This is something quite original in chess literature, and needs a preface. I have called it "Playing by System," and by "system" I do not mean a system of strategy like that of Nimzovich (which I have already summarized), but a system of thinking to be applied at every move-a sort of chess Pelmanism. A new system of chess strategy (like that of Nimzovich) would not be listened to unless it came from a great master of the game, but the value of a system of thinking can, I think, be demonstrated merely by an appeal to common sense. The amazing thing is that nothing of the sort has ever been put forward before. J ames Mason catches a glimpse of a rudimentary system of thinking in his Art of
Chess, p. 355. He says:
Chiefly in avoidance of oversights, question yourself, move by move, some what as follows: 1. Object, what? or what does he threaten? 2. Can I let him do it (if anything), or must I stop his little game?
3. What will be the position (generally) immediately [after] I have made this move? In other words, can he take any thing not intended by me, or in a manner not intended; can he check, menace an unsupported force or important uncom manded point; or can he make any move surprising me in any of these respects? These are leading questions, put in a mo ment, and upon the completeness of the answers to them the precision of your play will depend.
This is only a glimpse, nevertheless. Most chess players arrive at their moves by a series of clumsy jumps rather than by following a chain of reasoning. It is quite otherwise, for instance, with the chemist analyzing an unknown salt. He has definite tests laid down for him to apply to any and all salts, and a definite order in which to perform them. He, too, will make jumps sometimes, because his experience tells him
that certain tests will be useless, but he always follows the set system as a guide. That system has been designed to give the maximum saving of time and energy and the minimum of error. Why should some thing approaching this not be possible in chess?
The system I am going to put forward consists of a more or less elaborate series of questions which one is to ask oneself. It does not follow that the mere asking of these questions produces the correct an swers, but it makes the correct answers more likely than if the questions are not asked at all. It does not enable one to avoid errors due to an insufficient or faulty knowl edge of chess, but it enables one to play with the maximum strength that is possible for one with that insufficient or faulty knowl edge-that is, it should enable one always to play at one's best! It is only fair to confess that I myself have never had the patience to apply the complete system consistently, al though I have sometimes drawn up a list of the mistakes I have made during a tourna ment, and have proved every time defi nitely-to my own satisfaction-that the "sys tem" would have saved me from more than
half of them!
When Not To Use the System
Part of the system is to know when not to use it. When one is following book moves in the opening, or when there is obviously only one good move, there is clearly no need for the system.
If, however, there is a very obvious move, we should ask ourselves, before play ing it:
Question 1: Have I anything better, or can I with advantage make any other move first?
An example to show the desirability of this: 1. e4 Nf6 2. NcJ d5 3. exd5 Nxd5 4. Bc4 Nxc3?Here the average player would auto matically retake the �' but if he always forced himself to ask the question above, he would have a chance of seeing that 5. Q/3! should be played first. This forces 5 ... e6 and makes it hard for Black to develop his light-squared A. lf at once 5. bxc3,then 5 ...
e5!
Though no single move may be obvi ously best, the choice may be obviously limited to two or three moves between which it is quite easy to decide, and here again there is no need for the system; only make quite sure that the choice is as limited as it appears!
But suppose, as happens nearly always, that the choice is not obviously limited to two or three moves, or that if it is so limited, it is nevertheless not easy to decide between them. Then we begin applying the system.
First comes the reconnaissance. The Reconnaissance
In warfare, the first step is always the reconnaissance or survey. No move of any sort is considered before that. So it should be in chess. We should not allow ourselves to go tracing out the consequences of any move that may strike our fancy until a reconnaissance or general survey has been
carried out.
Its advantages are as follows:
( 1) It gives a general valuation of the position as a whole. It is tremendously im portant to know if one has the superior or the inferior game, and by how much, and also precisely in what the superiority or inferiority lies. It is otherwise impossible to make correct plans or to avoid blunders. To take the most obvious instance, the mo ment one is at a disadvantage one should cease to play for a win, and should seek a draw, unless circumstances compel other wise; but how can one perceive when that moment has arrived without examining the position as a whole at every move?
(2) It facilitates the calculation and analysis which is to follow, and prevents "chess blindness." For after a proper recon naissance you already know what squares each piece commands, so that their possible moves are, as it were, already at the back of your mind, and do not have to be sought so laboriously.
(3) It has a special psychological value in enabling one to avoid "chess hypno tism." It is dangerously easy to fall in love with some move which has struck the fancy, so that it becomes harder and harder to refrain from playing it, even in the face of clearly indicated objections; a preliminary general valuation of the position helps one to see things clearly and see them whole, and so remain sane.
A still more frequent error is to be come so intent on a certain plan formed some moves back that one overlooks a fresh opportunity which has arisen through an alteration in the position. The position changes at every move; hence, a plan should be revised at every move. If one keeps revaluing the position at every move, one can tell when the moment has arrived to alter a plan.
