Top PDF Norms of Citizenship and Political Engagement of Young Adults

The significant positive relationship between engaged based norms and political engagement further corroborated the findings of [43] on engaged-citizenship norms which was highly correlated with civic participation especially among the (Malays and Indian) students as they tried investigating why the trend of citizenship norms is altering amongst young populace. Besides, they concluded that young cohorts have extended their paths of involvement in an independent setting by adopting novel norms of engaged citizenship, that is now connecting them to voluntary activism more than before and apart from the conventional casting of votes. This finding is not surprising because it is consistent with studies by [18,23,35,51] whereby younger age groups place more emphasis on actively helping out in their community in a non-institutionalized manner. Equally, engaged based norms having substantial relationship with political engagement tap on traditions that are beyond voting. This spurs people (i.e. students) to partake in political consumption like boycotting, buycotting, or demonstrations for reasons (like civil or ethics), controversial action as well as internet activism. Also, it is alleged that a busy citizenry is relatively well educated [31], similar to the sample of undergraduates in this research, which explains why engaged based norms persuade students’ civil activities. Thus, suggesting youngsters are energetic in volunteering, but not consistent in voting.

behavior (boyd, 2006; 2007b; boyd & Ellison, 2007; Martey & Stromer-Galley, 2007; Yee, Bailenson, Urbanek, Chang, & Merget, 2007). A few studies have already examined which political behaviors may be considered inappropriate or appropriate by Facebook users. While Vitak et al. (2011) found that Facebook users are somewhat comfortable when friends share their political views, they also noted that users are less comfortable when being persuaded to vote or support a specific candidate. Based on an analysis of 690 surveys from Facebook users, Sibona & Walczak (2011) found that the second most common reason Facebook users remove individuals from their list of friends is because those individuals make too many controversial political posts. Less than half of the 905 young adult participants in a study by Watkins & Lee (2010) shared political views in their Facebook profiles. However, these studies imply a traditional definition of political participation and do not examine many differences in the acceptability of specific political acts. Therefore, it remains an important question whether there are any differences between the norms of traditional or everyday participation.

activities instead of merely voting in elections, and these individuals are more likely to support post-materialist values, and they tend to be more liberal and less trusting of the political elites and traditional political institutions than those who are older and support materialist values (Copeland, 2014; Oser, 2016). Furthermore, it has been pointed out that such changes in civic participation, which are likely to go along with changes in citizenship norms (e.g., Oser, 2016), are likely to be a result of young people’s situation, i.e. owing to the failure of traditional labour organisations and political institutions to provide adequate political solutions to current challenges, and due to the rise of new technology, these young individuals experience less duty and obligation, identify less with political parties and lose trust in traditional political institutions and authoritative sources of political information (Wells, 2014; Wells et al., 2015). Thus, ‘demands for expression, individuality, personalization and flexibility in the acting out of civic identity’ (Wells et al., 2015, p. 203) replace duty-based norms and lead to ‘lifestyle politics’ (e.g., political consumerism, volunteering in non-political organisations), which ‘blurs the boundaries between the public and private spheres’ (Copeland, 2014, p. 262; Wells et al., 2015). In fact, the study by Martin (2012) provides some indication for the development from duty-based to engaged citizenship values may apply to Australia, too. Yet Martin did not examine different norms of citizenship but primarily relied on Australian’s participation in different political activities, which is already a step ahead of the examination of values and citizenship norms.

Another Australian study on Muslims’ religiosity and civic engagement (Johns, Mansouri, and Lobo 2015; Vergani et al. 2017) reaches similar conclusions. Based on 49 interviews and several focus groups in Melbourne, the research team found that many Muslim participants viewed Islamic practices and beliefs as anything but a civic obstacle (Johns, Mansouri, and Lobo 2015, 186). To the contrary, civic engagement and volunteering was often described as being promoted or even mandated by Islam. Overall, these study findings indicate that, in the eyes of many civically committed Muslims, Islam urges them to get involved in “active forms of community engagement and service” (Vergani et al. 2017, 72). A clear distinction between religious norms, on the one hand, and democratic (secular) values around the promotion of social justice and human rights, on the other, is often hard to draw. Vergani et al. (2017, 72, emphasis in original) identify an “overlap between religious beliefs and active citizenship practice in a republican tradition, with its emphasis on striving for the common good.”

