Top PDF Philosophy And History Of Science Beyond The Kuhnian Paradigm pdf

Philosophy And History Of Science   Beyond The Kuhnian Paradigm pdf

Philosophy And History Of Science Beyond The Kuhnian Paradigm pdf

Instead, three alternative approaches to the relationship between philosophy and history of science have been sketched: Hacking’s account of styles of reasoning as a history of the prese[r]

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Integrating History and Philosophy of Science

Integrating History and Philosophy of Science

From these figures alone one might conclude that the call for work that would integrate the history and philosophy of science in a meaningful way has gone, if not unheard, at least only faintly heard, since Feigl called for a change in attitude almost forty years ago. But there is one further place to look. 1996 saw the first meeting of a new international grouping, HOPOS, whose concern is with the history of the philosophy of science. Its growth since that first meeting at Virginia Tech has been truly meteoric. Meeting every two years, alternately in North America and Europe, it appears to have built up an academic constituency faster than its founders could ever have thought possible. At its last meeting, held in Paris in 2006, there were 68 sessions spread over five days, five sessions in parallel in most of the time periods. In all, a stunning 257 papers were presented. Though the US was well represented, as one would expect, what was most significant about this meeting was that the majority of the papers were presented by European scholars. It is clear that the historical dimension of the philosophy-of-science enterprise evokes an impressive degree of scholarly interest on both sides of the Atlantic. Its future in the academy seems secure. Learning philosophy through study of the history of philosophy has always been a favored route. It is all the more appropriate a way to proceed when one takes into account the historical nature of the sciences themselves and thus of the philosophical reflections that they have inspired over the ages. In at least one of the HPS doctoral programs in the US, a two-semester sequence in the history of the philosophy of science is a required part of the graduate program. HOPOS is well on its way.
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The Decisive Role Played by Leibniz in the History of Both Science and Philosophy of Knowledge

The Decisive Role Played by Leibniz in the History of Both Science and Philosophy of Knowledge

The crucial problem of Western philosophy of knowledge was to recognize its foundations. By comparing past mathematical and physical theories I have ob- tained a new conception of the foundations of science. In the above a dichotomy regarding the two main kinds of logic was exemplified in a crucial case-study of the history of philosophy. In addition, in Mathematics some decades ago a long and obscure work achieved a new formalization of calculus and more in general of the whole of Mathematics; this constructive mathematics is new to the extent that it avoids (almost all) idealistic notions (Markov, 1962; Bishop, 1967). At present, although its premises are incompatible with those of classical mathe- matics, it is considered by mathematicians to be on a par with classical mathe- matics. I conclude that the foundations of science include two basic dichotomies, one in mathematics and the other in logic (Drago, 1987; Drago, 1996).
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Towards a methodology for integrated history and philosophy of science

Towards a methodology for integrated history and philosophy of science

Abstract We respond to two kinds of skepticism about integrated history and philos- ophy of science: foundational and methodological. Foundational skeptics doubt that the history and the philosophy of science have much to gain from each other in prin- ciple. We therefore discuss some of the unique rewards of work at the intersection of the two disciplines. By contrast, methodological skeptics already believe that the two disciplines should be related to each other, but they doubt that this can be done successfully. Their worries are captured by the so-called dilemma of case studies: On one horn of the dilemma, we begin our integrative enterprise with philosophy and proceed from there to history, in which case we may well be selecting our his- torical cases so as to fit our preconceived philosophical theses. On the other horn, we begin with history and proceed to philosophical reflection, in which case we are prone to unwarranted generalization from particulars. Against worries about selec- tion bias, we argue that we routinely need to make explicit the criteria for choosing particular historical cases to investigate particular philosophical theses. It then be- comes possible to ask whether or not the selection criteria were biased. Against worries about unwarranted generalization, we stress the iterative nature of the pro- cess by which historical data and philosophical concepts are brought into alignment. The skeptics’ doubts are fueled by an outdated model of outright confirmation vs. outright falsification of philosophical concepts. A more appropriate model is one of stepwise and piecemeal improvement.
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Quantum mechanics and Indian philosophies: A contribution to the history and philosophy of science

