Agency, as Onora O’Neill writes, “is manifest in abilities to integrate capacities to reason and to act, and to maintain some independence from other forces and agents.” 83 Moral agency incorporates into this definition the inter-related ideas of obligation and responsibility. Additionally, Alasdair MacIntyre writes, “to be an agent is to have the potentiality for living and acting in a state of tension. And this is never simply or mainly a tension or conflict between points of view at the level of abstraction or theory,” he states. “It is always a tension or conflict between socially embodied points of view, between modes of practice.” 84 Politics, on this reading, simply becomes the union of a variety of agents and actions working within a particular setting generating structures complementing the values and ideals shaping the ends of political agents. On this account, agency is the outcome of individuals being political. When actively engaged, agents create, in the words of Fred Dallmayr, “a constitutive, quasi-transcendental setting or matrix of political life.” 85 Of utmost importance, these structures go on to develop an agent’s conscience supported by the innate capacity to reason and participate in the natural law. It is to note, as Anthony Lang, Jr. writes, that to engage in politics is a highly personal endeavor which inhabits a particular space in the ambit of human life”. 86 Consequently, agents have a vested interest in the values structuring their interaction as they explicitly relate to the ends of action and the development of human potential as beings in common.
(Q2) From which it follows that the law and ordinance of nature, under which all men are born, and for the most part live, forbids nothing but what no one wishes or is able to do, and is not opposed to strifes, hatred, anger, treachery, or, in general, anything that appetite suggests. For the bounds of nature are not the laws of human reason, which do but pursue the true interest and preservation of mankind, but other infinite laws, which regard the eternal order of universal na- ture, whereof man is an atom; and according to the necessity of this order only are all individual beings determined in a fixed manner to exist and operate .
Believing in the process of using other nations’ experiences, Malkum succeeded in establishing the first functioning telegraph line in Iran. It ran from the Dar al-Fonun to the royal palace (Afshar, 1965, p.228). In his writing, especially in the ‘Qanun’ newspaper, Malkum tried to emphasise that understanding the customs of the Europeans, Aieneh Tamaddun (the culture of civilization), are the conditions for any kind of material progress. In relation to this matter Malkum introduced two basic elements of progress ‘order’ and ‘law’. These he saw as essential prerequisites if any movement towards European civilization was to be made possible. The foundation of Qanun was a reflection of these elements, which Malkum tried to express in different ways. In the Persian language the word ‘Qanun’ means “regulation, method, principle” (Mu‘in, 1953-1954). This meaning does not fully fit the concept of the European meaning of Law, which is based on the enforcement of rule of conduct or action by a government (The Chambers Dictionary, 1994). So he tried to explain it by using different practical examples to enable people to understand it more clearly.
was one of the reasons for the prosperity of the Rome Empire and indicates that „in a free country there should never be a necessity for law breaking and adherence to lawlessness … because if the means of being an outlaw is, even, for sometimes useful, it is a destructive example (pattern). Whenever, there is the habit of breaking the consti- tution for good objectives, the same excuse can be applied for bad objectives, as well”(Ibid: 127). It has to be mentioned that this statement of Machia- velli, is; on the surface, in contradiction to what was earlier mentioned by Romulus, because, Ma- chiavelli, had stated that nobody would insult his action, if his are useful to all, Machiavelli had ad- mired the outstanding actions and over looked some humanistic and ethical criteria in establishing Roman Republic, proposed by Romulus. The in- teresting point is that Machiavelli himself was aware of the dangerous outcomes of the actions and laws which were edited in emergency condi- tions, and had intended to reduce them and had alerted about them. It meant that if there were oth- er approaches, than those proposed by Romulus for establishing governments, they would have had to be chosen, and when one was obliged to proceed Romuluism approach, she should look for decreas- ing those activities and replace them with appro- priate ones, and not to leave the limitless power to his/her substitute.
