disrepute, the insufficiency of agricultural and other sectoral policies in treating problems of backward areas became apparent. It has become clear that the global conditions which dominated the post-war period were changing, and the basic assumptions of traditional regional development policies have become invalid. “Besides reduced growth rates, increasing energy and mobility costs, and reduction in the availability of public funds, one consequence of global change was the disappearance of ecological, economic, and political free spaces.” It became clear that the displacement of bottlenecks and costs of development to peripheral areas cannot take place indefinitely and core regions had to find internal solutions for their problems (Stöhr, 1986, p. 65). Results of externally driven ruraldevelopment policies turned out to be highly vulnerable to global economic and political forces. The recession of the early 1980s resulted in the closure of much of the 'rural branch plant economy' developed in previous decades (Lowe, Murdoch and Ward 1995). At the same time, economic recession greatly diminished the capacity of the urban sector to absorb the surplus rural population. Mistaken directions of post war agricultural policies and development also became obvious. The aim was not further intensification any more, but rather reduction of surplus agricultural production. All these resulted in rural unemployment and/or depopulation in certain areas. Extensive environmental damage, caused by industrial agriculture was also recognised, as green and ecological movements emerged all over Europe (Holzinger and Knoepfel 2000). At the same time, in many regions of Western Europe, society was being reshaped by an extending counterurbanisation; providing living space for urban migrants became a major purpose for many rural settlements (Murdoch and Marsden 1994). Newcomers, compared to locals, often had different or even contrasting preferences concerning the objectives of development and preservation. Counterurbanisation, therefore, brought both new resources and new sources of conflicts to rural localities.
The main purpose of this paper is to summarize the objectives and the connected measures of the two most important European documents for the future decade and to find the common features in the aspects of the rural areas and rural communities. The paper is mainly descriptive, a wide range of secondary sources were used including the international and Hungarian literature, EU policy documents, along with the detailed information of the ruraldevelopment features of the former and the present programming period. The comparison of the Europe 2020 Strategy and the future CAP in ruraldevelopment aspects is based on different EU and national documents and the information collected during the public debate.
their interests are under-represented at the EU level. Finally, as mentioned above, there seems to be a huge knowledge gap regarding the EU institutions, elections and politics that further keeps young people away from the ballot-box. On a positive note however, a great majority of the respondent to the survey are more supportive of the EU than of domestic political systems, and are hopeful that the EU can contribute to their lives in many different ways. A whopping 60% of the respondents indicate that they plan to vote in the upcoming EU elections, even while they see there is still much to improve. Based on the criticism and suggestions from these respondents, as well as their own experience and analysis, FutureLab Europe participants propose a number of concrete recommendations to ensure that all these willing young Europeans will actually cast their vote in May 2014, as well as in the elections after that.
In this paper, we argue that the new public health should in addition to promoting implementation of high standards of prevention methods available, should also be strategic, putting power and politics back at the centre of public health analysis in a way that can resolve the discrepancy highlighted by the difference between the reports of these two commissions. Progress on key challenges facing European public health will depend on the extent to which the European public health community can engage with the political economy of the world it inhabits. It is not enough to deal with the immediate causes of ill health; instead public health professionals must ask why things are as they are? What are the assumptions underlying how we organise society? Who sets the rules, and are they fi t for their purpose? After reviewing briefl y the determinants of health in a population, we illustrate our arguments with three examples: the individualisation and medicalisation of risk factors; the dominance of free market epidemiology in health systems; and the political transition in Eastern Europe and the persisting East-West health gap. We conclude with recommendations for a new public health perspective that would put power and politics at the centre of our debates and analyses.
borders, it was argued that the many activities of EUrope’s border practitioners created increasingly hazardous travel routes and enabled lethal border-collisions and acts of biopolitical abandonment at sea. Turning, then, to the difficult encounters between the families of the disappeared and Boats4People activists, as well as their practices of grieving in public commemorations, it was illustrated how a politics of solidarity at the margins always entails friction and difficulty but also the potentiality for the invention of new relations and collective subjectivities. Such politics responds to the inhumanity of the EUropean border dispositif by responding to others who have suffered its effects. Ahmed’s ‘modes of encounter’ and Butler’s account of grievability helped to consider both the ‘impossibility’ of as well as the necessity for these practices. The final part developed Rancière’s notion of ‘impossible identification’ into ‘impossible solidarity’, a practice that inhabits the willingness to seek togetherness even in encounters at the limits of intelligibility. A politics of solidarity that dares novel forms of being-with was then conceived as a facet of resistance that counter-acts the divisions that the EUropean border dispositif creates.
