The main positions, nonetheless, changed again as Latvia prepared to join the European Union and NATO and had to ally its national memory with how history is seen in Western Europe - inclusion of the Holocaust and condemnation of Nazi war crimes. This led to a broader acknowledgement that the myth of legionnaires-freedom fighters is inaccurate and problematic on the international stage. The new narrative recognized that Latvians were fighting on both sides during WWII and reinforced the simultaneous condemnation of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as two evils (Zelče, 2011). Consequently March 16 was also removed from the list of official commemorations in 2000 and public officials have distanced themselves from the March 16 commemorative events, especially the march held in Riga. The official Latvian state position has been to commemorate the legionnaires on November 11 as a common commemorative day for all Latvian soldiers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). In 2011 deputies of Saeima from the National Alliance sought to reintroduce the day in the calendar of official commemorations but their proposal was convincingly rejected (“Saeima noraida”, 2011). Lately, the number of people at the events is slightly growing but popular support in general is decreasing (Kaprāns and Procevska, 2013; Kaprāns & Saulītis, 2017). Also, in the political rhetoric March 16 is more and more abnegated. The following analysis of official memory regime on March 16 in 2014, nonetheless, reveals that the mainstream political elites face difficulties in responding to mnemonic warriors from more radical political parties.
before a listing case could be re-opened, EH recognised the potential significance of this new information and on 30 January 2013 confirmed that they would re-open the case, less than two years from the final decision on the second review request, stressing that this was “an exceptionally unusual case.” 71 Indeed, queried about the building’s non-designated status in November 2012 – just a few days before the latest threat to the building was announced by PCC and two months before the case was re-opened by EH – the new Minister Ed Vaizey had commented that the case was “unlikely to come up for listing any time soon” as it had been recently closed. 72 By 28 February 2013, EH prepared their consultation report and circulated this to the applicants and the building’s owners. 73 An extension to the consultation period was requested by PCC and, on 12 April 2013, it was announced that an application for a Certificate of Immunity from listing (COI) – submitted by PCC, as could be presumed and was subsequently confirmed – was to be considered in parallel to the listing application. 74 The final decision was announced on 23 September 2013 and placed the building under statutory protection at Grade II. 75
For many students, awareness of WorldWarII comes from the movies and the televised series, “The World at War.” The war has lent itself repeatedly to cinema, mediocre and brilliant – but its history requires the student and the historian to reach beyond even the best movies. Where films focus on transformative personal experiences, understanding the Second WorldWar as history also requires reconstructing how societies across the globe shaped each other’s collective experience. WorldWarII demonstrates the need for systemic world history.
1. Read their letters to home to other classmates in small groups. 2. Review for the unit test.
Students will come to class with their Letter to Home/Diary Entry. Students will be split into groups of 4 or 5 and be matched as best as possible with students who wrote from different perspectives than their own. The students will each read their letter or diary entry, and discuss them all as a group when each student has read. Students will then turn their assignment in. For the rest of class, students will be split into two teams to play a review game for the unit test. Day 13
While during the winter of 1939-40 the Soviets satisfied themselves with more-or-less veiled threats against Romania, in the late spring of 1940 they stepped up their preparations. The Red Army began concentrating its divisions along the Romanian frontier and began staging border incidents “at the rate of two or three a week,...” 26 These preparations, however, did not result in either drastic diplomatic action or a military assault against Romania for the time being. Hitler's successes in the West probably discouraged the Soviet leaders from undertaking the latter. Moscow finally made its move at the end of June, 1940, at the time of Hitler's triumph over France. Bucharest was given an ultimatum to hand over Bessarabia, as well as northern Buko- vina. The latter region (as has been mentioned above) had not belonged to the Russian Empire before 1918, but had a large number of Ukrainian inhabitants. The ultimatum was well timed. Romania's traditional ally, France, had just collapsed, and the Hungarians as well as the Bulgarians were also pressing their irredentist claims for the lands they had lost to Romania in the wake of WorldWar I. Under the circumstances, the Romanians were not likely to resist. In fact, it seems that Stalin and his associates had great expectations when they presented their ultimatum. They had hoped that Bucharest would not only surrender the regions in question without resisting, but would then proceed to request a Soviet guarantee of the rest of Romania and thus become client state of Moscow. 27 They, however, were to be greatly disappointed. In
This chapter covers the American involvement in WorldWarII and its effects on the United States. America began trying to ensure isolation by enacting a series of neutrality laws but as the war broke out in Europe and Asia, the U.S. gradually altered the neutrality laws. Even before Pearl Harbor, the U.S. was involved in conflict with Germany in the North Atlantic. U.S. policy was to deal with Hitler first but the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor changed that. The U.S. and its allies were on the defensive until mid-1942 when the North Africa offensive, the Battle of Stalingrad and the Coral Sea-Midway victories slowly turned the tide. The war became a battle of production with the U.S. possessing the advantages. While the U.S. fought the war for democracy, some constituencies still had to fight for democracy at home. The home front involvement in the war changed the lives of many women, African Americans and Japanese Americans. As victory was in sight, the U.S. was the major world power and at the center of global politics. Leaders tried to develop a new foreign policy to face these changing conditions.
