By exploring these issues, we examine an important though somewhat ignored aspect of the trading system. In the European Union, for example, internal trade in motor vehicles has been hampered by an antitrust exemption for the distribution and servicing of automobiles. (See both Flam and Nordstrom, 1995, and Lutz, forthcoming.) Access to the distribution system was also at the heart of a dispute between the United States and Japan involving Kodak and Fuji film (Nanto 1998). These issues also lurk behind the impact on trade of the retail distribution systems both in Switzerland and Japan, as well as the German experience with retailing cartels and the threat of foreign retail entry to established domestic players. With the elimination of trade barriers for textiles and clothing under the WTO’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 2005, the market power of such huge buyers as Wal- Mart may also be an important factor in the transmission of price and quantity changes across global textile and clothing markets. Finally, evidence is emerging that the benefits of non-reciprocal tariff preference schemes may be captured by high-income country importing firms, rather than the low- income country exporter firms for which the programs are intended. (See, for example, Olarreaga and Ozden 2005).
and 1b corresponding to S n
ij and S ij e , respectively). Country pairs that notied STAs and
GTAs jointly (as opposed to sequentially) were, on average, more distant and less similarly sized, with larger per-capita-income dierences both relative to each other and to the rest of the world. They had higher average and more dierent levels of services-trade restrictiveness. Country pairs that put STAs and GTAs jointly (as opposed to sequentially) into force were, on average, less distant, larger, and more similarly sized, but with bigger per-capita-income dierences both relative to each other and to the rest of the world. They had higher average but more similar levels of services-trade restrictiveness. Overall, Figures 1a-1b suggest that, unconditional on other factors, there are some dierences in the dierential characteristics between STAs that were merely notied and ones that were actually put into eect.
Many European SMEs are considering entering the Chinese market. If your company’s business is based on valuable intellectual property, you may consider exporting your technology to China. There are many reasons to enter the Chinese market: access to growing Chinese demand, establishment of R&D facilities, engagement in cooperative development, access to a skilled work force, access to a large number of suppliers, or the development of long-term partnerships with Chinese businesses. One way to get a foothold in China is to license or transfer ownership of your key technology and designs to Chinese subsidiaries of European firms, joint venture partners, or Chinese manufacturing and service companies. One of the challenges facing European companies using this way to enter China is devising creative solutions to minimise the risk to their IP associated with technology transfers.
domestic competition matters for trade. Indeed, problems with competition in domestic distribution and trade activities are likely to themselves act as barriers to trade. In a European context, this means that continued competition exemptions for automobiles, for example, should indeed be expected to hinder trade substantially. In the context of multilateral negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), this also means that WTO-based liberalization of these service sectors under the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) may also mean improved marketaccess conditions for affected goods sectors along the lines developed here. More broadly, this supports the notion that the benefits of trade for exportering countries is a function of their market power vis-` a-vis trade and distribution firms in the importing countries. At the same time, increased FDI flows in the service sectors leading to increased concentration and less rather than more competition in distribution and trade services, ironically may lead to an erosion of marketaccess for goods, both in a customs union and bilateral setting. It may also erode multilateral concessions on marketaccess for goods.
The sign of equation (21) is negative whenever q ∗ m > 0. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 2, where we plot optimized tariffs, welfare, and quantities for a range of competition index values. The figure is based on the same set of model coefficients as in Figure 1. The key difference is that we are now varying our index of competition σ and then plotting optimum quantities q m ∗ and q ∗ d , along with welfare W and the optimum tariff t ∗ = (τ − 1). As can be seen in the figure, the optimal tariff rate falls with our market power index σ, as does welfare W and domestic shipments qd, while from equation (20) imports remain fixed. With the additional distortion in the market, in the form of an imperfectly competitive distribution sector, the welfare implications of trade policy become more complicated. It is evident that the optimal tariff declines with increasing concentration in services. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 2, the optimal tariff when the service sector is a monopoly is a subsidy. In the absence of such an optimal tariff offset by the government, the more concentrated the service sector, the greater its exercise of its market power and, consequently, the lower the trade volume. A tariff further reduces the volume of trade, whereas a subsidy increases the level of imports and hence consumption. Such a subsidy benefits the service sector but, as their profits are part of national welfare, a welfare maximizing government would be prepared to offer it. We summarize the relationship between tariffs, profits, trade, and welfare in the following propositions:
Rules and regulations governing international trade and investment in services are an in- creasingly important aspect of regional and multilateral trade agreements. International negotiations have focused on regulatory restrictions and barriers to cross-border trade and FDI, while research has emphasized quantifying barriers and exploring the role of traded services as inputs to the manufacturing sector. 1 In this paper, we emphasize a different role for services in economic integration, highlighting the impact of domes- tic market power in margin services on goods trade. We thus highlight a set of issues at the nexus of domestic competition policy and international trade, the interaction be- tween international goods trade and domestic marketstructure in trade and distribution sectors. Analytically, domestic marketstructure in the service sector has a direct and predictable impact on marketaccess. Our empirical results indicate that these effects can be strong enough to nullify the promise of expanded marketaccess expected under free trade agreements and customs unions (like the EU’s single market program), as well as marketaccess concessions linked to trade preferences and multilateral agreements. 2 This follows from the determinants of domestic margins applied to goods between the border and final consumers. These margin activities include domestic shipping and lo- gistic services, of course, as well as the wholesale and retail sectors and other links in the distribution chain that carries imported goods to the industrial or household consumer. In a very real sense these services make possible any interaction between producers and exporters in one country and final consumers in another.
