opportunities are limited. Land-based, agricultural livelihoods are an important alternative, where some opportunities for accumulation do exist. This requires entrepreneurship, improvisation and the deployment of new skills for production and marketing.
In the past, the route to becoming established as an independent adult was often marriage and getting a piece of land. Men would be allocated plots by a local traditional leader, while women would marry and move to their husband’s area, farming on the plot. Today, the certainty of marriage or gaining land is not there. Many must just wait, existing in limbo, living with parents. They may invest effort in developing a ‘project’ on their parents’ farm, doing piecework locally, or migrating elsewhere in search of often very temporary jobs. The stress of the ‘waithood’ - not getting a job, not having land, not being able to set up an independent home, not being able to afford to marry (for men) or being pushed into early marriage (for women) - is a common theme across the cohort case studies. For many this is a challenge to self-esteem, to identity and personhood. Without recognition according to the norms of society (and the elder generation), a feeling of failure, generating stress, is apparent. Young men in particular frequently reflected, with a sense of shame, on their drink and drug habits.
Perceptions of state neglect feed into a new politics in these areas, where new elites—now prosperous business people and property owners in town, but with links to rural areas via resettlement farms—articulate discontent. They may in turn get co-opted by the ruling party through various deals or may take up opposition poli- tics, with all its attendant dangers. Whatever the outcome, the political dynamics of these areas have shifted dramatically. No longer are such towns the extension of the surrounding white farms, but they are part of a much more contested political milieu driven by new patterns of accumulation and class relations generated by landreform. With a differentiated population of farmers across communal area, A1 and A2 farms, it is those who are ‘accumulating from below’ particularly as a result of landreform that are profiting from new urban connections. This includes especially better-off male A1 farmers, but also women and youngpeople who engage in trade and town-based businesses.
appreciated as a significant rural population integrating in a new agrarian landscape, whose livelihood needs — contextualized by history and politics — must be taken seriously. As in South Africa, where a large, informal workforce supports agriculture, but often with people living off-farm and in informal settlements, the prospects for coordinated policy action or collec- tive response seem remote (Visser and Ferrer, 2015). Yet, as in the case of the De Doorns strike in the Western Cape, effective mobilizations can occur (Wilderman, 2015). Forms of organization have to move beyond a focus solely on wage and labour issues to wider livelihood and welfare concerns. Across southern Africa, and beyond, agricultural labour regimes are changing from more formal, regulated systems centred on wage work, with clear conditions of employment, to more informal systems, where ‘work’, as paid employment, is only one element of a range of livelihood activities, part of a complex bricolage of opportunities put together often under very difficult conditions (Du Toit, 2004). This poorly understood reality is increasingly common, a consequence of wider processes of change under deregulation and neoliberal globalization (Ferguson and Li, 2018). The reconfiguration of labour regimes, away from a clearly exploitative dependence on a commer- cial farmer, towards a more flexible, informal arrangement, does not mean that patterns of dependency and patronage disappear, of course, as new so- cial relations emerge between workers, brokers and new farmers, inflected by class, gender and age, affecting who gains what and how.
Mashonaland Central Province, it emerged there are certain religious activities surrounding reburial of the dead bodies of people who died in mass atrocities conducted by the white regime during the war of liberation. The exercise is spearheaded by War Veterans who form an Association. They have established Administrative Offices at the Headquarters at Mt Darwin. An executive body comprises the Reburial Committee Chaired by Comrade (Cde) D.A. Chihobo, Historic and Monuments Department by Cde Gumbeze and Education Department by Cde Goto Mukanya. The reburial committee operates under the guidance of a spirit medium. Identifying the graves is extremely complex given very few people witnessed the incidents of massacre in a war situation. The exhumation and identification of the fighters is made possible through the cooperation of the burial committee, spirit mediums, prophets, and local people who witnessed the massacres during the liberation war. The spirit medium acts as host of a national spirit. He leads a group of young male mediums who call themselves 'comrades'. 35 They sniff out the graves and imitate guerrilla fighters during the war. They
One can sift the contradictory and contesting power relations between different actors and social groups in a village politics around access to land. Adams’ (1991) research on rural women in Masvingo Province discovered that access to productive resources, including land, education, and higher-paid employment, is controlled largely by men. Adams’ (1991, p. 167) study noted a striking lack of access by female-headed households to the means of production: “Only one of the 10 households owned any cattle. None of the households had over 2,5 hectares of arable land and three households had only 0,5 hectares or less. Six of the 10 did not own a plough. Six of the 10 did not sell any crops in the year preceding the interview.” Traditional customs provide that men control land access and dictate the procedures according to which women acquire land. A married woman receives land from her husband, an unmarried woman (single or divorced) receives land from her father or brothers in her birth village, and a widow stays at her former husband’s area and continues to use his land if she is on good terms with his relatives and they agree to her continued presence. To a certain extent, traditional customs empower women, albeit only in ways permitted by tradition, ways that endorse traditional premises.
