Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the former. The age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement between the employer and the employees. However, in the absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed by law. Under Art. 287 of the Labor Code as amended, the legally mandated age for compulsory retirement is 65 years, while the set minimum age for optional retirement is 60 years. In this case, it may be stressed that the CBA does not per se specifically provide for the compulsory retirement age nor does it provide for an optional retirement plan. It merely provides that the retirement benefits accorded to an employee shall be in accordance with law. Thus, we must apply Art. 287 of the Labor Code which provides for two types of retirement: (a) compulsory and (b) optional. The first takes place at age 65, while the second is primarily determined by the collective bargaining agreement or other employment contract or employer's retirement plan. In the absence of any provision on optional retirement in a collective bargaining agreement, other employment contract, or employer's retirement plan, an employee may optionally retire upon reaching the age of 60 years or more, but not beyond 65 years, provided he has served at least five years in the establishment concerned. That prerogative is exclusively lodged in the employee. Indubitably, the voluntariness of the respondents' retirement is the meat of the instant controversy. Generally, the law looks with disfavor on quitclaims and releases by employees who have been inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities and frustrate just claims of employees. They are frowned upon as contrary to public policy. A quitclaim is ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure of a worker's rights, and the acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the non-renewal of a probationary teacher’s contract for the upcoming semester is considered as illegal dismissal
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the non-renewal in this case was indeed considered as illegal dismissal, for there was no justifiable cause to terminate the probationary employment considering Sambajon had above average reviews prior to his termination. The Court, in the case, also held that the concept that Sambajon’s contract was that of fixed-term employment and thus the end of the contract is equivalent to termination of employment, is dangerous unless qualified by the Labor Code provisions on probationary employment with regard to termination of contract. This is because probationary employment leads to regular employment, while fixed-term employment is terminated upon the end of the contract. By saying Sambajon’s probationary employment contract is one of fixed-term, allows the employer to escape regularization of a probationary employee with the argument that the contract has ended instead of renewing it. The Labor Code provision places a qualification for that termination which is “just cause” or “failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement.”
Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with love and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention. The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.
Floro v. Llenado
G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 713 Romeo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Simeon Floro is the owner of Floro Park Subdivision who has its own egress and ingress to and from the Mac Arthur Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing. On the other hand, Respondent Orlando Llenado, is the registered owner of Llenado Homes Subdivision, adjacent to Floro Park Subdivision. Prior to its purchase by Llenado, the land was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, a duly licensed and registered housing subdivision in the name of Soledad Ortega. Bounded on the South by the 5 to 6 meter-wide Palanas Creek, which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision, and on the west by ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo. the Llenado Homes does not have any existing road or passage to the Mac Arthur Highway. However, a proposed access road traversing the idle riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision which was duly approved by the defunct Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. Meanwhile, the Llenados sought, and were granted permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision as passageway to and from MacArthur Highway. However no contract of easement of right of way was ever perfected by both parties. Later, Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones, thereby preventing its use by the Llenados. Llenado instituted a complaint before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan against Floro for easement of right of way. The RTC granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered Floro to open the road and pay damages. Thereafter, the trial court rendered another judgment dismissing the case and lifting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction previously issued and ordered the plaintiff to pay defendant damages and costs. On appeal by Llenado on the CA, the judgment of the RTC was reversed ordering Floro to open roads 4 and 5 and remove all the objects that prevent passage on road 5 and to pay the plaintiff damages with costs and payment of indemnity for the easement of right of way.
I concur that the Secretary of Labor correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case ad properly acted I concur that the Secretary of Labor correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case ad properly acted within its authority in certifying the case for compulsory arbitration. The grant of plenary powers under within its authority in certifying the case for compulsory arbitration. The grant of plenary powers under Art. 263 of the Labor Code to the Secretary of Labor makes it incumbent upon him to bring about fair Art. 263 of the Labor Code to the Secretary of Labor makes it incumbent upon him to bring about fair and just solution to the differences between employer and employees. In this case there was no showing and just solution to the differences between employer and employees. In this case there was no showing that the Secretary of Labor abused his discretion or acted whimsically or capriciously as would invalidate that the Secretary of Labor abused his discretion or acted whimsically or capriciously as would invalidate his orders, therefore the unjustified refusal of the company to comply with theses orders is untenable. his orders, therefore the unjustified refusal of the company to comply with theses orders is untenable.
evaluation of evidence which was the basis of the labor agency in reaching its conclusion. Neither is it for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses nor substitute findings of fact for those of an administrative body which has gained expertise in its specialized field. Arguably, there may even be an error in judgment. This, however, is not within the ambit of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. It is beyond dispute that loss of trust and confidence constitutes a valid ground for dismissing an employee. It is settled that loss of confidence as a just cause for terminating employment must be premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This situation obtains where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as care and protection, handling or custody of the employer’s property as in this case. But, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be “work-related” such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer. Likewise, it must be noted that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required to dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of confidence. It is sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position.
