In addition to the difficulties faced in negotiations by parties to the peace process, there are a number of groups opposed to the peace process from both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides. Hamas. Hamas is the main Islamist movement in the Palestinian territories and was founded soon after the Intifada erupted in 1987. Hamas is a Sunni Islamist Palestinian group based in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This organisation opposes the Oslo peace process and ultimately wants to establish an Islamic state of Palestine in the whole of the territory originally mandated as Palestine. It demands a complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and believes that Chairman Arafat is too eage" to compromise with Israel. The Hamas has a 'military' wing that engages in attacks against Israel and a 'civilian' wing that confines itself to education and social programmes. Its Charter declared that all of Palestine belongs to the Muslims and that it can only be liberated by a holy war – Jihad 27 .
Another reason for skepticism that the UfM can succeed in attaining its limited goals has to do with the institutional framework within which the EMP and now the UfM, as well as the MEPP operate. The MEPP is an international endeavour, led by the United States, and the UfM is a regional initiative, presided over by a joint presidency (starting with France and Egypt). Yet the two are institutionally linked through a plethora of mechanisms, including the MiddleEast Quartet (that groups the EU, UN, US and Russia), the Arab Peace Initiative (devised and agreed by the Arab League, which now participates in the UfM) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The implications for the UfM of these overlapping institutional arrangements are explored in the sixth and final section of this paper.
Talking to different leading members of the IAF reveals a much more diverse picture of positions regarding the MiddleEast conﬂ ict. While some members emphasize the religious component of the party’s relation to Israel, others tend to very explicitly stress the political component of the MiddleEast conﬂ ict and rarely use religious arguments. Contrary to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, it is unlikely that the IAF will gain comparable political inﬂ uence through the Jordanian parliament or government in the foreseeable future. However, similar to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the JMB and its political arm, the IAF, have been inﬂ uenced not only by its ideology but also by the political circumstances, to which it has at times reacted in a pragmatic way. Given its current limited inﬂ uence in regional politics and the fact that the IAF is not a key political actor in the MiddleEast conﬂ ict, its positions vis-à-vis the conﬂ ict are especially responsive to the broader political context. Therefore, the IAF is not likely to act as a spoiler to the MiddleEastpeace process if there is some serious progress in the negotiations.
The Gulf War started with an aerial campaign on January 15, 1991 which targeted Iraqi military infrastructure. When the ground assault began on February 23, 1991, within a matter of hours, the coalition forces, headed by the United States, quickly expelled the Iraqi army from its position in Kuwait and gave chase in Iraqi territory. The coalition however did not seek regime change therefore did not march on to Baghdad. A cease-fire was declared 100 hours after ground operations commenced. Major operations had ended and coalition victory was quickly declared. With the Persian Gulf War behind him, and unparalleled popularity and influence, President Bush began to turn his attention to the broader issue at hand: the Arab-Israeli conflict. President Bush and Secretary Baker believed that they could ride a wave of goodwill that was achieved in the Arab community and bring about a lasting peace to the MiddleEast. The main obstacle however, would be for the leaders in the region to agree to meet.
Arguably one of the most significant steps taken by the EU in its policy towards the peace process is the appointment in November 1996 of Mr Miguel Angel Moratinos as EU Special Envoy to the MiddleEastPeace Process, through the adoption of joint action no. 96/676/CFSP. The special envoy’s mandate was subsequently extended and rectified with four more joint actions^^. The main objective of this appointment was to pursue better coordination of individual Member State policies; undeniably Mr Moratinos not only has contributed significantly to the preparation of common positions and the development of European initiatives aimed at promoting progress in the peace negotiations, but has also participated directly in many stages of these negotiations, earning the trust and respect of all the main actors involved. The real problem is that his action is hampered by the very terms of his mandate, which is formally quite broad^^ but still provides that his action must take place in a strictly intergovernmental framework: he is guided by, and report under the authority of the Presidency, and also reports to the Council’s bodies on a regular basis; as a result, his scope for autonomous initiative is very limited and tightly bound to the indications he receives from the Council. He cannot officially commit any Member State to any step which has not been
The MiddleEastpeace process was launched at the Ma- drid conference October 31, 1991. Within this process five multilateral working groups were set up to complement the bilateral negotiations covering water resources, environment, arms control and regional security, refugees, and regional economic development (Haddadin, 2002). Due to the fact that about 55% of Israel's total water supply comes from non-Israeli sources, 280 MCM from Golan Heights, 415 MCM from the West Bank, and 215 MCM from Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan (Zarour, 1992), Israel had from the begin- ning of the MiddleEast talks insisted on a full cooperation on water projects in a regional framework. The complexity of the water issue in the MiddleEast creates conflicts that require experts and mediators to be involved in the negotia- tion approach. Conflicts are resolved by negotiation. In general, negotiations can be right-based, power-based, or interest-based. The right-based approach has not worked for more than sixty years and it will not be, by itself, the way to resolve the conflicts in the MiddleEast, because Israel re- fused to admit or to apply the United Nation resolutions (242 and 338). The power-based approach, on the other hand, means resolving the conflicts for the powerful side interests, which is not the way to resolve conflicts in the MiddleEast where Arabs and Israel have had many wars since 1948 (i.e., 1967, 1973, 1979, and 1982). Moreover, the last two wars against Lebanon in 2006 and Palestine in 2008 have shown that power will not bring a sustainable peace, it has brought destruction and hate to human beings inside and outside the region. Power also allows the con-