Beyond the psychological opposition to buying and selling of land, other emotional issues included the concern about concentration of land ownership in the hands of few physical persons or corporations (“latifundiazation” of agricultural land), the fear of excessive fragmentation of land during privatization, loss of land holdings by former collective farms due to their weak financial situation and danger of bankruptcy, and that perennial bogey, the sale of Russian land to foreigners. The provisions of the 2003 Law of Agricultural Land Transactions were designed to address these concerns. While buying and selling of land plots (as well as land shares) was allowed, the state retained a preemptive right on land purchases; regional governments could impose limits on physical concentration of land by a single owner (typically 10% of the agricultural land in the district), on the one hand, and also limits on the minimum size of physical plots that could be surveyed and registered for farming purposes (household plots were exempt from this restriction); foreigner and companies with majority foreign capital could only lease agricultural land, not own it.
suffers from at least two serious problems. The first problem is the refusal of the cadastral chambers to issue registry extracts for land plots in joint shared ownership. In theory previously issued certificates of land ownership rights have the same validity as new entries in land registers, but in practice each new transaction requires full registration of the previous rights. As a result the whole area in joint shared ownership (often several thousand hectares) has to be surveyed. This is not only a very expensive operation (500 rubles per hectare), but it also takes a long time to complete (at least two months). The second problem is the multi-step and absolutely opaque operation of the registration and cadastral chambers, especially regarding the requirements for documents. These bodies develop internal instructions that are not always compatible with the relevant law and require additional documents that were not envisaged by the law. These administrative barriers involve additional expenses for the applicants and lead to a sharp increase of transaction costs.Personal experience suggests thatthe withdrawal of a single land plot from joint shared ownership requires up to one year of constant occupation. The cost of the entire procedure of converting a land share into a plot of land can be estimated by comparing the market price of a land share with the market price of a registered plot in the same area. In Volokolamsk near Moscow the price of a plot is double the price of a land share before conversion.
The situation in Estremadura (Badajoz, Caceres and Salamanca) and Western Andalusia (Cadiz, Cordova, Huelva and Seville) was less favourable for landless workers. In Estremadura, the numbers of owners and tenants decreased slightly between 1890 and 1930, but the proportion of landless never fell below 40 per cent, although absolute numbers plummeted from 170,000 to 127,000 between 1910 and 1930. Western Andalusia was the region where the landless problem was greatest, reaching 45 per cent in 1930, and the province worse affected was Cadiz, with two-thirds of the agrarian population was without land. However, and in contrast to Estremadura, the number of landless workers fell sharply from 1890 to 1910 but not between 1910 and 1930. Surprisingly, more than half of all the provinces under the landreform law had experienced a substantial fall in the numbers of landless workers between 1860 and 1930, suggesting that rural markets were allowing farm workers access to land in most areas of Spain.
With the overwhelming majority of Zimbabwe’s GDP coming from white owned industry, mining, and business, it was imperative for the economic stability of Zimbabwe that the white community be allowed to maintain their holdings after independence. In the prophetic words of Ian Smith, “They [whites] have the skills and the capital. I’m not a racist, but it’s the story of Africa: Every black country that forces its whites to leave has become a tragedy.” 41 The aforementioned provisions in the Lancaster House Agreements made foreign aid contingent on the protection of property, specifically land, thus making ZANU-PF’s goal of radical redistribution unfeasible. While some see Lancaster House as a continuation of unequal land policies and a direct bridge from imperialism to neo- colonialism, the fact remains that after witnessing the chaotic destabilization that occurred after the white exodus from Mozambique, Mugabe and ZANU-PF recognized the pragmatism behind maintaining large-scale agricultural production and a white cornerstone of the economy. In 1981, agricultural exports accounted for 46 percent of Zimbabwe’s total domestic export value. 42
This study quantitatively investigated the impact landreform polices in Zimbabwe could have on output, gross value added and households’ income in the country. It looked at welfare and equity issues that could possibly be addressed by landreform, specifically in favour of the rural poor farmers in post-independence Zimbabwe. The study used the 1991 social accounting matrix for Zimbabwe, which was updated by the 1998 household survey data provided by the Central Statistics Office of Zimbabwe. Information on the transfer of land was extracted from records of the deeds registries in Harare and Bulawayo. Using these data sources, the study computed the SAM multipliers and simulated the impact of land transfers on output, gross value added and households’ income. The simulations were based on four different scenarios.
