To avoid confusion over the numerical differences between 2016-17 and 2018-19 spending figures, the results are presented as a difference between the additional grant and the additional cost beyond the expected 1 per cent. For example, a difference of 0 per cent means that the school’s estimated additional funding matches the estimated additional salary costs beyond the 1 per cent. Similarly, a difference of 50 per cent means that the funding is 50 per cent higher than the increase in salary costs. Finally, we restrict our analysis to the mainstream primary and secondary schools that returned sufficient unsuppressed data in 2016-17 to calculate allocations and the cost of a salary increase. Smaller schools often have leadership teams with too few members for the department to report on without compromising individuals’ anonymity. For that reason our dataset contains only about 1,800 primary and 2,100 secondary schools, most of which tend to be larger than the average school. We have repeated our analysis using a large sample of 19,000 schools, but with less accurate methods, and found similar results.
The initial objective of performance budgeting is to allocate resources to funding programmes that deliver results. Performance budgeting therefore explicitly establishes a link between programme performance information and decision-making. The argument is that performance information will allow decision-makers to create a consensus on whether the programme is performing well and whether further funds should be granted. Following this reasoning it should be simple to “reward the winners and punish the losers” by means of establishing a relationship between performance and resource allocation. However, the article argues that this relationship is not as straightforward as it might appear at first glance. Given that the resource allocations on the basis of programme performance in real-life application pose some severe restrictions, the paper concludes that the initial objective of performance budgeting has to be reconsidered. This is not to claim that performance budgeting is without any merits but rather that in questioning the effectiveness of performance budgeting, it is essential to first ask for its purpose. If the purpose is not the allocation of resources in accordance to performance but to increase transparency then performance budgeting is a step into the right direction.
After its independence and the subsequent transition period between 1956 and 1960/62, the Moroccan State has developed different activist policies aimed at restructuring the economy through the process of picking winners and losers among firms, industries and regions. These policies include (a) incentive programs for investments in the industrial sector, (b) subsidized loans for investors in other selected sectors, c) public procurement policy in favor of certain firms in specific industries, (d) transfer of foreign ownership to Moroccans (known as “Politique de Marocanisation”), (e) creation of state-owned enterprises etc.
Consistent with the Leadership Development Initiative (LDI) commitment to strengthen the strategic leadership asset of organization in Africa this leadership and governance ‘rally call’, prioritizes capacity implication as delivery assets that separate losersfromwinners. It presents innovative knowledge solutions to address leadership barriers that are largely attributed to leadership and governance constraints by instigating innovative solutions. Investing in knowledge assets that empower leadership to address key barriers threatening organizations aptitude remains one of the most desired key to organizational success. As a specialized leadership and governance institution, LDI therefore has prioritized the need to walk with organizations and by it enable organizational leadership and management assets in general to transform challenges into impacting opportunities and enable organizations in Africa to assume status of choice.
The ‘Transforming the Experience of Students through Assessment’ (TESTA) project has shown that most degree programmes in the UK have high volumes of graded summative assessment, designed mainly to measure achievement, and low volumes of formative tasks designed to foster reflection and learning (Jessop et al., 2014; Jessop and Tomas 2016). High summative assessment loads reinforce grade-oriented and strategic behaviour among students, diverting attention away from formative tasks which have the freedom to be more playful, creative and open-ended. These patterns of assessment have evolved largely in response to modularisation. Modular assessment favours a compartmentalised diet of assessment and feedback, with the feedback tending to remain within the confines of each module (Hughes et al., 2015). These effects are compounded by the competitive framework within which summative assessment operates. In this environment, with few winners and many losers, not only do students behave strategically to gain marks at the expense of deep learning, but, worryingly, many students become demotivated and suffer from low self- esteem. TESTA has long advocated a rebalancing of summative and formative assessment as a means of engendering deep learning among students.
the U.S., China, India, Japan, and much of Europe—are benefit- ing from the plunge in prices. The biggest winners are economies with large consumer bases, like the U.S., that can benefit from the freeing up of household income for additional discretionary spend- ing. Businesses also benefit from lower oil-related input costs. Countries where oil is the primary source of revenue are coming under increasing duress. The biggest losers are those nations— including Russia and Venezuela—that are almost solely reliant on oil exports to support their economies (see Exhibit 3, below right). A drop in oil exports causes the trade balances of these countries to deterio- rate and leads to rising inflation, while falling oil revenues hit their gov- ernment budgets. These developments lead to tighter monetary and fiscal policies, which further weaken the already slowing economies and spur financial instability.