Indeed, historically, the DIY principle has been associated with an ‘autonomous anarchist ethos’, which considers that people participating in them should do as much as possible themselves (Nicholas, 2007: 1). Thus, several countercultural scenes in Europe which have been influenced by anarchism, such as squats, are linked to the DIY culture. Saskia Poldervaart describes the DIY scene of the Netherlands at the beginning of the ‘00s, for instance, by providing four representative examples: the squatter movement, the broader alterglobalization movement, punk subculture and animal rights groups (2001). All these four movements have developed a collective identity inspired by this ‘anarchist ethos,’ and present similarities to the extent that they develop their actions and sustain their collectivities through a DIY idea and practice. According to her, ‘Do It Yourself’ stands for each individual’s designing his own life and taking initiatives, without expecting the political or social institutions to do so (2006: 8). Older queer politics, close to the squatting/anarchist scenes, had also been part of the DIY culture. Gavin Brown acknowledges that queer activism in the UK in reality was ‘infused with a creative, `do- it-yourself ' (DIY) ethos that prefers thrift-shop drag over the latest designer labels’ (2007: 2685).
Let us now return to our original four questions. The first was: are young people politically disengaged? Very few young people join political organisations, but nearly all of them vote. Less than one half of young people engage with politics to some extent, even if only a tiny minority of them join political parties or political movements. The majority will vote, believe in the legitimacy of the system and about 45% support environmental concerns. Although this is less the case in Eastern than in Western Europe, and even within Western Europe, there are important differences, we cannot say that young people are disaffected. Longitudinal evidence from the UK implies that in fact young people are more politically interested and informed than in the past (Frazer and Macdonald 2000). We could say therefore that young people are not necessarily politically disengaged, but we need to look at the forms that this engagement takes.
It is as a result of those romantic and national utopias of the 19th century that certain languages in the 1900 were re-asserted by governments to serve identity, nation- alistic, and state goals. In some countries, by the turn of the 20th century there were fully fledged linguistic policies that informed nationalist politics and lasted until the later part of last century. Many regions or communities of Europe had their own lan- guage in the early part of the 19th century, but it is the nationalistic awakening for instance of Hungary, Greece, or the Baltic countries, and others around them, that led to the discovery and assertion of specific national languages, nations, and states during the 20th century. Clearly, it is the works of folklorists and grammarians, then, which was fundamental to the affirmation of certain national languages, while in the process other local or regional tongues were slowly disappearing. A prototypical example is France, where Oc and Oil languages divided the land along a north-south invisible line running from the city of Bordeaux on the Atlantic coast to the city of Basel in the Fran- co-German-Swiss borderlands region. Within the Oc language (southern) region, local tongues such as Languedocian, Provencal, or Catalan seemed to have nearly vanished by the end of the second part of the 20th century. In other words, history shows us that there is no inevitable relationship between language and nation, or language and state, because language has to be claimed, produced, and disseminated explicitly as a nation and/or state making tool in order for it to function as such. During the 19th century, there was an ideology of one language and one nation, but there are nations and states that are multi-linguistic.
