Top PDF Welfare vs. Market Access: The Implications of Tariff Structure for Tariff Reform

Welfare vs. Market Access: The Implications of Tariff Structure for Tariff Reform

Welfare vs. Market Access: The Implications of Tariff Structure for Tariff Reform

generalised moments serve in effect as sufficient statistics for the whole n-by-one vector of tariff rates. Of course, the generalised moments are not independent of the structure of the economy: on the contrary, they are defined in terms of the general-equilibrium substitution matrix. But there is clearly a huge economy of information from the fact that everything that is relevant to small changes in welfare and market access can be summarised in terms of changes in the two moments. However, there is no guarantee that the generalised moments are closely related to the standard moments which can be calculated using only information on the tariff schedule and the levels of imports. In this section, we show that the generalised moments coincide with the standard moments in a special but important case, where preferences take a homothetic constant- elasticity-of-substitution (CES) form, and where imports are imperfect substitutes for home- produced goods. The latter assumption follows Armington (1969) and is made in the vast majority of CGE models. Hence our result greatly enhances the usefulness of the generalised moments and the results based on them presented in previous sections. 16
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Welfare versus Market Access - The Implications of Tariff Structure for Tariff Reform

Welfare versus Market Access - The Implications of Tariff Structure for Tariff Reform

Computation can in principle provide answers to these questions. But computations of the effects of multiple tariff changes from any applied general equilibrium model will always be suspect because of uncertainty about the parameters and specification of the true' model of the economy. The theory of trade policy reform is a promising alternative which seeks to specify directions of change which can raise welfare or improve market access under plausibly general conditions. Unfortunately, however, progress in this research program has been relatively limited thus far (See Bruno, 1972; Foster and Sonnenschein, 1970; Hatta, 1977; Diewert, Turunen-Red and Woodland, 1989). There are but two results, the uniform radial reduction result (reduce all tariffs by the same proportion) and the "concertina rule" (reduce the highest tariff rate). Each
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Welfare Impacts of Imposing a Tariff on Rice in Iran vs an Export Tax in Thailand: A Game Theoretic Approach

Welfare Impacts of Imposing a Tariff on Rice in Iran vs an Export Tax in Thailand: A Game Theoretic Approach

An extensive literature has evolved in the past decades using economic theory to determine the impact of policy reform and trade liberalization of agricultural commodities. Wailes et al. (1991/a) provided a comprehensive study of the Japanese rice market prior to the GATT reforms. The Japanese rice economy is described in the context of the 1991 trade liberalization discussions. This study examined the high-cost Japanese rice production structure that is supported by managing the rice surpluses. They also analyzed the implications of trade liberalization for the world rice market in another study (1991/b). The authors used a multi-product quadratic programming model to investigate the impacts on the world market. The study focused on the changes in Japan rice market.
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ELECTRICITY TARIFF

ELECTRICITY TARIFF

18. The motor of IP set installations can be used with an alternative drive for other agricultural operations like sugar cane crusher, coffee pulping, etc., with the approval of the Licensee. The energy used for such operation shall be metered separately by providing alternate switch and charged at LT Industrial Tariff (Only Energy charges) during the period of alternative use. However, if the energy used both for IP Set and alternate operation, is measured together by one energy meter, the energy used for alternate drive shall be estimated by deducting the average IP Set consumption for that month, as per the IP sample meter readings for the sub division, as certified by the sub divisional Officer.
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ELECTRICITY TARIFF

ELECTRICITY TARIFF

18. The motor of IP set installations can be used with an alternative drive for other agricultural operations like sugar cane crusher, coffee pulping, etc., with the approval of the Licensee. The energy used for such operation shall be metered separately by providing alternate switch and charged at LT Industrial Tariff (Only Energy charges) during the period of alternative use. However, if the energy used both for IP Set and alternate operation, is measured together by one energy meter, the energy used for alternate drive shall be estimated by deducting the average IP Set consumption for that month, as per the IP sample meter readings for the sub division, as certified by the sub divisional Officer.
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Electricity tariff structure and renewable energy in rural Cambodia