The economic literature provides evidence that globalization is beneficial in terms of macroeconomic performance (Dreher, 2006) and increasing product variety (Broda and Weinstein, 2006), while income inequality between (Dutt and Mukhopadhyay, 2005) and within countries (Dreher and Gaston, 2008) has been exacerbated in a globalized world. At the same time, there is a growing literature investigating the effect of country-level variables on individuals’ subjective well- being (Di Tella et al. 2001; Frey and Stutzer, 2002). However, the question of who are globalization’s winners and losers in terms of well-being has so far only been analyzed in one cross- country study (Bjørnskov et al., 2007), while the results of this analysis are of limited use if subjective well-being is not internationally comparable (Diener and Oishi, 2006). 1
In summary, this paper adds to the UK mutual fund literature by analyzing the robustness of the FDR approach and how it may give different inferences from the standard approach of “counting” the number of significant funds. We also apply the FDR approach to portfolio formation and determine the expected alpha from a set of funds which have a maximum FDR set at a predetermined level. Our key results are that there is a much higher proportion of false discoveries among the best funds than among the worst funds – so the standard method of simply counting the number of funds with “significant” test statistics can be far more misleading for “winners” than for “losers”. We find few funds which truly outperform their benchmarks and these are concentrated in the extreme right tail of the performance distribution, whereas there are a far greater number of genuinely poor performing funds, which are spread throughout the left tail. This result holds for different investment styles, so there are few winners in any of our style categories but there are far fewer equity income funds that are truly poor performers, relative to the number of poor performers in either the All Companies or Small Company sectors. If we control the overall FDR at say 10% then from our set of significant funds, there are a maximum of 20 truly winner funds (3% of all funds) and about 4 times more loser funds (13% of all funds) - but the majority of funds neither statistically beat nor are inferior to their benchmarks and therefore appear to do no better on a risk adjusted performance then merely tracking their style indexes 5 .
In our paper we start from D. Norths (1990) under- standing of institutions as the rules of the game in the society, or more formally, the humanly devised con- strains that shape human interaction. Working with in- stitutions, it is also necessary to investigate how various actors perceive and interpret them. We refer to Webers concept of social action, which is related to the mean- ings ascribed to this action by acting people. If project- ing Webers understanding of social action into modern concepts of institutional economics, we can say that in a case this action is difficult (i.e. there is not an achieve- ment of understanding of its meanings when orienting our action towards others because the action misses its order secured by institutions), the action indicates high transaction costs. Czech economist L. Mlèoch (1997) shows that economic action is directly linked with mean- ings (with understanding) we ascribe to this action and therefore also with transaction costs. Those who can create the institutions and exploit them in the way to master their action within these institutions, they can achieve their goals and will become the winners. Those for whom the rules of the game make their action more difficult or those who did not internalise these institu- tions and who do not understand them (or who under- stand them as enemies) they are not able (or they cannot) to construct them in the way to master their ac- tivities within these institutions. Such people will become probably losers in the institutional change. All these is-
The financial links between winners and losers are nearly always indirect. During the period 2006-‐2008 individual households in the Euro Area (EA) turned fromwinners into losers through no fault of their own. This was caused by the U.S. home mortgage crisis, which spread to Europe through the sale of U.S. mortgage backed securities to European investors. The subsequent financial losses hit European pension funds and banks. The reaction of central banks on both sides of the Atlantic was to lower benchmark interest rates to their lowest levels for a generation. EA government debt levels went up from 66.2 percent of GDP in 2007 to 92.6 percent in 2013. However the return for new savers went down very substantially. In Germany the 10-‐year government bond yield dropped from the long-‐term average of 5.57 percent to 0.88 percent in early September 2014. In Spain and Italy it dropped from the long-‐term average of slightly over 6 percent to 2.15 percent in the same month. Savers, both individually and through their collective savings vehicles as pension funds, saw a great reduction in their earnings over their savings while simultaneously seeing their collective income reduced through higher unemployment levels and a growth in pay levels below inflation.
