will vary based on the location and nature of the associated hazard. Using a benefit-cost assessment, adaptations that prove too costly or ineffective can be foregone and the DoD may consider relocation of the critical assets.
Another type of adaptation may require coordination with non-military local stakeholders. State, local, and private institutions located around the installation likely face similar issues and spillover effects from hazards can impact both sides of the fence. Installations are intricately integrated into the counties where they are located. Military and civilian employees and families live, attend school, receive essential services from, and work in the surrounding community. The economy of neighboring communities is often extensively linked to the existence of a military base. Displacement of military units based on asset vulnerabilities can have a significant impact on the community. Job loss and base reuse planning can pose challenges for local communities (Cowan, 2012). A study of closed sites following the last round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) identified a more pronounced impact in rural areas (Cowan, 2012). The political consternation of this process has resulted in a moratorium of any recent BRAC actions despite DoD leadership identification of bases that are not deemed cost effective (U.S. DoD, 2016b). The repercussions of climate induced impacts on military sites may further motivate a new BRAC study.
T he UnitedStates is committed to understanding the issues driving global change and to conducting the energy research that will lead to global emission reductions over the long run. The UnitedStates is providing global leadership in developing the fundamen- tal scientific and technological foundation for understanding the causes and consequences of climate and global change, reducing scientific uncertainties, and supporting adaptation and mitigation actions to manage risks and produce benefits at local, regional, and global scales. The UnitedStates places a high priority on research and development (R&D) needed to un- derstand, observe, and respond to global change. Major U.S. investment in climate and related global change science over the past few decades has greatly increased understanding of glob- al climatechange, including its attribution to human influences. Now, as the effects on peo- ple’s well-being are already being felt in the form of more heat waves, alterations in rainfall patterns on which agriculture depends, and coastal communities increasingly at risk from ris- ing seas, scientific knowledge of the integrated Earth system is even more critical as the foun- dation for responding effectively.
We began by addressing one of the causes for climatechange — greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Reducing GHG emissions begins with reporting, and we have reported our GHG inventory every year since 2008. In addition, our sustainability reporting tracks our implementation of strategies that seek to reduce the Postal Service’s contribution to climatechange. However, even as many organizations seek to cut emissions, the world’s carbon emissions are continuing to increase. The Postal Service is taking the next step to integrate climate adaptation into our business processes so we can adjust to future changes and improve our ability to respond to climate-related risks.
Resource managers and scientists are needed to participate in interpreting and analyzing of the projections of climatechange made by global and regional (nested) models. While important progress is being made in improving models, there remain important uncertainties and only ranges of future changes can be estimated. There is an important role for analysis in determining the consistency of simulations in projecting changes in major climatic features (e.g., implications of changing precipitation patterns, soil moisture, runoff) that tend to determine a region’s water resource. It is also essential that managers and scientists contribute to our understanding of the vulnerability of regions or sectors to future climatechange and the resources’ sensitivity to past change and variations. Water resource managers and scientists can play important roles by developing and interpreting historic records of the region's climate and participating in analyses of how these affect the region’s water quantity and quality and how the condition of the resource influenced the region's environment and socio-economic activities.