Quantum mechanics and Indian philosophies: A contribution to the history and philosophy of science

In this paper we have study four quantum experiments that challenge the “common sense” of reality. In fact, in the 20 th century, the emergence of Quantum Mechanics and Transpersonal Psychology have contributed to challenge our “common sense” about the vision of the world. It is true that scientific progress have allowed us an improvement in our day to day life, but the core of the questions that were raised in the Introduction of this paper, still remain to be answered by contemporary society, such as What is the role of the human being in the Universe (the choice of the observer)? How we could explain the exceptional capabilities of the human brain (telepathic communication)?What is the purpose of Life (the perception of Life)?.In this regard, Prigogine (Prigogine and Stengers, 1986). suggested “a new alliance” between science (physics, biology, chemistry) and humanities/social sciences (history, philosophy, psychology) in order to answer the previousquestions in a transdisciplinary and in a deeper way.
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Traditional Knowledge as a Tool for Discussing History and Philosophy of Science in Teacher Education

Traditional Knowledge as a Tool for Discussing History and Philosophy of Science in Teacher Education

The results from this field research were presented by means of a written re- port and a poster during a mini-conference at the university. The reports needed to be written based on the theories of history and philosophy that had been dis- cussed. In total, 23 reports were produced. These reports were read and gathered by similarity generating excerpts that could be associated with elements of scien- tific literacy. This analysis followed qualitative content analysis principles (Bar- din, 2006). This analysis allowed to identify indicators relating to three issues: the nature of comprehension of science, scientific language and socioscientific issues (Santos, 2007). These indicators were assembled in categories that can be considered to form a representation of the students’ scientific literacy.
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History and Philosophy of Science: A Phylogenetic Approach

History and Philosophy of Science: A Phylogenetic Approach

As one traces back through the history of a current theory, one finds various alternatives. This historical research opens up a space of theoretical possibilities that were earlier rejected, or not considered, but in the light of current problems, may seem interesting and suggestive. Stephen J. Gould often mines the history of science in search of alternatives to neo-Darwinism, for example. His claims about ‘the hardening of the Neo-darwinian synthesis’ are claims that a variety of theoretical options available for exploration in the early work of people like Sewall Wright and George G. Simpson were simply not pursued. Why weren’t they? Should they have been? Would those options help us with some of the foundational problems in evolutionary biology today? These are historical questions with philosophical pay-offs.
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History and Philosophy of Science : An Analysis

History and Philosophy of Science : An Analysis

In Buddhist thought, recognizing the occurrence of any phenomena is first justified by the doctrine of Origination in Dependence where everything is somehow connected. Therefore, the key principles for maintaining our world are inherently linked to bio- diversity and symbiosis in nature. This mutualism is suitably expressed in the simile of Indra‘s Net describing the aspect of ―arising from causation (engi)‖ in the Huayan or Flower Garland Sutra (kegon-kyo) in Buddhist literature. The simile describes a great net that hangs in the palace of Indra, the God of Thunder. The net has countless joints or knots adorned with jewels in a beautifully complex mesh. Each of these jewels clearly reflects all the other jewels in the net, so that every part of the net reflects all other parts. The knots of the net express each living entity, and the net is stabilized so that the relation is complicated. The reason each link or knot is expressed as a jewel implies that each living entity has value beyond imagination, and projecting other jewels signifies the mutual respect and deep relationship each living entity has towards one another. But, if parts of the net are cut out or a jewel is removed, the stability of the mesh will be lost. It is said that the mesh of the net is so complex that it would extremely difficult to pinpoint the area that has been cut or removed, and even more difficult to determine where the next break may occur which would eventually bring the entire net down. This parable correctly explains the process of environmental degradation and collapse of an ecosystem. At present, we often overlook the impact of the extinction of a few small animals in nature. However, the simile of the sutra suggests that it is very difficult to predict where and how the potential extinction will influence the ecosystem in the future. Further, we are forewarned that the entire ecosystem could collapse by the destruction of one link. The parable distinctly reveals the meaning of the concept, ―arising from causation.‖
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Some dimensions of commonsense reasoning about the physical world : an empirical study of the structure of students' conceptualisations

