In this regard, the elders, representatives of Babylon, not only penetrate the domain of the earth but also want to take over (penetrate) the authority of God. By replacing God’s position, the elders played God to defile all the people of God in the court. Therefore, not only does lawlessness penetrate Susanna by touching her body but they also penetrate the place and authority of God to put the innocent, Susanna, to death. All in all, the progression of the penetration of evil on earth can be fully illustrated by the comprehensive Figure 1. From Figure 1, one can see that the penetrating of the wicked influence from Babylon starts being (προσεκαρτέρουν) in the house, when the elders are looking closely (ἐθεώρουν) at Susanna going in (εἰσεπορεύετο) to the garden which is a private place in the house, and leads to evil thoughts penetrating (κατανενυγμένοι) the elders’ hearts. By watching, the elders start wanting to (ἤθελον) have sexual intercourse (συγγενέσθαι) with Susanna. This brings them to take action by going into (εἰσῆλθέν) the garden, hiding (κεκρυμμένοι) and watching the body of Susanna closely (παρατηροῦντες) to find a good time when Susanna was alone and by forcing her to concede to their evil intentions. Because of Susanna’s refusal, the penetration progresses to the opening (ἤνοιξεν) of the door of the garden (private space) and even calling all the people to rush into (εἰσεπήδησαν) the garden to see. Lastly, the penetration continues still further in the court by unveiling (ἀποκαλύψαι) Susanna’s face to the public and touching (ἔθηκαν) her head with evil hands. Here, lawlessness penetrates (ἔθηκαν) the authority and place of God, who is the real Judge. Therefore, the entire bottom domain on earth from the house to the garden and the court has been defiled by the wicked power of Babylon through the elders (judges), and Susanna was sentenced to death.
As described at the outset, the goals of organizational laws are two- fold. The first is to make available and facilitate the development of organizational forms that are desired by businesses, and the second is to mitigate conflicts of interest that arise within organizations. These two goals sometimes work in unison and other times in tension with one another. They are in tension when, for example, PPE sponsors may desire a full waiver of all personal liability arising from the enter- prise. But organizational law—even the most permissive Delaware partnership statute—places limits on the sponsors’ ability to waive their liability for acts that constitute a bad faith violation of the im- plied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 163 On the oth-
Indeed, online life-writing gives women teachers the opportunity to be chameleon-like; to ‘make themselves through the act of writing’ (Martin and Goodman, 2004, p. 6). According to Heehs (2013), ‘By creating a profile and uploading text and pictures, users define who they are or rather create an online identity that they offer to others as themselves’ (p. 235). Social networking, therefore, allows a person to be a version of themselves that they want others to see – a ‘simulacrum’ (ibid), according to Heehs – which results in ‘a blurring of the line between the user’s “actual” identity and his or her online persona, together with an undermining of traditional ideas about responsibility and privacy’ (ibid). Some of these ideas will be picked up on later, but the reference to creating an ‘online persona’ (ibid), that in some way replaces ‘the user’s “actual” identity’ (ibid), is interesting because it supports Johnson’s (2011) views from the beginning of this piece about the digital world allowing users to have, essentially, a celebrity status where we are voyeurs to each other’s private lives. Despite some potential barriers around this idea (such as the suggested absence of privacy), this digital space, where the public and private spheres of society are blurred, enables women teachers to get their voices heard; they can create a feminised world in cyberspace where multiple selves are written into existence, and where multiple selves are acknowledged and listened to.
The use of smartphones and public Wi-Fi is on the rise. There are 300 million smartphone users in India alone (Chauhan, 2017), and 2.3 billion users worldwide. By 2021, the number of smartphone users in India is estimated to be 468 million (Statista, 2017). Likewise, the ubiquity of public Wi-Fi has grown leaps and bounds. In 2016, there were over 31,000 public Wi-Fi hotspots in India, according to industry estimates, and this number is expected to grow to over 202,000 by 2018 (Kolla, 2016). Recently, Google teamed up with Indian Railways to create the Google RailTel initiative, which aims to provide free Wi-Fi with speeds ranging from 20-40 Mbps in as many as 400 stations by 2018 (Varma, 2017). Research on the importance of delivering Internet amenities demonstrates that providing a Wi- Fi service is a predictor of the likelihood of customers returning to a restaurant (Cobanoglu et al., 2012) and helps improve customer satisfaction (Bulchand- Gidumal et al., 2011). Customers also prefer such locations because they offer broadband speed and provide a more reliable connection compared with mobile data. This helps them preserve data, thus reducing costs and, at times, improving battery life (Bolton, 2017).
