18 results with keyword: 'the optimal income taxation of couples'
Under additional regularity assumptions and independent abilities across spouses, our central result is that the optimal tax function should have a negative cross partial
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But for couples with very large primary earnings, second-earner participation has a negligible effect on family utility, implying that redistribution from two-earner to
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Музей антропологии и этнографии имени Пе- тра Великого (Кунсткамера) РАН (далее — МАЭ) обладает многими редкими или да- же раритетными экспонатами
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Assuming independent abilities across spouses, our central theoretical result is that, if the social marginal utility of income is convex in income, then the optimal tax function has
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We have shown that joint taxation for households with men working for medium or high earnings is only optimal if at high earnings points the marginal welfare weights are very low
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For women married to a husband with low earnings we find a fairly similar structure of the optimal marginal welfare function for joint and individual taxation. As highlighted above,
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We show that pure joint taxation (with total household income as tax base) is equivalent to having no distortion in the allocation of both spouses’ labor supplies for a given level
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The fi rst one is the paper by Shroyen (2003) who studies optimal nonlinear income taxation in a setting where labor supply decisions are made within the household (couple) while
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Equation (15) shows that a wage increase for the primary earner raises his/her labor supply by inducing a substitution from primary earner time to secondary earner time in
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With this model we can show that, with an arbitrary, finite number of n individuals, the optimal mechanism satisfying a feasibility condition and a Bayes-Nash incentive
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The intuition for this result is that joint taxation with income splitting increases the amount of insurance implicitly o¤ered by the government: as compared to individual
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With this model we can show that, with an arbitrary, finite number of n individuals, the optimal mechanism satisfying a feasibility condition and a Bayes-Nash incentive
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If there is no migration option, the optimal lifetime income taxation en- tails full deferral of taxation of saving and taxation of interest at the ordinary wage income rate..
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Instead of setting the capital income tax rate equal to zero and using a distortionary labor income tax to collect revenue as in Chamley-Judd, the results in this paper indicate
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taxation framework... In period 2, he inelastically supplies one unit of labor and saves s 2. In the third period, the individual chooses his retirement date l , i.e, the fraction
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In particular, we have an additional self-selection constraint (the µ-constraint) requiring that the lifetime expected utility of a mimicker must be lower or equal to the one of
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Cuts in tax rates at the top have been funded by higher tax rates over the range of low-to-middle incomes, and our analysis suggests that, given the substantial increases in
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We find that, given plausible parameter values and wage distributions, the globally optimal tax system is convex, and marginal rate progressivity increases with rising inequality..
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