The use of public debt has important economic consequences that extend beyond the comparative metrics presented in this report. Economists examine broader issues surrounding governmentdebt and its impact on the financial markets and the economy. These issues, which are not mutually exclusive, include (1) the degree to which governmentdebt crowds out domestic investment and net exports and (2) the economic efficiency of using tax-exempt debt to subsidize public capital formation. The two chiefly negative consequences may seem to justify greater oversight of state and localgovernmentdebt and the implicit federal subsidy. Designing a federal oversight role, however, would need to address the underlying constitutional issues governing the federal-state relationship.
The 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria guarantees a system of localgovernment run by a democratically elected council and requires all the state governments to enact legislation providing for the establishment, structure, composition, finance, and functions of such localgovernment councils. This provision placed the structure, composition, finance, and functions of localgovernment at the mercy of state legislation. Therefore, the various state governments adopted the presidential system of administration until recently when the parliamentary system was re-introduced in Osun State among other states of the federation. This calls for attention, to peruse the relevance or otherwise of this new policy. The paper intends to look at the strength, weakness, opportunity, and threats of this new policy in Osun StateLocalGovernment system using a SWOT analysis. The paper is divided into six parts. Part one is an introduction, part two examines the parliamentary system of government, part three discuss the presidential system of government, part four examines the parliamentary system of localgovernment in Nigeria, part five analyses the parliamentary system of localgovernment in Osun State and the last part is the conclusion, and recommendations on how to ensure a strong localgovernment structure that will meet the yearning and aspiration of the people at the grassroots.
As China is in the process of urbanization, local governments often assume the responsibility for the construction of most public facilities, and thus have strong investment needs. Under the current trend of large and growing local debts in China, local governments in all regions and at all levels in China have a lot of debt operations and complex debt relationships. The accumulation of local debts leads to the out-of-control of the scale of debts, which seriously affects the normal operation of government agencies and hinders the devel- opment of the economy, which is prone to huge financial risks and social conflicts. In order to control the risk of debt, the central government began to adopt a series of policies in 2018 to implement debt limit management for lo- cal governments, and the national localgovernmentdebt limit was 21 trillion yuan. In this context, this paper starts from the status quo and problems of localgovernmentdebt, accurately analyzes the causes and mechanisms of debt formation, and proposes specific measures and methods to rationally control debt growth and reduce risks, in order to strengthen local govern- ment debt management and resolve social conflicts. This article provides guidance advice.
Abstract — This study determined the Marketing Channel and Structure of Cattle among Intermediaries in Mubi LocalGovernment Area of Adamawa State, Nigeria. Objectives of this study area to examine the marketing channel for cattle; determine the marketing structure of the intermediaries and identifying the major constraints in cattle marketing in the study area. Simple random sampling technique was employed to select 123 respondents in Mubi International Cattle Market. Primary data were collected through the use of structured questionnaire from the market. Descriptive statistics and Gini-coefficient were used in analyse the data of this study. The result shows that 87% sell live cattle, 13% sell butcher pieces, while 61.8% and 27.6% sell their cattle in secondary and terminal markets respectively. About 73% had their major source of trading cattle in north-east and 26% are from other countries (Cameroon, Chad and Niger). Gini- coefficients of 0.5673, 0.6340, 0.452 and 0.5719 were obtained for wholesalers, retailers, butchers and brokers respectively, while Respondents indicates that insurgency (insecurity) (78%), inadequate market information (74%), inadequate credit facility (73.2%), cost of transportation (72.4%), double charges by market officials been the least (48.8%) were some of the major constraints. The study recommended that good roads, better and cheap means of transportation should be provided to the marketers through their cooperatives.
Risk index is ensured, for each index to determine the threshold of different risk status. Before confirming the threshold of each index, the following principles should be adhered to: First, it should be synthetically considered according to the history of economic change or the economic cycle, the functions and nature of each variable in economic activities, and the macro-control policy each time taken by the government and economic development goals; Second, consulting to the related domestic and international research findings; Third, compare different regions, especially the related index of governments of the same type; Fourth, experience standard, which is based on management practice of long-term economic activities development laws, is put forward by experts with extensive experience in the field of financial management after a rigorous analysis. In the premise of upholding the four principles, risk interval (threshold interval) of the index is ultimately divided into three intervals according to an upward trend of risk: security domain, risk early warning domain, and the crisis outbreak domain. Security domain indicates that finance is running in safe condition. Risk early warning domain indicates that certain risks already exist in financial running, but not go beyond a certain warning level. Crisis outbreak domain represents that financial running is facing serious risks of possible outbreak of financial crisis. In the actual operation, there is an internationally recognized standard, by which early warning value is determined, however, if there is no international standard, this article will take example by previous research results, refer to the actual situation of the relevant economic sectors, and combine with our specific local realities as the accumulation of the experience in order to early design a proper early warning value of the debt crisis index. Of course, whether the setting of the threshold is reasonable or scientific and whether it accords with the reality of the region or the government will directly affect the risk value of each index, and ultimately affect the judgments on the debt risk, so the threshold should be determined under the specific circumstances.
