has a role in all three of these areas of HSPD-8. In prevention, the fireservice can act as a deterrent to terrorist by being visible and aware of their normal activities in their response areas. Several leaders interviewed stated the fire engine on the street or the fire boats on the water is just like a police car patrolling the streets and are a deterrent to terrorists. Fire departments also have specialized detection equipment and have partnered with other agencies for new applications of detection equipment to enhance prevention capabilities such as the DNDO pilot project for radiological/nuclear detection in the marine domain currently underway in Seattle and San Diego. Several of those interviewed stated fire’s role in homelandsecurity response is very similar to the duties they perform every day: life safety, incident stabilization, and initiating the incident command system. The survey indicated responders view their agency better prepared than other response agencies. This could be due to the lack of understanding between agencies of their response capabilities, equipment and training. Some of the leaders interviewed stated recovery should be a consideration early in an incident, and agencies involved in recovery need to be part of the unified command as soon as possible to improve recovery and reduce down time. The research from this thesis indicates that recovery needs to be addressed very early in the incident to minimize the impact, and reduce the time until marine and port operation can be resumed.
To carry out its border security mission DHS will incorporate the duties and responsibilities of the following agencies—United States Coast Guard, the United States Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United States Border Patrol, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and the Transportation Security Admin- istration. This will allow a single government entity to manage entry into the United States. The Coast Guard will maintain its existing independent identi- ty as a military organization under the leadership of the Commandant of the Coast Guard. Upon decla- ration of war or when the President so directs, the Coast Guard will still operate as an element of the Department of Defense, consistent with existing law. DHS has additional responsibilities for emergency preparedness and response. It will oversee federal government assistance in the domestic disaster pre- paredness training of first responders and will coor- dinate the government’s disaster response efforts. FEMA would become a central component of DHS. The new Department will also manage such critical response assets as the Nuclear Emergency Search Team and the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. Finally, DHS will integrate the federal interagency emergency response plans into a single, comprehensive, government-wide plan, and ensure that all response personnel have the equipment and capability to communicate with each other as necessary.
Information sharing on foreign nationals at ports of entry and along the land and maritime borders is primarily the responsibility of the CBP Office of Field Operations, U.S. Border Patrol, ICE HSI, ICE ERO, the Coast Guard, and the USCIS Asylum Division. These components have legal authority and access to biometric and biographic data systems necessary to decide who is admitted or denied admission to the United States, apprehended and placed in immigration or criminal proceedings, or ultimately removed from the United States. As the December 2010 GAO report noted, many task forces, joint operations, and working groups led by ICE and CBP play a fundamental role in information sharing on foreign nationals and could be better coordinated. We reached the same
3. Use of Public Resources One commenter asked if private responders can ever really be the primary responders, if public responders can be contracted, and if planholders will have the ability to evaluate public resources. Private responders can be primary responders and may need additional equipment to meet a planholder’s needs in all required geographical areas. However, this final rule does not mandate additional equipment for private responders. Public responders can be contracted up to the restraints listed in § 155.4045(d). It must be understood that because public marine-firefighting services have jurisdictional boundaries, it may not be appropriate to select one public marine-firefighting service to cover a whole COTP zone. Since OPA 90 emphasizes the use of private over public resources, public marine- firefighting resource providers should only be listed when the planholder has determined no private resources are available that can meet the response times and the public resource has a responsibility to respond to incidents in the area specified in the VRP. Also, the public resource must agree, in writing, to be included in the VRP. Planholders will be able to evaluate public resources in much the same way as is required for private resource providers, as stated in § 155.4050. In addition, the COTP and the FOSC will have a critical review and oversight role in agreements that local municipalities may consent to for marine-firefighting support. The Coast Guard will separately publish additional guidance in this area.