This paper analyses poverty dynamics in Vietnam during the ‘Doi Moi’ renovation period and tries to identify the winners and losersfrom the economic and trade reform process implemented in Vietnam in the late 1980s. Our results are based on data available for a panel of 3494 rural households interviewed in 1992-93 and 1997-98. We find that movements in and out of poverty between the two periods vary substantially across population subgroups, suggesting that not everyone benefited equally from the process of reform. We model poverty dynamics using a multinomial logit model that explains movements in and out of poverty between the two periods of time in terms of household characteristics, characteristics directly related to the economic reforms and changes in the returns to those characteristics. The results suggest that changes in household poverty status in Vietnam are correlated with geographic location, access to key institutions and infrastructure, the education level of the head and spouse, as well as changes induced by the economic reform. These results are robust to shifts in the poverty line and changes in model specification. The paper forms part of a wider study funded by the UK Department for International Development that examines the impact of trade reform and trade shocks on household poverty dynamics.
Figure 2: Heatmaps showing annotation distributions for one of the events - the Oscars and all event types, separating winnersfromlosers. Vertical labels indicate veridicality (DY “Definitely Yes”, PY “Probably Yes”, UC “Uncertain about the outcome”, PN “Probably No” and DN “Definitely No”). Hor- izontal labels indicate desire (SW “Strongly wants the event to happen”, PW “Probably wants the event to happen”, ND “No desire about the event outcome”, PD “Probably does not want the event to happen”, SN “Strongly against the event happening”). More data in the upper left hand corner indicates there are more tweets with positive veridicality and desire.
the situation is quite different as prices adjustments for Top Losers last longer than 2 days and continue up to 5 days even if positive abnormal tend to fade away as time goes by. What may explain this difference is the way Bremer and Sweeney chose their stocks: they decided to analyze the returns of stocks that had previously lost more than 10% of their value in the previous 10 days. In this study the focus is put on Top Losers (and Top Winners but as we have seen, results are less interesting than those of Top Losers), which means that there is no minimum loss required, instead, the only criteria to meet is that on a given trading day, the selected stock has to be the worst performer of the CAC 40 index for a short period of time. Therefore, on average, negative returns are lower than those observed in the study by Bremer and Sweeney - where it was -13% - versus -8% to -4% here depending on the observation period chosen (from 1 day to 5 days). The fact that the observed rebound is lower in this study than in that of Bremer and Sweeney is consistent with their results, indeed they showed that by lowering the trigger threshold (in absolute terms) from -10% to -7,5%, rebounds were lower, while changing the trigger from -10% to -15% made the rebounds higher. In this study there is no threshold, therefore it is consistent to find lower rebounds than those found in the study by Bremer and Sweeney.
From a development perspective, however, what matters is not how many of a country’s native-born engage in higher education, but how many of those who do engage remain at home. The brain drain can benefit a home country if it increases the proportion of college graduates in the population remaining. There are two conditions for such a benefit to obtain. First, the level of development in the country should be low enough to generate strong incentives for the more educated to emigrate, but not so low that personal liquidity constraints on investment in education become strongly limiting (in which case the incentive cannot operate). Second, the probability of emigration by high-skilled workers must be sufficiently low—for example, below 15–20%. On average, the level of brain drain that maximizes human capital accumulation in a developing country is around 10%. This level varies across countries, depending on their size, location, language, and public policies. In particular, it declines with development and the effectiveness of the higher education system. The hypothetical levels of human capital that would be obtained in the absence of brain drain have been simulated and compared with actual levels . Countries with low human capital and low emigration rates are likely to experience a net gain. But there appear to be many more losers than winners (88 losers and 20 winners out of 108 developing countries). Importantly, the losers show substantial losses, and the winners only small gains. The situation of many sub-Saharan African, Central American, and small developing states appears worrisome in this respect. In contrast, the largest developing countries (Brazil, China, India) all seem to experience moderate gains.