participation of the eternal law in the rational creature(7), he did suggest that in the search for principles, "it is entirely contrary to Christ's teaching to rely upon the technique of prayer alone."(8) He also rejected the guidance of intuition: "If man is prone to create God in his own image, is it not likely that in the moral sphere the Highway which he tends to recognise as good may he the one which suits his own needs and hopes and habits?"(9) Bland looked for guidance to principles immanent in Christ's teaching. Nevertheless, the "patient, studious preparation for tasks ahead" which Bland explicitly commended to his audience could hardly be regarded without elaboration as a satisfactory method of identifying the principles underlying Christ's pronouncements - despite his earlier criticisms, it almost amounted to an invitation to intuitionism - and this left the foundations of Bland's exegesis not fully developed.(10)
But what does all this really mean in terms of its practical effects? One is constantly moved, in reading Sein hold Niebuhr, to question the character and scope of the lim its that he thinks restricts man in the attainment of the . . ideal in history. Niebuhr seems content however, as in the above quotations, merely to assert that the limits do exist, based on the Biblical insight or revelation of his view of man. He may describe them as self-assertiveness, but he is adamant in his refusal to specify them in concrete terms, for to claim to know the exact limits of human perfection other than that the Absolute is not possible, is to claim Divine knowledge. Perhaps one might agree with Niebuhr that if it is prideful to abolish all limits, it must surely be no less so to claim to know them or seek to define them. Thus Niebuhr criticizes all natural law theories for portraying man as a being with a fixed and structured nature, and for compromising too readily with historical phenomena which man may increas ingly master.^
John Calvin, a Frenchman, who was born in 10 January 1509 in Noyon Diocese (near to Paris). His father was clerk in financial affair of local Diocese. Young Calvin, educated to Paris University and after end of his course in Latin Grammar, entered to College de Mon- tague as assistant to Maturin Cordia and after (McGrath, 2005: 99). His extensive study in field of civil law, make him familiar with thought that later when he has been known as crusader, used these thoughts. He studied Greek language in Orleans and in 1529, un- derstanding of Andre Alessati reputation (Italian Great Jurist) went to Burges. After his education in law course, returned to Noy- on for his father’s decease, but local council of Church excommunicated him and for this, he return to Paris to continue to his studies, but attract strongly to reformation thoughts of Looter, that newly has been paid attention by people. This is while authorities seriously hated him.
ambassador to Britain (1876-1878). Kuo kept close contact with the Chinese naval students, and had a special friendship with Yen Fu. According to Kuo's account, the subject of Yen Fu's study in the Royal Naval College was naval command. His curriculum included mechanics, chemistry, physics, mathematics, navigation, and current international military affairs, such as the German-French war and the Russian- Turkish war.*^ According to Kuo, Yen Fu was very impressed by the depth and richness of Westem science and technology,'^ by the physical strength of Westerners in contrast to the Chinese,"* and above all, by the social, economic and political ideas and systems of Britain. Yen seemed to have paid a great deal of attention to the general social, economic and political situation in Britain, and tried to understand the differences between Britain and China. He 'often spent whole days and nights discussing differences and similarities between Chinese and Westem thought and political institutions' with the Ambassador Kuo Sung-t'ao.*^ He visited the British law courts and remarked to Kuo that the reason why England and other countries of Europe are wealthy and strong is that impartial justice is daily extended. Here is the ultimate source.'*^ By contrasting Britain with China, Yen Fu developed very critical attitudes towards the current Chinese situation. In a conversation with Kuo Sung-t'ao, Yen criticized the conservative attitudes of Chinese officials as demonstrated by their opposition to everything from the West, e.g. railways, ships and technology alike.'^ He also criticized arguments used by some Chinese scholar-officials to suggest that
Machiavelli moves away from this absolute defi- nition and sets out to analyze it (Denkis, 2001). The prominence and originality of politics is the underlying assumption of his analysis of virtue and within this framework he seeks to further de- velop the possibilities of the new king—which are the same as the context of the modern politics. After around two decades of serious political ac- tivities as a king counselor and diplomat, Machia- velli came to the conclusion that he has to open a new horizon in understanding politics. His aim was not to discover the regularities of politics, but rather to discover the possibilities and opportuni- ties in front of the king. A disregard of law which is of natural stability and essence drew his atten- tion to virtue. Virtue, unlike law, principle or reg- ulation is based on politics, change and particular- ly preparedness to make a change on the part of the king. Virtue sets aside the standards and ISOs which are fixed and eternal, and seeks possibili- ties. This does not mean anarchy but refers to the independence of politics against external con- stants. And of course, it has limitations of its own (Chisholm, Ibid: 19).