requirement of consent generated structural requirements that varied with our level of concern that, in a given area, voluntarism might be absent. In public law, procedural due process demands different levels of proof of lawmaker competency depending on the risk of otherwise uncorrectable incompetency in a given lawmaking area. For formal, top-level legislatures, there is essentially no procedural due process review, not because the first principle plays no role, but because it is automatically satisfied by rule-like constitutional form and procedural commands. Many lower-level legislative bodies, however, do find themselves subject to procedural due process review. And just as with the measurement of consent, the degree of evidence required to demonstrate competency, satisfying the first principle, varies depending on experience-based estimates of the frequency with which a given type of institution administering a particular kind of law will lack atomic competencies. For example, in administrative law, agency lawmaking that can be characterized as “adjudication,” basically laws that apply to deprive “[a] relatively small number of persons” of important interests, are subject to more stringent ex ante procedural requirements. 84 Agency actions that work similar deprivations on
In the twenty-first century non-state actors are increasingly shaping governance at all levels. Traditionally, international law and international institutions facilitated relationships among sovereign states, but now, corporations, non-governmental organizations, and other non-state actors are increasingly becoming participants rather than spectators. One of the important areas of law that has undergone a dramatic transformation in recent decades is international investment law. With the spread of investor- state dispute settlement as a core dimension of bilateral investment treaties, foreign investors can directly challenge states’ actions in a range of areas. A number of investor-state cases focus on public health regulations, including Philip Morris International’s recent challenges to the required health warnings and plain packaging for tobacco products in Uruguay and Australia. These cases reflect the growing role of non-state actors in shaping the international system and highlight the potential implications for the regulation of public health.
General Verifiable Computation Among Anonymous Participants While we state our main results in terms of polling, the security guarantee we give is that the final published graph does not contain too many “bad” nodes. It may be possible to leverage this technique for doing more general computations, where the edges in the graph correspond to a private computation between two parties, and the final goal is a joint, publicly-verifiable computation (in this case, the “responses” might be some intermediate public values of the computation). Parallel and Distributed Verification The verification procedure in our protocol is highly parallelizable: each responder must verify three properties, each of which can be done by reading only a small part of the graph:
A natural question is whether imposing constitutional limits on the size of transfer payments can make the public provision and private provision outcomes more similar to each other. To see whether this is true, I recompute the DCW and SPE sets this time requiring all individuals' net taxes to be nonnegative – that is, net subsidies are not allowed. The computation is done for case 1, in which individuals have identical tastes and incomes. Figure 8 shows the expected values (assuming all sustainable payoffs are equally likely) of the level of the public good, the tax rates, and the utility levels under public and private provision. In addition, the minimum and maximum sustainable tax rates and levels of the public good are given under “Case 8” in Tables III-a, III-b, IV-a, IV-b, V-a, and V-b. The new restriction barely alters the private provision results. This is not surprising given that very large voluntary transfer payments were never sustainable in the first place. Under public provision, however, the social MRS
Private Rights for the Public Good SMU Law Review Volume 66 | Issue 4 Article 4 2013 Private Rights for the Public Good J Janewa OseiTutu Florida International University, joseitut@fiu edu Follow this[.]
The Route 68 concession in Chile, linking Santiago with Valparaíso and Viña del Mar was the ﬁrst ﬂexible term contract assigned via an open auction along the lines suggested by our imple- mentation results in Section 3.1. This concession involved major improvements and extensions of the 130 kilometer highway, and was auctioned in February of 1999. Bidders were given a choice of ﬁxed or ﬂexible inﬂation adjusted interest rates (plus a 4% risk premium) to use in discounting their annual toll revenue. The winner, which chose the ﬁxed rate, asked for a present value of revenue of US$373 million, which was lower than the US$ 379 million construction and maintenance costs estimated by the Ministry of Public Works. A possible explanation is that the risk premium was set too high.