Without a defi nitive homelandsecurity concept, policymakers and others with homelandsecurity responsibilities may not successfully coordinate activities well or focus on the most necessary activities. Coordination is especially essential to homelandsecurity because of the multiple federal agencies and the state and local partners with whom they interact. Coordination may be diffi cult if these entities do not operate with the same understanding or set of priorities. For example, defi - nitions that do not specifi cally include immigration or natural disaster response and recovery may result in homelandsecurity stakeholders and federal entities not adequately resourcing and focusing on these activities. Additionally, an absence of a consensus defi nition may result in Congress funding a homelandsecurity activ- ity that DHS does not consider a priority. For example, Congress may appropriate funding for a counterterrorism program such as the State HomelandSecurity Grant Program when DHS may have identifi ed an all-hazards grant program, such as the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program, as a priority. It is, however, possible that a consensus defi nition and overall concept exists among policymak- ers and federal entities, but that it isn’t communicated in the strategic documents.
the Intelligence Component of Fusion Centers for Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Law Enforcement, "HSPD-5 (HomelandSecurity Presidential Directive #5), requires the Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS) to coordinate with other federal departments and state, local, and tribal governments to establish a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident Management System (NIMS). Each of these items plays a role in the establishment of fusion centers and lays a foundation for enhanced information and intelligence sharing among all levels of law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector." SEMA personnel have indicated they believe that Missouri's future federal funding may be contingent on the establishment of a working intelligence fusion center. To increase Missouri's ability to detect, prevent, and monitor terrorism within the state, and to ensure Missouri remains eligible for future federal homelandsecurity funding, efforts should continue towards implementing an intelligence fusion center.
TSP, GETS, and WPS are services provided through the Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS) National Communications System (NCS). TSP provides priority restoration and provisioning for users critical to coordinating and responding to a crisis. GETS provides emergency access and priority processing in the local and long distance segments of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) for voice and voice-band communications. WPS is the wireless equivalent to GETS and provides priority for calls from cellular telephones. Key Federal, state, local and tribal government, and critical infrastructure personnel are eligible for TSP, GETS, and WPS. Businesses supporting critical infrastructures, such as the power industry, should consider obtaining TSP for their enterprise and GETS and/or WPS for critical IT staff so these employees can support business continuity. More information about these services can be found at: http://gets.ncs.gov/, http://wps.ncs.gov/, and http://tsp.ncs.gov
requirements dealing with transferring document images and linking document images to the driver record, and opined that the requirement to color scan and exchange documents using AAMVA’s Digital Image Exchange program is misplaced. Another commenter stated that this program deals only with photos and that ‘‘it would be a giant leap to consider its use for documents.’’ Several commenters objected to the costs of purchasing scanners, using computer storage space, retaining color images, and integrating the image into the driver record. Some commenters believed the document retention period should be the same for paper copies and electronic storage, while others believed that the retention period for paper copies should be shorter than electronic. A few commenters pointed out that the Driver Privacy Protection Act and State laws had their own record retention requirements. Some commenters objected to the storage of documents containing sensitive personal information as such documents are attractive target for criminals and hackers, and thereby pose significant privacy and security risks.
Last month, at a hearing of the Senate Commerce Committee, Sen. Ted Stevens complained that his wife, Catherine, is frequently mismatched to the watch list name “Cat Stevens.” 33 Senators Ted Kennedy and Don Young are among those who have been improperly flagged by watch lists. 34 Sen. Kennedy was able to resolve the situation only by enlisting the help of then-HomelandSecurity Secretary Tom Ridge.
Personnel using social media to support mission operations told us that there was a need for additional policies or procedures that address the various challenges and questions relating to the use of social media. Component level procedures for employees who want to create new social media accounts for official purposes, or who are using social media for surveillance and interaction with individuals online, had not been developed. This has led to confusion as to what legal, privacy, and information security boundaries exist when using social media to perform operational tasks. For example, one program office used social media sites to monitor the activities of benefit applicants to help detect fraud. However, it was determined that the office did not have the proper authority to use social media for undercover work, and the use of social media was halted within the component.