Blanco, in Question 3. What Are His Threats?
Practically every player in the world, however unmethodical, follows a set sys tem at one point in his thinking at every move; as soon as his opponent has made his move, he immediately looks for any threats it may contain. The question to oneself should be put in the form:
Question 2: Mat are his threats? Certainly not, "What is his threat?" How often does a player, having found a threat, forget to look for others! That, of course, may lead to fatal blunders. Mason puts the question in the form "What does he threaten?" This again does not emphasize sufficiently the dangerous possibility of there being more than one threat. The universal custom of putting this question first is a good one. This may seem to contradict the previous statement that the general recon naissance should come before any particu lar moves are considered. But we meant particular moves on our own part. The search for threats is itself part of the recon naissance. It is not, theoretically, the first part, but in practical play most of the recon naissance has already been carried out at previous moves (see later), and perhaps partly during the time one's opponent has been considering his move. And the ques tion "What are his threats?" may enable one to see at once that the choice of moves is very limited, and so save the bother of applying the system at all.
On the other hand, it may not. It may be very difficult to decide if a certain appar ent threat is a real threat, i.e., if its execution would actually harm us, and to solve this problem much calculation may be neces sary. This should not be embarked on till the reconnaissance has been carried fur ther. Again, on finding a threat one should not at once set about searching for ways of
parrying it. Where there is any difficulty whatever about seeing the best move, this problem should also be postponed until one has valued the position as a whole. You may then find that the threat or threats can be ignored. A weak player, on seeing a threat, seeks automatically for a defense against it, while a strong player seeks auto matically for a way of ignoring it, i.e., he looks first to see if he can afford to allow the execution of the threat and continue with his own designs.
How To Treat a Threat
One of the most difficult problems I have found in evolving the system is how to treat threats. Till recently, my idea was that one should first ask "Is the threat real?" and answer this by seeking to discover what would result on its execution. This, how ever, involves a waste of thought, for even if the threat is real, there may be some attack ing move on the board for you which will make it unreal, and you are taking no ac count of this.
The following illustration shows how Capablanca made this mistake in his game with Bogoljubov at Carlsbad, 1929. The moves (Capablanca played White) were: 1.
d4 Nf6 2. c4 g6 3. g3 Bg7 4. Bg2 0-0 5. e4 d6 6. Ne2 Nbd7 7. 0-0 e5 8. d5 Nc5?
Before making his last move, Bogol jubov should have adopted the precaution
usual in similar positions of playing 8 ... aS! to prevent the 4J being displaced by b4, but
in this case he thought he could transpose the moves because of the threat to the e- ft . Capablanca thought the same, and so defended the e- ft by 9. Nbc3? and Bogo immediately established his 4J by 9 ... aS. Cap a had missed a splendid opportunity, as was pointed out by Znosko-Borovsky, who contributed a list of Carlsbad "howlers" to L'Echiquier. Capa should have played 9. b4, for if then 9 ... Ncxe4 White wins the piece by 10. f3, so that Black would have had to retire his 4) to d 7 with probable fatal loss of time. What would be the best process of reasoning for the discovery of this? The question "Is the threat ( . . . Nxe4) real?" would be useless, for in the position as it stands the threat is very real; it is only the move b4 which, by preventing the 4J's retreat to cS after capturing the ft , makes the threat unreal. I therefore believe that the proper treatment is:
Imagine the threat could not possibly be executed. Then what would be my best move? Try out each candidate separately: imagine the position as it would be after this move, and then and only then work out whether the opponent would gain by carry ing out the threat.
Making the Reconnaissance
How is the reconnaissance to be car ried out? In what follows we assume, for convenience, that the student is confronted with a position that is altogether new and unfamiliar to him. In an actual game this is not so, for each position is usually identical in most of its characteristics with the one preceding. Therefore, it is usually not nec essary to go through the whole process afresh, but only to ask:
Question 3: How has that move changed the position ?
This general question comes after the more particular question "What are his threats?"
Example (Capablanca-Blanco, Ha vana, 1913): 1. e4 e6 2. d4 d5 3. Nc3 dxe4 4. Nxe4 Nd7 5. Nf3 Ngf6 6. Nxf6t Nxf6 7. Ne5 Bd6 8. Qf3 c6? 9. c3 0-0 10. Bg5 Be7 11. Bd3 Ne8 12. Qh3! White pursues his attack on the black ra;;. Here Black played
12 ... £5.
Now the average player, with White, would be likely to seek for some way of continuing his attack on the ra;;, merely because that is the plan he has been follow ing, and the chances are that by patient search he would find a way, and duly lose the game. If, however, he asked himself the question above, he would realize, more or less clearly according to his strength, that Black's last move has completely changed the position, that the attack on the ra;; is over, but that a new weakness has arisen in the backward e- ft , and that the attack must now be concentrated on that instead. Capa now exchanged As, castled (0-0), doubled his )"is on the e-file, and played c4 and d5, and very soon he was wiping Blanco on his shoes.
