The Indonesian government, cq. the Ministry of Manpower, Transmigration and Cooperatives, began the sending of migrant labour in 1970 through a program called AKAN. This program was carried out by a section at a fourth-echelon level, reporting directly to the first-echelon Director General for Development and Deployment. In 1986, the Directorate General was merged with the Directorate General of Development and Protection, changing its name to the Directorate General for Development and Placement. Due to this merger, the AKAN section was promoted to a second-echelon level and renamed as ‘Pusat AKAN’ or Centre for Overseas Employment. In 1994, Pusat AKAN was dissolved and its role taken over by another second-echelon level, the Directorate of Export of Migrant Workers Services. In 1999, the Directorate was renamed the Directorate of Placement of Workers Overseas. In 1999, the government established Badan Koordinasi Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (BKPTKI – the Coordinating Agency for the Placement of Indonesian Migrant Workers) with members coming from nine related institutions. In 2001, the Directorate General for Development and Placement was dissolved and replaced by the Directorate General for Placement and Protection of Workers Overseas. When Law No. 39 of 2004 was enacted, Article 94 (1) and (2) mandated the establishment of BNP2TKI. The Presidential Instruction in 2006 detailed the establishment of BNP2TKI. The agency began its work in 2007 when its first head was appointed. With the existence of BNP2TKI, all matters concerning placement and protection of migrant labour was put under the authority of BNP2TKI, coordinated with the MoMT, yet responsible directly to the President. With the existence of BNP2TKI, the Directorate General of Placement and Protection under the Ministry was dissolved as its functions were shifted to BNP2TKI.
In doing so, this article provides some lessons for emerging critical thinking in climate adaptation and resilience-building. The research suggests that adaptation main- streaming needs reframing away from a series of technical challenges and towards an understanding that the construction and negotiation of climate change leads to different distributional implications for impacts and adaptation. It asks whether the models of governance and theories of change assumed by a predominantly technically led framing of adaptation mainstreaming are appropriate. Given the concentration of political and bureaucratic power and informality of many policy processes found in many administrations, it questions whether the dominant technical models that underpin externally supported mainstreaming efforts are reflected by, or even com- patible with, the realities of governance in many places. Drawing on the examples presented here and foregrounding the importance of informal and tacit strategies for policy influence can therefore help others designing and providing technical assistance to support national and sub-national governments to mainstream adaptation into their policies. These programmes can factor in design elements in order to maximise this potential, while also balancing and developing the skill sets of staff to cover the different types of policy influencing tactics presented here.
Personal relationships do matter as well as the image of the negotiator as per- sonable, trustworthy and knowledgeable (EP 1; EP 2; NMS 8; NMS 10). As negotia- tions on the international level among member states are characterised by repeated meetings over years, the negotiators form working relationships with each other that facilitate signalling on possible bargaining chips and negotiation preferences. If nego- tiators trust each other they may be willing to engage in informal negotiations by ex- changing their ‘briefing scripts’ and informing each other on which points they could move and what is absolutely crucial national interest that may not be touched (NMS 4; NMS 8; NMS 10). This also happened in the case of the negotiations on the RED in the Council and in the Parliament, yet none of the involved negotiators made refer- ences to changed beliefs. One key conclusion could be that because it was a negotia- tion setting, it did not help to convince the negotiator as even if the negotiator had changed his/her beliefs as a result of constructivist learning, s/he would most likely not have been able to move on the national position given that civil servant’s negotia- tion mandates are limited and even ministers face political constraints back in their home countries (although this can also be used as bargaining chip across the two governance levels, see Putnam 1988). So even although constructivist learning may have occurred on the individual level, it remained unlikely that this was transferred into constructivist learning on the organisational level in the form of changed negotia- tion positions that resulted from modified beliefs.