Accordingly, it will therefore be essential to manage and control municipal debt, and so various official public documents 3 state it is fundamental that Local Administration (LA) participates fully in striving for budgetary consolidation in Public Administration. Mainly since 1979, various rules have been implemented in Portugal to restrict LA debt. Those rules predominantly take the form of successive local finance laws. In this context, the current Local Finance Law (LFL) (Law no. 2/2007 of January 15) sets out in Art. 35, that municipalities debt must adhere to the following objectives: minimization of direct and indirect costs from a long-term perspective; guarantee a balanced distribution of costs over the various annual budgets; guard against excessively concentrated amortisation periods and avoid exposure to excessive risk. In this context, considering the institutional theory and more specifically the coercive isomorphism perspective, in this research we will study the evolution of debt (from 2004 to 2009), to be able to assess if formal pressures, in the form of the various norms attempting to limit debt, have led to municipalities showing a common behaviour, originating a reduction in debt.
We find that current collateralization practices vary a great deal across bond issues and have changed over time, and discuss the legal and other problems attendant upon each type of backup. Remarkably, we find that unlike our initial sample of bond issues, recent bond issues virtually all state explicitly in the prospectus that they carry no security. Thus, the popular image of local governments wildly overpromising with guarantees they are not legally empowered to give seems, at least as far as recent bond issues are concerned, to be wholly wrong. This in turn calls into question the figures commonly provided for localgovernmentdebt, since they often include LGFV debt that localgovernment is neither legally nor morally obligated to pay. To be sure, they may wish to pay creditors voluntarily, but it is misleading to label as “debt” soft obligations of this nature. Creditors who have tried to force local governments to make good on their guarantees have uniformly failed, at most receiving half of what they sought. The argument that local governments have some politically enforceable obligation to pay on their guarantees does not seem supported by the evidence.
The emoluments are the most important thing to attract the best students of any subject. If salaries ar e higher, it would attract the high ranking students from the lot and vice versa. In the present case we are exploring about the Management degree holders. Therefore, the State and discipline-wise analysis has been made of the average emoluments in respect of fresh and experienced degree holders in Management. The results have been presented as follows. Table 1.2 shows that the fresh management degree holders received maximum emoluments of Rs. 92400 per month and minimum Rs. 2500 per month in India. It is interesting to note that the average monthly emoluments received by the pass outs were Rs. 23000 per month. The State-wise analysis of emoluments of fresh degree holders indicates that the maximum emoluments per month received by the pass outs of Karnataka were Rs. 92400 followed by Maharashtra (Rs. 71000) and Kerala & Chandigarh i.e., Rs. 40000 each. On other hand, the Minimum emoluments per month were received by the degree holders of Karnataka around Rs. 2500 followed by Kerala Rs. 3000 and Punjab i.e., Rs. 4000. However, the highest average emoluments were received by the pass outs of Chandigarh Rs. 29167 per month followed by Maharashtra i.e. Rs. 25978 and Arunachal Pradesh Rs. 25167. The lowest average emoluments were received by the pass-outs of Assam i.e., Rs. 11153 followed by Punjab with Rs. 12375 and Kerala around Rs. 13928.
Serious deterioration in government fiscal finances in the late 1990s and early 2000s asked for prudent fiscal management. The fiscal deterioration of 1990s and 2000s led to elevated levels of debt liabilities at both the national and sub-national level. Uttar Pradesh (UP) fiscal position during 1990s and 2000s was one of the most vulnerable. Fiscal and revenue deficit and debt levels were appallingly high creating unmanageable pressure on fiscal finances. The UP government has enacted its FRBMA in 2004 with the aim to arrest rising deficits and debt which mandated reduction in deficit and debt levels within a limit in a given time frame. The sustainability analysis has been made in the current study to capture the effect of reforms on debt position and to assess sustainability of debts in pre and post FRBMA years. Our analysis suggests improvement in all debt and deficit indicators in post 2004-05 years. Debtanalysis also confirms sustainable fiscal health ( τ = -4.533; p<0.05; with constant and trend) during post-FRBMA years. The policy implication of the finding is that UP government need to stick with fiscal rules policy.