A 2007 earthquake in the western Solomon Islands resulted in a localised subsidence event in which sea level (relative to the previous coastal settings) rose approximately 30–70 cm, providing insight into impacts of future rapid changes to sea level on coastal ecosystems. Here, we show that increasing sea level by 30–70 cm can have contrasting impacts on mangrove, seagrass and coral reef ecosystems. Coral reef habitats were the clear winners with a steady lateral growth from 2006–2014, yielding a 157% increase in areal coverage over seven years. Mangrove ecosystems, on the other hand, suffered the largest impact through a rapid dieback of 35% (130 ha) of mangrove forest in the study area after subsidence. These forests, however, had partially recovered seven years after the earthquake albeit with a different community structure. The shallow seagrass ecosystems demonstrated the most dynamic response to relative shifts in sea level with both losses and gains in areal extent at small scales of 10–100 m. The results of this study emphasize the importance of considering the impacts of sea-level rise within a complex landscape in which winners and losers may vary over time and space.
I now discuss the results concerning intention to reuse. I see from Table 4(a) and (b) that EXPE produces significant positive signs in all estimations. I found it interesting that past experience encourages complainants to reuse regardless of whether they are winners or not. This suggests that the positive learning effect on reuse outweighs the negative aspiration effect. Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that its coefficient for losers is 0.04–0.05, which similar to that for winners. The past experience of a lawsuit makes a contribution to the enhancement of reuse even when complainants cannot obtain any benefit in the current lawsuit. From this I derive the argument that the behavior of experienced complainants is less likely to be influenced by the result of the current lawsuit since their behavior depends not only on the current result but also on the results of any previous lawsuits.
What has been observed thus far suggests that, for winners, similar results are presented in estimations of both intention to reuse and satisfaction. On the other hand, for losers, it is interesting that opposite results of EXPE are obtained for the estimation of intention to reuse and that of satisfaction. That is, past experience encourages complainants to reuse whereas experience does not always increase satisfaction. It follows from this that experienced complainants tend to reuse even if they are not satisfied with the result of the current lawsuit. This seems to be at odds with the view of policy makers that “meeting public expectations” leads to an increase in numbers of those bringing lawsuits. In my interpretation, the difference of the EXPE effect between intention to reuse and satisfaction might be mainly to the result of aspiration change, which is closely related to satisfaction but not to behavior. This is in line with the argument that preference changes have stronger implications for individual welfare than the prediction of human behavior (Hollander 2001). This leads me to argue that aspiration change during the process of adaptation creates a gap between welfare and behavior for those who bring lawsuits.
We investigate the performance of winners and losers for German equity mutual funds (1990-2009) using empirical order statistics. When using gross returns and the Fama-French three factor (3F) model, the number of statistically significant positive-alpha funds is zero but increases markedly when market timing variables are added. However, when using a “total performance” measure (which incorporates both alpha and the contribution of market timing), the number of statistically significant winner funds falls to zero. The latter is consistent with bias in estimated alphas in the presence of market timing. We also find that many poorly performing funds are unskilled rather than unlucky.
In addition, future research should consider the optimal design of state-tribe compacts. The characteristics of tribal-state gaming compacts vary widely from state to state. Most compacts restrict the types of games, some restrict the size and number of casinos tribes can run, and other specify annual payments to states. Whether states design tribal compacts such that the revenue payments exceed foregone tax revenue is ultimately an empirical question that depends crucially on what gaming and tax revenue from commercial-casinos would be. Furthermore, the current legal environment prevents state and local governments from imposing a tax on tribal gaming ventures that would force them to internalize the costs of negative externalities on the surrounding community. Though some tribes do pay fees as specified in their compact, there is no standard practice across states. 11
most productive, firms. The growth of CEO pay can then also be explained by the growth in average firm size. An alternative view is provided by ‘managerial power’ theories which suggest that CEOs inflate their pay via their influence on the pay-setting process (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004), thus breaking the link to productivity. The advocates of corporate tournament theory (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981) instead argue that the large CEO ‘prize’ is central to how organisations structure their incentives and motivate their workers. The logic of this is that, within each level of the corporate hierarchy, a tournament develops whereby success at one level leads to both higher earnings and entry into the next level of the promotion competition (Rosen, 1986). At the highest level, the pay of the CEO reflects ultimate victory and serves to incentivise those at lower levels. It is the relevance of this last theory on which this paper primarily focuses.