Since then, the integration of ruraldevelopment policy activities in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and at various stages in the Structural Funds programmes has taken place. Policy elaboration was signifi cantly accompanied or, at least at times, signifi cantly infl uenced by, rural develop- ment research (Dax, 2014). Soon it became clear that inter- national analysis and comparative approaches were needed to address the European dimension and the diversity of rural regions across Europe. A growing research community focus- ing on rural issues established in European countries and net- working was facilitated through targeted projects within the European Union’s (EU) Framework Programmes (FP), com- missioned studies and transnational cooperation (Dax, 2002). In particular, networking activities, such as the REAPER programme (the European Rural Studies Action Network; Arkleton Centre, 1997), the COST activity A12 Rural Inno- vation (Blanc, 2003) and the synthesis work of the Standing Committee for Agricultural Research (SCAR; Blanc, 1996) raised commitment for comparative research perspectives. Finally the intensive discussions on opportunities for Euro- pean research cooperation of two SCAR Collaborative Work- ing Groups (Agriculture and Sustainable Development, and RuralDevelopment Research) and the recognition of the need to enhance cooperation among rural researchers and to con- tribute to a more explicated European perspective stimulated the European Commission (EC) to establish an ERA-NET under the FP7 call KBBE-2008-1-4-10 focusing on ‘Agri- culture and sustainable development in a ruraldevelopment context’. Since 2002 more than 100 collaborative activities of national research programmes, so-called ERA-NETs, have been established to contribute to the strategy of a European Thomas DAX*
strongest show that these attempts, while carried out in the name of EMU almost in all cases, resulted in welfare reforms that were far more modest were planned. Even if governments view welfare reforms imperative, retrenching social programs prove to be extremely difficult to calculate, program and achieve. The persistence of welfare provision within the context of what constitutes the European Social Model in the face of EMU pressures stands out as some powerful evidence for the enduring primacy of politics of reform over economics of rule- based constraints. Moreover, while some welfare states or programs might have undergone some degree of surgery for a host of factors, EMU does not seem to be directly related to these. If there is a lesson to be drawn from the European experiment, therefore, it is the observation that Europe’s welfare states enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom through which a welfare overhaul was averted even in the face of pressing fiscal constraints. Although the evidence in this paper can not resolve the policy debate definitively, lessons from the European experience at least draw our attention to alternatives to deterministic scenarios of welfare state dismantling. A future NAMU designed along the lines of EMU would certainly exert pressures on the Canadian Social Model should Canadian fiscal balances require a substantial corrective. Even in the face of these constraints, however, currency unification need not necessarily lead to welfare state downsizing. Besides, in the NAMU case, the country with the larger welfare state – Canada – also happens to be the one that has tamed her deficit and debt. This implies that if there would be any currency partner to undergo radical fiscal surgery during a Maastricht-style convergence period, it simply would not be Canada. Taken altogether, to the extent that NAMU resembles EMU, this suggests that apprehensions over Canadian welfare state futures seem to be doubly unfounded.
Therefore, if the meanings embedded within the frames used by Liverpool and Oldham Athletic supporters were to be understood, knowledge of their culture would have to be gained. 40 It is uncertain whether a cultural understanding can be gathered by someone who is not part of the group (Budick 1996; Motzkin 1996; Iser 1996). If full group membership is required, comparative ethnographic research would be extremely difficult to undertake as social researchers could only understand their own social reality. There are two main ways in which this can be looked at. First, it could be argued that the in-group culture was defined by support for either Liverpool or Oldham Athletic supporters. This is particularly true because both fansites were themed according to the group supported. However, the group culture was arguably more specific than this as the Liverpool e-zine members repeatedly distinguished themselves as „genuine‟ fans from the seemingly less authentic „out of town‟ fans (which they referred to as OOT‟s) and „wools‟ (which was a non-endearing term used to describe Liverpool fans who came from the more rural areas in the hinterlands of Merseyside). For instance, if I had tried to convince the Liverpool supporters that I was a Wigan-based fan, I may have been rejected as an „OOT‟ or „wool‟. However, although the online supporters were not knowingly met, it was clear that Steve Kelly and his friends accepted me into their group of „genuine‟ supporters because I am a Wigan-based Wigan Athletic fan, who attends live matches and they saw me as similar to them, in that I am not a „consumer‟ fan. 41 Therefore, if the group‟s
Research seeking to explain the enactment of lustration laws in Eastern Europe has paid little attention to issues of time and has been based on a limited set of cases. Early work by scholars of democratic transitions (e.g., Huntington 1991; Elster 1996) posited that transitional justice mechanisms like lustration, if they were to happen at all, would happen shortly after the collapse of state socialism in 1989 and 1991, and their enactment would be dependent on the mode of exit from authoritarianism. More recent scholarship on this subject has also focused on time-invariant explanations, such as the level of Communist-era repression (Nedelsky 2004), the extent of pre-Communist experience with political pluralism (Stan 2008), or deals made by elites at the time of transition (Nalepa 2010). The emphasis in the literature on these explanations is puzzling. Although lustration was sometimes employed in the transitional years of the early 1990s, lustration efforts have not been confined to that period. More than two decades after transition, lawmakers in countries like Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Georgia, continue to renew lustration legislation, change the scope of existing legislation, and propose and adopt new legislation.
