Commission staff believes accepting the argument that the Commission should somehow be responsible for providing security protection for filers or the building security policy regarding door access should be suspended when access is substantially the same as an unlocked door is not a policy that should be set. “Each candidate for public office has the responsibility to assure that his or her nomination papers are prepared, circulated, signed, and filed in compliance with statutory and other legal requirements.” Wis. Admin. Code EL § 2.05(1). If such arguments are accepted, what would stop future candidates from claiming they were late because of a high number of red traffic signals slowed delivery, an unexpected detour because of road construction caused the trip to take a couple minutes longer, a slow or maximum capacity elevator, or the plan to park in the front of the building had to be modified because all available spots were filled and they had to park a block away. Candidates need to plan ahead and arrive in time to get into the building and file the papers in the office of the Commission prior to the deadline, there are no exceptions under the statute or the relevant case law. 2 Commission staff did receive a call from
15 testimony that this was a Section 1031 transaction 16 tax exchange under IRS, but I find that it was not 17 a factor based on the evidence that took the sale 18 outside of a typically motivated sale. I think and 19 I find the evidence overwhelming in that regard. 20 These types of transactions are often commonplace 21 and the court finds no varying from the standard 22 merely because that may have been a purpose or a 23 determination in the sale.
Under Michigan law, res judicata bars a subsequent action between the same parties when the facts or evidence essential to the action are identical to those that were necessary in a prior action. Begin v Michigan Bell Tel Co, 284 Mich App 581, 599; 773 NW2d 271 (2009); Pierson Sand and Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass Co, 460 Mich 372, 380; 596 NW2d 153 (1999). “The doctrine bars a second, subsequent action when (1) the prior action was decided on the merits, (2) both actions involve the same parties or their privies, and (3) the matter in the second case was, or could have been, resolved in the first.” Adair vState, 470 Mich 105, 121, 680 NW2d 386(2004). “For res judicata to apply, the prior action must also have resulted in a final decision.” Begin, supra, citing Richards v Tibaldi, 272 Mich App 522, 531; 726 NW2d 770 (2006).
29. As provided by Section 501.160(3), charging unconscionable prices in a declared state of emergency is a violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Section 501.204. By undertaking the activities described in paragraphs 8 to 22, Defendant DAVID MEDINA engaged in unconscionable, unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of Florida Statute Section 501.204.
State whether defendant or his/her representatives was/were convicted of or pled guilty to any violation arising out of the collision in question, and if so, state the charges for which defendant or his/her representatives was/were convicted or pled guilty, the name and address of the court where same occurred, the date of final disposition, and the case number for plea or conviction.
Estate of Berghauer v. Heyl, et al. , 98 CV 164, CircuitCourt Outagamie County, Wisconsin. Tried July, 2000 ($546,000 verdict in psychiatric malpractice/suicide case. Reportedly largest verdict in jurisdiction in ten years. Case subsequently settled after a favorable decision in the Wisconsin Appeal Court for $624,000). Meister v. North Aurora Motel, L KA 96 0506 Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane County, Illinois. Tried September - October, 1999 ($3,700,000 verdict for plaintiff in carbon monoxide poisoning case).
Under Tennessee law when a tort is committed against a child the parents have a derivative cause of action for medical expenses resulting from the injury. In Dudley v. Phillips, 218 Tenn. 648, 405 S.W.2d 468 (1966) the Tennessee Supreme Court stated: “We hold a cause of action arising in favor of the parent resulting from a tort committed against the child is derivative in nature and such action is subject to the same defenses that are available in the action arising in favor of the child. Id. at 656 and 471.
18. On or about December 10, 2012, S. Frazier and the fictitious Defendants fraudulently induced the Plaintiff to enter into a “Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement” (“Agreement”). The fraudulent means by which the Plaintiff was induced to enter into the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement was the misrepresentation to the Plaintiff made by S. Frazier that entities named in the Agreement owned approximately 536.843 acres of land located in Limestone County, Alabama and more particularly described on exhibit A to Exhibit 1 attached hereto and that they would deliver a marketable fee simple title to the real estate to the Plaintiff. The fraudulent means by which S. Frazier and the fictitious Defendants induced the Plaintiff to sign the Agreement was that they misrepresented that the real estate was owned by the limited partnerships listed above when, in truth and in fact, those limited partnerships did not exist nor did they own the real estate, and accordingly could not sell it.
After the opening statements, the plaintiff will introduce evidence. The defendant may then introduce evidence. There may be rebuttal evidence after that. The evidence may include the testimony of witnesses who appear personally in court, the testimony of witnesses who may not appear personally but whose testimony may be read or shown to you, and exhibits such as pictures, documents, and other objects.
This order can be extended upon notice filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court and a hearing held prior to the expiration of this Order. NOTE: To ensure adequate time for a hearing, it is recommended that Petitioner seek an extension at least 3 weeks prior to the expiration of this order.
Group brought action against Company, alleging Company’s liability for introducing arsenic pollution from ash storage in settling ponds. The action commenced years after Company had first become aware of high pollutant levels and entered into a corrective action plan with Agency, a state entity. Group alleged that Company was in violation of the Clean Waters Act (“CWA”) by allowing pollution from “point sources,” as well as two conditions of discharge permits Company obtained as part of its corrective action plan with Agency. The lower court found Company in violation of the CWA but deferred to the Agency’s understanding that Company had not violated the discharge permits. Both parties appealed, and the appellate court held for Company in both respects. The court noted that a CWA violation turned on the definition of “point source,” as the CWA was strictly limited to pollutants discharging from such sources, and that other environmental protection laws, such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), contemplated restrictions on other sources of pollution. The appellate court noted that the term “conveyance” was essential to understanding a point source, and that the carefully defined terms of the CWA constrained its applicability. Under that understanding, settling ponds were not point sources, as they allow diffuse seepage and therefore distribution but do not convey a pollutant as a pipe or channel would. The distinction removed Company’s settling ponds from CWA liability. The court noted that RCRA still applied to Company’s obligations, and therefore Company was still directed to manage the pollutants. However, the discharge permits at question were obtained from Agency in compliance with RCRA. Therefore, Company remained responsible for pollutants, Agency’s determination that the discharge permits were not to be understood via a CWA analysis was appropriate, and Company was not in violation of the CWA.
5. Upon receipt of all Objections and Responses, the Judge presiding over the case shall either rule on the pleadings or shall schedule a remote proceeding if the Judge, in his or her sole discretion, deems a hearing or oral argument necessary. Court staff shall transmit the Judge’s ruling to all counsel of record and self-represented parties within seven (7) days of the expiration of time to respond to objections.