Some dimensions of commonsense reasoning about the physical world : an empirical study of the structure of students' conceptualisations

Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science will make it possible to relate commonsense reasoning about entities in Science to the ways in which the scient[r]

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The Nexus Between Philosophy and Science: The Import of Philosophy of Science to Science and Philosophy Itself

The Nexus Between Philosophy and Science: The Import of Philosophy of Science to Science and Philosophy Itself

This quotation implies that in the long history of mankind both philosophy and science have a common background in the sense that, as commonly believed, there was a time when philosophy has a nick name ‘a mother of all sciences.’ 1 Basically the relation between philosophy and science are intertwined or interdependence so as in both disciplines there is epistemology, metaphysics and different kinds of theories that are common for both of them even though the way they look at things are different. In other words, Science gave philosophy a way of empirically testing theories and concepts, while philosophy can contribute indirectly to the development of scientific theories that we are using today in a different ways. Furthermore, Philosophy also enables to show what areas science can and cannot test, demarcating the boundary between physical and metaphysical questions and thereby, based on this boundary both disciplines developed their own way of conducting research over the centuries. In line with this, philosophy of science also underlies methodology and foundations of the scientific process that contributes in shaping science in today’s world. To show how one influence the other, let me briefly discuss concepts like: logical positivism, Copernicus influence on the Kant’s philosophy (Kant’s Copernican Revolution), Descartes’ philosophy on Quantum theory in physics, Heisenberg’s notion of “The role of modern physics in the present development of human thinking” etc.
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A retrospective view on the history of natural sciences in XX XXI

A retrospective view on the history of natural sciences in XX XXI

The quantum mechanics, in difference from the classi- cal (non-quantum) physics, revealed that on the micro- scopic level there is the un-removable indeterminism, represented by the uncertainty relations of Heisenberg, by the essential non-locality of the particle-waves (still un- measured, i.e. before measurements) and also by the measurements with the discrete interaction of the micro- scopic objects and the measurement devices (when, for instance, there are the photons are emitted and absorbed). Then in quantum mechanics there is the problem of the interpretation of the quantum measurements and particu- larly the wave-function collapse etc, when the state of the measured system is formed by the observer [5,6]. All these problems and paradoxes had arisen as a challenge to the philosophy and even now bring to the acute discus- sions [5,6]. And if the majority of the physicists agree with the Bohr Copenhagen interpretation of the quantum mechanics, a certain part of the physicists still assumes that A.Einstein was righteous in his statement that the quantum theory (in its Copenhagen interpretation) does not directly describe the reality. Still the more acute situa- tion had arisen from other quantum phenomena such as
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METHOD AND METAPHOR IN ARISTOTLE’S SCIENCE OF NATURE

METHOD AND METAPHOR IN ARISTOTLE’S SCIENCE OF NATURE

Perspective” in Freeland, Ed., Feminist Reflections on the History of Philosophy. I disagree with some details of her interpretation, but it is an excellent guide to these issues. Witt interprets the argument for the principle of separation “as a means of keeping the better, more divine principle (form) from the inferior, material principle.” She argues that “[t]he better, more divine principle needs a location separate from the inferior material principle. Hence, the need for two sexes. On my interpretation the characterization of the two principles in this text simply re-states the intrinsic normative features of form and matter in Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Their respective locations (form in the male and matter in the female), however, is not an intrinsic feature of hylomorphism. The locations of the better principle and the worse principle reflect the value accorded to men and women in Aristotle’s culture. Where would one locate a more divine, better principle than in the male, given the respective social and political positions of men and women?” (Witt, 126- 7). On Witt’s view, Aristotle’s attribution of greater divinity and goodness to males follows from a kind of associative chain of reasoning: divinity and goodness belongs to the form, form belongs to the first efficient cause, and the first efficient cause belongs to the male but not the female. And so, the male is better and more divine than the female because it is associated with the form. But why should Aristotle attribute divinity and goodness to the formal cause? Presumably, because it is prior in actuality to the matter on which it operates. In other words the formal-efficient cause is actually-F because it contains the form, whereas the material cause is only potentially-F because it lacks form, and since form is the end of a teleological process, and the actual existence of a form is better, something that is actually-F is better than something that is only potentially-F. I think there are two problems with this as an interpretation of [ii]. First, neither the male nor the female contributes anything to the process of generation that is actually-F. The male seed has soul potentially, as does the female katamenia. Second, both a male and female animal are actually-F. If we are to claim the actuality/potentiality distinction is doing any work in this passage, we would have to say that the female is less actually-F, or imperfect, while the male is actually-F. This is something Aristotle will go on to say, but he cannot say it here. If he did, the argument would be question begging: the reason for distinct sexes is precisely what is at issue. Nor does he say the male is better than the female because the female is a
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Scientific Prediction in the Beginning of the “Historical Turn”: Stephen Toulmin and Thomas Kuhn