based on the Orientalist image of a barbarous, anti-Christian enemy of Western civilization has been perpetuated in Europe for a long time. The Muslim Other has once again become an iconic symbol of cultural fears concomitant with neoliberalism and its globalization from above, income inequality, and social injustice, as they are perceived by a systematically decaying middle class and even more impoverished poor. Terrorist attacks and refugees have been mentally glued together in popular attempts to explain ev- eryday hardships, disintegrating social cohesion, and eroding collective identities. Immigrants, most of all Muslims, but also other ethnic and religious groups, including those who set off from postcommunist countries to Britain, are victims of a type of handy populism that is fed by the predicament of neoliberal capitalism with its job insecurity, its slogans of flexibility, its unequal distribution of wealth, and its ensuing social and regional inequalities. This is why I hold that this is not a “refugee crisis” but a crisis of a dominant economic sys- tem that prompts people to blame some other people. This is also connected to liberal democracy, with its values of toler- ance and political correctness. Populists deny liberal tenets by making the claim that they are “implementing the will of the majority,” the wish of the nation, the ultimate sovereign. Majority rule stands above law. Historical circumstances have made racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia an integral part of this complex “antiliberal” worldview. Multiculturalism is bashed as a leftist disease, a bastard child of political correctness, preventing people from voicing their true opinions. Both authorities and ordinary people ride on the wild horse of hatred toward others. While it is often said that the rot starts at the top, the top needs its base. In the Polish case, images of refugees reinvigorated the rhetorical power of the rightist political camp. Pictures of war victims, miserable
The paper begins with a discussion of alternative explanations, including structural, institutional and electoral factors, as found in the literatures of street protest, riots and contentious politics, all of which fail to convincingly account for the Greek paradox. It then offers a two-level explanation. First, it shows how the type of the Greek transition to democracy shaped a political ‘culture of sympathy’ to acts of resistance against the state. Second, it notes the mechanisms through which daily practices of resistance have become institutionalized to permeate the Greek culture. It concludes that the cultivation of a political culture of sympathy has become a ‘winning formula’ adopted by vocal minorities who deploy unlawful protests. Equally, the early socialization into unlawful practices allows the public to turn a blind eye on the use of violence to settle conflict, unlike Spain where there is zero tolerance of violence.
In order to benefit from IPARD, SEE and Turkey will need to establish national structures able to define strategies, programmes, management and monitoring conditions for IPARD type programmes. This requires enhancing the knowledge and the transparency of the Agricultural and Rural situation (rural census, farm register, land cadastre, price statistics, sector analysis for the more important agricultural sectors, etc) and involving other public bodies and the relevant civil society partners in the elaboration of a national strategy for ruraldevelopment. This will in turn also require supporting the organization of key civil society partners, namely: farmers, food processors, environment and, local ruraldevelopment associations. Currently, both the support of initiatives to facilitate access to credits for farmers and rural business, and the establishment of advisory and extension services for farmers and rural population are ineligible for funding under IPARD.
given expression to what Hagen Keller terms the ‘polycentric’ nature of the Ottonian polity, now it failed to do so adequately. Also important were new social, religious and political ideals. Within the church, the rising tide of reform made the intercessory roles of bishops come under closer scrutiny; what had once been an essential part of episcopal ministry might now look suspiciously like simony. Similarly important were shifts in royal ideology: during the ‘Salian century’ and the Staufer period thereafter a more hierarchical understanding of regalian rights came to the fore, one which chimed less naturally with the acts of begging pardon and favour which had characterized Ottonian politics. It is this which, Gilsdorf suggests, paved the way for the active role of intercessor to give way to the more passive one of witness; intercession formulae were abandoned in favour of the witness-list. Nevertheless, as Gilsdorf notes, this was not the end of
beginning and end. Thus those who are positioned within the boundary are accepted as members, and those on the exterior are rejected. So, in Europe, the EU has clear boundaries – all citizens of the 27 states belong to Europe - and other countries which lay territorial, historical or cultural claims to be European may be excluded. But this is just one definition. For example, any map of the world shows that Switzerland is territorially hemmed into the centre of Europe, but it is not an EU member. Does this mean Switzerland is not European? As far as the EU is concerned, it clearly is not, but other definitions are likely to include it. This argument can be reapplied to other definitions of Europe. Is Israel in Europe? EU officials would argue that it is not, as would most cartographers (Wallace 2003). However the case becomes fuzzy when it is included in other cultural terms, as discussed earlier in this chapter sub-section. This makes the boundary of Europe imprecise. Therefore, in Cohen‟s words Europe „operates in the minds‟ of its „beholders‟ (Cohen 1985: 12). Europe signifies a social construction which sometimes exists only as a loose label placed upon non-American western organisations. It is clear that definitions of „Europe‟ are hugely contested and that there are multiple reference points and manifestations to it. The same could be said about the term „identity‟ which, in even its clearest manifestation, can be described as „slippery‟.