to affirm suffering and the contingencies of life without experiencing or giving in to ressentiment. In this way, a will to self-responsibility is invoked and enacted but it is particular to a future-based active pathos. In other words, it is not the kind o f forced responsibility that obtains under the rule of law or in the social contract as we understand these concepts. Indeed, this will to self-responsibility or the right to make promises is a self-mastery that as Nietzsche puts it, “gives him mastery over circumstances, over nature, and over all short-willed and unreliable creatures” (GM II, 2). Nietzsche does not mean direct control over circumstances and nature but rather a will to affirmation in the face of life’s contingencies, the effects of one’s actions, and the effects o f others’ actions that one might suffer from. Thus, the sovereign individual does not, in a sense, need the law and the social contract the way the reactive type does since his will to self-responsibility accepts and affirms the burden of suffering and demands that he renounce ressentiment toward life and others as a result. This places the sovereign individual in an extra-moral realm above the common morality of present-day democratic values and it means that he is “self- legislating”.46
Related to nationalism challenge in Indonesia, there exist several matters that need and should get serious attention either now or later such: poverty problem, corruption, collusion, nepotism, classism, political currents and nationalism. 19 Among other challenges which Moslem politicians will still have to deal is the urge to reawaken national illumination resource, peaceful cultural society, phenomena of sharia appearing inside regional regulations (better assimiliating sharia in regional regulation using “capsule” approach rather than “tablet” model), problem in real sector or micro economy where sharia economy perspective can supposedly serve as an alternative, long struggle in maintenance effort for gender equivalence, saving children and nation‟s young generation, democratic consolidation (improving the quality of political elites and party system, effort to articulate quality legal drafting, consolidation of equivalence principal of all citizens before the law), ethic in art and culture away from pornography, preservation of environment, wide spreading preventive and educative spirit in all life aspects, not merely hovering over judicative and punitive issue.
this (wealth) may not circulate solely among the rich from among you" (35). In spite of its importance, zrairat, as a devotional and social obligation, is limited in effect and cannot alone lead to social justice(36). Since zakat is the minimum religious obligation on wealth, it is the task of the government to pass any taxation law it deems necessary to attain the general welfare in the realm of al-Masalih al
types in Imam Khomeini’s distinctive out- look. In fact, Imam Khomeini has frequently has discussed the divine legitimacy both in- tellectually and practically, and it has been most likely due the fact that the Islamic gov- ernment primarily should be a main execu- tive tool for actualizing the divine law as true embodiment of God’s government on earth. In “Kashf-e Asrar (the Discovery of Myster- ies)”, for instance, he writes: “no one has the right of sovereignty over the nation and no one is allowed to dominate others except God; because the exclusive right of govern- ance and legislation belongs to God himself. Logically it is expected that God establishes a government for the people and makes re- quired law. But, the law is the Islamic law (Shariah), as such, which he has established originally, then it is proved that this law will be employed limitlessly at any given time and place” (Imam Khomeini, n.d: 184). Hence, from this point of view, a govern- ment, which has been founded in order to implement divine regulations or particularly the Islamic law, will have divine legitimacy within the political organization. Further- more, his later arguments on Velayat-e Faqih explained in Persian (1968) contain certain implications on divine legitimacy of rulers. For instance, he notes that: “the Islamic Gov- ernment is nothing but a government of law. I.e. the Sovereignty and Guardianship are exclusively confined to God and naturally, the only law would be God's command. This law predominates overall members of the Islamic society. Every individual must be subordinate to the divine law from Holy Prophet himself and his successors (Caliphs) to ordinary citizens. God himself forced the Prophet Muhammad (S) by direct divine in- spiration to declare and introduce his succes-
While Hobbes does not develop the analogy of the state of nature and international relations beyond the quoted passages, his more detailed comments on defence suggest that the international realm provides greater room for peaceful coexistence. When discussing the requirements of state formation in Elements of Law, Hobbes argues that the number of individuals that agree to the social contract “must be so great, that the odds of a few which the enemy may have, be no certain and sensible advantage.” 53 In On the Citizen, Hobbes likewise describes insufficient numbers as an incentive to
Joseph Canning's preface acknowledges a debt to his research supervisor Walter Ullmann, whose Penguin History of PoliticalThought: the Middle Ages, published in 1965 (revised edition 1970) has remained a standard introduction for anglophone readers. A new short guide is timely, and the ex-student's will bid fair to replace the master's. Like Ullmann's, this book is admirably clear in presentation and exposition. It judiciously summarises a good deal of the research done over the past thirty years, and has an up-to-date bibliography, including much in Germ. an. Specialists will be grateful too for end-note citations of texts in the original Latin. The book's division into four well-defined chronological chapters of virtually equal length provides a solid structure: the first chapter goes from Late Antiquity to the eighth century; the second covers the Carolingian and post-Carolingian periods; the third opens with a clear account of the Investiture Contest and traces church-state conflicts through the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, as well as discussing the impact on political ideas of 'the revived legacy of antiquity' in law and philosophy; the fourth pursues church-state conflicts, and also conflict within the church, in the late Middle Ages, specifically through their exposition in the writings of jurists. Lines of substantial continuity are picked out and followed up consistently. Thus ten lucid pages in Chapter 1 on the Code of Justinian provide a reference-point for the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 of the revived study and application of the Code in the central and later Middle Ages; and evolving ideas of papal government are dealt with successively in all four chapters. This is, in one important sense, to go with the grain of the subject: ideas do have a life of their own, as one writer copies, modifies and refines another's work, takes up the old terminological tools, while putting them to new uses.
