intervention. It is therefore important to understand universal human rights. I will try to take the least controversial definition and interpret it into a minimally plausible account for the purposes of determining when the right to non-intervention is lost. Universal human rights can best be summed up by saying, there exists common rights, such as rights to life, security, etc., inherent to all by virtue of being human. However, the concept of universal human rights is quite contentious among philosophers and political theorists and is often criticized as perhaps being too idealistic and for not addressing concerns surrounding cultural relativism. George Cristian Maior mentions the concept of universal human rights has been accused of being "a tool for promoting a type of 'cultural imperialism' outside a cohesive cultural and ideological space, bounded by a particular religion – Christianism – and a specific political ideology - liberalism." 31 In this conception, universal human rights may just be the product of Western Liberalism and is merely used as a tool to justify intervention, even when Western Liberalism is not accepted universally, a problem also known as the 'parochialism objection'. Alan Buchanan simplifies the 'parochialism objection' as, "the mistake of thinking that what happens to be valued from the perspective of some particular culture or type of society is universally valuable." 32 This is a legitimate concern when dealing with humanitarianintervention as one does not want to see 'cultural imperialism' taking place and if truly universal human rights do not exist then by what measure can a state lose its legitimate sovereignty for purposes of intervention? The answer is there could be a truly universal conception of human rights that transcends cultural borders and perhaps avoids the concern that universal human rights is merely an excuse to impose one's values on others. If there exists any view of human rights which can be universally accepted, then humanitarianintervention can be considered permissible in cases where those universal human rights are violated.
So far we have seen that the very concept of Humanitarianintervention poses problem from the point of view of its definition, the ulterior criterion which an intervening authority might have in their mind while making a case for intervention in a particular nation state. Next section will explore the legal hurdles that have made humanitarianintervention a controversial norm in spite of the fact that at times, it intends to promote and help in solving higher purposes. It is because of the controversial nature of the HumanitarianIntervention that the concept has now been replaced by Responsibility to Protect. The problem is that HumanitarianIntervention has not travelled the road where a norm becomes legal through legitimacy. The argument related to the dual nature of legality- legitimacy and its relationship with Responsibility to protect will be discussed in the next sections of the paper. The next section deals with the legal conundrum that humanitarianintervention faces and how it has made the concept controversial Section II
individual’s assets, and restricting their movements, can constitute preventive administrative measures necessary to prevent the threat from terrorism manifesting itself in indiscriminate acts of violence. As such they are not subject to due process, at least fair trial, protections. However, a number of listings appear to be almost permanent without real review, and like indefinite preventive detention, cease to be a response to an imminent existential threat but are rather forms of punishment without due process of law. There is a clear need to be able to challenge these decisions, if sanctions against NSAs are to maintain their legitimacy as a modern and sophisticated form of tackling threats. There is a danger that by allowing for quasi-permanent listings the UN is endorsing a system of punishment for wrongs determined by executive organs of states and organizations without any determination or trial before a court. Rather like targeted killings, the roles of judge, jury and executioner are rolled together. This is even more so as regards the auto-interpretation system of targeted measures triggered by UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted after 9/11 of 2001. This piece of UN Security Council law- making has legitimated the development of separate ‘lists’ of terrorists by member states, fulfilling their obligations under that resolution to: criminalise the financing of terrorism; freeze any funds related to persons involved in acts of terrorism; deny all form of financial support for terrorist groups; suppress the provision of safe haven, sustenance or support for terrorists. 72 Given that there are no
One of the greatest problems faced by the Syrians im- migrating to Turkey or to Europe via Turkey is seen as their inability to retain their cultural identities, lan- guages, and beliefs. In that context, education is affili- ated with a fight against exploitation and assimilation by the Western values. There is an increasing concern among the Turkish faith-based NGOs that Christian missionary institutions would utilize the education gap to estrange Syrian children and youth from their moral values and force them to move away from their identities for better life and career opportunities in the West. For the IHH-Humanitarian Relief Foundation education sec- tor manager “unless the Syrian schools in Turkey and Syria are supported, brain drain to Europe will continue by means of missionary organizations and Syrian youth will be assimilated” (from interview dated 11.11.2015, Hatay). There is no evidence for the presence of mis- sionary organizations providing education for Syrian ref- ugees in Turkey, yet considering the argument of Horstmann (2011) on the link between humanitarian aid and proselytizing, the fears of Islamic NGOS in Turkey might have grounding. To what extent the Islamic NGOs provide assistance to Syrian refugees regardless of faith, on the other hand, is questionable, especially when the ethnic and religious differences among Syrian refu- gees are considered.
