On the other hand, Tusi in his famous book "Naseri Morality" argues that the ex- pansion of "public charity" needs politics and the signifier of central politics in his thought- according to Foucault’s discourse method-is formation the government so, examined this issue is obvious. Tusi's attention to human characteristics personality and exist the good and evil forces in his show that he put deep thought in Islamic anthropology. He believes that if governor does not know the knowledge and science affaires, how he could his duties in critical condition.
Investigation and thinking on concepts such as knowledge, power and legitimacy is considered one of the most important subjects in this study. Till now, the concepts of knowledge and power by using Foucault's discourse on Ghazali political thought, have not studied by researchers And this is may be one of the innovations of this research. Of course, in this article we will act de- scriptive – analytical method and using Foucault's discourse concepts. So, Due to the position of each of these concepts in Islamic thought, Assessment the position of power, knowledge and legitimacy in the Ghazali political thought will be analyzed. The results that obtained during this study, investigate the position of knowledge, power and legitimacy in the political structure of Ghazali government. In Ghazali political thought, the concept of knowledge have the superior position in structure and form of his government and in this structure, Knowledge is in the ser- vice of the government and power; That this claim within the Ghazali intellectual framework observed for defining Esteslahy policy, But since Ghazali knows the greatness of caliph as a factor for the homage, formation and survival of the government and believes A special place for the ruler and king for community administration, In practice, says the primacy of power over knowledge so, getting out the legitimacy of power.
It seems to us there is a need to enhance understanding of the nature of compliance, how it is elicited, and how it recursively constitutes a form of resistance particularly amongst professionals such as R&D scientists who enjoy high degrees of operational autonomy and whose knowledge is closely woven into their conception of identity. While Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) describe managers as ‘knowledge-engineers’, a view that invests in managers positional legitimacy in the exercise of power and control, Swan, Scarbrough, and Robertson (2002) have characterized managers’ ability to exploit ‘communities of practice’ in order to legitimize new practices where they recognize they are up against more powerful professional groups. These scenarios highlight the contested nature of the knowledge-appropriation context, one in which tacit knowledge is not directly appropriable because it cannot be directly transferred (Grant, 1996), and where it cannot be taken for granted that people will willingly share knowledge (Currie & Kerrin, 2003; Konstantinou & Fincham, 2010). This in turn raises important questions not just about power asymmetry but also about identity, whereby individuals either through strong cohesive groups or individually come to identify themselves with certain work practices and determine the form and extent of their engagement with technology (Shamir, 1991), or with management practices (Doolin, 2002).
To study elusive power relations, Foucault invented the neologism ‘governmentality’, which referred in a narrow historical sense to the distinctly new approach to governing, emerging in Europe from the sixteenth century, “which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy” (Foucault, 1991, p. 102). In a more general way, though, ‘governmentality’ is conceived as “a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed)” (Gordon, 1991, p. 3); or, as the way in which thought both “operates within our organized ways of doing things” (Dean, 1999, pp. 17-18) (‘regimes of practices’) and “is embedded within programs for the direction and reform of conduct” (Dean, 1999, p. 18).
Results: Laparoscopic distal pancreatectomy was performed in a total of 21 cases, among which TUSI-LDP was performed in 14 cases. As far as the demographical results concerned, there were no significant differences between the two groups. The conversion to open surgery was conducted in one case in the TUSI-LDP group because of severe adhesion between pancreatic cyst and surrounding tissues, while in the C-LDP group the only one conversion was for the difficult detection of small lesion. The mean operating time and intraoperative blood loss in TUSI-LDP group was a little shorter (166.4 ± 57.4 versus 202.1 ± 122.5 minutes, p > 0.05, and 157.1 ± 162.4 versus 168.6 ± 157.4 ml, p > 0.05). The postoperative pain and post-operation lengths of hospital stay in the TUSI-LDP group were also less, though there was no significant statistical difference between the two groups. For the post-operation complications, in TUSI-LDP group the pancreatic leakage occurred in only one case, and ceased spontaneously with only a drain for 61 days. There were no other complications including postoperative hemorrhage, venous thrombosis, infections and so on in both groups.