Electricity tariff structure and renewable energy in rural Cambodia

As a large fraction of the electricity sales in the EDC area (Pnomh Penh) is based on IPP generation and PPA’s this would constitute an important tariff to compare against in the evaluation of new RE projects that are to supply power to the larger grids either in regional towns or in Pnomh Penh region. So far no information on the exact tariffs in these PPA’ are available but they should be used in the EAC evaluation of new generation licensees and possible funding. As these are of relative large size and in the large grid these rates will probably be lower than what is becessary for the RE projects. The possible tariffs to be used by RE projects as the 1MW facility in the feasibility studies should be compared to the agreements regarding the new hydro projects as well. Therefore the RE projects should be entitled to at least the rates in the existing PPA’s and that shoud be without deducting anything for lower availability of the small-scale RE projects.
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The Developmental Relevance of Tariff Rate Quotas as a Market Access Instrument: An Analysis of Swiss Agricultural Imports

The Developmental Relevance of Tariff Rate Quotas as a Market Access Instrument: An Analysis of Swiss Agricultural Imports

Existing NTBs are another factor that impedes participation of developing countries. Examples of some important NTBs are specific sanitary and phyto-sanitary requirements on meat and poultry processing standards, residue limits for pesticides in foods and regulation of agricultural biotechnology. Such stringent requirements result in high costs of compliance for developing countries. The disadvantage of most low- income developing countries is compounded by their inability to design production structures compatible with the standards required for processed agricultural products. There are, in addition, supply constraints as well as infrastructural weaknesses in these countries that result in high transportation costs; as well, there are institutional drawbacks and technological backwardness, lack of credit availability, high costs of financing trade and lack of insurance. All these further limit developing countries’ participation in TRQ imports. The inability of most developing countries to benefit from preferential market access within in-quota tariffs questions the justification of employing TRQs as means to enhance market access. The findings show that, on the contrary, this trade policy instrument has the potential to restrict imports of agricultural products – a detriment to market access from a developmental perspective.
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The Contribution and Trends of Tariff Revenue in the Ethiopian Tax Structure

The Contribution and Trends of Tariff Revenue in the Ethiopian Tax Structure

Revenue collection from internationally traded goods is one of the core roles of Customs Administrations in many developing countries. Currently, the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority (ERCA), the only government department authorized in the country to collect taxes from foreign trade, is also collecting customs duties, excise tax, value added tax (VAT), surtax, and withholding tax from imported goods to the country. These taxes provide considerable revenue to the government. The central theme of this Article is to evaluate the performance of customs duty towards its contribution to total government revenues. To achieve this objective, two important measurements of a tax revenue performance, the ratio of the tariff revenue to the total government revenues and the revenue productivity of the tax base in the study period (1959/60-2012/13), are analyzed first. Then, both the share and the trend of customs duty in the trade taxes, total taxes and total government revenues are analyzed, respectively. The trend of customs duty/GDP ratio is also included in the analyses. The findings of the analyses indicated that although its share in the government budget is significant, the effective tariff rate is much lower than the average tariff rate; its contributions to both the total tax revenues and total government revenues have also declined over time. Therefore, the identification of the responsible factors for this low performance of the tariff revenue in the country needs further investigations.
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WTO Negotiations on Market Access in Agriculture: A Comparison of Alternative Tariff Cut Scenarios for the EU and the US

WTO Negotiations on Market Access in Agriculture: A Comparison of Alternative Tariff Cut Scenarios for the EU and the US

While a formula approach has some distinct advantages, it can produce very different outcomes depending on the type of formula that is adopted. What is the most effective formula in terms of achieving greater market access? The determination of the appropriate level of bound tariffs is a fairly complex task as this involves judgement on several factors, such as future movements of world market prices and exchange rates, the evolution of domestic competitiveness, availability of contingency measures, revenue considerations, and so on. A comparison of tariff cutting schemes using formulas that reduce dispersion or provide for uniform tariff reduction make it possible to define the relative importance, in terms of both welfare and imports, of reducing tariff dispersion as well as its average level.
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Assessing the adjustment implications of trade policy changes using TRIST (tariff reform impact simulation tool)