– ARTICLE 14: TRADING RIGHTS AND RELATED RIGHTS
1. Vietnam shall adopt and maintain in force appropriate legal instruments allowing foreign pharmaceutical companies to establish foreign-invested enterprises in order to perform importation of pharmaceuticals, which duly got the marketing authorization from Vietnam's authority. Without prejudice to Vietnam’s Schedule of Specific Commitments in services contained in Annex […] under Chapter […], such foreign-invested enterprises are allowed to sell pharmaceuticals legally imported by them to distributors or wholesalers that have the right to distribute pharmaceuticals in Vietnam.
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The current model bears resemblance with few other earlier works in the literature on access pricing. Lewis and Shappington (1999) consider mechanisms under price competi- tion and asymmetric information where the entry decision is taken as given. Gautier and Mitra (2003) consider an environment where the firms produce homogenous products and compete sequentially in quantities. In their model, the marketstructure is endogenous and they show that inefficient entry can occur, i.e., a more cost effective firm could not enter the market or a less cost effective firm may enter the market. As an alternative to Ramsey pricing, the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) prescribes that the access price should be equal to the incumbent’s opportunity cost for the retail services. With this type of access pricing, (a) potential entrants can enter profitably the market only if they are more cost efficient and (b) entry is neutral with respect to the incumbent’s profit. In
appropriate generalized mean and variance are based on marginal substitution effects rather than on average trade shares. 3 In a special CES case, we show that the generalized mean and variance reduce to the trade-weighted mean and a simple function of the trade-weighted variance. In surprising contrast to the one-good case, welfare increase and marketaccess increase are substantially in conflict. The two cones of liberalization are disjoint except on a single path along which tariff changes preserve relative domestic prices, so the economy is identical to one in which only a single composite commodity is subject to tariffs. This highlights the inadequacy of the one-good framework: the coincidence between the sufficient conditions for welfare improvements and market-access increases falls apart once we move to the realistic case where two or more goods are subject to tariffs. A key reason for this contrast is that reductions in dispersion are good for welfare but bad for marketaccess.
Russians have a history for the love of expensive things. There is a proverb: “We are not rich enough to buy cheap stuff.” According to experts in the field of social psychology, the purchase of elite goods or services is always a question of prestige, of special status as well as a sign of the social "elitism" of its owner. Unlike any other consumer, the Russian consumer of luxury goods is the most glaring example of the concept of conspicuous consumption and status-seeking, concepts formulated by the economist Thorstein Veblen. There is a number of explanations for such behavior. First, the wealth has been acquired during the last 10-15 years and is therefore quite “young”, and in Russia there are absolutely no traditions for the financial management of such million-dollar fortunes. Such traditions are usually formed over centuries. The second important factor influencing people in the average age category is backlog demand. The generation of today's successful 35 to 45 year-old businessmen grew up in the period of total deficiency in the country and was denied free access to information available in the rest of the world. In this consumer group the exaggerated consumption and desire to show off is a natural psychological response to its current rise in its financial status and its awareness of global fashion trends. Essentially, Russian consumers are easily influenced by public opinion, and it is therefore important for them that the product they choose is recognized by others. Thus, in order to determine the current fashion trends in clothing, cosmetics, vacation, etc., interviews with prominent personalities, who express their consumer preferences, are frequently used.