Scientific Prediction in the Beginning of the “Historical Turn”: Stephen Toulmin and Thomas Kuhn

Even though Toulmin emphasizes the importance of history of science and the difference between the historical periods, his philosophy of science highlights the internal factors of scien- tific activity. For him, the central aims of science lie in the field of intellectual creation. Thus, other activities — such as pre- dicting — “are properly called ‘scientific’ from their connec- tion with the explanatory ideas and ideals which are the heart of natural science” (Toulmin, 1961: p. 38). In this regard, a few years later, Toulmin criticizes Kuhn’s views on the distinction between normal and revolutionary science. He wants to em- phasize that “any attempt to understand the nature of intellec- tual development in science must, surely, be to distinguish between the intellectual authority of an established conceptual scheme and the magisterial authority of a dominant individ- ual.” 15
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Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections

Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections

“alternatives : scientific theories :: objections : philosophical theories” (Mizrahi 2014, 428). In that respect, it is important to note that Stanford’s PUA is supposed to point to a real problem in the history of science, not merely to a logical problem. That is to say, Stanford’s PUA is not merely a logical problem of failing to conceive of logically possible alternatives to then- well-confirmed theories. Rather, Stanford’s PUA is a real problem of failing to conceive of empirically viable alternatives to then-well-confirmed theories, which turned out to be equally confirmed by the evidence. This is because, for Stanford, an unconceived alternative is a competing theory that is “well confirmed by the body of actual evidence we have in hand” (Stanford 2006, 18). That is, a mere logical possibility is not an unconceived alternative because it is not a competing theory that is “well confirmed by the body of actual evidence we have in hand.” For example, the hypothesis that the universe is accelerating because God is blowing wind on galaxies is not an unconceived alternative to the dark energy hypothesis because it is not confirmed (let alone well confirmed) by the body of actual evidence we have in hand. On the other hand, the Tychonic system was an empirically viable alternative, not merely a logical possibility, and hence a serious contender and a serious objection to the heliocentric model. For this reason, it will do scientific antirealists who endorse Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science no good to object to the New Induction on the History of Philosophy by saying that some (not yet conceived) objections lack the power to undermine now-defensible theories.
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Philipp Frank: Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, and Social Engagement

Philipp Frank: Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, and Social Engagement

Philipp Frank––physicist, philosopher, and early member of the Vienna Circle––is often neglected in retrospective accounts of twentieth century philosophy of science, despite renewed interest in the work of the Vienna Circle. In this thesis, I argue that this neglect is unwarranted. Appealing to a variety of philosophical and historical sources, I trace the development of Frank’s philosophical thought and, in so doing highlight the roles played by history, sociology, values, and pragmatism in his philosophy of science. Turning to contemporary literature, I then argue that Frank’s work should be understood as an early instance of what is now called “socially engaged philosophy of science.” This understanding is explored through a careful consideration of his work on education, where previous work on history, sociology, values, and pragmatism is applied to an important, real-world problem. This socially engaged reading of Frank extends beyond pragmatic issues of theory application, because as I show, Frank used sociology to argue for the meaningfulness of metaphysical claims. However, Frank’s account of meaning may seem to be problematic since it heavily relies on Percy Bridgman’s operationalism. So, I outline the problems associated with Bridgman’s account of operationalism and show that Frank’s view does not fall prey to the same criticisms. After these objections are addressed, Frank’s work is contextualized in the broader debate about value-free science, where I argue that Frank did not endorse the value-free ideal. As a result of these findings, we will not only have a clearer picture of Frank’s philosophical contributions, but also a better understanding of how the philosophy of science can better engage important social issues.
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Intellectual history