Global climatechange presents an array of uncertainties that planners must address as they work to build more resilient communities. Scholars from both climate and planning disciplines have categorized different sources of uncertainty and identified different planning approaches suited for climate adaptation planning. No systematic comparison of these two literatures, however, exists. Moreover, little is known about how planners conceive and frame climate related uncertainties and what approaches they are using relative to those recommended in the literature. To bring clarity to these issues, this paper begins by reviewing the most common types of uncertainty identified within the climate literature and organized into those within and outside the control of local planners. Next, 11 planning approaches recognized as useful for reducing climate related uncertainty are categorized by whether they reflect a ‘predict and plan’ or an ‘adapt and monitor’ approach. Finally, the content of 44 U.S. local climate adaptation plans are evaluated to determine how they frame uncertainty and what uncertainty reducing approaches they use. Results show that local planners disproportionately focus on uncertainty beyond the planning process as well as bridging uncertainty. Local planners are also using a number of uncertainty reducing approaches in their planning with the four most common being: 1) the use of multiple climate scenarios, 2) vulnerability assessments, 3) monitoring changing climate conditions, and 4) acknowledging the importance of adaptive management. The first two approaches fall within the “predict and plan” model of planning and the later within an “adapt and monitor” model. These results suggest that while planners are beginning to recognize the importance of flexible uncertainty reducing approaches, significantly more work is needed to operationalize these approaches. This research provides planners with an understanding of how
evidence accumulating that some changes are already occurring. The executive summary of the 1995 IPCC report stated that the weight of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on climate (IPCC 1996a). Nearly five more years of evidence of various kinds have accumulated since that report was completed. Indeed, a primary reason for the rapidly growing concern about global climatechange is the observation from more and more data sets of departures from historical averages, combined with a growing understanding of how current climate variability affects humans in their day-to-day lives. Despite gaps in data, inadequate and uneven climate monitoring, short record length, and biases in instrumental data, recent research suggests that changes and variations in the hydrologic cycle of the earth may already be occurring as a result of growing greenhouse gas concentrations. Trends of increasing temperature have been noted and debated for more than twenty years and recently departures from historical averages have been observed for the timing of snowmelt, runoff magnitudes, flowering dates, ice retreats, borehole temperatures, butterfly ranges, onset of egg-laying in birds, and many other things (see, for example, Changnon et al. 1993, Groisman et al. 1994, Beaubien and Johnson 1994, Moore and McKendry 1996, Dettinger and Cayan 1995, Cayan 1996, Ainley and Divoky 1998, Hodge et al. 1998, Crick and Sparks 1999, Parmesan et al. 1999, Schwartz and Reiter 2000, McCabe et al. 2000). Detection of trends in hydrological time series is notoriously difficult because of the normally large variability in natural systems and because of inadequate or incomplete long-term data records. Nevertheless, a number of the observed changes are sufficiently different from the past record to be considered the result of something other than natural variability.
An important task for future research, then, would be to try and specify the conditions under which beliefs concerning policy instruments are divisive, and the conditions under which they find support across coalition lines. Identifying these conditions would be helpful for understanding policy gridlocks and possibilities for policy change. A first step towards this direction is taken by Leifeld (2013, p. 193), who suggests that beliefs concerning policy instruments glue coalitions together especially in redistributive subsystems where the normal state of policy making is the dominance of one hegemonic coalition, in comparison to regulative ones where the normal state is often more competitive, including two to three competing coalitions. Comparative studies across policy domains and countries are needed to assess
In 1992 almost all nations agreed on the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange) declaring the commitment to develop and implement an education about climatechange and its effects on national and regional levels and to develop and share educational programs and materials (article 6 on education, training and public awareness). Since 2011 the USA use “A Framework for K-12 Science Education” which requires the students’ knowledge of global climatechange as a part of science education (section ESS3.D). The European Commission recommends to implement the climatechange topic to the formal national education through the Education for the sustainable development. Education about climatechange differs in European states. Uherek (2008) published a paper summarizing opinions of European teachers on the state of the education about climatechange in their countries. Generally, teachers assess the information presented to pupils as scattered and not comprehensive.
Focused recharge is expected to increase in several of the aqui- fers studied. The reason for this expected increase is that precipita- tion intensity will likely increase in a warmer climate due to the greater water vapor holding capacity of the atmosphere ( Dominguez et al., 2012 ). While expected increases in precipitation intensity might increase focused recharge, the magnitude of this change is challenging to quantify due to: (a) the relative uncer- tainty of projected changes in precipitation intensity, particularly associated with convection during the warm season; (b) a lack of understanding of how to use coarse-resolution climate, land- surface, and hydrologic model outputs to effectively predict the fine-resolution process of focused recharge ( Ng et al., 2010; Pulido-Velazquez et al., 2015 ); and (c) the relatively short lived peak flows that induce focused recharge might not greatly impact overall recharge fluxes. A recent example of an analysis of the interaction of climatechange with focused recharge is provided by Shamir et al. (2015) , which evaluated focused recharge to small micro-basin aquifers along the Upper Santa Cruz River in southern Arizona. While their study did not connect to regional aquifers like those investigated in this synthesis, the methods utilized are appli- cable to investigating these larger scale regional systems.