Das’ argument is that the philosophical literature dealing with humanitarianintervention often exhibits two ideal-theoretic assumptions (i.e., idealising assumptions). These assumptions – that there are two easily distinguishable groups of good and bad guys in the target state, and that there are clear external ‘good guys’ who are capable of carrying out a successful humanitarianintervention – are crucial in the moral arguments for intervention but often left implicit. Das’ main aim in his contribution is to question these assumptions and to argue in favour of a non-ideal-theoretic approach to the ethics of humanitarianintervention, that is to say, one that does not rely on these idealising assumptions. By scrutinising the cases of Rwanda and Kosovo, he hopes to show that the idealising assumptions obscure rather than illuminate and that a non-ideal-theoretic approach would entail a considerably more restrictive norm of permissible intervention than has been advocated by those who employ the ideal-theoretic approach. He raises some important points, and his distinction between the ideal-theoretic and non-ideal-theoretic approach is illuminating. On the whole, however, I am not sure how successful he is. There are two main reasons for this, one of which also has some bearing on Zunes’ chapter and some of the other critiques presented in this volume.
This specific problem raised by the malfunctioning of the regulatory mechanisms of the United Nations system brought up some old issues regarding the structure and functioning of the system itself. According to the Charter, the Security Council is composed of fifteen members: ten chosen on a rotating basis, and five permanent. 354 The permanent members are granted – individual – veto power over any decisions taken by the Council. Hence any one permanent member can block a decision, without having to justify its decision. The choices and privileges associated with the so-called ‘permanent members’ are a legacy of the Second World War and of the bargaining that occurred at the end of the war between the winning powers. The then victorious allies and instigators of the United Nations system relied on the United Nations’ structure to create a form of post-war balance between the superpowers of the time, granting themselves the role of regulators. Changes in the international political balance of power and the advancement of the international relations since 1945 have led a number of states to question this structure and ask for major changes in the organisation’s structure. Specifically, the way permanent members use their vetoes has been criticised as it turns the Council into an arena of interest feuds between the superpowers. The Yugoslav bombing was a clear example of opposition between the ‘liberal West’ – United States, Britain and France, which were in favour of the intervention, and the post-communist states – Russia and China, which were against. The Security Council system was created in the first place to act as an independent and impartial organ; yet, in practice, decisions have often been taken not on the basis of solving the problem under consideration, but of serving the great powers’ interests along the traditional divide: liberal West versus former communist totalitarian block. As regards the specific case of Kosovo, the question of the legitimacy of the Security Council had heavy implications for the overall international involvement in the Kosovo situation. Neither Serbs nor Kosovo’s Albanians, the main parties to the conflict, were represented. This lack of representativeness encouraged backstage bargaining and partisan tactics to gain the support of the veto powers to their respective causes, relegating the humanitarian crisis to a
The Entebbe raid was considered by scholars as the clearest example of the protection of nationals abroad doctrine. In that incident, terrorists hijacked a French aircraft and diverted it to the Uganda airport of Entebbe where non-Israeli passengers were released. An Israeli aerial commando stormed the plane, resulting in the killing of the hijackers as well as a small number of hostages. Several Ugandan soldiers were also wounded and about ten Ugandan aircraft were destroyed. Israel relied on the right of a state to take military action to protect its nationals in mortal danger. The right was allegedly
describes two shifts in this period: one in the purpose of humanitarianism as a result of the link between relief and development; and another in the further expansion of the state role. Chapter nine focuses primarily on the role of the United Nations in the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s. Barnett gives brief case histories for Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, although there is no reason given for this particular selection of case studies, or its limitation to the 1990s, despite recent and controversial interventions (or non- interventions) in humanitarian crises in Sierra Leone, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Georgia, Sri Lanka, and others. Chapter ten once again presents a case study of five NGOs and their changing relationships with the politics of human rights. Finally, the conclusion looks again at the arguments for studying humanitarian movements in their broader context.
This article has traced debates between two forms of “good” care for dementia sufferers in Shanghai, China. While acknowledging these debates are historically contingent in order to address the urgency of social support for elders, they equally reveal interactions between state and society—two forms of power in constructing modes of care. The relationship between these two forms is opposing yet co-constructive. In the systematic care model, the state possesses the authority to establish social policies and laws. This form of care has been implemented through the construction of dementia-care units and the professionalization of dementia care services, especially the standardized training of nursing aides. Non-stateactors, especially nursing home directors, exercise their agency by embracing relational care, which integrates Western humanitarian ethics with Confucian values. Some nursing home directors have generated grassroots strategies for creating a family-like institutional culture to negotiate the state care regime. Moreover, these directors advocate for nursing aides, who are primarily from rural areas and have limited training. While acknowledging the significance of professionalization of eldercare, nursing home directors are consciously aware of the potential challenges of these rapid policy changes. Condemning public discrimination against nursing aides, non-stateactors claim that “good” care cannot be achieved without taking the social rights of formal caregivers into account.