Because both policy change and the mobilization of policyentrepreneurs across jurisdictions are dependent on varying decision-making systems and existing policy legacies, 47 propagating ideas that could cause policy change should take into account territorially-embedded institutions. Whether it is comprehending institutional differences at the sub-national level (states, regions, and municipalities) or understanding the role of varying decision-making systems in effecting similar policy ideas in different countries, 48 cross-jurisdictional scans, comparative analyses, and public policy evaluations would be effective tools. 11,66-68 For example, the imminent legalization of marijuana in Canada across 13 provincial and territorial jurisdictions is bound to raise challenges regarding implementation and regulation. 5,69,70 This policy change would benefit from cross-jurisdictional scans and comparative analyses that would aid policyentrepreneurs in influencing institutions across jurisdictions.
rules in the asylum field had already changed from unanimity to qualified majority vote (QMV) in the Council of Ministers with The Hague Programme. The then Tory shadow home secretary, David Davies, claimed that ‘the British veto would be given up on asylum, immigration, and visa matters.’ ‘That is not co-operation - that is decisions effectively driven out of Brussels’ (ibid). Factually, the European Commission cannot legislate even under QMV, but rather the Council using the co-decision procedure with the European Parliament. Formally, the European Commission only proposes legislation under such a procedure. However, this could still indicate a major success for the European Commission in the field of the EU asylum policy. In essence, this means that the asylum area is then fully communitarised, and national sovereignty has been pooled at the EU level. The focus of the following paper will be on the role of the Commission in the EU asylum policy. Did the Tampere programme from 1999 to 2004 represent a major success for the European Commission acting as a Supranational Policy Entrepreneur (SPE)?
In the second half of these discussions, a third important event happened that was not related to a new discussion or bill, but rather was centred on a person: Secretary of State Clinton. Blomdahl (2016) suggests that Clinton switched sides to support U.S. military engagement in Libya because the Arab League supported a no-fly zone and military engagement, the British and French did not want to military engage without the U.S. and Gadhafi and his army were approaching Benghazi, which could lead to a possible major human catastrophe (Blomdahl, 2016). Following this, Clinton joined Ambassador Rice to try to convince Obama to act in Libya. This was followed by a statement from Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), who said that the international community cannot watch from the side- lines while the quest for democracy is met with violence (Blanchard, 2011).
In this study, Turkish citizens were asked if they definitely agree, partially agree, neither agree nor disagree, partially disagree, or definitely disagree of their leader’s decision to back down from a commitment in four different foreign crises. 2 In all four models, I employ the same five independent variables, namely (i) self-placement of the respondent on an ideological scale, (ii) the respondent’s sex, (iii) the level of political activism the individual declares, (iv) the respondent’s approximate income, and (v) the average age of the participant was also collected. I have reason to expect different factors to have varying impacts between the levels of approval and disapproval across scenarios of a same foreignpolicy. For example, some factors that may influence voters in the Military Intervention scenario might not have the same impact for voters in the Economic Sanctions scenario. It is possible that a respondent may not care about what Turkey does in an economic sanctions episode, but may gauge a leader’s competence by looking at how that leader acts in a militarized crisis. Alternatively, a respondent may think that an economic sanctions scenario can be a good opportunity to manifest Turkey’s resolve while risking a military adventure for such an endeavor may be too costly. More broadly, I expect a variance in the way participants approve or disapprove of the leaders’ decision across all four scenarios. Since my dependent variable is an ordinal one, I will employ ordered logit regression models to see whether the five aforementioned independent variables significantly affect the way
,Q D VLPLODU YHLQ $UÕER÷DQ FODLPV WKDW7XUNH\¶V VWDQFH DQG SROLF\ RSWLRQV FDQ KDUGO\ EH clarified by just single identity ascendance over its domestic and foreign affairs, because of its interlocked geopolitical location that encourage it behave as both western and eastern country at international area. From this perspective, it becomes obvious that Turkey should have multi-faceted identities in an effort to be an opening door for all the regions, which it have borders such as &DXFDVXV %DONDQV :HVW DQG 0LGGOH (DVW $\GR÷DQ ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV VLQFH 7XUNH\ WDNHV place between Asia and Europe, behaving as a central country with its both western and eastern LGHQWLW\IHDWXUHVVHHPVWRDPRUHYLDEOHRSWLRQIRULW$UDVDQG$NSÕQDU%H\RQGWKHVH interoperations, some scholars such as Aras regard these seemingly considerable changes in Turkish foreignpolicy towards the Middle East as a natural consequent of “Europeanization” process in Turkey (Gündem, 2007).