Several other reasons exist. Firstly the London Guidelines were mentioned by Alvarez as being an example of regulation making by UNEP (Alvarez, 2005). It can therefore be assumed that this guidelines fall under the law making power of this IO. Secondly the London Guidelines were chosen because of their content. Not only are they complementary to UN and World Health Organization (WHO) instruments and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Code of conduct on this matter but they also contain and explain the PIC (Prior Informed Consent) procedure. Even if this procedure is voluntary it was meant to significantly help in the trade of potentially hazardous chemicals. According to Sands by 1998, more than 150 countries had designated national authorities with the sole reason to implement the PIC procedure (Sands, 2003). So even if the implementation proved difficult, this number shows that this procedure and therefore the London Guidelines which contains them have a strong peer pressure potential. In other words, even if these Guidelines are only made as being soft law they still may have quite an impact in the international community. One reason why the MEA Guidelines are important for this thesis is that they are firstly the latest soft law conducted by the UNEP according to its website and secondly got some complementary documents after their adoption, which allows even to take a look at how the
Another difficulty in this particular enterprise of legitimizing the EU's normative power lies in the content of the universalism Sjursen identifies as the right standard against which to judge the EU's actions. Sjursen opts for the "thin universalism" of Habermasian communicative ethics mentioned above. She argues that anything other than the higher order norms of equality, freedom, solidarity, self-realization and human dignity brings cultural bias into the normative equation. Sjursen distinguishes between norms as values and norms as rights. The former are culturally bound, the latter universalizable. The trouble with this distinction is that it empties universal categories of much of their content. Instead of thinking of universalism in terms of concrete outcomes and visions for the future that demand a transformation of society, Sjursen's thin universalism is essentially procedural. It is about how individuals should relate to each other, rather than about what individuals can achieve when they act in concert. Such is the message from another member of the ARENA group of Habermasians, E. Erikson, who argues that the EU should follow a principle of universalization that is deontological instead of axiological. In Erikson's words, this "question of fairness… is concerned with what we are obliged to do when our actions have consequences for others". In his own account of Habermasian discourse ethics, Andrew Linklater draws out the meaning of the distinction between deontology and axiology. He argues that "discourse ethics sets out procedures to be followed… it does not offer putative
resistances’ ‘to the ubiquity of power’. The work of Chong Ho Shon (2002) illustrates these processes by exploring the detail of encounters between the police and citizens; for example, he notes that ‘prior research has overlooked instances of language use where the meaning and intention is ambiguous or where a participant subverts the communicative process by saying one thing to mean another’. (Chong Ho Shon, 2002, p. 151). Edwards and Sheptycki (2009) similarly identify a new form of criminology (‘third wave’), which acknowledges the politics of research without a partisan approach.
in determining Egypt’s orientation towards the world: Egyptian national identity, Arab identity, Islamic identity or Western/Mediterranean identity. Thus, “even in a society with significant ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, different identities have been constructed and employed to shape the country’s orientation and its identification of allies and enemies” (Karawan 2002, p.156). As Hinnebusch puts it, “the Middle East has a unique combination of both strong sub-state identities and powerful supra-state identities that, together, dilute and limit the mass loyalty to the state” (Hinnebusch 2005, p.153). Indeed, Egypt has been much affected by the strong supra-state identities; i.e. Arabism and Islamism, and, to quite lesser extent, by sub-state loyalties. It has often been possible, as Hinnebusch (2003; 2002, pp.7–8) notes, for the counter-elites to exploit the incongruence between nation and state, or identity and sovereignty, to mobilise segments around supra-state identity; i.e. mainly Islamism after the June 1967 War. Even before 1967, Nasser was only able to defeat Islamism and consolidate his rule by adopting a version of Arab nationalism that became the official ideology of the state. This has changed after Nasser, under Sadat and Mubarak, who made Egyptianism the state’s official ideology (with selective employment of other ideologies). The identity conflict that Egypt has been living for more than a century reflected itself in an on-going struggle between three ideational conceptions: Arabism, Islamism and Egyptian nationalism. The collapse of the Ottoman caliphate in the beginning of the 20 th century created an “identity vacuum” (Hinnebusch 2005, p.154) for Egyptians (Tadros 2013). The caliphate represented the ultimate reference of legitimacy, and its demise left Egyptians, especially after the formal independence in 1922, facing the tough question of deciding who has the right to rule; in other words: legitimacy. The response at the time was twofold: Arabism and Islamism. Both Arabism and Islamism, “challenged the legitimacy of the individual states and spawned movements promoting their unity as a cure for the fragmentation of the felt community” (Hinnebusch 2005, p.154). Indeed, “trans-state identities—Arabism and Islam—are, for many people, more emotionally compelling than identification with the state” (Hinnebusch 2002, p.30).