In seeking to fulfil the research objectives, the necessary information was acquired from both secondary and primary sources by means of a literature review and an empirical study. The literature review is based on a qualitative study, which includes literature, legislation, policy documents, journal articles, books, conference papers, internet resources, and government reports on municipal financial management, credit control and debt management. The main aim of the study is to develop an integrated debt management model to assist municipalities in the Free State Province to improve their debt management. A model is a presentation of a complex reality that has been simplified in order to understand some aspects of the reality better and to describe and explain the relationships between the different variables in that reality (Bailey, 1994:322) According to Brynard, Hanekom, Brynard (2014:5) a model is the presentation, replica or copy of an existing thing or of a proposed structure and it indicative of a particular design or style. For this study the model will be developed based on the literature study (Chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5) and empirical findings (Chapter 6) followed by recommendations in the final chapter. A quantitative research method was used to evaluate objective data consisting of numbers and the analysis of causal relationships between variables.
Finally the electoral business cycle could be explanation for dramatic changes in level of debt in 2009. Political or electoral business cycle (Nordhouse; 1975; Rogoff 1987), suggests that public authorities spend more on items visible for voters (and increase deficit and indebtedness) in pre-election period and generally spend less after election. (analysis for local level, was presented e.g by Veiga 2004; Pettersson 2003). It is difficult to observe this cycle on general data, especially when we take into account changes in economic situation and legal framework, but still we could find some aspects of this trend. In Poland the local election were in 2002, 2006 and it will be in 2010. It is visible, that in years after election (2003, 2007) deficit is lower than in previous years. In election year 2002, deficit counted for gminas and cities together was smaller comparing with previous year (what is contrary to election cycle idea) but in 2006 was higher. 2009 – year before election is good time to start investments, which will be finished in 2010- election time.
The expected signs of the coefficients are shown below each correspondent variable. With respect to income, it is quite difficult to determine a priori the expected sign of its coefficient, given that this variable compounds both elements of fiscal capacity and fiscal necessity, as Farnharm (1985) pointed out. Also, some authors think that there exits a negative effect, in the sense that lower- income people prefer debt financing because they have to pay less taxes in the present-day. On the contrary, higher- income people would be in opposition to an expansive debt policy (Adams, 1977). Nevertheless, these type of arguments are suitable for the USA, but they are not appropriate for the Spanish local public sector. The reason has to do with the referendum requirement that exists in many local and State governments in USA, whose aim is to reconcile voters’ preferences and government’s policy. Other authors like Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) think that income exerts a positive influence on borrowing, given the fact that there exists a positive income elasticity for capital goods. Thus,
This paper studies the current state and drivers of governmentlocal currency bond market (LCBM) development in Sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that well-developed government LCBMs could reduce countries’ exposure to external shocks; help overcome ‘original sin’; facilitate domestic savings mobilisation; and may have important financial, macroeconomic and institutional spill-overs. With detailed information collected from various sources the paper first shows that quite a few African countries have made significant progress in developing LCBMs. Increasingly, African governments issue fixed-rate local currency bonds with tenors of ten years and more on a regular basis. However, we also find that LCBMs in Africa often have low liquidity, feature very few corporate securities and generally have relatively narrow investor bases dominated by commercial banks. The second part of the study presents an econometric analysis of the drivers of African government LCBMs based on a new high-quality panel dataset compiled by the OECD. Our results indicate that LCBM capitalisation is correlated negatively with governments’ fiscal balance and inflation, and positively with common law legal origins, institutional quality and strong democratic political systems.
It was demonstrated earlier that statedebt is analysed taking into ac- count the average maturity of the debt. The longer the loan period, the higher the debt refinancing risk. The methodology of computation of this indicator is only possible to apply in respect of individual self-governments, but it is not possible to apply to the group as a whole. The following period of repayment of operating surplus presented below is a proposal with a universal scope of potential use, as one of the most important determinants of local governments’ financial condition being the difference between the current income realised and current expenditure. This figure indicates how much of the financial re- sources generated by a given localgovernment remains after financing its day-to-day operation. The current Act on public finance has made Polish self- governments concentrate their activities on achieving the highest possible level of operating surpluses. The latter is the most important factor in deter- mining the permissible level of indebtedness of local governments. It is, after all, from the operating surplus that local governments can finance investment operations or repay their debt.