generalised moments serve in effect as sufficient statistics for the whole n-by-one vector of tariff rates. Of course, the generalised moments are not independent of the structure of the economy: on the contrary, they are defined in terms of the general-equilibrium substitution matrix. But there is clearly a huge economy of information from the fact that everything that is relevant to small changes in welfare and marketaccess can be summarised in terms of changes in the two moments. However, there is no guarantee that the generalised moments are closely related to the standard moments which can be calculated using only information on the tariff schedule and the levels of imports. In this section, we show that the generalised moments coincide with the standard moments in a special but important case, where preferences take a homothetic constant- elasticity-of-substitution (CES) form, and where imports are imperfect substitutes for home- produced goods. The latter assumption follows Armington (1969) and is made in the vast majority of CGE models. Hence our result greatly enhances the usefulness of the generalised moments and the results based on them presented in previous sections. 16
The eﬀects of the alternative market-structure assumptions on the proﬁts of the entering multinational are interesting. Use the ﬁxed assumption as a benchmark and now introduce free entry and exit. If the ﬁrm chose green- ﬁeld under the former or switches from exporting to greenﬁeld, its proﬁts will increase with entry, whereas if it initially chose acquisition the situation is a bit more complex. If the multinational continues to choose acquisition or switches to exporting it must be worse oﬀ. But if it switches to greenﬁeld, it can be either better or worse oﬀ: free entry reduces the proﬁts from ac- quisition but increases the proﬁts from greenﬁeld. If that latter proﬁt level “jumps over”acquisition proﬁts suﬃciently that greenﬁeld proﬁts are now higher than the initial acquisition proﬁts, then the multinational is better oﬀ.
IV. Results of the experiments
A. The issues
Before considering the experimental results, it is useful to review the issues that make them relevant. The first three experimental variables (M, B and C) could imply normative policy implications. If there were some market composition minimizing the inefficiency measures, and the market. is not currently achieving that optimum, then it would be in the general interest exogeneously to impose barriers to entry or exit, to force the market toward the optimal composition. Such a direct approach falters here on the standard vector optimization problem: none of the four experimental variables is uniformly good or bad across all five inefficiency measures. Establishing an objective function for inefficiency .minimization would require some implicit or explicit prioritization of the different types of inefficiency. Such a weighting is not attempted here. A more holistic analysis of the results proves fruitful, however. It is suggested that a single microstructural fact
The benchmark was run on one of the machines to be used in the production environment. The outcome was obtained through a benchmark program which runs iterations, making a block of calls to the nanoFilters library functions in each iteration. Each library call represents the processing associated with the validation of a new order or modification. Cancellations were not included in the benchmark, as their latency is less than that for an order or modification. The order data (security, price, etc.) is changed in each library call, so that the access to the filters resembles the real situation in a production setting.
In 2009, in response to a global recession, the failure of the WTO Doha round negotiations and concerns about protectionism, there was a growing recognition that a proactive approach to marketaccess was needed to protect and advance Canada’s export interests. As a result, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) and the Canola Council invested in the Canola MarketAccess Plan (CMAP) to develop a long-term strategy for maintaining and increasing access to current and potential canola markets. Funded through AAFC’s Agricultural Flexibility Fund, as part of the federal government’s Economic Action Plan to create jobs and economic growth, the CMAP has succeeded by maintaining or growing access to markets worth over $2.3 billion in 2012 – markets whose value continues to grow each year. The CMAP encompasses the following initiatives:
having less efficient division of labour, and having less opportunities for spreading fixed managerial costs, overhead costs, fixed human-capital costs, and fixed-capital costs. Further research could establish the reasons for the presence of the minimum-efficient scale size. Apart from scale-related inefficiencies, we find evidence that X-inefficiencies related to input choices may occur in all size classes. Estimation results for the generalised stochastic frontier model (GSF) indicate that X-inefficiencies caused by sub-optimal input choices are affected by market characteristics and the regulatory environment of firms. In particular we find that business- services markets may be segmented by size class of firms. This means that firms from different size classes on average only have weak competition with firms in other size classes. Small firms hardly compete with large firms and vice versa. They possibly serve different market segments, have different clients and also different types of products.
The U.S. housing market has been through significant boom and bust in recent years. The U.S. housing price indexes, published by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), ran up by almost 40% from January 2003 to June 2006, followed by a 28% drop, unprecedented in the U.S. history. Time series studies on housing price movements using the U.S. national data include Meen (2002) and Gallin (2006). Also, Malpezzi (1999) uses a panel of 133 metropolitan areas in the USA over the period 1979 to 1996. More recently, Holly, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2010) use a panel of 49 states over the period of 1975 to 2003 to show that state-level real housing prices are driven by economic fundamentals, such as real per capita disposable income, as well as by common shocks, such as changes in interest rates, oil prices, and technological change. They apply the common correlated effects (CCE) estimator of Pesaran (2006) which takes into account spatial interactions that reflect both geographical proximity and unobserved common factors. This estimator is consistent under heterogeneity and cross-sectional