Finkelstein, 1999). These competing influences underlie many of the merger typologies (e.g., Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; Marks and Mirvis, 2001), from preservation where ongoing separateness between the merging parties is emphasized to symbiotic mergers where synergies pursued via integration are pursued (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Nonetheless, research is needed to explore the relationship between the legitimacy strategies suggested here and merger integration dynamics, including the extent to which particular legitimation strategies are associated with the different modes of integration in the existing merger literature, such as absorption, preservation and symbiotic approaches (e.g., Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). It is likely that the oscillation dynamic we outline here is most prevalent in those mergers seeking at least some degree of synergy and integration between the two entities as a source of merger value. Building on this point that mergers often wrestle with the competing demands for integration and separateness often stemming from various stakeholders, the dynamic embedded in our framework also can illuminate the management of legitimacy in relation to contradictory demands from different stakeholders in post-merger contexts. Generally, the oscillation dynamic is also likely to be more evident when merging the organizations creates a range of competing pressures for integration and separation. Such situations could include having distinct, established or favorable reputations or well- established brands that provide rationales for separateness as well as negative consequences should spillovers occur, or when top management’s self-interests are closely tied to the success of the merger (Sinha et al., 2012) which escalates a drive for continued integration.
The difference between the courts and other political institutions is key to the theory of positivity bias, and Gibson and Caldeira expand on this distinction with what they call expectancy theory (2011a). Importantly, individuals understand that the role of the judiciary contains a policy-making component and that discussion of philosophy and ideology by judges is acceptable. These activities are acceptable to the public so long as judges maintain the appearance of being fair and impartial arbiters of the law. Gibson explains that expectancy theory begins with individuals varying in their expectations of the appropriate behavior of judges. Members of the public assess the activity of judges against their own expectations and any “dissatisfaction diminishes legitimacy accorded to the court” (Gibson 2012, 111). The source of institutional legitimacy is the expectation that judges make fair and impartial decisions during the procedural component of any case. However, “fair and impartial” may mean different things for different people, and they may vary in their preferences when the choice becomes, for example one of rule of law versus fairness versus broader societal values (Gibson 2012, 89–90). While
particular kinds of intellectual voices and scholarship with spaces for critical engagement and debate. The response by the media to the SOAS campaign illustrates that any production of alternative, resistant knowledges, even within the context of a university, can be dismissed as unqualified knowledge, resulting in the continued epistemological exclusion and marginalization of alternative knowledges. In fact the ruptures to existing Eurocentric knowledge sought by the students aimed only for a greater representation of non-European philosophers and thinkers in order to envision alternative knowledges and diverse ways of thinking and the openness of curricula to critique, contestation and challenge. The pluralism envisioned was not one of cultural exceptionalism, racism or cultural approbation but the challenging of existing power structures and centreing of marginalized knowledges to ensure that diversity does indeed rupture the centre and becomes visible on its own terms, and is not simply seen through the eyes of more privileged groups.
A second research direction is to understand the power dynamics between market, state and civil society actors in the context of global climate change governance. While we know that organizations tend to engage with stakeholders that have some level of power we do not know enough about how civil society actors can exercise authority over the global governance of climate change. What discursive strategies do civil society actors use to contest the dominant economic discourse? How do these strategies create new forms of authority and accountability? How do authority and capability of non-market actors influence corporate responses to climate change and the strategic and regulatory forms of climate change governance? Exploring these questions can help us develop a more democratic process of climate change governance and offer ways of changing the normative framework of political decision-making enabling more
Similarly, scholars such as al-Ṭahṭāwī (d. 1873) and Muḥammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905) have affirmed, based on their interpretation of the Islamic theology, that revealed knowledge and individually-sought rational knowledge are compatible, and thus endorsed the study of modern ‘Western’ sciences by Muslims. 36 ‘Abduh in particular emphasized the compatibility of religion and reason, and called for sweeping social and legal reforms by employing reason through the tool of ijtihād. Yet he made it clear that the core five pillars of Islam and the sphere of worships were not subject to any reforms as they are unchangeable. 37 While opposing the Western political domination and colonialism, he did not see the Western civilization in itself as a threat to Islam. Therefore, he considered the modern science and technology should be adopted to the extent that they improved the quality of life and supported social advancement, just as Muslims had once embraced the learning of the ancient Greeks, Persians, Indians, and so forth. 38 In this regard, Sayyed Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) from India was also of an akin opinion, 39 that “the Work of God and Word of God can never be antagonistic to each other,” 40 apparently referring to the universe and the Qur’an.