The relative absence of young women from discussions about youth citizenship in general is well documented (Osgerby 1998, 50; Bhavnani 1991, 28-1). This is somewhat surprising as women’s life experiences have undergone significant change over recent years. They are, for example, more likely to remain in education or to enter paid employment (Jowell and Park 1998, 10). Indeed, there are more female full-time undergraduates than males at UK universities, with 55 per cent of current cohorts female compared to 45 per cent male (Ratcliffe, 2013). However, disaggregation of the data in relation to youth unemployment reveals that young women are more likely to be unemployed than young men (BBC, 2013). Such factors are generational and may well contribute to a future politicisation of young women who could be a powerful political voice. This noted, in circumstances where they do not enter either the world of work or academia, so-called ‘lifestyle’ choices such as young motherhood should also mean that women want and need to concern themselves with political issues and questions. Politicians and policy makers may well make calculated choices to ignore or at least sideline the views and wishes of young women, especially if they are the sector of society least likely to cast their vote. It should though be of some considerable concern to those interested in the health of our democracy that more young women are not currently seeking to participate in politics. However there is a need for young women to have their levels of political awareness raised to encourage greater political participation, particularly given the continued existence of such issues as sexual discrimination and sexism within society, of the gender pay gap (currently men still earn, on average, 15 per cent more than women) and domestic violence that predominantly involves males using force against women. 2 By addressing such issues, politicians can ensure that young

To test our hypotheses, we used data from the 2014 Citizenship II Module from the ISSP. This module was conducted in 34 countries, focusing on issues of civil rights, political participation, and communication (see Scholz, Jutz, Pammett, & Had- ler, 2017). In France and Finland, the survey was administered via web survey or email. The total sample was of 1,263 participants for Finland and 973 for France. Dependent variables: Political participation. The ISSP measured respon- dents’ engagement in different political actions. We classified eight items into two distinct dimensions: (1) institutional participation, and (2) non-institutional par- ticipation. We tested the fitness of these dimensions using a confirmatory fac- tor analysis, which showed good applicability in both countries (see Appendix A). Institutional participation included all items concerned with actions directly ai- med at the political system: (a) being a party member; (b) attending a political ral- ly or meeting, (c) contacting a politician (Finland (FI): M = 1.76, SD = 0.67, α = 0.63; France (FR): M = 1.69, SD = 0.67, α = 0.64). Following previous research on political participation, we excluded voting from these categories. We did so as voting is a very common activity and thus very different from other participato- ry behaviors, which would overshadow other relations in the data, or beg for it to be analyzed separately (Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier, 2010; De Rooij, 2012).

The second explanation, generational effects, argues that political attitudes and behaviour are shaped by events and circumstances at play during one’s formative years – that is, as one comes of age. People who were young adults during the 1960s, so the argument goes, are likely to possess attitudes and engage in behaviour shaped by the events and culture of those times. The most influential articulation of this argument, Inglehart’s (1997) postmaterialism thesis, argues that, in Western democracies, more recent generations express beliefs and behaviour that are decidedly different from earlier generations because they have not experienced the hardship and failure to meet material needs that comes with times of war and economic downturn such as the Great Depression. As such, recent generations (referred to as “cohorts”) have moved beyond material needs to focus on “higher order” issues such as environmentalism and human rights. An example of generational analysis is the cognitive mobilization thesis (reviewed below), which argues that recent generations express different political beliefs and behaviour given their increased level of education. Explanations for changes in attitudes and behaviour focusing on generational influences examine whether individuals in certain birth cohorts today think and act in ways similar to the same cohort in the past. Life cycle and generational effects are often both at play in shaping political and civic engagement; the difficulty lies in trying to disentangle their independent effects. In the end, age has always been a variable of particular interest to those who examine political behaviour.

