Pursuant to Florida's longstanding policy, weekly workers' compensation benefits payable to a claimant, when combined with collateral benefits, such as federal social security disability benefits, cannot exceed 80% of the claimant's average weekly wage. Supplemental benefits provided pursuant to § 440.15(1)(e)1, Fla. Stat., are considered compensation payments, and must be considered part of a claimant's total compensation for purposes of calculating an offset. The offset is mandatory when the combined benefits from all sources, including supplemental benefits, exceed 80% of the worker's average weekly wage. In this case, the Employer/Carrier reduced the Claimant's total benefits from social security and workers' compensation benefits by the amount they could be reduced under 42 U.S.C. 424(a). The Judge of Compensation Claims correctly concluded that the offset being employed was proper. The court concluded that recalculating the offset as the Carrier did, so as to include the increase in supplemental benefits, was in accord with the very purpose of those benefits.
Power to the People? A Critique of the FloridaSupreme Court's Power to the People? A Critique of the FloridaSupreme Court's Interpretation of the Referendum Power in Florida Land Company Interpretation of the Referendum Power in Florida Land Company v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1983)
psychiatrist. As of the date of the Specifications, Applicant had not amended Item 26.b. of her Florida Bar Application to disclose treatment with a psychiatrist for her major depressive disorder. This Specification alleged that Applicant’s history of noncompliance with the prescribed treatment of this disorder evidences a lack of effective treatment of the disorder, and Applicant has not established that she can satisfy the Essential Eligibility Requirements for the practice of law contained in rule 3-10.1 of the Rules of the SupremeCourt Relating to Admissions to the Bar (Rules).
In Enfinger, this Court set out the joint residency rule requiring that when a natural person/individual is sued along with a corporate defendant and there is a county in which they both reside, venue is proper only in that county of joint residence. Enfinger at 540-41. In Enfinger, the plaintiff sued Enfinger, an individual, and Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Enfinger’s employer, was joined as a party defendant. Enfinger at 539. Enfinger’s county of residence was Polk County. Id. His employer, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., had an agent and did business in both Polk County and Duval County. Id. The plaintiffs brought suit in Duval County and the defendant moved to dismiss for improper venue arguing that it should have been brought in Polk County. Id. The trial court denied the motion and the defendants appealed. Id. The SupremeCourt, after reviewing the Florida Statutes pertaining to venue, determined that in the situation such as this where there is an individual defendant and a corporate defendant, and both share a county of residence, suit must be in that common county of residence.
There are essentially three separate systems currently being maintained for the collection and reporting of caseload data generated by the court system. As statutorily mandated (Section 25.075, Florida Statutes), the SupremeCourt has developed a uniform caseload reporting system. Additionally, the State Attorneys and Public Defenders have reported caseload data in varying forms for years, most recently as part of a performance based budgeting initiative (Chapter 216, Florida Statutes), requiring the reporting of performance measure data which includes caseload data. As also noted in our report No. 03-114, the maintenance of separate caseload reporting systems by three entities (SupremeCourt, State Attorneys, and Public Defenders), which are, to some degree, capturing and reporting the same data appears to be costly, duplicative, and inefficient. While our review has identified certain weaknesses, it may be more efficient from a Statewide perspective to explore the possibility of creating one system that can be used by all three parties.