Assessing the adjustment implications of trade policy changes using TRIST (tariff reform impact simulation tool)

3 Low-income countries currently face a range of trade policy options and issues. First there is the option for unilateral reforms to the trade regime, for example, to reduce, the most distorting peak tariffs. Most countries are actively negotiating bilateral and regional trade agreements. The African, Caribbean and Pacific countries are negotiating and implementing Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU to replace the previous Cotonou Agreement. An integral part of these agreements is preferential reduction of tariffs against imports from the EU. Many African countries are involved in initiatives towards regional free trade (COMESA, EAC, SADC, ECOWAS) and most of these regional communities have plans to adopt a common external tariff. Finally, there is the multilateral trade reform process centered on the WTO. All of these trade policy options entail changes to revenues and implications for output, employment and poverty. This paper provides a description of the TRIST tool and gives examples of its use. Section 2 discusses the objective behind the development of TRIST and outlines crucial advantages compared to existing tools. Section 3 presents the trade model underlying the tool and discusses the intuition behind the calculation steps. In Section 4, some examples of the analysis of short term adjustment costs are presented using TRIST. These comprise both the main focus of TRIST, namely the simulation of fiscal adjustment costs of trade policy reform, as well as the adjustment costs in terms of domestic production and employment and the use of TRIST in the analysis of poverty and trade diversion. Section 5 concludes.
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Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two part tariff in a vertical structure

Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two part tariff in a vertical structure

products where , = 1, 2 and ≠ . The downstream firms require a critical input for production that they purchase from a monopoly input supplier, U, through two-part tariff contracts involving an up-front fixed-fee and a per-unit price. U produces the inputs at a constant marginal cost of production, c which we assume to be zero. We assume that one unit of input is required to produce one unit of the output, and and can convert the inputs to the final goods without incurring any further cost.

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Trends in tariff reforms and trends in the structure of wages

Trends in tariff reforms and trends in the structure of wages

This paper provides new evidence on the impacts of trade reforms on wages. We first introduce a model of trade that combines a non-competitive wage setting mechanism due to unions with a[r]

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Welfare Reform: Implications and Alternatives

Welfare Reform: Implications and Alternatives

Under the current proposal for welfare reform, states receiving block grants are given almost complete license to redesign their programs with two major conditions: [r]

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Welfare and Poverty Impacts of Tariff Reforms in Bangladesh: a General Equilibrium Approach

Welfare and Poverty Impacts of Tariff Reforms in Bangladesh: a General Equilibrium Approach

This paper examined welfare and poverty impacts of trade liberalization in Bangladesh. By using a computable general equilibrium model based on a social accounting matrix, an empirical investigation of the transmission channels linking trade liberalisation to the rest of the economy was carried out by conducting three simulations. In the first two simulations full tariff removal was accompanied by respective increase in production tax rates and income tax rate to ensure revenue neutrality. Third simulation resembles the actual tariff reforms undertaken in the country. This entailed the decline in both the spread and effective average duty rates, thereby reducing the mean rates and variance.
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Indirect Tax Reform in the Philippines: A Complementary Measure to the Tariff Reform Program, 1979-1985

Indirect Tax Reform in the Philippines: A Complementary Measure to the Tariff Reform Program, 1979-1985

In caseswhere no tax credit provision applies (i.e., goods subject to specific taxes), the protective effect results from the dif- ferential rate provisions, the capital holding costs du[r]

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Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

Despite the many practical examples pointing to its importance, the theoretical literature has paid little attention to the interaction between trade reform and domestic tax reform. A number of authors (e.g., Michael et al. (1993); Falvey (1994); Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994); and Tsuneki (1995)) have examined the welfare and revenue effects of integrated tax-tariff reforms for small, competitive economies. In that same context, Keen and Ligthart (2002) show that a simple strategy of coordinated tax-tariff reform in which reductions in tariffs are exactly offset by increases in consumption taxes—so leaving consumer prices unchanged— has extremely attractive properties: it unambiguously improves domestic welfare and raises government revenue. 2 They also show, however, that increasingly stringent conditions are
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A Win-Win-Win Tariff-Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