First, self-enhancement values, devoted to the meeting of personal needs, never significantly predict foreign pol- icy orientations, while interpersonal values — particularly conservation and self-transcendence — play a larger role. Thus, as anticipated given the sociotropic nature of for- eign policy preferences, interpersonal values more strongly predict foreignpolicy orientations than personal ones. Openness also adds little. Second, conservation val- ues are statistically significant predictors of support for militant internationalism: individuals who embrace values that emphasize group survival like conformity, tradition, and security are the most supportive of the United States employing tough, coercive means of foreignpolicy abroad. Third, self-transcendence strongly predicts sup- port for cooperative internationalism: respondents who seek to promote the welfare of others endorse foreign pol- icies that do the same. Fourth, in comparison with mili- tant and cooperative internationalism, isolationism appears to be less rooted in personal values. There is some support for H6: conservation’s effect is statistically significant, but substantively weak, and even combined, the values explain relatively little of the variation in isola- tionist views, echoing other research highlighting the diffi- culties of rooting isolationism in personal values (Kertzer et al. 2014).
In casting for a great power role, Britain portrays itself as a major military power with global reach and responsibilities. The government employs discourses that foreground its “outstanding capabilities” as the country with “the biggest defence budget in Europe” 72 and “a leading member of NATO”. 73 Correspondingly, Britain has reaffirmed its commitment to meet NATO targets on defence expenditure and has reinforced its contributions to European and international security ‘on the ground’. The British government agreed shortly after the Brexit referendum to deploy 650 troops to Estonia and Poland to strengthen NATO’s forward presence in Eastern Europe and has pledged to place another 3000 troops on call as part of a NATO rapid-response unit. 74 Most symbolically, perhaps, Britain committed to restore its “military presence East of Suez” 75 by rolling out a large-scale investment to re-open a naval support facility in Bahrain, “the first such facility East of Suez since 1971”. 76 It has announced deployment of Royal Navy frigates to the Persian Gulf to achieve an “enduring presence” in the region and to demonstrate Britain’s “global reach and world class capability”. 77 This is framed as a reversal of the policy of disengagement from East of Suez in the 1970s, which has come to embody Britain’s retreat from a great power role. 78 That disengagement, for FM Johnson, was a historical mistake that the current government has corrected: “Britain is back East of Suez”. 79
Figure 1 indicates that there was an imbalance in regional development in several provinces in Indonesia. One of the causes of inequality is that the allocation of funds can come from the government or the private sector. In the autonomous government system, more government funds will be allocated to the regions so that development disparities between regions will tend to be lower. Private investment is more determined by market forces, where the location advantage that is owned by an area is a force that has many roles in attracting private investment. The location advantage is determined by transportation cost, both raw materials and results to be paid by employers, differences in labor costs, market concentration, level of business competition, and land rent. Therefore, the investment will tend to be more in developed provinces compared to underdeveloped regions. These factors encourage to examine the influence of the poor, the allocation of development funds, government spending, and foreign investment in driving economic growth, as well as to investigate the role of fiscal policy in each region. Government expenditures used to influence the economic course of a region (infrastructure of education, health, transportation, and others) will result in increased economic activity and encourage economic growth (Todaro, 2000). Research on the effect of government spending on economic growth was conducted by Hussain, Khan, and Rafiq (2017), Udoh (2011), Oni, Aninkan, and Akinsanya (2014), and Surjaningsih, Utari, and Trisnanto (2012). The results of research by Hussain et al. (2017), Udoh (2011), and Oni et al. (2014) concluded that government spending had a positive influence on economic growth. Research from Surjaningsih et al. (2012) uncovered that in the long run, government spending had no effect on economic growth.
