On behalf of WorkSafeNB’s Board of Directors, I’d like to thank you for having joined us at our second stakeholder engagement session. As you know, the aim of these sessions is to create a workers’ compensation system that will be effective and sustainable in the long-term – a system that needs to be shaped by you, our stakeholders. This second, in a series of meetings, was held on June 20 th , 2017 at the Best Western in Bathurst, New Brunswick. Along with WorkSafeNB Board Members and staff, representatives from the employer community, the worker community, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal, the Workers’ Compensation Task Force and various levels of government attended.
Revenue is recognised in the income statement when it is probable that future economic benefits will flow to the Company, and these benefits can be measured reliably. Revenue includes only the gross inflow of economic benefits received and receivable for the Company’s own account. Revenue from the sale of goods is recognised when the Company has transferred the significant risks and rewards of ownership of the goods and the Company does not exercise any effective control over the goods sold. Revenue is recognised at the fair value of the consideration received or receivable, net of discounts. Settlement is made in cash, with revenue comprising the amount of cash received or receivable. Amounts collected on behalf of third parties are not included in the Company’s revenue. Revenue from the rendering of services is recognised when the economic outcome of the services can be estimated reliably and the economic benefits flow to the Company.
The Investment Committee decided to delegate to Quest Management NV the power to decide on its behalf upon co-investments with funds in which the Issuer has already invested up to € 500.000 and upon follow-on investments in companies in which the Issuer already holds a stake up to a maximum of 50% of the already existing investment and up to an aggregate value of € 3.000.000. The chairman of the investment committee however has an evocation right and can at all times decide to bring the proposal to the investment committee
Aloha, on behalf of our entire Board of Directors of the Hawaii Public Health Association, the Hawaii State Department of Health, our conference co-sponsors and our Conference Steering Committee, I am pleased to welcome you to the 2015 Hawaii Public Health Conference.
Currently, our Government Relations Committee and Board of Directors are working on behalf of the Canadian camps industry for the financial security of our camps, outdoor education providers, and Preferred Vendors. Through a proposed Sustainability Fund and amendments to current non-applicable financial support programs, they are working to #savecanadiancamps.
The following table sets forth certain information regarding the composition of the Company’s Board of Directors, including their terms of office and the nominees for election as directors. The nominating committee has recommended and approved the nominees identified below. It is intended that the proxies solicited on behalf of the Board of Directors (other than proxies in which the vote is withheld as to the nominees) will be voted at the Meeting “FOR” the election of the nominees identified in the following table. If such nominees are unable to serve, the shares represented by all such proxies will be voted for the election of such substitutes as the Board of Directors may recommend. At this time, the Board of Directors knows of no reason why any of the nominees might be unable to serve, if elected. Except as described herein, there are no arrangements or understandings between any director or nominee and any other person pursuant to which such director or nominee was selected.
This raises the question of whether fund investors’ interests are protected under contractual mutual fund governance. A good governance structure will effectively promote fund investors’ interests. Those interests c include a fund management company’s expense ratio and performance, as those factors are at the top of the list of investor interests. In addition, this paper adopts the market share of a fund management company as a third factor. This factor may reflect whether fund investors have preferences for a particular governance structure. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to examine governance effectiveness, which is reflected by a fund management company’s expense ratio, performance and market share under contractual governance. The first measure of governance effectiveness is whether a certain type of governance structure is related to the expense ratio. All else being equal, fund investors will choose funds with a lower expense ratio. Del et al (2003) indicate that boards with a higher percentage of independent directors have a negative impact on the expense ratio. The second measure of governance effectiveness is whether a fund management company’s performance is correlated with board structure. This link is indirect; thus, if the board can exercise better monitoring of the management and recognize skilled fund managers, the managers will work more diligently and reduce misbehaviour. Finally, the third measure of governance effectiveness is a fund management company’s market share. Khorana and Servaes (2012) claim that market share represents the culmination of all the decisions made by fund families and the investors’ response to those decisions. Hence, market share may reveal investors’ preference for a certain type of governance structure.
The Shari’ah compliance advocates accountability and transparency in governance through Islamic principles whereby those Shari’ah companies have to portray good example to their non-Shari’ah compliant. This study aims to investigate the relationship between board characteristics and company of origin with Shari’ah-compliant companies’ performance by employing multi regression analysis of 1000 companies for the year 2007 to 2010. Using ROA, the finding shows that company of origin has significant negative association with company performance while Tobin’s Q revealed insignificant result. The result also revealed that only duality role has significant negative association with company performance by using Tobin’s Q whereas insignificant result appears for ROA. This study contributes to the corporate governance literature from the perspective of Shari’ah-compliant companies. It is envisaged to assist Bursa Malaysia, Securities Commission and regulators in improving effective corporate governance and stringent screening procedures specifically for non-compliant companies that opt to Shari’ah compliant. Furthermore, the results would be as a baseline to the organizations to attain the corporate objectives by emphasizing a greater accountability in the governance practice.
