Absent Elements

From an analytical standpoint, what is just as important as what the RRG’s de-radicalization program addresses is what it does not address. It should be apparent from consideration of Figure 9 that there are elements that the RRG program does not address in its efforts. The remainder of this chapter examines the program’s limitations with respect to these absent elements.

-In-group vs. out-group

Figure 9. Trust and Influence vs. Ideological Dimensions in the RRG Program

First, because the RRG was born from the asatizah’s sense of duty in volunteering to counsel the detainees because of their misconceptions of Islam (Hussain, 2007a, pp.

175-176), the program is fairly narrow in scope. The detainees are engaged only in ways that lead to the series of decision points as depicted in the nested games earlier in this

chapter. This means that the specific nature of the program, focusing as it does on moving detainees’ beliefs back into the boundaries of the Muslim mainstream, tends not to address many of the elements that were identified in Chapter III. For example, notice in Figure 9 that no personality traits/personal enablers of trust are considered by the program. Elements in this area that intersect with the affective dimension of the ideology would include many of the psychological traits identified in Singapore’s 2003 “White paper,” including the need for a “no fuss” path to heaven, a concrete/objective personality, high measures of guilt and loneliness, and highly compliant personalities.

Addressing these elements, which contribute to the emotional and personal attraction of the ideology (especially in the Singapore case), could potentially directly affect the individual’s buy-in of the ideology. Instead, the use of reinterpretation of Islam as the primary issue may address these items indirectly, such as leveraging the ustaz’s eventual credibility to guide a compliant personality. Many of these same elements may also be seen in this row’s intersection with the ideology’s evaluative dimension; in addition to constituting an emotional attraction to the ideology, items such as a concrete/objective or a highly compliant personality make individual’s willing to carry out actions in judgment of the out-group. Simply isolating detainees from the close-knit reinforcement of the in-group without attacking the rationale of the underlying ideas may be enough to mitigate these violent judgments in some cases. Again, the RRG’s program may address these in an indirect fashion, but primarily addresses the issue of religion.

One additional area that is not addressed is the absolute loyalty/oath taking element as it is applied to the evaluative dimension. This element is a factor in both the Trust in Relationships and Legitimate Power areas as the loyalty to the cell leader or the JI Amir, in the vein of discipleship, creates an unquestioned adherence to the judgments levied by the group’s ideology. Again, because the primary concern of addressing the ideas held in the ideology narrows the scope of the interventions, the possibility of discrediting JI leaders is not directly undertaken.

Finally, there is one process related to the absolute loyalty element that is not present in the RRG’s program: the influence of other detainees’ actions on individual decisions to reform. A central maxim of this program is that detainees are not allowed to

communicate with each other (or anyone outside of their families, the ustaz counselor, or security service personnel). If we add a specific assumption that detainees of similar status are allowed to communicate with each other as their decision sequences progress and that one of the detainees values the reform option highly, a new dynamic is added to the scenario’s context. The reinforcing nature of the in-group’s “attraction” has the potential to leverage tendencies for maintenance of the group identity by securing conformity (French & Raven, 1959, p. 163).

This can be shown in game theory in a multiple-player contest where a possible coalition between two detainees of similar status changes payoffs. Of course, if both detainees are fully opposed to cooperating with the counselors then, if allowed to communicate, they will simply form a coalition with each other to strengthen their opposition. If, however, a credible member of the in-group (Detainee 1) decides to prefer receptivity to reform then the dynamics change. The following game (Figure 10) shows the new player, Detainee 2, who is assumed to be skeptical about reform; his preferences are shown by the third numeral (note that even though the game is presented in two matrices it still represents one contest).

Detainee 2 option E. Interested but not Convinced Detainee 1

C. Receptive D. Not Receptive

4,4,3 3,2,4 2,3,2 1,1,1

A. Attempt Reform

Ustaz

B. Don’t Attempt Reform

Detainee 2 option F. Not Receptive Detainee 1

C. Receptive D. Not Receptive

4,4,1 3,2,3 2,3,2 1,1,4

A. Attempt Reform

Ustaz

B. Don’t Attempt Reform

Figure 10. Three-Person Coalition Game

Detainee 2’s option E. Interested but not Convinced presents a scenario where he may be slightly open to rehabilitation, especially given Detainee 1’s choices, but still values retaining the ideology above all. Detainee 2 basically has two choices given the entering assumptions: play alone or form a coalition with Detainee 1. Of interest is what Detainee 2 could expect in an overall payoff in this game if he decides to form a coalition with Detainee 1 to maintain the group identity. Finding this payoff value entails finding Detainee 2’s security level, or the worst payoff that he could get when going it alone while Detainee 1 and the ustaz cooperate. His security level in this example is 2. Given the assumption that the counselor and Detainee 1 play option AC, Detainee 2’s option E gives him the highest possible payoff (over option ACF) and beats his security level, making his reform more likely.

Execution of this strategy would require letting detainees communicate among themselves. For this reason alone, such a strategy is, of course, not likely in the RRG’s case. The sensitivity of the RRG program’s goals in establishing credibility in the ustaz along with potential skepticism in the Muslim community limits the engagement strategy to a one-on-one affair that is not open to other detainees’ participation. While the possibility of using peer detainees or those who have already reformed to help in the RRG’s work is evident to the asatizah, the central belief remains that reformed detainees’

top requirement is to “readjust and reintegrate” into society “without being in the spotlight” (Y. Ibrahim, as reported in Hussain, 2007b, p. 188).