There is ample evidence to suggest that social media are different from traditional media in many ways. First, these two media types often contain different information sources. Traditional media outlets normally rely for their sources on professional journalists, official authorities, organizations, and institutions (Jackob, 2010). Social media, on the other hand, contain more user-created and unsolicited information (e.g. Westerman et al., 2014). Also, in China social media have provided citizens with more diverse kinds of information than before, including critical information about political issues (Hassid, 2012). Traditional media are associated with editorial control and fact checking, and generally provide information selected by gatekeepers (e.g. editors, critics, and authorities). Social media have content from more sources (e.g. family, close friends, peers or strangers) and often lack of professional gatekeepers to check content (Song et al., 2016; Westerman et al., 2014). Second, by comparison to traditional media, social media not only offer easier and faster access to unlimited information at any time of day (Y. Li, Wang, Lin, & Hajli, 2018), but also provide more options for users who may wish to participate in activities and interact socially with others (C. Li, 2018; McKinley & Wright, 2014). For example, social media such as Facebook and Twitter offer users more opportunities to voice their opinions directly, in written political expressions and through interaction with others (Edosomwan, Prakasan, Kouame, Watson, & Seymour, 2011). In China the media system is politically oriented more than market-oriented, which may imply that, owing to the rise of the Internet, differences between state-controlled traditional media and more independent social media have augmented. Given the situation of state-controlled traditional media in China, media are regard as mouthpieces of the Party, traditional media in particular (H. Zhang, Zhou, & Shen, 2014). Although online platforms are also under the tight control of the Chinese government, there is more space for young adults to resort to opinions that are different from those of traditional media (Luo & Harrison, 2019). Understanding how traditional media are different from social media is helpful insofar as it leads to a better understanding of the credibility of traditional and social media in the eyes of young adults, as well as to a better understanding of further online engagement.

The 2016 election saw a great political divide in the American public over the two candidates running for the U.S. presidency (Enli 2017). The polarization in voters has been attributed in part to the Internet’s perpetuation of “echo chambers” and “filter bubbles” that allow people of similar political views to validate and reinforce each other’s ideologies, leading to stronger and more extreme political views (Sunstein 2009; Flaxman, Goel, & Rao 2016). It was also evident that social media engagement in relation to politics had increased since the 2012 election (Pew Report 2018). This shift may in part be related to how Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton actively utilized social media networks to bypass the mainstream media and directly influence their audiences (Enli 2017). As a whole, the 2016 presidential campaign and its outcome suggest that the Internet and social media have saturated the lives and political discourse of Americans, producing effects that remain of legitimate concern.

Interviewer: ‘Do you know what citizenship means?’ ‘Yeah, that you’ve got a passport and they’re not allowed to kick you out and all that stuff. I feel as if it [citizenship] is more a legal thing. Like, having it on paper, you know, paying for the test and having a passport. Because… I don’t know, yeah, I think it is. Although I do feel like, you know like a British citizen, but legally I probably am not.’ Mitre,15, Bulgaria)

those who have to deal with the requirements of citizenship in modern pluralistic market- oriented societies. All-encompassing moral communities would not experience the free rider problem because there would be clearly defined roles for all in every aspect of their life. Thinking about common goods would be simple because each individual would have a clear understanding of how the work that they do is connected to the education that their children receive, as well as to their familial obligations. All of these practices would be driven by a clear, mutually understood notion of the purpose of their common existence – often formed through a common church life. Thus the problem of the intelligibility of one’s standards – both in one’s own mind and when explaining one’s actions and beliefs to others – would no longer be an issue. For MacIntyre, this vision is radically distinct from the fragmented way in which most modern individuals make decisions about their children’s education, the type of work they perform (and the meaning of that work), the church they go to, the organizations they join – all without a conception of how these activities work together to form a coherent moral vision. Contemporary liberal democratic citizenship is thus, in MacIntyre’s eyes, deformed because citizens do not have the resources necessary to form coherent moral positions or the communal structure necessary to make them creatures that care about the common good. 38