These are only the most likely scenarios; there are possible lower and higher estimates outside the most likely range. Within that range, there are also disparities, of course: As the maps that follow demonstrate, some regions of the country will be far harder hit by extreme heat than others, and some will experience rising temperatures in terms of warmer winters rather than unbearable summers. What matters isn’t just the heat, it’s the humidity—or, in this case, a dangerous combination of the two. One of the most striking findings in our analysis is that increas- ing heat and humidity in some parts of the country could lead to outside conditions that are literally unbearable to humans, who must maintain a skin temperature below 95°F in order to effectively cool down and avoid fatal heat stroke. The U.S. has never yet seen a day exceeding this threshold on what we call the “Humid Heat Stroke Index,” but if we continue on our current climate path, this will change, with residents in the eastern half of the U.S. ex- periencing 1 such day a year on average by century’s end and nearly 13 such days per year into the next century.
diaphanous state of cultural heritage protection at the time. 101 ARPA’s protection extends to archaeological resources and sites found on tribal and public lands, and other provisions foster cooperation between inter-agency, private, and community entities. 102 ARPA defines “archaeological resources” as any “material remains of human life or activities which are at least 100 years of age, and which are of archaeological interest.” 103 Regulations promulgated under ARPA define a “material remain” as a physical object related to human habitation, use, or activity, including shelters, arrow heads, carvings and artwork, trails, and the site where the remains are found, among other things. 104 An object of archaeological interest is defined broadly as an object capable of informing scientific or humanistic understanding of human culture or behavior through controlled, scientific study. 105 The teeth of ARPA proscribes the removal and sale of archaeological resources from federal or Native American tribal land without a federal permit. 106 Violations can result in both civil and criminal penalties, but criminal penalties only attach if the defendant acted with the requisite mens rea: a “knowing” violation of ARPA. 107
On plausible assumptions, this is a sensible approach to take to climatechange. To be sure, it is possible to object on grounds of corrective justice: Why should the victims of pollution be asked to pay polluters to get them to stop? Why should the world pay China to persuade it to cease imposing risks on the rest of the world? Such questions might be decisive in the context of intentional or reckless wrongdoing, but they may well point in the wrong direction in the context of the unintended side-effects of otherwise desirable activity. 151 Imagine, for example, that a company in New York is employing large numbers of poor workers, who would lose their jobs if the company were forced to close; imagine too that the company’s actions produce pollution that harms the wealthiest people in (say) Albany. It might well be best to ask the wealthy citizens of Albany to pay the company, and its workers, to cease their activity. 152 Indeed, if China’s relatively low per-capita emissions are taken into account, it might be tempting to argue that those who
2. Renewable fuels for mobility – While EVs attract a lot of attention and present some interesting opportunities, biofuels and their supply chains are another area for investors to consider. For example; California has implemented a robust program to drive incentives for low carbon transportation fuels that rewards low carbon alternatives such as renewable diesel from used restaurant grease. Beyond understanding the supply chains, technologies, and supply/demand dynamics, an understanding of the regulatory framework is critical as well, as this regulatory framework can provide opportunity as well as risk of unfavorable changes that must be monitored by investors. Darling Ingredients and Valero Energy have created a profitable Green Diesel joint venture which produces high-quality diesel fuel from waste products and has been recognized as having an 80-90% lower carbon impact than fossil fuel alternatives and benefits from considerable incentives driven by this carbon displacement. 3. Energy efficiency, storage, and transportation –
Most projections of climatechange presume that future changes—greenhouse gas emissions, temperature increas- es, and effects such as sea level rise—will happen incre- mentally. A given amount of emission will lead to a given amount of temperature increase that will lead to a given amount of smooth incremental sea level rise. However, the geological record for the climate reflects instances where a relatively small change in one element of climate led to abrupt changes in the system as a whole. In other words, pushing global temperatures past certain thresholds could trigger abrupt, unpredictable, and potentially irreversible changes that have massively disruptive and large-scale impacts. At that point, even if we do not add any additional CO 2 to the atmosphere, potentially unstoppable processes
In April 1997, USAA 7 , a Texas-based insurer, established a special purpose reinsurance company called Residential Re that issued a $477 million catastrophe bond to 62 different investors. Technically, the bond was composed of two tranches: $313 million of A-2 notes with a coupon (the interest) of 5.75% plus LIBOR, in which the principal was completely at risk, and $164 million of A-1 notes with a coupon of 2.82% over LIBOR in which the coupon is at risk, but the full return of the principal was guaranteed. A default of these notes was to be triggered given a hurricane on the East Coast between July 15, 1997 and December 31, 1997, that caused over $1 billion of claims against USAA. A complete default would have occurred if the damage from any one hurricane caused claims on USAA of $1.5 billion or more (Canter and Cole 1997). USAA gives many arguments for issuing the bond: the need for the industry to meet mega-catastrophes and to reduce the variability and uncertainty to the insurer from these events. Interestingly, these arguments can also be used for the case that the government can benefit from securitizing catastrophic risks.