Owing to cybersecurity’s borderless nature, it is essential that foreign governments and international organizations play an active role in developing cyberspace security policies and procedures aimed at improving collaboration, information sharing, and incident response capabilities. As the Internet’s core functionality relies on systems of trust, the international community needs to recognize the implications of its technical decisions and act with respect for one another’s networks with the broader interest of preserving global network functionality and improving security.
The report contains seven recommendations aimed at improving personal property management in the United States Coast Guard. Your office concurred with six of the recommendations and partially concurred with the seventh recommendation. As prescribed by the Department of HomelandSecurity Directive 077-01, Follow-Up and Resolution for the Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that includes your (1) agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target completion date for each recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of the recommendation. Until your response is received and evaluated, the
recovery, and invest in transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure that will provide long-term economic benefits. The Recovery Act appropriated $1 billion to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for “procurement and installation of checked baggage explosives detection systems and checkpoint explosives detection equipment….” According to TSA, $574,023,483 of that amount was awarded to 25 airport organizations for 29 projects modifying airports to accommodate new baggage- screening equipment.
The HSWG membership comprises not more than 30 voting members as stipulated in Executive Order 2011-31. For the 2012 meetings, 27 voting members were nominated and appointed to the HSWG, along with the Chief of the Division of Emergency Management (State Administrative Agent) and the Urban Area Administrator as non-voting members and who participated as co-chairs of the organization. The role of the HSWG is to bring together subject matter experts from state agencies, law enforcement, tribal representatives, first responder organizations, and local government to participate in an open and collaborative vetting process to select projects eligible for receiving State HomelandSecurity Grant Program (SHSGP) funding for the current federal fiscal year (FFY). The HSWG makes project funding recommendations to the Finance Committee of the Nevada Commission on HomelandSecurity. The Finance Committee reviews the project recommendations and after consideration passes the final project recommendations to the HomelandSecurity Commission for final consideration and approval. The Commission met on April 26, 2012 and approved the HSWG recommendations with the concurrent recommendation of the Finance Committee. The HSWG successfully carried out its duties for 2012. The HSWG met on March 21, 2012 after the release of the FFY 2013 HomelandSecurity Grant
Participants in this course will gain practical, real-world experience and a better understanding of the evolving terrorist threat, risk management and protective security methodologies, different approaches to cognitive-based security screening for the aviation, maritime and land domains, critical infrastructure protection, quality assurance tools and best practices aimed at mitigating both existing and potential future threats based on field-proven techniques developed over decades of experience. They will also gain unparalleled access to top Israeli security and counterterrorism experts as well as important strategic, cultural and historic sites in the Holy Land.
The Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Fire Prevention and Safety (FP&S) Grant Program (hereafter referred to as the FP&S Program) is one of three grant programs that constitute the Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) focus on enhancing the safety of the public and firefighters with respect to fire and fire-related hazards. The FP&S Program accomplishes this by providing financial assistance directly to eligible fire departments, national, regional, state, local, tribal and non-profit organizations such as academic (e.g., universities), public health, occupational health, and injury prevention institutions for fire prevention programs and supporting firefighter health and safety research and development. The FP&S Program represents one part of a comprehensive set of measures authorized by Congress and implemented by DHS. Among the five basic homelandsecurity missions noted in the DHS Strategic Plan, the FP&S Program supports the goal to Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience. In awarding grants, the FEMA Administrator is required to consider:
occurred because the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Standard Operating Procedures did not indicate what evidence should be maintained to support conclusions made by Supply Chain Security Specialists or where this evidence should be included in the Security Link Portal, which it uses as its records management system. In addition, the “evidence of implementation” training provided to Supply Chain Security Specialists did not contain specific details of what should be obtained to support tests conducted for critical business partner and conveyance security requirements. The deficiencies that we identified in CBP’s initial validation process have reduced the agency’s ability to ensure that carriers’ security practices promote supply chain integrity, and could expose CBP to increased risk of compromised border security.