owned the land through exercising a form of title, and the resettled farmers have no property rights over their newly acquired land (Degeorges and Reilly, 2007). In Malawi, Ethiopia and Nigeria, an executive authority, usually the State President, on behalf of the people, owns the land and may only extend leasehold rights evidenced by a certificate of occupancy. A slight variant of this trend is found in those countries where large proportions of their land mass are state owned with prohibition on sale even to nationals. In Israel, which typifies the later stance, private ownership of land is available for only about 7% of the country‟s land, since approximately 93% of the land is owned by the state by virtue of Basic Law (Stephen et al., (1999). Moyo (2006) asserts that in Zimbabwe all rural/communal land belongs to the President and Rural District Councils hold it in trust. It is argued that this made it very difficult for farmers to access credit from financial institutions hence by the end of 2002 Zimbabwe‟s farming output was down by about 75% from the previous year (Degeorges and Reilly 2007). The land usage arrangements are that beneficiaries of model A1 will be awarded permits while those in model A2 will attain a 99-year lease period. Bruce (1993) argues that the government accepts the de facto prevalence of customary tenure whilst they simultaneously maintain the de jure state ownership. Currently the beneficiaries of the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme are using different temporary licenses and offer letters. Zikhali (2010) argues that the duration of contract under the lease is relative despite it stating that the lease is for 99 years and the conditions for subletting are not clear. Under normal circumstances tenure is determined by set of rights enjoyed by the holder as well as the duration for which the rights are valid. It is the individual‟s perception of his/her rights to be allocated piece of land on a continual basis without any imposition or interference with the rights vested on him/her to reap the benefits of any investment made on the given land. Using data based on the study from Mashonaland Central Province in Zimbabwe by Zikhali (2010) on tenure security, the results provide evidence that the programme has created some tenure insecurity among its beneficiaries, which has impacted investments in soil conservation adversely. Similarly, the beneficiaries of land did not get fully fledged tenure security in Matobo District.
Another reason why the school attracts a great number of students is that Bergen University College is located in the city of Bergen. Bergen is the second largest city in Norway, and youngpeople like to study where they can have all sort of entertainment, sports, events etc. All this is something Bergen can offer. In the study from January 2010, 61, 4% answered that they chose to study in Bergen because of the proximity to their home. In addition to this, 30% answered that Bergen is known as a good student-city. Some even answered that they wanted to study in Bergen because it is so far from home. The fact that you don’t need high school math or physics is also a plus, so that everybody who has three years of high school is able to apply for the program. The good job opportunities you will have after finishing the program is important to many students, many are tempted by the possibilities of getting a safe and well- paid job.
Women in formalized (civil) and non-formalised (uncivil) groups have played a vital role in ensuring their improved access and control over land in Zimbabwe. Prior 1998, the involvement of women’s organizations and other civic groups in land issues was limited and marginal. During this time the women’s movement devoted its time and effort to welfare and development projects in communal areas. Emphasis by the more formal organisations was again on human rights and equality. Those that pursued landreform advocated for market-based and orderly methods of landreform, because the discourse at that time had shifted to radicalism. However, the market-based and orderly methods of landreform were gender blind. The aim at this time was to address racial imbalances, and gender imbalances were not foremost. Poor coordination of women’s organi- zations at this time affected efforts at addressing gender imbalances in land distribution. The ushering in of the Fast Track LandReform Programme saw improved coordination of women’s organizations, that coincided with ‘uncivil’ women’s fight for land and land grabbing through the war veterans led land invasions that preceded the Fast Track period. Little has been done in terms of research to establish the role played by the uncivil women’s movement to the current land ownership pattern, but their role need not be underestimated. This paper mainly considers the role played by formalized or civil women’s move- ment to current achievements in women’s access and control of land under the Fast Track period. It specifically focuses on the role played by the Women and Land Lobby Group as well as other organizations in documenting the plight of women, lobbying for women’s access to land, advocating for legal reform in favour of women among other issues that facilitated improvements in women’s access to land under the Fast Track period.