It is true, as the state argues in a companion case to the instant case, Reese v. State, 476 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1985), that the United States SupremeCourt has held in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), that it is not unconstitutional to place the burden on a defendant to prove he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. However, we have chosen not to place this burden of proof on the defendant in the state of Florida, but as we have said, to create a rebuttable presumption of sanity which if overcome, must be proven by the state just like any other element of the offense. We do not reconsider that policy in this decision.FACDL submits that the Legislature did not have the authority to increase the burden of proof of a defendant relying on the insanity defense; pursuant to Yohn, only this Court can make such a Apolicy@ decision. 2
In reviewing the case, the SupremeCourt acknowledged the national trend towards recognizing that a spouse has no duty to retreat in the marital home and that this was particularly true in battered spouse syndrome cases. The Court found legislative support for the instruction in the numerous statutes enacted to protect victims of domestic violence. It also noted the executive branch had studied the matter in the Governor=s Task Force on Domestic Violence, and the judicial branch
14 F.L.W. at 1946. The Wheeler court also noted that simple possession is not a necessarily lesser included offense of sale, according to the Florida standard jury instructions schedule of lesser included offenses, because the definition of sale does not require proof of possession. 14 F.L.W. at 1948, fn. 9.
Thus, the White Court identified as the relevant privacy invasion the police intrusion upon the location where the vehicle was parked, rather than the inventory search which routinely occurred with the impounding of a seized vehicle. White’s attention seems curiously misdirected. The search for a car in a typical garage would rarely be highly intrusive; where would an individual “hide” the car in the ga- rage? In contrast to this relatively minimal intrusion, an inventory search of the interior of the vehicle itself can be quite probing, for people have been known to store all sorts of personal items in the compartments and containers of cars. In focusing on the stray speck of information regarding the vehicle’s location, the Court blinded it- self to the larger invasion of the inventory search.
social security number as specifically required by statute. Section 440.192(2)(a)….Accordingly only the class of persons who are not lawfully in the United States would be unable to attain a social security number. Yet, under Section 440.02(15)(a), Florida Statutes, employment is covered whether legal or illegal. This provision thus requires that an exception be made to the requirements of Section 440.192(2)(a). Because of crucial identity verification functions of social security number, the exception is made only when strictly necessary. To be exempt from the [SSN] requirement a claimant will need to allege that he or she has applied for a [social security] number and been rejected, or that he or she is unlawfully employed and ineligible to apply for a social security number. Since the claimant in this case has done neither, the order striking the petition stands and the motion to vacate is denied without prejudice.
In fact, for nearly four decades a small but significant number of providers have charged unreasonably high rates for services reimbursable under personal injury protection (“PIP) polices and thereby thwarted the purpose of Florida’s No-Fault law by. Indeed, numerous local and state agencies have consistently emphasized the need to curb the practice of providers charging unreasonably high rates in order for the No-Fault system to survive. For this reason, the Florida Legislature has tried to combat the practice of overbilling since shortly after the No-Fault system was implemented in 1972. Indeed, as early
Regardless of the differing philosophies which may imbue these two measures, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act and the federal Social Security Act both contain “hold harmless” provisions which effectively guarantee that the worker will receive the maximum disability benefit payable under either statute’s offset scheme. See, American Bankers, supra; citing, Fla. Stat. §440.15(10) (1975); 42 U.S.C. §424a(d) (1976). In fact, in initially authorizing retroactive application of the Florida offset “reversal” statute, Fla. Stat. §440.15(10), this Court assured all concerned that the differing computational methods of the federal and Florida offsets were entirely irrelevant, as these “hold harmless” provisions would require use of the highest of the two measures. See, American Bankers, supra.
commonality. Id. at 1038. The court found that the State misunderstood the nature of the class claim – that the State’s failure to properly screen and treat HCV exposed all inmates to the same unconstitutional injury. Id. The court reasoned that, while a class seeking damages would struggle to meet commonality, a class seeking only injunctive relief could meet Rule 23(b)(2). Id. The court further concluded that typicality was met as “factual variations in the individual claims will not normally preclude class certification.” Id. at 1039.
a primary e-mail address and may designate no more than two secondary e-mail addresses. Thereafter, service must be directed to all designated e-mail addresses in that proceeding. Every document filed by an attorney thereafter must include the primary e-mail address of that attorney and any secondary e-mail addresses. If an attorney does not designate any e-mail address for service, documents may be served on that attorney at the e-mail address on record with The Florida Bar.