At present, the research on quota management in China is not enough, most of them stay in the stage of theoretical analysis, Yingqiu Liu  through the empir- ical analysis of the EU, concluded that the full equilibrium deficit rate is 3.5%, the maximum limit is 5.5%, and the full equilibrium debt rate should be 30% - 35% as the control target, with a ceiling of 58%. Weitao Diao  estimates the general debt limit and the special debt limit in localgovernmentdebt through the portion of localgovernment fund income and local public revenue, and he believes that the current debt of local governments with repayment responsibili- ties has exceeded the sum of the limits of general debt and earmarked debt, It is therefore necessary to reduce the size of the debt by disposing of government assets, to ensure the rigid implementation of the debt limit after the implemen- tation of the “new rules” of localdebt. Entao Ma  analyzes the necessity, ex- isting problems and quota index of current debt limit management in China, puts forward the direction to be considered in the design of the debt limit index, and sets the debt balance, the debt burden rate, the debt rate, the gold rule, the debt rate in the area of infrastructure construction and other 6 indicators. In the empirical analysis, Fan Zhong  measured the risk and performance of localgovernmentdebt, divided the country into a comprehensive risk of higher, high performance of the region; higher comprehensive risk, Use of areas with lower performance; combination of lower risk and higher performance in areas; lower combined risk and lower performance. Feng Wang  using the ZSG-DEA models, calculates the efficiency of the use of localgovernmentdebt in various provinces of the country, and distributes the limits of localgovernmentdebt in provincial and municipal governments under the principle of optimal efficiency and total quantity.
Thess markets and streets were purposively selected and a simple random sampling technique was employed to select ten (10) and five (5) watermelon marketers from the markets and streets respectively, thereby making a total of seventy five (75) respondents. Data were collected through the use of structured questionnaire supplemented with verbal interview, especially where the respondents could not read or write. The data collected were analyzed using descriptive statistics such as frequency distributions, percentages and farm budgeting analysis.
This paper constructs a closed DSGE model, which includes households, firms, central bank, and the financial sector. Assuming that families are free to choose consumption, labor supply and government bond holdings to achieve intertemporal maximization. Manufacturers are intermediate goods manufacturers and final product manufacturers, their goals are to pursue cost minimization and profit maximization. Intermediate goods manufacturers are in a monopolistic competitive market, and the final products are in a completely competitive market. The interest rate rule is formulated by the central bank, and the financial rules are formulated by the government.
Moreover, the ability of state and local governments to issue bonds on a tax-exempt basis encourages local control over local capital projects. State and local governments set their priorities for infrastructure and economic development and shoulder the burden of these investments through the issuance of their own tax-exempt debt. They pay all of the principal of and interest on the debt, with the federal government contributing a relatively small portion through foregone tax revenue. If the current system were replaced with one in which the federal government provided grants or loans to replace the assistance now provided by the exclusion of interest on state and local bonds, the federal government would inevitably appropriate control over infrastructure and economic development decisions that are now made, effectively, at the state and local level.
From 1994 to 1999, there were no clear-cut criteria for approving government guarantees. Independently of the Ministry of Finance, the Government issued guarantees for loans taken on mainly by public sector institutions, but also by the private sector. In this period, the criteria and conditions for approving government guarantees were laid down in annual state budget execution acts. These acts also regulated the sources of funding for government liabilities, as well as the terms and the manner of their settlement. From 1999 on, the approval of government guarantees has been subject to the prior opinion of the Ministry of Finance and the responsible ministry, to which applicants must submit detailed ﬁ nancial data showing their ﬁ nancial positions and data on the development programmes. It was only in 2003 that the Government set the guarantee approval criteria (OG, 16/03 and 108/03); guarantees are only given to budget users, extra-budgetary users, localgovernment units, and the CBRD. The Government does not guarantee the coverage of current costs or operating losses of companies (salaries, current as- sets, etc.), neither does it give guarantees to beneﬁ ciaries who default on their liabilities to the state, and have not obtained positive opinions of the responsible state or business audit for the last two business years.