Since their introduction, transnational broadcast services in the MiddleEast have fought for greater market share. This usually means that they look for issues that appeal to their audience and are different from what is currently available from their national services (Amin, 2000). In this sense, their target broadcast audiences are not individual national audiences but the general Arab audience. The MiddleEast conflict was ,and still remains, the most attractive item in news broadcasts because of its relative importance to many viewers in the region. Coverage of the recent Palestinian-Israeli violence and the war in Iraq is demonstrating the power of the transnational media to cut out the government middleman by reaching viewers directly in their households. Before, news about the conflict came to the MiddleEast through the state broadcast media with the official line, suppressed or exaggerated depending on whether a particular government supported peace with Israel and its relationship with that country. This time, Arab TV viewers are getting the picture, to a large extent, uncensored, direct from the scene, and sometimes taking to the streets in protest at what they see (Ragab, 2002).
presidents since 1973. The term ‘defensible borders,’ for Israel, suggested it could retain control of virtually all of the territories it seized in the 1967 war. Nevertheless, reporters, Israel and Israel’s American supporters immediately seized on Carter’s misstatement, regardless of subsequent White House clarifications, leading to some confusion in the negotiations.(3) As Carter soon came to realise, not least during his marathon negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at the 1978 Camp David Summit, language matters deeply in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Indeed, it is that very phrase – ‘peace process’ – that Rashid Khalidi assails in Brokers of Deceit: How the US Has Undermined Peace in the MiddleEast as all ‘process’ and no ‘peace,’ with the American role as a ‘dishonest broker’ as the central culprit.
7 Kedourie, E. Democracy and Arab Political Culture Frank Cass and Co., London 2nd. edition, 1994 pp. 103-104. For an excellent discussion o f “patrimonial” patterns o f leadership in Arab societies and the centrality o f national political leaders in decision-making processes, see Bill, J. A. and Springborg, R., Politics in the MiddleEast Scott, Foreman / Little Brown Higher Education, Glenview 111., Third Edition, 1990 pp. 152-176. Bill and Springborg make the point that modernisation is requiring elites to recruit individuals o f professional skill and competence, but recruitment processes are personally and tightly controlled from the centre o f the system: “Considerations o f political loyalty, personal connections and complete central control remain at least as important in determining entry into the elite as those of professional expertise, personal merit and institutional position.” op. cit. p. 175. See also Korany, B. and Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal “Arab Foreign Policies in a Changing Environment” in Korany, B and Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal (eds.) The Foreign Policies o f the Arab States: The Challenge o f Change Westview Press, Boulder, Second Edition 1991, pp. 410-411. For comments on the Arab middle class see Hourani, Albert A History of the Arab Peoples Warner Books, New York 1991 p. 454. For a brief but useful overview of the characteristics o f Palestinian society before 1948, see Morris, Benny The Birth o f the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987 pp. 11-15.
Gas deals or notions of “economic peace” must therefore be pursued in tandem with efforts to resolve outstanding political issues. As the studies in this brief show, gas has worked as a catalyst for economic stabilisation only when there were diplomatic agreements already in place (Israel and Egypt/Jordan). Even in those cases, the long-term stability of the deals remains questionable because of the absence of a political settlement that secures rights for the Palestinians. Addressing political questions is therefore important even between countries that already enjoy strong relations. Gas deals are long-term agreements, and, while decisions can be pushed through by a top-down approach, long-term sustainability is contingent on support for these deals extending beyond the regimes that backed them. In the Jordanian and Egyptian cases, attempts to push through these deals with minimal transparency have led to distrust and increased the risk that the deals will falter in the face of unexpected popular mobilisation. 97
In North America and Europe, technological change (Acemoglu, 2002) has also influenced social stratification: the use of new technologies has expanded the gap between those people who are able to use them and those who are not. “Computerisation” has led to the inevitable deterioration of routine workers‟ average remuneration. A large part of the middle class has had to bear the brunt of it: their work requires routine brain power, which has been already replaced or is now being replaced. Instead of labor, the greatest beneficiaries of the digital age have been shareholders. According to a recent estimate in the USA, the three leading companies of Silicon Valley employed some 137,000 workers in 2014 with a combined market capitalization of $1.09 trillion.4. By contrast, in 1990 the three largest companies in Detroit had a market capitalization of $36 billion while collectively employing about 1.2 million workers. 2. Tug of war between apocalyptic and integrated views.