The question at this point is why the IRGC and not the Foreign Ministry is the dominant actor in the Middle East. As discussed before and highlighted by Interviewee 5, Iran’s beyond-border security understanding is one reason for the centrality of IRGC in this policy. As Interviewee 10 explains, the Iranian regime treats the security risks in the region as ‘an issue of regime security’ and thus directly refers the Middle East file to the IRGC, who is responsible for the external and internal security of the Islamic Republic according to the Islamic Republic’s Constitution. 508 However, Abbas Khalaji’s interview shows that the IRGC also has its own ideological and domestic political reasons to invest in the regional policy. Ideologically speaking, Khalaji says that IRGC and other conservative institutions are responsible to export the revolution and ‘the mentality of regime exportation is still there among these groups and this is a very important objective.’ 509 ‘The Middle East is the destination for the export of the revolution,’ 510 he adds, which suggests that the domestic developments in the Arab countries and the Shia revival after 2003 is evaluated as another opportunity to manifest this ideological objective. Besides the revolutionary ideology, Khalaji also argues that ‘All revolutionary institutions and organizations like IRGC, Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, the Foundation of the Oppressed, and the Basij Forces see that their power will increase by exporting the Shiite Revolution.’ 511 External power will help the revolutionary institutions increase their leverage in domestic politics and balance the reformists internally. 512 In other words, external power in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen means greater domestic power inside Iran. It should be concluded that, irrespective of the IRGC motives in the region, IRGC is the most influential actor in Iran’s foreignpolicy and any analysis on the matter should focus on their activities in the region. It should also be emphasized that their role in the Middle East policy is independent of any presidential change and
Summarising the above results, this case study on the Corruption Court Law has explored how the three policy influencing paths of political allies, public opinion and knowledge helped explain NGO influence (or lack thereof) and how NGO strategies and resources were used in this process. In the case of the Corruption Court Law, the influencing path of political allies played a central role for NGOs to achieve influence over policy change. While research and technical assistance was an important strategy employed by NGOs, and that they perceived a significant part of their proposed policy content to have been incorporated into the final law, they failed to influence the policy issues of most concern to them. The public opinion influencing path also played a role, but thanks to different strategies and resources than in the Cicak Buaya case, relying more on media coverage than on social mobilisation and mobilisable troops, and on anticipated rather than actual public opinion. NGOs achieved influence over the perceived high-salience issues related to preserving the authority of the KPK (“saving the KPK”), such as passing the law before the deadline and maintaining KPK’s prosecution and wiretapping authority. For those issues, intense media coverage, the emerging Cicak Buaya crisis, the increased weight of anticipated public opinion during a focusing event such as an election period, added to the use of symbolism and imagery borrowed from the cicak movement’s discourse, and the support of decision-making allies (both the president and legislators) concerned about their anti-corruption image and fearing electorally damaging consequences, seem to have played a role. Hence, while expectations about electoral victory can provide a positive incentive for policy-makers to hear NGO demands, the opposite (fear of electoral loss) can also work as a (negative) incentive for policy-makers to accept
Finally, in the longer term, it is not inconceivable that these developments might signal a very significant structural tension between the growing weight of cities, and the fading strength of the territorial sovereign state. We have noted the multiple signs of this tension in the contemporary city/state relation. But decades from now this issue may be far more prominent. There is also a growing tension between a city- based political order and state-based institutions like the UN, where the role of cities remains opaque and potentially destabilizing of established norms and procedures. Some of the larger cities and urban regions have, in recent decades, generated astonishing levels of growth and economic power, are linked transnationally by the most advanced technological infrastructures on the planet, have reach that stretches across traditional state boundaries, and have populations so large that they begin to destabilise traditional understandings of what international politics is. Cities are beginning to realise their power in both economic and political governance, and act as important ‘norm-entrepreneurs’: generating some of the normative content and aims behind emerging global agendas such as sustainability and resilience. A global network of thousands of linked cities affords a vast reservoir of human capital and creativity that will develop in unexpected directions in this century.
Along with its composition, the Commonwealth's most valuable role for the Canadian government had been transformed during the post-war period. It was no longer primarily a vehicle to manage Canada's relations with Britain. These were now managed through other channels? their security aspect through NATO and their economic aspect via bilateral mechanisms such as the UKCCC. The Commonwealth's main role for Canada was as a cooperative framework for like-minded Western powers with a shared history to use as a bridge to the developing world. While neither intended nor wielded as an escape from American influence, it was also a useful vehicle to move beyond the North American continent and the friendly, if overwhelming, presence of the United States. But first and foremost, cooperating in the Commonwealth allowed Canada to demonstrate sympathy for the aspirations of new members with the hope that the non-intrusive proximity afforded by broad, regular contacts would keep these countries more favourably disposed towards the West than would otherwise be the case. It was a narrow and specialized role, but in this way, it was integrated into broader Canadian foreignpolicy objectives at the height of the Cold War and given a use without which the Canadian government would have been less willing to agree to anything which tended to increase the scope its of activities.