By focusing on the primacy of securing order Williams rejects ‘the basic relation of morality to politics as being that represented either by the enactment model or by the structural model’ (IBWD, p. 8). Political moralism pays insufficient attention to the centrality of answering the first question in realistic terms and, more often than not, forgets the contextual and historically conditioned nature of judgements about what makes sense. Williams insists that ‘inasmuch as liberalism has foundations, it has foundations in its capacity to answer the “first question” in what is now seen, granted these answers to the BLD, as an acceptable way … but this is not the foundation of the liberal state, because it is a product of those same forces that lead to a situation in which the BLD is satisfied only by a liberal state’ (IBWD, p. 8). He puts this most schematically when he writes that LEG + Modernity = Liberalism. ‘Now and around here’ we only permit liberal solutions because ‘other supposed legitimations are now seen to be false and in particular ideological’ (IBWD, p. 8). This is markedly different from claiming that liberalism is the political expression of a set of timeless moral truths or that all previous legitimation stories were false. Williams accuses political moralism of forgetting this because it has an implausible understanding of ethics as a ‘mere moral normativity’, the result of the exercise of ahistorical reasoning. He holds that such views lack a theory of error that can explain ‘why what it takes to be the true moral solution to the questions of politics, liberalism, should for the first time (roughly) become evident in European
Among these books one can mention Nezam- e Hoghough-e Zan Dar Eslam (The system of women rights in Islam), Ensan va Sarnevesht (Mankind and the destiny) -in whose intro- duction, there is a question posed about the decadence of Muslims -, Khadamat-e Moteghabele Eslam va Iran (the mutual ser- vices of Islam and Iran, Mas'ale-ye Hejab (the issue of Hejab), Akhlagh-e Jensi (sex ethics), Jazebeh va Dafe'ey-e Emam Ali (the Attraction and repulsion of Imam Ali), and Velaa ha va Velayat ha (leadership and Loy- alty) (cf. ibid: 536-537). His works in the other decades also follow the same rules. They spread from Islamic Economy to the issue of slavery, and from history to Hafez mysticism. But those of his books which are more useable for analyzing his political views and beliefs, are: Elal-e Gerayesh be Maddigari (the reasons of tendency to mate- rialism), Seiri dar Nahjolbalagheh (a survey in Nahjolbalagheh), Ghiyam va Enghelab-e mahdi PBUH (the rise and revolution of Mahdi PBUH), Dah Goftar (ten articles)- especially the article named as "The main problem in clerical system" which is his most political article-, Bist Goftar (twenty articles), Goftarhaye Ma'navi (the spiritual sayings), Nehzat-haye Eslami-e Sad Saal-e Akhir (the Islamic Causes of recent hundred years), Moghaddame'I bar Jahanbini-e Eslami (An introduction to Islamic ideology), Emamat va Rahbari (Imamah and the leadership), Jihad (Jihad), Takaamol-e Ejtemai-e Ensaan (The social evolution of the mankind), Seyri Dar Sireye Nabavi (A survey in prophet’s biog- raphy), Seyri Dar Sireye A'emmey-e At'haar (A survey in Innocent Imams' biography), Eslam va Moghtaziyyat-e Zaman (Islam and the exigencies of the time) (in two volumes), Ensaan-e Kaamel (the perfect mankind), Hemaasey-e Hosseini (the Epic of Hussein) (in three volumes), Falsafey-e Tarikh (the
98 Rousseau, Discours sur I’Origine, pp. 238-9. In the Discours, Rousseau represents the social contract as a trick played by the rich and powerful on the poor and weak. The rich stress the necessity for law in order to bring stability to society and to reduce the conflict which has grown up in the state of nature., but this form of the social contract only gives increased power to the rich and further oppresses the weak. In the Du Contrat Social, by comparison, the act of contracting is more abstract, a hypothetical coming together of equals - see Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p. 55. 99 Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, p 55: “I suppose that men come to the point where the obstacles which detract from their preservation in the state of nature are greater than the strength that each individual has to survive in this state. So, this state no longer being able to exist, humans would perish if they did not change their way of life. Now as men may not create new forces, but can only unite and direct those which exist, the only method of preserving themselves is by forming, by aggregation, the sum of their forces by which they can overcome any resistance, putting them in operation by a single force and making them act in concert”.
In their quest for designing a viable representative government, the founding fathers dedicated themselves to careful study of the political philosophy of Europeans. Focusing primarily on British political thinkers from the 16th and 17th century, the founding fathers focused primarily on the natural rights of man, which in turn varied according to the individual philosopher studied. Over the course of their study, the founding fathers openly discussed their opinions with one another so as to properly bring forth differing views in order to prudently construct a government that would protect individual liberty, as well as determine what was required of government to protect civil liberties.