A Win-Win-Win Tariff-Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

Given these growing interests in the empirical literature, there is a the- oretical literature that examines the effects of tariff-tax reforms. While this paper is along this line of research, we focus on one specific tariff-tax reform, which is increasingly recognized in the literature, in a context of imperfect competition. The policy reform we study consists of one unit of tariff re- duction and the same unit of consumption tax increase. This policy reform, which is first addressed by Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994), is welfare-improving for a competitive small open economy. Keen and Ligthart (2002) general- ize this result, but the same authors (Keen and Ligthart (2005)) show that the same no longer survives imperfect competition. Concretely, assuming a duopoly served by a domestic and a foreign duopolists, and linear demand and marginal costs, Keen and Ligthart (2005) demonstrate that the point- by-point reform necessarily reduces welfare.
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Informal Wage, Informal Price and Extortion under Migration and Tariff Reform

Informal Wage, Informal Price and Extortion under Migration and Tariff Reform

Here we have a small open economy producing three goods: X, Y and Z. Out of these three goods X (exportable) and Y (importable) are traded but Z is a non-traded one. Hence Px and Py are determined in the international market whereas Pz is determined by the standard Cobb- Douglas demand function. X and Y use skilled labor (S) and unskilled labor (L) respectively as specific factors but they share a common capital (K). Note that Y is protected by a tariff and L is

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Bairoch revisited. Tariff structure and growth in the late 19th century

Bairoch revisited. Tariff structure and growth in the late 19th century

This will be defined in our two measures of “75Corr-Skill” and “75Diff-skill”. We also introduce Х c0 βX as country-specific variables related with the quality of institutions . To construct the skill-bias index of the respective countries’ tariff structure, Nunn and Trefler’s (2006) procedures have also been used. The first proxy used is “75Corr-Skill”, a correlation between skill and tariff rankings of the industrial sector of every country. Defined as the cross-industry correlation between skill intensity ranking constructed in Table 1 of the Appendix and the respective ad valorem tariffs of the same sectors estimated for every country for the year 1875. Most of the countries in our sample have a negative correlation sign between the skill and tariff ranking because tariffs are usually higher in non skill-intensive industries and lower in skill-intensive industries. The second proxy used is “75Diff-Skill” which is constructed choosing an arbitrary “cut-off” in the ranking of skill-intensive industries. This cut-off has been chosen in relation with the largest differences in sectors’ skill intensity around the mid point of the ranking. The skill intensity ranking and the cut-off chosen is shown in Table 1 of the Appendix. The “75 Diff-Skill” is calculated as the difference between the simple average of the ad valorem tariffs of the respective skill-intensive sectors (“up cut-off”) and the non skill-intensive sectors (“down cut off”) for every country. In relation with the institutional variables, two types of index have been used: one that relates the level of democracy of a country POLITY2 (numeric) Range = -10 to 10 (- 10 = high autocracy; 10 = high democracy) ; and another which measures the grade of independence of the executive government, XCONST (numeric): Executive Constraints: operational (de facto) independence of chief executive.
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Tariff 007 (REPLACES TARIFF No. 006) Updated March 11, 2021

Tariff 007 (REPLACES TARIFF No. 006) Updated March 11, 2021

Neither concealed nor open carry of firearms, alcohol, controlled substances, or photography are permitted in the POB’s secure-restricted area. If you have any questions concerning these provisions, please contact the Port of Beaumont Police at 409-554-2020. All persons granted unescorted access into secure-restricted areas of the POB must produce his or her TWIC upon request by U.S. Coast Guard or POB security personnel. Persons unable to produce a TWIC will be escorted off the facility and may be subject to criminal prosecution. The POB may, at its sole discretion, ban any person for any period of time for violation of federal laws or port rules and regulations. Those persons who violate access control procedures may be subject to arrest, prosecution and/or loss of port access privileges.
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