[PDF] Top 20 Rotational-XOR Cryptanalysis of Reduced-round SPECK

... primitives, rotational cryptanalysis was not evaluated on Speck until a new method to deal with the constants was proposed in FSE 2017 ...the XOR of round constants into the analysis by ... See full document

... The differential attack was introduced by Biham and Shamir in [20] and is now one of the most classical attacks on modern block ciphers. Resistance to this attack is the first requirement during the design of new ... See full document

... Abstract. SIMECK is a family of 3 lightweight block ciphers designed by Yang et al. They follow the framework used by Beaulieu et al. from the United States National Security Agency (NSA) to design SIMON and ... See full document

... Lightweight cryptography is the field of cryptogra- phy that studies the level of security of cryptographic algorithms designed to be implemented and run ef- ficiently on constrained devices. Nowadays, as we move closer ... See full document

... We could try to find a higher number of distinguishers (higher than 1024) but it does not make the attack faster. We will give details on this later in the section. The distinguishers are for 2.5 rounds and each one has ... See full document

... key. Round function of Present , which is depicted in Figure 1, is same for both versions of Present and consists of standard op- erations such as subkey XOR, substitution and permutation: At the beginning ... See full document

... Contribution. In this paper, we analyze Speck regarding to its resistance against differentials cryptanalysis. We show conventional key-recovery attacks on round-reduced versions of almost all ... See full document

... First, we describe the preimage attack on 3-round Keccak -512 which is based on the rotational distinguisher given in the previous section. Then we show how to extend the attack to 4 rounds. To have the ... See full document

... LSB of registers are treated as original variables. In this case, the XOR-ed func- tion of approximations for each active S-box can be expressed as a quadratic function of these original 0-1 variables. ... See full document

... distinguisher below thwarts such approach, since it requires the attacker to be able to build the input pair for any random difference ∆. This type of problem already has been analyzed in the work of Patarin [17] – he ... See full document

... on reduced-round variants of the SPECK block cipher ...first round, we start from the middle and run the experiments forwards as well as in the reverse ... See full document

... differential cryptanalysis was first proposed by Albrecht and Cid in [2], where it was applied to the block cipher PRESENT (and was further used in followup publications such as [3, ...differential ... See full document

... In this section, we improve the preimage attack on 6-round GOST-512 in [31]. First we reduce the time complexity from 2 505 to 2 496 by removing the unnecessary Meet-in-the- Middle (MitM) step. Then we show a ... See full document

... Abstract. In this paper, we give the first pre-image attack against 1- round KECCAK-512 hash function, which works for all variants of 1- round KECCAK. The attack gives a preimage of length less than 1024 ... See full document

... the round keys are not independent but are produced from a single master by the key scheduling ...use round keys in every round (after each non-linear operation) – see LED [11] and Zorro [9], for an ... See full document

... In this attack, we use a borderline cube containing d = 32 variables. Recall that in the case of MAC-based Keccak, a 32-variable cube was used to attack 6 rounds, but here, we have a larger output of 1348 bits which ... See full document

... like cryptanalysis, which takes both auxiliary and dynamic variables into consideration and aims to find almost optimal attacks by balancing the two phases of cube-attack-like ... See full document

... Given the 17-round approximation for SIMON-48, introduced in Section 5.3, we apply the ap- proach presented in Section 5.4 to extend key recovery over more number of rounds. Our key recovery for SIMON-48/72 and ... See full document

... Comparingtwo attacks above, we realize there are some improvement for time efficiency. The observation captures our attention and prompts us to improve the attack. Consequently, we mount a more efficient attack. First, ... See full document

... is reduced in a very generic ...linear cryptanalysis, it usually result in an increased time complexity (R T > ...linear cryptanalysis, we use a variant of Matsui’s Algorithm 2 [28], and the ... See full document