In Spain, the main objective of the Liberal Reform was to secure property rights and to eliminate the restrictions for the free operation of good and factor markets; therefore, it can be considered as a prototypical market-oriented reform of the 19 th century. 6 Authorities derogated
the legal apparatus of the Old Regime. Feudal rights were eliminated, together with the restrictions for land sales, grain commerce and labor contracts. Many of the old forms of land tenancy that complicated the definition of property-rights were simply abolished and was established the private property of land. Furthermore, to alleviate their budget problems and to finance wars and infrastructures, successive governments put into the market the properties of the Church, the municipalities and the communal lands, which were sold in auction. According to a substantial literature, all these measures resulted in a moderate expansion of agrarian production but did not redistribute land in hands of landless peasants. 7 Like in other European countries
However, the benefits identified above must be weighed against the potential costs of privatisation. Firstly, a large percentage of the world’s land shortage cases are not related to a physical lack of land, but rather to the high concentration of land owned by a minority of powerful individuals. This raises normative questions on the morality of such a situation, as the land owned by one individual could otherwise provide accommodation and livelihood for a much larger group of people. Secondly, it is argued that private ownership results in the most efficient use of resources. However, Bromley and Cernea (1989:13) highlighted that in certain countries, the best land is devoted to activities that yield the highest rates of return, like cattle farming, while crop farming and alternative activities must take place on poorer quality lands, placing greater pressures on their success. Privatisation therefore takes place on all the best, most arable land, leaving the inferior land to other property regimes. For this reason, it is often unfair to compare the performance of private property with communal property, as the latter cannot be expected to be equally successful if it is taking place on inferior resource bases (Bromley and Cernea, 1989:13). Situations such as these cast doubts on the validity of the hypothesis that private property regimes automatically result in greater efficiency, although in other cases, where land usage is not skewed, increased efficiency may well occur (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973:22).
On February 20 th 2003 we had the opportunity to meet Tiny Mankge at her home in Johannesburg. She is the representative of a group of claimants in a rural case concerning a piece of land in Mpumalanga in the North Eastern part of South Africa. Mangke’s ancestors had populated the land in question since the 19 th century, and her grandfather was the chief of the area. In order to lodge a substantial claim, Mankge reached out to possible neighbouring claimants via radio and public meetings. This resulted in a group claim 163 , but if more people had joined in they could have lodged for more land. There is additional surrounding land that rightfully belongs to natives, but it is difficult to reach everyone and convince them of the importance and the possibilities of a restitution process. Mankge regrets that it was impossible to reach all possible members of the original community, but accepts the fact. “It cannot be expected that you reach everyone and that they are interested in doing this. It is expensive and takes a long time. Many think that it will not be worth the effort.”
government’s success in negotiating the 1900 Buganda Agreement led to decades of economic growth and peace with the Buganda kingdom (the Central Region). With this stability, the British government was able to expand its control over neighboring kingdoms and people, and the Buganda kingdom was able bring order to an administration that had experienced 20 years of political discord and civil war. This chapter explores land law under three regimes, asking “when do land rights create functional institutions?” I found that land institutions can succeed when land laws reflect the interests of salient political stakeholders. In each of the cases that I study in this chapter – the Busuulu and Envujju Law of 1928, the 1969 Common Man’s Charter, and the 1975 LandReform Decree – land law was created without a deliberative democratic process. Even without a democratic process, land law can still be successful if the actors give their support and have their interests represented. In the 1920s, the British colonial government drew support of the Buganda kingdom and landless farmers and was successful whereas the Obote and Amin administrations failed. This key difference explains land law success in historical Uganda. Each of these laws was designed to create or alter existing land laws and the relationship between farmers, land owners, and the government. The laws that succeed promoted
The government supports partnerships between beneficiaries and other parties as one of the strategies aimed at making the objectives of landreform realisable. Such initiatives have taken the form of voluntary partnership and other proposals where a farmer and farm workers agree on some form of joint ownership and utilisation of land as well as the division of proceeds arising therefrom. Indeed, project proposals of this nature are now a common experience within the DLA. A coherent DLA policy on how to go about harnessing and supporting such initiatives is, however, needed.
Lack of adequate financing for landreform has often limited otherwise possible landreform efforts. In particular, providing adequate compensation for the taking of privately owned land may reduce landowner opposition and help legitimize reform for significant sectors of public opinion, thereby substantially reducing the amount of grassroots pressure or central-authority determination otherwise necessary to accomplish a given degree of reform. The feasibility of this “carrot” has been reduced in recent years, however, by substantial increases in the value of privately owned land in many countries, especially in settings where there is high population pressure on land. This has reduced the quantity of land that can be acquired with a given amount of financing. As a result, new and imaginative approaches to landreform design that take into account how much land must be distributed to provide essential benefits to most of the needy group must be considered. These implications are discussed in Section VI.