With increased US involvement in the Pacific, Japan became drawn into a war of attrition, meaning that both sides attempted to wear each other down to the point of collapse, even though forces and supplies were depleted. Under pressure to replace its depleted forces, particularly after the disastrous Battle of Midway, Japan threw inexperienced recruits into the frontlines. Japan’s war industries could not keep up with the need to replace its ships and aircraft. Japan gradually lost the resources to undertake major offensives. With Japan on the back foot, the Allies made two successful counterattacks in 1943. These campaigns reduced casualties by simply avoiding many Japanese bases in the Pacific. The Australian army was given the job of ‘mopping up’ in the wake of many of the areas retaken by the Allies. This ‘mopping-up’ role was highly controversial. Many people thought the remaining Japanese forces were already isolated and posed little threat, and that the campaign was simply a waste of Australians’ lives.
In the aftermath of WorldWar I the 1920 Westerve It Board recommended the design of a new 75-mm (2.95-in) light howitzer for use in mountain war- fare and as a general-issue pack howit- zer. This was one of the proposals that was actually pursued at the time, for by 1927 the 75-mm Pack Howitzer Ml had been standardized; some later pro- duction changes altered the designa- tion to the MIAI. The howitzer was mounted on a carriage of ingenious design that could be easily broken down into six loads, and the box trail was perforated to save weight. The howitzer itself could be broken down for pack transport, and was so arranged that the barrel was held in a trough and kept in place by a cover along the top: this gave the weapon a distinctive appearance. Traverse was effected using a screw mechanism directly on the axle, so the cradle had to carry only the elevation mechanism. The first MlAls were mounted on the Carriage Ml, which was intended for animal traction and so had wooden- spoked wheels. The introduction of mechanized traction led to the adop- tion of the Carriage M8, which used rubber-tyred metal wheels. This little howitzer became one of the first Allied airborne artillery weapons, for it was issued to nearly every Allied airborne formation, including the British air- borne divisions. But it should not be thought that the Ml carriage went out of fashion: many were produced dur- ing WorldWarII for issue to Allied armies such as the Chinese, who used the howitzer in some numbers.
to the principles of international law? The US tried to keep peace through the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the League of Nations tried to keep the peace between nations but proved
unsuccessful due to the lack of enforcement. The US did participate in embargos- trying to hurt the nations through economic facets. The Munich Pact just appeased (policy of appeasement) the aggression so you could say that if the League would have been able to punish these countries and the policy of appeasement did not happen they might have stopped. But… people were tired of war (WWI) and they were trying to avoid war at all cost. The Treaty of Versailles really damaged countries’- putting them into depressions and not listening to colonies pushing for self-determination.