Moreover, like the above three frameworks on HMI, there are also moral arguments supporting and opposing the legitimacy of HMI. Moral principles supporting existence of legitimacy of the right of HMI are based mainly on the natural law and the related Just War ethics. Natural law represents a set of rules with a universal character regulating the behavior of states in their international relations. What is unique about the natural law is that it has a primacy over and exists independently of both treaty and customary law(George, 1999). Natural law accepts existence of the right to use force in case of a moral imperative of protecting the innocents, even if the suffering occurs in another state. Natural law constitutes a major inspiration for the foundations of the Just War Theory (JWT), which deals with the justification of HMI much more specifically, concretizing the exact conditions for both waging and conducting a ‗just war‘(Williams & Caldwell, 2006). Based on the JWT, an act of war can be classified as ‗just‘ when the following six criteria become fulfilled: ‗just cause‘; ‗just intent‘; ‗just authority‘(Harhoff, 2001); ‗last resort‘; ‗proportionality‘ of the used force to the ends it seeks to achieve; and a reasonable chance of ‗success‘(Harhoff, 2001).
As a preliminary matter, it is useful to note that cyber activities take place along an expansive continuum with information analysis and gather- ing at one end and hostilities at the other, roughly, and including espionage, surveillance, crime and other activities along its span. In many cases, it is likely that groups or individuals will engage in operations that fall within more than one category along that continuum, thus triggering potential ap- plication of multiple legal frameworks. Terrorist attacks pose many of the same challenges. A terrorist attack is, at a minimum, a crime, but over the past decade it has become accepted fact that terrorist attacks can also be hostilities that constitute an armed conflict. As a result, policymakers and academics have engaged in extensive debate regarding whether responses to terrorism fall within a law enforcement paradigm or a war paradigm. Although the full parameters of that debate are outside the scope of this article, the debate itself offers useful lessons in recognizing the multiple legal paradigms applicable to cyber activities and analyzing how and in what situations they apply. Throughout the analysis, therefore, this article will often refer to existing and developing considerations in responses to non-State terrorist entities, both in rhetoric and in policy and legal choices, as appropriate in examining the legal paradigms for responding to cyber threats from non-Stateactors.
After decades of immigration from countries with high population shares of Muslims to Western European countries, the integration of Muslims has become a central political issue. In recent years, many governments in receiving countries have established advisory boards to enable consultations with Muslims on issues related to the integration of Islam. A growing number of studies has focused on the structures and participants of these consultations as well as on the negotiations. Particularly comparative studies have tended to choose an institutionalist approach trying to uncover nationally divergent opportunity structures (cf. Dolezal, Helbling, & Hutter, 2010; Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Koopmans, Staham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005). However, at a closer look, the political oppor- tunity structures (POS) approach also contains assumptions of the – rather constructivist – framing approach. This is striking since the two approaches allow for somewhat contradict- ory expectations. From an institutionalist point of view, one might expect actors to use cross-nationally divergent argumentative patterns assuming that national frameworks pro- vide a focal point for both governmental representatives and civil society groups when
In both simulations ISIS begins gaining combatants quickly but ISIS as an insurgency-quickly stalls out and begins a general decline. As it never seizes territory the “insurgency” does not present an obvious target for military offensives as the emerging-state actor ISIS does. It still contains a great deal of lethal capacity as seen in the Total Civilians Killed all Ethnographies, but the key chart is in the bottom right – which charts the Calculated Legitimacy an Actor presents to ethnographies. Whereas ISIS acting in the fashion of an emerging-actor can generate this form of strategic side- choosing at least among Sunni Arabs, ISIS as an insurgency never gains even this limited form of legitimacy from the population. The insurgency ISIS dwindles away to end up in similar straits as the emerging-state actor version, but never having obtained the massive success and ability to create a worldwide brand. It is possible that AQI suffered a scenario such as this in 2006 when it rapidly gained coercive control of a population of nearly one million civilians but was unable to openly seize territory in its area of influence nor transition to an open system of governance due to the requirements to remain clandestine due to the presence of US forces. AQI also showed little interest in even a show of providing services. All lessons learned perhaps by its successor ISIS. Conclusion
However, both of these international legal duties to cooperate are reactive in the sense that they only apply to known cyber threats or a where a cyber threat endangers international peace and security. In order to create a secure cyberspace what is needed is prospective cooperation and collaboration between the relevant stakeholders (including international organisations, states, software providers, cyber security companies etc) over issues of cyber security and internet governance. 116 A commitment encompassing such diverse actors to this type of dense, future-orientated cooperation can only be achieved through an international treaty. In addition, in order to ensure effective cooperation between stakeholders detailed procedural obligations would need to be imposed. These may include, for example, the requirement that states create domestic authorities that can act as 24/7 points of contact and which can liaise and interact with similar authorities in other states over cyber vulnerabilities and cyber threats and even the creation of supranational institutions that provide a forum for states and other stakeholders to meet to discuss threats connected with cyberspace, debate potential solutions, share information, set agendas, take collective decisions, exchange best practices and assist less developed states with enhancing their cyber capacity. Such detailed procedural obligations cannot be imposed by the