Elmer Espina and Miguel Cotiamco were candidates for director of Leyte IV Electric Cooperative (LEYECO IV), representing the Baybay South District. On May 23, 1990, Espina filed with the LEYECO IV District Election Committee (DECOM) a petition to disqualify Cotiamco on the ground that Cotiamco was not a bonafide member of the LEYECO IV. The DECOM endorsed the petition to the National Electrification Administration (NEA) on May 26, 1990. On May 27, 1990, the election for the position of director of the LEYECO IV, Baybay South District was held where Cotiamco garnered 636 votes while Espina got 599 votes. Accordingly, Cotiamco was proclaimed winner by the DECOM and sworn in as member of the board on June 6, 1990. On June 27, 1990, the NEA remanded the petition for disqualification filed by Espina to the DECOM for proper disposition on the ground that the latter had original jurisdiction over the case. After hearing, the DECOM rendered a decision on July 28, 1990 disqualifying Cotiamco. Consequently, Espina took his oath and assumed office. Cotiamco appealed to the NEA on October 1, 1990. The NEA found that Cotiamco was a bonafide member of the LEYECO IV. It reversed the DECOM and declared Cotiamco duly elected director of LEYECO IV, Baybay South District. On October 23, 1990, Espina filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction. Cotiamco moved for the dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, failure of Espina to exhaust administrative remedies and lack of merit of the petition. On March 15, 1991, the Court of Appeals upheld the order of the NEA. It found the order of the NEA dated October 1, 1990 issued in the exercise of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives, and that the findings of the NEA were supported by substantial evidence. Espina then filed a petition to the Supreme Court to review the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
proceedings – namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required – the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence – point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra- judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
constitute law practice. Brillantes VS Yorac
FACTS: President Corazon Aquino appointed Comelec Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat attempt. Petitioner Brillantes questioned the appointment in view of the status of the COMELEC as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution that “In no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”
The history of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members of the National Assembly from criminal arrest. When American sovereignty was implanted into these Islands, a new theory of government was implanted too. This theory of government places every man equal before the eyes of the law. The grant of certain privileges to any set of persons means the abrogation of this principle of equality before the eyes of the law. The State Legislature is the agent of the State. The power or the right of the Legislature to claim privileges is based on the right of self-preservation. The right of the State to claim rivileges is due to the fact that it has the right to carry its function without obstacle. But we must also remember that any Legislature is but the agent of the State. The State is the principal. Any crime committed, whether such crime is committed by a colorum or by a gangster, endangers the State. Giving more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at the expense of the principal, which is the State, is not a sound policy. Also, in the Williamson case (US), it was decided that the immunity from arrest would apply only to prosecutions of a civil nature. - In the language of the constitutional provision then that portion of Article 145 penalizing a public official or employee who shall while the Congress is in regular or special session arrest or search any member thereof except in case he has committed a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor is declared inoperative. It is to be remembered that the RPC took effect on January 1, 1932 before the enforcement of the present Constitution in 1935. The latter states: "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution."
offenses) of lower courts as well as determines whether there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any "branch or instrumentality" of government. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncement about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers. THE COMELEC MY PASS UPON SUCH PROPOSAL INSOFAR AS TO ITS FORM AND LANGUAGE ARE CONCERNED AND WHETHER THE SAME IS PATENTLY AND CLEARLY OUTSIDE THE CAPACITY OF THE LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY TO ENACT.- Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the Comelec itself has no power to pass upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the contrary, we are ruling that these matters are in fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission - to which then the herein basic questions ought to have been addressed, and by which the same should have been decided in the first instance. In other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over "approved" propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned, as discussed earlier; and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the "capacity of the local legislative body to enact." Accordingly, the question of whether the subject of this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon.
It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land which used to be an idle, swampy land was converted by the petitioner into a fishpond. And it is settled that a fishpond is an agricultural land. An agricultural land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in Republic Act No. 6657 and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Republic Act No. 6657 defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee or tenant. The law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over
2. Withholding. HUD or its designee shall upon its own action or upon written request of an authorized representative of the
Department of Labor withhold or cause to be withheld from the contractor under this contract or any other Federal contract with the same prime contractor, or any other Federally-assisted contract subject to Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirements, which is held by the same prime contractor so much of the accrued payments or advances as may be considered necessary to pay laborers and mechanics, including apprentices, trainees and helpers, employed by the contractor or any subcontractor the full amount of wages required by the contract. In the event of failure to pay any laborer or mechanic, including any apprentice, trainee or helper, employed or working on the site of the work (or under United States Housing Act of 1937 or under the Housing Act of 1949 in the construction or development of the project), all or part of the wages required by the contract, HUD or its designee may, after written notice to the contractor, sponsor, applicant, or owner, take such actions as may be necessary to cause the suspension of any further payment, advance, or guarantee of funds until such violations have ceased. HUD or its designee may, after written notice to the contractor, disburse such amounts withheld for an on account of the contractor or subcontractor to the respective employees to whom they are due. The Comptroller General shall make such disbursements in the case of direct Davis-Bacon Act Contracts.