The seeds for this study were planted when this writer encountered her very first Muslim students in 2002, after twenty years of teaching. With a knowledge of Islam and Muslims per se, shaped largely by a white, Judeo-Christian upbringing and vivid media images of terrorist attacks carried out in the name of Islam, the migrant Muslim families of a regional town in North Queensland, totally transcended these negative stereotypes. After completing a Master of Arts in Islamic Studies in 2010 and having worked as a Head of Faculty for English and the Humanities in various senior colleges around Australia, it was apparent that
Exogamy was a vital diplomatic tool, but it carried an element of risk: a foreign wife might be a powerful ally, or a clandestine enemy. The symbolic role of the Women of Discord resonates with the reality of royal women married to foreign elites: caught between loyalty to their home city and family, and their new husband, who would these women favour? The female potential for trouble was no mere metaphor: a wife who betrayed either her father or her husband possessed serious disruptive power, which could become a dynamic force given the right circumstances. Such intrigues are exemplified by accounts of
Your mother was a white woman. They had to lock her up, as she was having a child by the stable boy who was a native” (Head, 16). This prophecy impacts on young Elizabeth’s mind heavily. She subconsciously bears these words of prophecy in her whole life what causes her mental trauma. Elizabeth’s mother was white and her father was black and she is neither white nor black. Moreover, in South Africa, Elizabeth experiences inhumanity, poverty, and mental torture during apartheid because her true identity is unstable. So, to escape the violence of apartheid, Elizabeth leaves South Africa and immigrates to a village in Botswana. But as a refuge in new place, she turns into an outcast in the society again because she was unfamiliar with language and culture of Botswana. Like Bessie Head, Elizabeth appears to lead a life of alienation outside of the rest of society. As such, because of some inevitable reasons for instance; the isolation from the entire world, her mother’s historical background in her mind, her poverty and the extreme violence from Sello and Dan eventually force her to confront her struggle with mental illness. I argue that Elizabeth’s mental illness strengthens her power and association with social and political issues, which ultimately lead to the reconciliation of her body and soul. Although Elizabeth’s insanity appears to give her mental and physical trauma, a deeper understanding of her illness shows that she can gain freedom and peace in her life.
This archaeological method is a consistent feature of Agamben’s thought. From early works such as Language and Death, Agamben has sought to explore foundational tensions in Western thought. Since the 1970s Agamben has preoccupied himself with such closure of thought in terms of so-called foundational paradoxes that define being and action only negatively and which regulate power as ‘fruit to pick’. Yet this has never been a process of dull historicism, instead it has always been an attempt to encounter the structures of ‘our situation’ through the past in order to demonstrate their ultimate contradictions and ‘inoperativity’. The structural inoperativity of these formations plays itself out in the contemporary in ways which should never be seen as ‘new’ or ‘unprecedented’ but as indicative of social, legal and political forms that have been emptied out of any value through their inherent contradiction. This diagnosis, the declaration that ‘politics has entered a lasting eclipse’ has been misread by those who see themselves, whether knowingly or not, as apologists for liberal democracy, as a form of nihilism. Yet if Agamben’s own thought is read correctly it appears as nothing less than a joyous attempt to profane the inane spectacular nature of our own culture.
E. A MORE NUANCED UNDERSTANDING OF LEGITIMACY IN PRISON Our contextualized analysis of correctional officers’ perceived use of power across prison settings demonstrates the fruitfulness of focusing on the exercise of authority by “junior power-holders” in order to provide a richer understanding of legitimacy in a prison setting. 137 That is, when considering the officials who have the most contact with power recipients, not only do we gain an appreciation for the influences on their actions that constitute barriers to effectively establishing legitimate authority, we also see how some of these factors are beyond their control (i.e., organizational training, prison security level, physical environment, and size of the inmate population). Applied to other settings more generally, the external influences on the behaviors of junior power-holders are equally as salient (if not more so) for discussions of legitimacy relative to understanding the orientations and actions of their superiors who interact far less with their constituents. 138 Hence, an understanding of legitimacy and its feasibility might incorporate a more substantive focus on the extent to which junior power-holders’ methods of exercising their authority over power recipients is shaped by factors outside their control. In a prison context, based on our findings, such factors might include larger offender populations, more serious offender populations, and more sterile physical environments. Downplaying the role of contextual effects creates an illusion of free will in the exercise of power that outsiders, including academics, impose on the behaviors of government officials. Specific to prison organizations, and consistent with Raz’s study, prison contexts that necessarily shape greater use of coercive force by officers are likely to undermine an administration’s ability to “secure from their audience a recognition of their right to rule.” 139 On the other hand, a context that allows officers to exercise authority in ways that preserve the dignity and respect of inmates can facilitate an administration’s valid claim to legitimate authority. Liebling’s descriptions of prison contexts that shape the moral performance of prison staff, particularly those that coincide with more respectful inmate-officer relations, are potentially applicable in this regard and move beyond the prison level factors examined here. 140