An attempt to address the issue of concurrentdelays has been made in some standard form contracts in Australia. Clause 35.5 of the AS2124-1992 is an example of the attempt to deal with the issue of concurrentdelays, which provides— “Where more than one event causes concurrentdelays and the cause of at least one of those events, but not all of them, is not a cause referred to in the preceding paragraph, then to the extent that the delays are concurrent, the Contractor shall not be entitled to an extension of time for Practical Completion.”
Research in the USA during the first part of the 1990s on major defence contracts indicates that trends established early in a project are very unlikely to change later. D. S. Christensen & S. Heise (1993) sampled 155 defence projects that were using C/SCSC for reporting progress (cost performance) to the Department of Defense. Their report found that the ‘Cost Performance Index (CPI)’ on these projects did not change by more than 10% from the net cumulative value measured at the 20% completion point through to the completion of the project. When the CPI did change, it usually got worse 1 .
concerned, unless it is assumed that there is a pre-existing moral obligation to honor one’s contracts. Obviously, that would give away the game, for the point of the whole contractarian exercise is to construct our moral obligations from non-moral materials. So contractarians, like Narveson, insist that the binding nature of the social contract lies in the rational pursuit of self-interest (or, more general, whatever one values). However, we can simply repeat the challenge of the regress problem: what is it about self-interest, or value in general, that makes acting in accordance with it binding? We can agree that it would be a good thing if one’s self- interest was promoted, but why is it obligatory to comply with a scheme designed to further one’s interests (or values) in an environment composed of other agents similarly disposed? Contractarians will now say that this is what the contract does: the fact that one has
It is generally said that the contract language is considered difficult to comprehend and they are therefore a major source of disputes. Most of construction contracts are equipped with provision for extension of time, (eg.Clause 23.0 of PAM Standard Form of Contracts and Clause 43.0 of PWD Standard Form Of Contract 2010) and clarify the relevant events which the contractors are entitled to claim for extension of time. These contracts also provide for the remedies in which contractors are compensated through the Loss and/or expense clause where in cases for the delay are not due to their default (Clause 24.0 of PAM 2006 Standard Form Of Contract). The contracts are silent on the issue of concurrent delay and the parties assume that the silence operates to their benefit. This can lead to protracted disputes and outcomes contrary to the intention of the parties.
It is also important to distinguish between “critical” and “non-critical” delays. The former are those that cause delay to project completion date whilst the latter affect progress but not overall completion. Most contracts require that in order for delay to warrant an EOT, it must affect the completion of the project
during implementation (N. Charles, 2005). In addition, the approach develops a conducive working environment for the project team as the designer and contractor are in one team which is liable in case of non- performance. This prevents excess costs in resolving disputes between the designer and the contractor and moreover the rapport reduces delays and other differences in ideologies (Levy, 2006). Thus the management time costs by the client are reduced as little time is required by the client to project manage the contract. This allows the project to be completed at lower cost and within the intended time period. Costs that are borne by the client for individual teams of designers and contractors like in the traditional contract are reduced using the turnkey approach as these two parties are amalgamated to form a turnkey contractor whose pricing includes the design element (Levy, 2006). Nonetheless, turnkey contracts have weaknesses in anticipating the client’s needs for the project. In addition, the approach requires high capital investments valued at more than One (1) Billion US dollars both in designing and implementation of the project as payment is made by the client upon final delivery of the end product (Lowe, 2013). It can be critiqued that the turnkey approach does not fully deliver the required quality of the project for the fact that works are undertaken with no independent supervision nor interest for the client (Rumane, 2011). This argument can be justified following previous research which has illustrated that the turnkey approach allows the contractor to select a designer/supervising consultant to form one team. The merger being controlled fully by the turnkey contractor compromises on quality deliver such that their performance appraisal is rated with respect to time and proper functionality of the end product. Thus quality in turnkey is defined as fitness for purpose and conformity to specifications (Knowles, 2011).
The Average Magnitude for passenger trip delays exhibits a heavier right tail and larger mean than the Average Magnitude for flight delays (∆σ = 34 min and ∆µ = 21 min). This divergence is caused by cancelled flights. The top 7 routes (in Figure 2) with largest Average Magnitude of Passenger Trip Delay are BWI-PIT (203min), CVG-MDW (258min), EWR-PHL (238min), JFK-PHL (253min), MDW-CVG (256min), PHL-EWR (298min), PHL-JFK (209min). Many of these routes are short-haul routes serving shuttle flights with high frequency, small aircraft size, and high cancellation rate. The high cancellation rate results in large passenger trip delays.