(d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and
(e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case
2. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.
REMEDIAL LAW / CIVIL PROCEDURE / RULE 39 / DUTIES OF A SHERIFF
F: The MTCC rendered judgment that was adverse to Bahala. Pending appeal, the rTC rendered a judgment on the compromise agreement of the parties pursuant to which Bahala paid the balance of the money judgment, among others. By the end of the two- year extension, she offered to sell the building standing on the property that she had supposedly built in good faith. Not wanting to pay for the building, the plaintiff opted to execute the judgment. Sheriff Duca served the writ of execution. Bahala also alleged that Sheriff Duca demanded payments from her in several instances. Without filing his return on the writ, Sheriff Duca served a notice of auction sale. Consequently, Bahala opposed the sale and the RTC ruled in favor of her. In his answer, Sheriff Duca denied demanding and receiving any amount from Bahala. The Court resolved to re-docket this case as a regular administrative matter, and referred it to the Executive Judge of the RTC in Cagayan de Oro City for investigation and recommendation. In his report, then Executive Judge Edgardo T. Lloren found and concluded that Sheriff Duca had committed simple misconduct and recommended that he be suspended for six months and one day without pay. The OCA agreed with Judge Lloren’s finding.
employer may pay the wages of the deceased worker to the heirs of the latter without the necessity of
intestate proceedings. The claimants, if they are all of age, shall execute an affidavit attesting to their relationship to the deceased and the fact that they are his heirs, to the exclusion of all other persons. If any of the heirs is a minor, the affidavit shall be executed on his behalf by his natural guardian or next-of-kin. The affidavit shall be presented to the employer who shall make payment through the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his representative. The representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment shall act as referee in dividing the amount paid among the heirs. The payment of wages under this Article shall absolve the employer of any further liability with respect to the amount paid. Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor.
regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting-out of labor to protect the rights of workers.
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
As regard the issue of privity of contracts, We need to add only that Article 1311 of the New Civil Code which DMPI invokes is not applicable where the situation contemplated in Article 1729 obtains. The intention of the latter provision is to protect the laborers and the materialmen from being taken advantage of by unscrupulous contractors and from possible connivance between owners and contractors. Thus, a constructive vinculum or contractual privity is created by this provision, by way of exception to the principle underlying Article 1311 between the owner, on the one hand, and those who furnish labor and/or materials, on the other. [Velasco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47544, January 28, 1980]
general provisions of the Civil Code regarding obligations. Article 1158 provides that "payment may be made by any person, whether he has an interest in the performance of the obligation or not, and whether the payment is known and approved by the debtor or whether he is unaware of it. Any person who makes a payment for the account of another may recover from the debtor the amount of the payment, unless it was made against the express will of the latter. In the latter case he can only recover from the debtor in so far as the payment has been beneficial to the latter." According to this legal provision, it is evident that the plaintiff-appellant is bound to pay to the plaintiff what the latter had advanced to the creditor upon the judgment, and this is the more so because it appears, that although L. executed the bond without his knowledge, nevertheless he did not object thereto or repudiate the same at any time. From the proven facts it cannot logically be deduced that the appellant did not have knowledge of the bond, first, because his properties were attached and the attachment could not have been levied without his knowledge, and, secondly, because the said properties were returned to him and in receiving them he was necessarily apprized of the fact that a bond had been filed to discharge the attachment.
law is the collec the collectio tion n of of taxe taxes. s. The three steps above- The three steps above- men
menti tion oned ed ar are e bu but t th the e me means to ans to th that at end end. . Thu Thus, s, th the e purchase of the stamps is the form of payment made; the purchase of the stamps is the form of payment made; the affixture thereof on the document or instrument taxed is to affixture thereof on the document or instrument taxed is to insure that the corresponding tax has been paid for such insure that the corresponding tax has been paid for such document while the cancellation of the stamps is to obviate document while the cancellation of the stamps is to obviate the possibility that said stamps will be reused for similar the possibility that said stamps will be reused for similar documents for similar purposes. In the case at bar, there documents for similar purposes. In the case at bar, there appears to be no dispute on the fact that the documentary appears to be no dispute on the fact that the documentary stamps corresponding to the various policies were purchased stamps corresponding to the various policies were purchased