A complete reconnaissance, however, must be carried out quite frequently. The first one should be made, of course, in the opening as soon as known paths are left. Again, at any stage of the game, a series of two or three forced moves, or even a single exchange of pieces, may so change the posi tion that a complete revaluation becomes necessary.
Let us assume that Questions 1, 2, and 3 have proved inadequate, and that a com plete new reconnaissance is to be made.
1. Material
First, we count up the material. This is very easy, and it is the first thing that any player does when confronted with a new position.
Besides the mere counting, however, one should take special note under this
heading, "Material," of two things: (1) minor pieces; and (2) ft majorities.
To elaborate this: One should note any of the various possible combinations of mi nor pieces:
(a) two As+4J vs. two 4Js+ A; (b) two As versus A +4:); (c) two As versus two 4:)s; (d) A versus 4:); and (e) As on opposite colors.
If (a) or (b) obtains, for instance, one always has to consider the possibility of one of the two 4Js exchanging itself for a A and so producing As on opposite colors, which combination has powerful drawing tenden cies in the endgame. Also, one should see how the value of each minor piece is af fected by the ft formation. E.g., in blocked positions the 4J is usually the superior piece; if there are a great many fts on dark squares, a dark-squared A is usually too immobile to be of much use; while on a fairly open board, especially if the fts are numerically unequal on one or both wings (so that a passed ft can be forced by one party or both), a A is usually much superior to a 4:), both in the middle- and endgame.
And as to ft majorities: "The majority of fts on the 'l!¥-side" is a familiar parrot cry, but few players know just when and why it is a real advantage. It is of no advan tage unless both �s are castled on the �-side. If both are castled on the i!¥-side, the majority on the �-side is an advantage. There are two reasons:
(1) A majority in front of a castled � cannot advance before the endgame with out exposing the �' so that the player with the majority on the other wing gets a big start with his passed ft ; in fact, his oppo nent is debarred from getting one unless and until the endgame arrives.
(2) And when the endgame does ar rive, our � is all ready to stop the enemy passed ft , while the enemy � is on the wrong side to stop ours (the � is much better at stopping fts than helping them on, for the latter duty forces him to move a long way, and he is so painfully slow).
If the �s are castled on opposite wings, each � is similarly placed as regards his own and his opponent's majority, so it is not in itself an advantage to have the majority on one wing or the other.
Of course, a majority on either of the two wings is always an advantage if the opponent has not a majority on the other. This can occur even with equal fts, e.g., in the exchange variation of the Ruy Lopez after 7. e4 e5 2. NJ3 Nc6 3. Bb5 a6 4. Bxc6 dxc6. Black has four fts to three on the i{y-side, but has not a majority because he can never get a passed ft . This is because he has no ft on a file not occupied by an enemy ft . Black can, however, force a passed ft with a formation like that result ing, also in the Ruy Lopez, after 3 ••• d6 4.
Bxc6t bxc6 5. d4 exd4 6. Nxd4. This is because, in spite of his doubled fts, he has one ft (here, the d- ft) on a file unoccupied by an enemy ft , and in a ft ending this can be forced through, though not as easily as with all four fts united.
Having finished with material, the sec ond thing to consider in the reconnaissance is . . .
2. The King Positions
The conclusion to be drawn from the mere counting of material may have to be considerably modified because of the ex posed position of one of the �s. An ex posed � may be worth a piece to the other side, and so throw into insignificance such weaknesses as isolated fts, which otherwise loom large.
one of the fts in front of it has been moved, more particularly the b/g-ft or a/h- ft , as it then invites exposure by a pawnstorm.
There is another way a r:; can die besides by exposure, and that is by the reverse ill of suffocation-that is, when he is castled and so hemmed in by his own sup porters that he falls victim to a sacrificial mating net.
3. Weaknesses and Strengths Thirdly, we make a mental list of all the weaknesses and strengths of each side. Of course, one might include both under the heading of weaknesses, for a strength to one side is a weakness to the other; but a 4J, say, entrenched at d6/d3, or �s on the seventh/second rank, and so forth, are much more conveniently considered as strengths to the possessor than as enemy weaknesses. The term "strength" is unusual, but it is the only way to avoid a circumlocution, the word "disadvantage" having drawbacks.
Briefly, the various kinds of weak nesses are, in general:
(1) weak fts (isolated, backward, doubled, or even merely unprotected, as a tempo may be gained by attacking them in this case, even though they may be able to move into safety) ;
(2) weak points or "holes," i.e., squares on one's own side of the board which can not be protected by fts, and which are open to occupation by an enemy piece;
(3) confined pieces;
(4) a generally cramped game. Strengths are:
(1) larger terrain (more than half the board for one's pieces);
(2) greater elasticity or freedom of movement;
(3) well-posted pieces (commanding