A qualitative methodology was adopted for this research. The sampling technique identified key actors involved in climate adaptation programs addressing the tourism sector in the Maldives. They comprised of five government officials, four tourism industry managers, and three members from non-governmental organisations. To maintain respondent confidentiality and anonymity, further details are not presented. Interview excerpts are assigned identifiers based on whether the respondent is a government official (GOV), industry manager (IND) or non-governmental organisation (NGO). Data was gathered during April 2012, using in-depth face-to-face semi-structured interviews to explore perceptions of: (1) climatechangerisks that affect the tourism industry; (2) vulnerability of the industry to these risks; and (3) factors which influence adapting to climatechangerisks. Except for four interviews, all were conducted in English. The average duration of the interviews was 38 minutes.
The CCRA identifies the two main climate drivers for increased flooding in the UK as increases in rainfall and sea level rise. Changes in levels of rainfall are expected to impact on surface water flooding, sewer flooding and groundwater flooding. Surface water flooding occurs when heavy rainfall overcomes the drainage system. It is an area of climate risk which is particularly increased in urban areas such as London because development reduces the amount of permeable surfaces where rainwater can drain away. In London there are currently estimated to be more than 800,000 properties at risk of surface water flooding. The CCRA’s rainfall analysis suggests that heavy rainfall events will increase in intensity in London and elsewhere and that this increase is most likely to occur in winter months. Further development due to population increase in London is projected to place an additional pressure on surface water drainage. London’s Built Environment case study, Drain London, looks in more detail at how surface water flood risks for London have been assessed.
Observational studies show that SST forcing is related to Sahel rainfall variability on interannual to decadal time scales (e.g., Lamb 1978; Folland et al. 1991), and there is evidence that climate models with prescribed SSTs are able to capture these relationships, at least in part (Vizy and Cook 2002; Giannini et al. 2003; Hoerling et al. 2006; Hagos and Cook 2008). A number of investigations have tried to understand the potential for climatechange in northern Africa in terms of changes in SSTs. Cook and Vizy (2006a) examined projected warming in the Gulf of Guinea in the AR4 AOGCMs and related this warming to Sahel rainfall through a mechanism that is a prominent source of interannual variability in today’s climate (e.g., Ward 1998; Vizy and Cook 2002). Biasutti et al. (2008) used 19 pre-industrial integrations of the AR4 AOGCMs to construct a bivariate linear regression model that computes Sahel rainfall as a function of Indo-Pacific SSTs and the meridional Atlantic SST gradient. Unlike, Joly et al. (2007) who find that only one of twelve of these AOGCMs captures the observed relationship between tropical Atlantic SSTs and Sahel rainfall, Biasutti et al. (2008) conclude that their statistical model has skill in simulating rainfall on all timescales in the twentieth century and for twenty-first century interannual and decadal rainfall variability over the Sahel. However, changes in the Indo-Pacific SSTs and the meridional Atlantic SST gradients produced by the AOGCMs fail to explain the trend in Sahelian rainfall in the twenty-first century for the majority of the AOGCMs.
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Easterling, David R.; Arnold, Jeff; Knutson, Thomas; Kunkel, Kenneth; LeGrande, Allegra; Leung, L. Ruby; Vose, Russell; Waliser, Duane; and Wehner, Michael, "Precipitation change in the UnitedStates" (2017). Publications, Agencies and Staff of the U.S. Department
of Commerce. 586.
The mistrust and turf protecting issues continued to be major obstacles to moving the project forward. As Waugh and Sylves (2002) point out, the top-down, command-and-control approach to the war on terrorism, represented by the Department of Homeland Security, may be
undermined by existing federal interagency competition and conflicts, and by the combined differences in organizational cultures. Some scholars recommend the “network approach” based on intensive inter-agency information sharing and cooperation, in order to meet the challenges of “complex, unstructured, and rapidly changing problems” (Wise, 2002, p. 141) generated by terrorist threats. Transformational organizational change requires cultural change, and that is seldom possible without the presence of either a real or perceived threat to the organization. Even three years after the September 11 th attacks, organizational cultures still seem to be a major obstacle to organizing for effective homeland security in the UnitedStates.