• developing the type of infrastructure that enables people’s participation in decision- making using the means and methods now available in an information society Although these projects have consumed a significant amount of resources, their results have been rather modest. One may even go so far as to argue that nothing has been achieved in terms of citizen participation during the Programme’s 4-year implemen- tation period. From the lifelong learning viewpoint, it is quite interesting that adult education was left with a practically non-existent role in the development of citizen participation. Was it the intention to look into a distant future where present-day chil- dren and young people will be living the prime of their adulthood? Was it believed that the adult population’s civic capabilities were already complete and beyond the reach of education?

There has been a dramatic increase in opioid-related overdoses and deaths that have had extensive health impacts in Delaware County, New York. Social workers play a crucial role in working with individuals who have substance use and co-occurring disorders. The study was guided by ecological systems theory and the generalist intervention model focused on the engagement process between social workers and local young people. The current action research study explored the social work practice problem of challenges encountered by clinical social workers who engage in services with young adults ages 18- 25 who have or are at risk for substance use disorders in Delaware County. It is essential to identify these challenges to help improve social work services that may potentially reduce substance use rates. The practice focused research question asked the participants their perception of the challenges in providing substance use services for young adult’s ages 18-25 who reside in Delaware County. A focus group took place with 4 local private practice, licensed clinical social workers and 1 agency-based, licensed master- level social worker who all have experience working with Delaware County residents. Content analysis was used to explore and organize the data. The study revealed 7 themes that included client resistance, cultural issues, economic factors, professional

Of course, as Manfred Nowak and Alexander Lubich (2005: 80) point out, the Court was not bound to have limited itself to defining the ‘people’ for the purposes of the elections to the Bezirksvertretungen by reference to Article 1 of the Constitution, but rather it could have taken a different line in relation to the fact that these local bodies, which have very few powers, are not covered explicitly by the Constitution. If it had not concluded that these bodies are general representative bodies, it would not have felt itself obliged to apply the narrow concept of (Austrian) people to them. It is also notable that the Court hardly makes any reference to the contribution of EU law to undermining a unitary concept of ‘the people’, but rather it simply dismisses the relevance of EU law to deciding the issue in relation to other groups of ‘non-people’. Bernhard Perchinig deplores the failure to refer to the development of concepts of citizenship in the EU context, including the notion that the rights and status of third country nationals resident in the Member States should be approximated as closely as possible to those of EU citizens resident in another Member State. In any event, the Court’s narrow conclusion on the reach of a nationality-defined concept of the ‘people’ as sovereign means that the Bezirksvertretungen elections cannot become a laboratory within which the city authorities in Vienna could experiment with different participatory mechanisms to promote the integration of non-nationals, in addition to naturalized citizens who are already included in the franchise. Indeed, naturalization – however difficult it remains – is the only route to political inclusion in Austria for third country nationals.

In young adults, intake of high calorie snack food has been reported to be influenced strongly by perceived so- cial norms, as the extent to which people believe others are consuming large or small amounts of high calorie snack food affects intake [12] (although see Salvy et al. [13] for other types of social influence on eating behav- iour). Experimental studies have shown that participants eat greater amounts of high calorie snack food if they believe that previous participants in the study have eaten a large amount of snacks than if they believe the other participants have eaten a small amount [12,14]. These early studies made use of a ‘remote confederate’ design, whereby participants learn about previous participants either consuming small or large amounts of food. These findings are of interest, as participants eat alone and are therefore likely to be changing their behaviour as a result of the information they are exposed to, not just because they want to make a good impression or be liked by a dining companion. Similar effects have been observed in children, whereby beliefs about what other children have been eating have been shown to influence how much food both healthy weight and overweight children eat [15]. Another interesting observation is that being led to believe others have eaten very little food produces just as strong an effect on food intake as does eating with an- other person who has been instructed to eat very little [16]. Thus, it appears that social norms exert a substan- tial influence on food intake. Similar effects have also been reported on food choice. One study [17] found that if participants believe the norm is to select a high calorie snack food, they are more likely to make similar food se- lections. Finally, outside of the laboratory, beliefs about snack amounts consumed by peers are a significant pre- dictor of snack food intake [18,19].