* = 0.25 + 0.25sin and " = 0.25 + 0.25sin . The leakage delay and the time-varying delays satisfy = 0.1, & = 0.1, * = 0.5, " = 0.5, t = 0.1 and s = 0.1. By using the Matlab LMI solver, in order to see that the LMIs given in Theorem 3.1 is feasible. Therefore, it follows from Theorem 3.1 that the delayed BAM neural network (4) is globally asymptotically stable in the mean square.
In this paper we investigate the moral hazard model in which agents choose unob- servable actions and provide an axiomatic approach to characterize the optimal con- tracts, which we call “fair contracts,” in the view point of both eﬃciency and equity. The standard approach to the moral hazard problem (for example see Grossman and Hart (1983), Rogerson (1985), Jewitt (1988)) has focused only on the eﬃciency in the sense that the principal chooses a contract to maximize her expected payoﬀ sub- ject to the set of constraints as follows. (i) incentive compatibility (IC) constraint: contract must give the agent the proper incentive to choose a right action because his action is not observable. (ii) individual rationality (IR) constraint: contract should give the agent at least the reservation utility. (iii) Budget balanced (BB): total incomes of both parties sum up to the realized total revenue. We then say that a contract satisﬁes incentive eﬃciency (IE) if it satisﬁes (IC), (BB) and there exist no other Pareto improving contracts which satisfy (IC), (BB). In the standard principal-agent model a contract is selected in favor of the principal from all (IE) contracts by satisfying (IR) of the agent.
The second relevant demand theory concept is the law of demand, which we extend both to include heterogeneous inputs and to encompass models with or without prices. The law of ag- gregate demand condition holds that when the set of feasible contracts expands, the number of contracts that the firm chooses to sign weakly increases. In terms of traditional demand theory, this means that, for example, when the wages of some of a heterogeneous group of workers falls, if the workers are substitutes, then the total number of workers employed rises. We show that (a) when inputs are substitutes, the choices of a profit-maximizing firm/hospital satisfy the law of aggregate demand. Moreover, when the choices of every hospital/firm satisfy the law of aggregate demand and the substitutes condition, then (b) the set of workers/doctors employed is the same at every stable allocation, (c) the num- ber employed by each firm/hospital is also the same, and (d) truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for doctors in the doctor-offering algo- rithm. Moreover, we prove (e) that if the law of
pairs of hospitals (and being unemployed). Each hospital has one position. Matching with couples can be seen as a special instance of matching with contracts as follows. Each couple can sign at most two contracts (one for each member), and each hospital can sign one contract (note that a couple in a couple problem plays the role of a hospital in our contract setting, and a hospital in a couple problem plays the role of a doctor). For any couple c = (m c , f c ) and hospital h, there are two possible contracts
Many-a-times, settlement for spot/tom transactions may not happen on the T+1 or T+2, but gets rolled over. In a typical spot/tom transaction, actual delivery of one currency and receipt of other currency happens between two parties. However, most forex traders are speculators. They do not trade with the intention of delivering (the currency they have sold) or receiving currency (the currency they have bought), but wants to make profit from speculation. Hence, forex brokers allow these speculators to rollover the contracts. Rollover delays the actual settlement of the trade and it goes on until the trader closes its position.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of μ-stability for a class of impulsive neural networks with unbounded time-varying delays and continuously distributed delays. Based on Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional and some analysis techniques, several suﬃcient conditions that ensure the μ-stability of the addressed systems are derived in terms of LMIs, which can easily be checked by resorting to available software packages. The organization of this paper is as follows. The problems investigated in the paper are formulated, and some preliminaries are presented, in Section 2. In Section 3, we state and prove our main results. Then, a numerical example is given to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the obtained results in Section 4. Finally, concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
When implemented in a concurrent language, a window system can be concise. If its client programs connect to the window system using an interface defined in terms of communication on synchronous channels, much of the complexity of traditional event- based interfaces can be avoided. Once that interface is specified, complex interactive programs can be assembled, not monolithically, but rather by connecting, using the same techniques, small self-contained components that each implement or modify elements of the interface. In particular, the window system itself may be run recursively to imple- ment subwindows for multiplexed applications such as multi-file text editors. This is the software tool approach applied to windows.
important for any engineering company to survive in market with their product. The current scenario of market demand is the product has less costs, best quality and that should be available within less time. These all aspects full filled by any organizations with their productivity rate. Getting a correct product is the main target, with an estimated term and controlled and reduced cost. This paper intends to carry a review of the concurrent engineering in various sector, and the traditional method as well as development of new products by advanced method based on a new approach.