PPPs are often undertaken by joint venture companies (special purpose vehicles, SPV) with equity contributed by the private and public sectors (European Commission, 2004; Corbacho and Schwartz, 2008; Weber and Alfen, 2010; Schaeffer and Loveridge, 2002). The share in equity of the SPV is usually reflected in the partners’ voting power and management involvement. To be attractive and viable, the shareholding structure of the SPV should secure the interest of both the public and private partner, by providing enough public capital and sufficient private sector managerial skills and know-how. The rationale for hybrids solutions is similar to that developed by Rangan, Samii, and Van Wassenhove (2006, pp. 740-741), but the drivers presented here are easier to operationalize and more management-oriented. Efficient financing of public investments by the private sector requires that the higher financing cost of the private sector be offset by the savings in development outlays due to the transfer of managerial skills and know-how from the private sector. As Hennart (1988, p. 372) points out, some knowledge types are firm-specific assets, i.e. they cannot be acquired separately from the firm. Thus, a full takeover of the private partner holding the know-how will involve substantial management costs if the firm to be acquired is large, if it operates in a different industry or has a different managerial culture – as is the case of public agents and private companies – than the acquirer, or if it is foreign-based.
countries and in the same sectors. In the UK, considered to be a pioneer and the most advanced country in the development of private sector participation through its ‘Private Finance Initiative’ (PFI) program, a report by Her Majesty’s Treasury (Britain’s Finance Ministry) in 2003 noted that over 85 percent of public investment was still delivered through conventional procurement, which is definitely distinct from PPP. A worldwide investigation on PPP by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) identified 206 projects in developed countries for the years 2004-2005, of which 50 percent were in Europe (including Turkey), mostly in the UK (all sectors), to a lesser degree in France and Portugal (roads and water) and Spain (ports, roads, water & wastewater). Australia, Canada and Japan were the main countries concerned outside Europe. 13 In some countries, there might even be a ’privatization reversal’, with the reintroduction into the public sector of services previously delivered through PPP. Data collected by Warner and Hefetz (2007: 563 sq.) on local government service delivery in the US for the period 1992-2002 showed a progress of direct public delivery (from 54 percent to 59 percent), while complete contracting out went down, from 28 percent to 18 percent. At a more anecdotal level, Paris and Grenoble in France have abandoned their water concessions, switching back to a public ‘régie’, while the citizens of Munich and other German cities have rejected proposals to introduce private participation in the municipal provision of infrastructure and services (Ménard and Peeroo, 2011: 315-316).
Transport projects can also have a substantial environmental impact. Such projects frequently attract strong opposition from community and environmental groups over issues of pollution, congestion, neglect of public transport and visual impact. Similarly, land acquisition can be a protracted process with the potential for extensive legal delays, particularly in developing countries. 10 In general, the public sector often ends up taking on the responsibility for most of these risks since often it is easier for the public sector to take the responsibility for acquiring the rights-of-way, to pay for them and contribute this asset to the project. Project sponsors often try to ensure that the government bears the risk of providing all necessary land within a given time frame or being liable for damages. Furthermore, the cost of land acquisition can become a major factor where land values have risen rapidly or are subject to speculative activity over which the project developer has no control. In these cases, agreement on some form of cost ceiling may be necessary in the concession contract. In some cases, a special government body may be charged with implementing the land acquisition process. Generally, the host government should ensure that required licenses and permits be obtainable without unreasonable delay or expense.
ABTRACT: Redundancy is a four-letter word. According to courts and scholars, redundant litigation is costly, unfair, and confounding. Modern civil procedure has a (nearly) maximalist preference for centralization, and various rules seek to limit duplicative suits within and across court systems. This seemingly dominant view stands in marked contrast to the reality of the modern regulatory state. Redundant public- private enforcement, in which public and private actors have overlapping authority to enforce the law, is ubiquitous. Redundant enforcement also is noticeably underrepresented in the substantial literature on private and public enforcement, which treats government agencies and private attorneys general as substitutes rather than complements.
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