The times they are a-changing. International order premised solely on the Westphalian tradition of respect for state sovereignty no longer is sufficient given failed and failing states, non-state terrorists with and without state support, and the possibility of non-attributable biological, chemical, cyber, and nuclear attacks and the emergence of space as a theater of war. If some of what goes on inside a country threatens other countries or even its own population, under the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that has been emerging since WWII, such states no longer are considered exempt from international response. In 2005 the U.N. resolved that “Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.” It declared the international community responsible for “collective action” “in a timely and decisive manner,” although implementation remains problematic. The idealistic goals for peace building of the1990s can be replaced by more pragmatic ones aimed less at transforming the world into liberal democratic free market states than at building stable states that will prove sustainable and less aggressive. Despite the difficulties, state building appears essential but not sufficient to peace building.
Britain and France exported the Westphalian states system to the MiddleEast but in a flawed form that had conflict and instability built into it. MiddleEast peoples saw the West as both a threat and a model that needed to be selectively imitated in order to defend the region against Western expansion and, once the region was conquered, to empower resistance and enable viable independence. As Europe shed its imperial past, the US assumed the role of world hegemon, deploying hard power to contain MiddleEast conflicts and to establish control over the region’s oil, which helped sustain its hegemony over Europe. Europe sought, thru the EMP, to export its experience of economic integration and democratization as an alternative solution to MENA’s instability; EU norms were thought to also serve security purposes (Youngs 2004). EU discourse was much more respectful of MENA sensibilities and was welcomed by elites seeking to integrate into the world capitalist economy on favorable terms and intellectuals who hoped it would encourage democratization. In practice, the EMP aimed less at partnership than at assimilation of the south to the neo-liberal practices of the north, thereby promoting the reconstruction of the hub and spokes structure typical of the imperial era. As Adler and Crawford (2004) concluded, the Barcelona Process was caught between the language of post-colonialism and the behavior of neo-colonialism. Increasingly, too, Europe became a partner in the project of US hegemony over the region in which its soft power supplemented the American hard power directed at those who resisted this project. The actual outcome is to reincorporate the MENA region into a subordinate position in a global hierarchy that, as Little and Buzan (2009) observed, is incongruent with the norm of sovereign equality exported with the Westphalian states system at de-colonization.
Therefore, we decided to try to develop a one-page statement, a statement that would contain the principles of the final status. We decided that if the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and our respective leaderships were not going to do it, then we, the people would do it ourselves. This is how we started: we wrote up one page stating what we thought was possible and necessary to make peace. Instead of going directly to the leaders, we decided that we would go to the people in order to get their input into this. Surprisingly, we discovered there are a lot of people out there among the Israelis and the Palestinians who are far more daring than their leaders and who are prepared to say and put their names down on a statement that contains the proposed concessions on both sides. Thus, we started collecting the signatures. I am not saying that we did not come up against opposition and resistance, especially on the Palestinian side. On the other hand, there has been a lot of recognition and response— positive response—so that, in about three to four months, we have been able to gather about 60,000 signatures. This public support is unprecedented.
Despite the fact that the water resources under discussion encompass Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, and Syrian jurisdictions and that there is a committee on water in the multilateral component of the MiddleEastpeace process, each of the substantive agreements on water to date have resulted from bilateral (as opposed to multilateral) negotiations. Although the bilateral format has until now been more effective at achieving agreements, a shortcoming of the approach is that important third parties in multiriparian basins are left out of the resolutions. Simply put, the pie tends to be divided without all the consumers present at the table. The Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace is an example of such an agreement, with the waters of the Yarmuk tributary and the mainstem of the Jordan distributed between Israel and Jordan as though Syria and the Palestinians were not riparians to the watershed. In sum, the only challenge to unilateralism in water development in the region has been bilateral, rather than basin-wide multilateral agreement.