This study was carried out on a total sample of 176 Emirates adults (91 males and 85 females) selected from individuals who attended the Emirates health centers, high schools and colleges according to the following criteria: natural born ethnic Emirates with Emirates grandparents, ranged in age from 19 to 25 years old, balanced and acceptable facial profiles, normal skeletal Class I with well aligned upper and lower dental arches, permanent dentition stage (the third molars may or may not be present), no history of previous orthodontic or prosthodontic treatment , no history of maxillofacial or plastic surgery, no congenital facial anomalies, and no history of systemic diseases or chronic illness that may affect the normal dentofacial growth.

Professional  science  communicators  are  also  included  in  the  study  to  provide  a  broader  view   of  science  engagement.  Professional  science  communicators  were  defined  as  those  whose   primary  work  responsibility  was  for  some  aspect  of  science  communication,  e.g.  at  a   museum,  media  professional  etc.  Furthermore,  science  teachers  were  included  within  the   overall  sample  as  this  category  of  staff  routinely  engages  with  other  practitioners  to  run   science  engagement  events.  Finally,  ‘pro-­‐ams’  (amateurs  with  specialized  scientific   expertise)  were  also  sampled,  that  is,  those  with  a  particular  interest  in  some  area  of   scientific  endeavour,  but  who  do  not  seek  to  gain  formal  qualifications  in  relation  to  that   interest  (Leadbetter  and  Miller,  2004).  Pro-­‐am  scientists  might  include  amateur  

The application of corporate branding theory to the political arena allows political parties, candidates, politicians and coalitions otherwise known as ‘political brands’ to develop desired identities and reputations, create an authentic-credible offering of intangible and tangible elements and to project an ideal position to multiple stakeholders (Nielsen 2015; Scammell 2015; Speed et al. 2015). Corporate political brand can be conceptualised as a trinity of elements including the party, leader and policy (Butler et al. 2011; Davies and Mian 2010; Smith and French 2011). Corporate ‘political’ brands are multifaceted constructs yet should provide a clear, understandable, consistent message and avoid ambiguity to be considered authentic, credible and successful (Gurau and Ayadi 2011; Phipps et al. 2010; Smith and French 2009). However, attempting to capture and comprehend political brands particularly from an ‘external’ voter-citizen perspective can be challenging and confusing as there are very few models, tools and techniques designed to undertake this task (Baines et al. 2014; Scammell 2015; Speed et al. 2015). This raises the question of how to capture and understand the long- term external orientation of political brands?

This thesis has shown that Vietnamese-Austrahans value Australian citizenship, regarding it as providing the opportunity to participate fully in society. People v^^ished to leave behind their 'statelessness' and become a part of this country.-^they are entitled to the same benefits as any other citizen, but particularly express a strong desire to contribute to the development of Australian society.\^Most Vietnamese-Australians retain strong emotions about the country they had to leave and the family members who stayed behind, or were lost. Because the Vietnamese family is central to traditional culture, such feelings are perfectly natural and should not prevent people participating in society herei There are also many who still have an active interest in homeland politics, in other words, the fight for democracy and human rights in Vietnam, together with removal of the communist regime in Hanoi. Again, it is necessary to appreciate the tragedies and suffering that have been experienced by these people, but this does not mean that their political opinions should be accepted without question. Vietnam has changed and is changing and, at some point, the decision must be made to move forward within the more immediate society, providing more assistance to the local community and participating in the broader Australian society. Austraha and Vietnam have a long-standing relationship within which dialogue occurs and it is important to maintain such communication as the best way of tackling the issues of human rights and democracy in Vietnam.

We are inviting you to participate in a research study that will attempt to identify the benefits of physical activity and exercise for youth and young adults with childhood onset phys[r]