It meant disregarding any kind of alliances or commitments that would lead to war and conflict. Non-alignment implied a position to critically analyse and judge each issue without any bias. By adopting this policy, India emerged as neutral mediator in bitter conflicts and thereby promoting world peace. In the various conflicts like Indo-China and the Korean War, the role of India as a peacemaker was vital. We can see India‟s decisive role in some global conflicts in the efforts to promote world peace.
Religion has become (again) a recognisable significant factor in many aspects of inter- national politics. Any consideration of its role inevitably raises in the mind of the British reader the current threat of terrorism from ‘Al Qaida and related terrorist groups’ as MI5 puts it (1). For reasons that I will return to later, this ‘international terrorism’ is not labelled as being in any sense related to, or derived from Islam officially in the British language – MI5 describes the threat as being not even from readings of Islam, but rather from ‘Al Qaeda’s ideology’ (2). But all recognise this terrorist threat as being related in some form to religion. The attacks on New York and Washington, Bali, Istanbul, London, Madrid – have all brought into sharp relief the mobilising effect of religion. But religion is not only impor- tant in the twenty-first century because of those terrorist acts and threats.
The particular channels that multilateral organizations may use to influence recipient countries differ not only across organizations, but also between the issues that are fronted. It is well known that the World Bank specifies a detailed set of conditions, which the recipient must implement before it receives aid, a practice which is often referred to as “buying reform”. Less is known, however, of what is actually agreed upon in the negotiations between the top officials during the implementation process. There appears to be some room for maneuver, since it is frequently found that the World Bank disburses almost 100% of the aid, even if only 50% of the conditions are implemented (World Bank 1992). We propose an explanation for the partial success of conditionality that is complementary to those suggested by Svensson (2002) and Villanger (2004). Our results suggest that when the multilaterals must include foreignpolicy in their recommendations to the recipient, then the multilateral has to accept some slippage in the recipient’s implementation of the conditions in order to make the recipient accept the total aid conditionality/foreignpolicy package. Moreover, we show that making the recipient adhere to the foreign policies of the donor always has priority, and thus, the implementation of conditions levied by the multilateral will be partly crowded out.
domestic critical cost-benefit assessment of potential membership was largely disregarded and positive aspects of Euro-Atlantic integration were hailed by domestic political elites and consequently the public, with the minor exception of a few open academic debates (Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič 2017). The ‘othering’ of the (war-waging) Balkans and Yugoslav foreignpolicy accompanied by top-down Europeanization concerning core EU principles and values was the driver of Slovenian state foreignpolicy-making in the period of 1992–1998. Ironically, the very same Euro- Atlantic external foreignpolicy environment to which Slovenia wanted to get closer by abandoning its Balkan identity and connections pushed Slovenia to completely change this and reorient its foreignpolicy ‘back to the (Western) Balkans’ in 1998. In that year, in the context of accession talks with Slovenia, the EU demanded that Slovenia take an active role in South-East European (SEE) post-conflict cooperation schemes. Slovenia was extremely reluctant to do so as that compromised its effort to build an ‘away from the Balkans’ foreignpolicy profile. Importantly, in the domestic external environment, anti-Balkan sentiments were widespread. These developments were rather worrying for the then Slovenian government, which feared that domestic opposition parties would interpret Slovenian engagement in SEE as a reestablishment of the former Yugoslavia (Bojinović 2005: 21). In truth, such critical voices were understandable, because the public could not see the direction in which Slovenia wanted to go with its foreignpolicy. It became clear that a new foreignpolicy strategy was not only needed, but was overdue.
Therefore, it can be argued that the continuous exercise of Nigerian foreign policy‘s principles, particularly the four concentric circles by both past and present government of the country is attesting to the notions and assumptions of systems theory. This is because, Nigeria has foreseen it that, if it fails to come into the rescue of the African countries, or the neighbouring States during their needs, it will be difficult for its national interest to be achieved. Thus, the willingness and commitment of Nigeria towards actualizing part of its foreign policy‘s objective of maintaining peace and stability in the Africa is arguably canvassed for its significant role played during the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to AU. This also canvassed for Nigeria‘s role in formulation of Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act which allows the organization and States to interfere in the internal affairs of other members whenever there is grave violation of human rights.