During the first part of WorldWarII, Germany had superior tanks, such as the Panzer IV. Eventually, the Allies developed good tanks of their own, such as the Sherman tank from the United States, and the T-34 from the Soviet Union. Sherman tanks weren’t as formidable as German
their labor market opportunities. In particular, evidence suggests that education may reduce crime (Lochner and Moretti, 2004), reduce mortality (Lleras-Muney, 2005), and improve some outcomes among individuals’ children (Currie and Moretti, 2003; Murnane, 1981; Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens, 2006; Thomas, Strauss and Henriques, 1991), so a natural question is whether the additional education induced by wartime events had spillover effects onto other outcomes. To our knowledge, only a few studies have empirically explored the relationship between WorldWarII, the G.I. Bill, and non-labor market outcomes: Bedard and Deschenes (2006) find that cohorts with higher rates of WWII participation were more likely to die prematurely (excluding deaths attributed to combat) and that higher death rates among these cohorts are associated with higher rates of military-induced smoking. Yamashita (2008) and Fetter (2011) find evidence of a fading relationship between G.I. eligibility and homeownership, and Page (2007) shows that the children of affected cohorts had lower probabilities of repeating a grade. To our knowledge, no one has yet investigated the impact that these historic events may have had on marital opportunities and sorting in the United States. 7
What is of a great importance is the solidarity and the support that Albanians gave to the antifascist movement despite their geographical location. In March 1942, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania and the County Committee of the Communist Party of Yogosllavia for Kosovo and Dukagjin Plane addressed a joint call to the Albanians: “In this war of liberation where the fate of the nations is at stake, participate we must bearing the arms in our hands to save ourselves from the captivity we have fallen. Let us join in a common war together with our brothers in Albania as well as our neighbours in Montenegro, Serbia and Greece. Create your bands of partisans and collaborate with those of Greece and Yogosllavia. Do create a common front with all the other nations against the common enemies as soon as possible and freedom and the right of self-determination shall you reap by taking this step 12 .
In the late 1960s and 1970s, restrictions in government funding as well as scholars’ disillusionment with both the Vietnam War and events in Indonesia, where 1965 saw mass killings and a coup by General Suharto, caused a change of direction in research on the archipelago away from Western assumptions and models. Benedict R. O’G. Anderson and Benda in particular made waves. They focused not on the elite or the Dutch-Indonesian conflict as a whole, but rather investigated internal Indonesian conflicts and tensions between, for instance, policies of diplomasi and perjuangan, and paid attention to the social rather than national revolution taking place in the islands. See: Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944- 1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971); Benda, “Democracy in Indonesia,” Journal of Asian Studies 23, 3 (1964), 449-456. At the same time, scholars began zooming in on particular time periods and on regional and local events rather than on national happenings. See, for instance: John Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Press, 1964); Audrey R. Kahin (ed.), Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985).
As in WorldWar I, the accounting profession’s efforts in anticipation of war predated formally declared hostilities. In June of 1940, AIA President John K. Mathieson sent a letter to the membership inquiring as to whether “they would be able to serve without compensation or allowance for expenses” on sundry advisory panels likely to be requested by the Advisory Commission. 1 Foreseeing the demands of war, the American Institute of Accountants created a special committee on National Defense in September of 1940. 2 This committee, chaired by Mathieson, President of the AIA, included, among others, such noteworthy CPAs as: T. Coleman Andrews, John F. Forbes, George P. Auld, Norman L. McLaren, Maurice E. Peloubet, Victor H. Stempf, and C. Oliver Wellington. By June of 1941, ten of the committee members had been called upon for service in connection with the war defense programs. 3 Furthermore, the Institute provided lists of available members who were willing to assist in essential capacities. Many in the profession answered the call of duty by resigning civilian pursuits and volunteering their services to the government. This chapter highlights the activities and actions of
Despite some conflicts between the OWI and the studios, the treatment of foreign countries was also as important to Hollywood as it was to the OWI and Washington. Even though many countries were cut off due to the war, 33 percent of Hollywood's gross earnings came from movie sales outside the United States. 29 Markets in South America actually saw growth in the number of Hollywood films audiences watched during the early 1940s, and business continued to remain surprisingly high in neutral European counties like Spain and Portugal. 30 In a New York Times article by film critic Thomas F. Brady, he mentioned that the OWI had frowned upon two MGM pictures, Kim and White Cargo, because the films raised the issue of the "white man's burden". 31 Based on the OWI's suggestion, MGM shelved Kim, but produced White Cargo anyway. North Africa became an increasingly important market for the OWI as General Eishenhower's forces moved into the area and Axis films were replaced by American ones. According to the OWI, it was through film that the Axis had "poisoned the minds" of North Africans. 32 Germany and their allies had used films, even in hard to reach places, to sway public opinion against the Allies. Hollywood's war films had the potential to combat German propaganda, and as such played a larger role in the war effort overseas than initially imagined.