Gallen; Privatdozent, Dr iur (Zurich), LL.M. (College of Europe), Lic iur (Basel), admitted to the Bar in Zurich. Contact: email@example.com, publications at: <www.thomas-burri.com> and SSRN. My sincere thanks go to: Peter Sand, for co- organizing the workshop at the University of St. Gallen, Dominik Hofstetter for administrative help and reviewing a draft of this article, all the participants in the workshop, the University of St. Gallen for funding, and the scholars in charge at Questions of International Law (Irini Papanicolopulu, Lucas Carlos Lima, Loris Marotti and Maurizio Arcari) for publishing the zoom out on the ICJ and Chagos, including double peer review, on a very tight schedule.
Section 5. DIRECTORS TERM. Five directors shall hold office for three (3) years, and four directors shall hold office for two (2) years and until a successor director has been designated and qualified. An incumbent director may stand for election for a single-year (1) term only to ensure a majority of directors have Board experience. Directors may not hold office for more than nine (9) years unless the board is otherwise unable to fill a vacancy.
accountability of the HHSC system by giving the HHSC Corporate Board final approval of each region’s budget, and thus the general fund distribution. This will make individual regions more accountable for financial and management decisions, and will promote system wide efficiencies and collaboration. Furthermore, returning to a fully-centralized system would be very disruptive and at this time, the corporate office is not positioned to undertake that responsibility.
6. Finally, in addition to the influence of the Board Chair/CEO positions, some boards evolve small sub-groups within themselves, sometimes referred to as cliques or “core groups” (Bradshaw, Murray, & Wolpin, 1992). These informal groups are not recognized officially in any way though they may dominate certain commit- tees or formal offices. They are important because the attitudes and beliefs of their members regarding how the board should operate or what position it should take on various issues can significantly impact those who are not part of the group. It is important to realize that “core groups” are not necessarily a bad thing. Some- times they emerge simply because some people have more time and interest in the organization so do more and find others with a similar outlook to whom they naturally gravitate. Other inner groups develop because they are made up of people with similar periods of long tenure on the board (part of the founder’s syndrome phenomenon discussed earlier). This is especially common when there are no fixed maximum terms of office for board members. New members might come and go but a core of “old timers” stays around.
Through the General Meeting, the shareholders exercise the highest level of authority at SpareBank 1 SR-Bank ASA. The Ordinary General Meeting elects the members of the Supervisory Board, the Control Committee and the Nomination Committee, as well as approving the annual financial statements, including the allocation of a surplus or coverage of a deficit for a year.
To study the relationship between bank liquidity and board size and independence as shown in Eq. (1), we build a new database on these two board characteristics. This is a challenging issue since such data is not widely available (see also Laeven and Levine, 2009). Relevant information is collected by hand from the Spencer Stuart Reports. 2 Spencer Stuart, founded in 1956, is one of the leading executive search consulting firms. It also publishes the “Spencer Stuart Board Index”, which contains information on the board of directors of the largest companies within the countries that are being covered. This information is gathered from questionnaires and annual reports. We end up with a sample that consists of 127 banks operating in 10 OECD countries (Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA) between 2000 and 2006. Therefore, all banks considered are based in relatively developed and liberalized banking systems, a fact that enhances the comparability of the respective observations. The maximum number of available observations is 536, yet some are missing for certain variables.
Whether the Board of Directors (Board) of Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) should approve modifications regarding Letter of Credit Concentration limits in the ERCOT Creditworthiness Standards, as recommended by ERCOT staff and endorsed by the Credit Work Group. The Finance and Audit (F&A) Committee will review such proposed modifications at its November 18, 2013 meeting.
(1) The scale of the board of petroleum enterprises has a significant positive effect on financial performance. Board of directors of the larger, which means get a more expert advice in the decisions of the board of directors, which greatly improves the decision of the board of directors is reasonable and scientific, so as to improve the efficiency of corporate governance, finally to corporate financial performance to the certain positive role. (2) The proportion of independent directors and corporate financial performance is not significantly negative correlation. That oil companies are not of independent directors, and the important role of get the attention it deserves, some oil companies the proportion of the independent directors has not yet reached the provisions of the state, some even reached the corresponding proportion, but independent directors in the board of directors did not play its due role, because of the independent director system in the petroleum enterprises should arouse the attention of the corresponding management departments.
The Power Balance constraint is the balance between the ERCOT System Load and the amount of generation that is dispatched by SCED to meet that load. This Shadow Price for this constraint, also called System Lambda (λ), is the cost of providing one MWh of energy at the reference Electrical Bus. System Lambda, i.e. the Shadow Price for the Power Balance constraint, is equal to the change in the SCED objective function obtained by relaxing the Power Balance constraint by 1MW. The System Lambda is the energy component of Locational Marginal Price at each Settlement Point in ERCOT. The Power Balance Penalty sets the maximum limit for this Shadow Price, i.e. Power Balance Penalty is the maximum cost paid for one addition/less MW of generation to meet the ERCOT system load constraint. This section describes those factors that ERCOT considered in developing the amount of the Power Balance Penalty in $/MW versus the amount of the mismatch and provides the resulting Power Balance Penalty Curve proposed for ERCOT Board approval.
As I write this — I am excited to have had two nice days in a row – I’ve noticed that the sunshine really makes a difference in my entire outlook these days. Do you feel that way too? It seems like on a sunny day I have the energy and the