A Clarifying Step Back: A More Distant Vantage Point

In this section, I take a step back to examine the discussion, and outline some critical aspects of its general characteristics. In section 6.5.1, I introduce two perspectives within the field to how we should think about our varied, seemingly incompatible attempts to account for the epistemic condition: it may not be that there is only one epistemic condition, as has been implicitly assumed thus far, but many. In section 6.5.2, I illustrate how this implicates that the pragmatic view is distinct from many of the prevailingly descriptive views examined, via its distinctly normative nature.

6.5.1 Different types of moral responsibility?

The searchlight view, Sher’s FEC, Zimmerman’s qualified searchlight view, Smith’s attributionism, the pragmatic view, and other positions seem to be prima facie well comparable and appraisable against one another. However, as for example Talbert (2011), Tognazzini (2010), and Zimmerman (2009, 2017) have noted, there may be several different modes or forms or types of moral responsibility or evaluability in play between different accounts of the epistemic condition, meaning that there might be a lot of talking past one another going on. Notice that already the distinction between responsibility as accountability on the one hand, and attributability on the other, reveal two types of responsibility (sect. 2.2; Talbert 2016, 48–49).

Specifically, Talbert (2011, 151) sees that there are likely to be degrees of responsibility and different forms of responsibility that are not properly noted. Specifically, for example, if Alessandra deliberately neglected Sheba or adjusted her actions in ways that implied her not caring about Sheba, the degree of responsibility that she would or should face would likely be altered from her merely forgetting about Sheba due to a cognitive glitch (assuming responsibility would play any role in the latter case). Further, it seems that the case of Alessandra overall is very different from someone like amerika (the bank robber in the example case Bad Weather; see sections 3.3.2 & 6.1.1.3): Alessandra is deprived of awareness of all considerations about her wrongdoing, whereas amerika seems to have considered his actions a lot but has concluded them to be morally justified. Thus, there seems to be nuances of degree and form that are not considered when responsibility is understood as a single phenomenon.

Further, Tognazzini (2010) notes that responsibility may, to some significant degree, be context dependent in the sense that the consequences we are pondering for the target agent may change our judgments. In other words, what would it entail for us to hold Alessandra or Bob or Jack morally

responsible? Does our friendship hang on the line? Us publicly shaming them? Us not liking their status updates on social media? Or us banning them from some platform or service? All these things, and other consequences we might be pondering, may each entail different forms of responsibility, also implicating different processes of evaluation and different epistemic conditions.

As touched on section 5.1.3, Zimmerman (2009, 258–261) echoes the concern of different forms of responsibility, by referring to the possible differences between his “appraisability” and Scanlon and Smith’s “attributability” (or “answerability”). Furthermore, much like Tognazzini and Talbert, Zimmerman (2017, 229–230) argues that the way agents are responsible vary a lot depending on their situation, even though most philosophers tend to focus only on the question of whether an agent is (in some general way) responsible. In other words, Zimmerman sees there to be varieties of praise- and blameworthiness. For example, given that Alessandra would be held responsible, it would be contingent on further situational factors of whether that (form of) responsibility entails, for example, the evaluator resenting, reproaching, berating, shunning, or punishing Alessandra.

I would add that the evaluation of the target agent also depends on the state of mind of the agents who perform the evaluation. They too are likely to be affected by situational circumstances in their own life; for example, have they happened to have been frustrated recently by someone who Alessandra reminds them of, did they just get a puppy and thus currently feel greater empathy towards dogs than they otherwise would, or did they not have their breakfast and are thus more prone to get agitated, and so on. They may even be affected by the colors or smell in the room they are performing the evaluation in (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz 2011; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom 2012a; see also Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt 2012b).¹⁹³ Furthermore, they are likely to be affected whether the evaluation is performed amidst the negative affordances of in-group-influenced social media versus one-on-one face-to-face encounter or something in between (sect. 1.1 & 1.2; Crockett 2017a; Schroeder et al.

2017). Further, they are affected by their situationally varying motives (Ditto et al. 2009).

Given these kinds of considerations, it has been suggested that one conception of the epistemic condition could, in some sense, still be the right one (Levy 2005; A. M. Smith 2012). However, the more popular view appears to be that different conceptions capture different aspects of our practices concerning responsibility and there are thus various epistemic conditions applying only to specific types of responsibility. (Rudy-Hiller 2018, ch. 4; see also sect. 5.4.)

6.5.2 The pragmatic view as a predominantly normative view

Following this line of stepping back and looking at the arena of discourse from a more distant vantage point, there seems to be three approaches to how the pragmatic view – or any account of the epistemic condition – could roughly be thought about. Namely, it may be thought as (1) one descriptive account of an epistemic condition among others, all more or less equally valid but concerning different types of responsibility or evaluability; or as (2) the one descriptive account of the epistemic condition, superior to all other accounts; or as (3) a normative account on top of any descriptive account(s) we would like to give. By now, it seems quite clear what variety we are dealing with: the very variety we set our eyes on since the pragmatic turn in section 6.1.3.1.¹⁹⁴

If thought of as (1), the pragmatic view may seem to fit together with some of the accounts examined but not with others, as illustrated in section 6.4.3.3. Alas, this approach of thinking about the pragmatic view would seem misguided, as the majority intuitions do not seem to match with it.

Also, the view’s primary purpose, in the first place, is to demonstrate its fit with our moral goals (especially compared to Sher’s FEC). For the same reasons, it seems even more misguided to think of it as (2). Thus, it seems best to think about the pragmatic view as (3); as a normative account that can be taken to be agnostic about any descriptive accounts, even though it does appear to match the intuitions of some minority (see sect. 6.1).

At the same time, the pragmatic view can coincidentally fit together with some descriptive accounts that may be seen to, perhaps unwittingly, follow a normatively praiseworthy account of the epistemic condition, at least in the case of Bob and Jack (see previous sect. 6.4.3.3). Yet, it also fits together with descriptive accounts that are not normatively praiseworthy – e.g., Sher’s FEC – in the sense that it remains agnostic of what account(s) best describe people’s intuitions. Of course, it can also fit together with other normative or mixed views (Zimmerman’s view might be described to at least have significant normative implications; sect. 5.4.3; 6.4.3.3n190), or it can conflict with some.

Furthermore, it is not ruled out that the pragmatic view could not become more descriptively widespread in time, given that our intuitions are malleable to some required degree (see sect. 6.4.3.1).

Noting that some minority intuitions would appear to fit together with the pragmatic view – even though partly shaped via pragmatic respect for evidence – it would appear that it is not beyond the capabilities of human intuition, given a certain kind of individual history. It should be noted that the pragmatic view does not deny there might still be degrees and types (etc.) of responsibility, it just points towards what ought to be minimally required for us to evaluate someone as morally responsible if we want to take our moral goals seriously.