometimes less.’ He was incredu- lous when I informed him that, ‘Yes, I’ll interview for about forty-five minutes and I’ll have them in again for another forty- five minutes before I make a decision.’ Of course, as you’ll remember, John had nothing but problems with this team. It doesn’t need to be forty-five minutes. It’s possible that you could identify if this person has the talent you want (or not) within thirty minutes. However, I think fifteen minutes is a bit too quick. Find out what makes your