Intellectual history

approaches to intellectual history that have been advanced by two very different schol- ars: Mark Bevir and Dominick LaCapra. Informed by post-analytic philosophy – and hence no easy read for historians unfamiliar with the philosophical discipline – Bevir's Logic of the History of Ideas, published in 1999, provides a normative second-order study of intellectual history and the human sciences in general, exploring key concepts of the field such as tradition, meaning and belief. As Bevir explained in one of the numer- ous debates on his book, the Logic may also be read as an attempt to put the approach of the Cambridge School on a surer philosophical footing. 39 Taking his cue from the philosophical strands of "holism", "postfoundationalism" and "folk psychology", and drawing on philosophies of mind, language and action as developed by Wittgenstein, Quine and Davidson, Bevir maintains that ideas cannot have any innate meanings but possess meaning only in relation to agents, which alone are able to provide the "back- ground theories" that lend meaning to ideas. Therefore, ideas only exist as beliefs, which historians are to ascribe to people while being governed by logical presump- tions in favour of sincere, conscious and rational beliefs – "rational" being defined as "consistent". These beliefs are, moreover, part of wider "webs of belief" which arise against the background of intellectual and social traditions. "Webs of belief" is one of the Logic's pivotal terms, one which Bevir borrows from Quine and Ullian's classic in- troduction to the study of rational belief, 40 and which is, in fact, at the heart of Bevir's
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A New Task for Philosophy of Science

A New Task for Philosophy of Science

Standard empiricism. The basic aim of physics is truth, nothing being presupposed about the truth. The basic method is to assess claims to knowledge impartially with respect to evidence. When it comes to deciding what laws and theories to accept, considerations of simplicity, unity, or explanatory power may legitimately influence choice of law or theory in addition to empirical success and failure, but not in such a way that nature herself, or the phenomena, are presupposed to be simple, unified, or comprehensible. Again, choice of theory may, for a time, be biased in the direction of some metaphysical view, Kuhnian paradigm, or Lakatosian “hard core.” The decisive point is that no permanent thesis about the world can be accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independent of evidence. 2
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Contextuality: A Philosophical Paradigm,
with Applications to Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Contextuality: A Philosophical Paradigm, with Applications to Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Contextuality does not lead to radical relativism. That everything is dependant of a context by no way means that “anything goes”. This is because we share most parts of our Seelenzustandes, precisely because most parts of them are learned socially. It is because we have many parts in common in our Seelenzustandes that we can communicate, and attempt to agree on what we perceive and do in our world. We would describe the paradigm we propose as a contextual relativism grounded on experience. This is because even when everything is dependent of a context, Seelenzustandes are developed and shaped though experience. And since we share similar environments, and we are all in the same universe, our experiences will be similar, and therefore our Seelenzustandes will also be similar. Experience limits the possibilities of our contexts.
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Experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy

Experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy

The methodological importance for Boyle of personal experience of discrete results of empirical investigation does align him with experimental philosophy in the sense of Systma and Livengood. Boyle’s personal involvement in generating the airpump data corresponds to the do-it-yourself character of experimental philosophy as Systma and Livengood define it. But it also raises a question of the coherence of a research programme geared to natural histories as opposed to common opinions and textual sources. If personal observation of phenomena, including experimental results, is supposed to contribute to a written record of natural phenomena that others subsequently rely on, then the natural histories of the experimental philosophers contribute to second-hand explananda just as much as textbook results. They may be more specific, and more reliably described, second-hand explananda than those derived from textual sources with no explicit conception of the dependence of natural philosophy on natural history, but they are second-hand all the same. 11 In other words, the more natural history is compiled and relied on,
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The Kuhnian mode of HPS

The Kuhnian mode of HPS

Realism   in   the   face   of   the   Pessimistic   Meta   Induction. The Pessimistic Meta Induction (PMI) has been  proposed as an argument against scientific realism. From the fact th[r]

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