Acceleration Phase: October – November, 2002

Media Coverage: The high number of foreign casualties ensured continuing international media attention which was further enhanced by outlets keen to show the best of an abundance of supplied amateur visual footage and photographs of the bombings. In addition to the sustained blanket coverage in the immediate aftermath, the new wave of images and explanatory stories helped build the collective fear of terrorism which, among others, was blamed for unbalanced and sensationalist media reporting (Gurtner, 2006). Emerging clearly from the chaos was that terror had struck

―Indonesia‘s tourist jewel‖ (Guardian Unlimited, 2002b) and a ―tourism Mecca‖ had been ―shaken to foundations‖ (AFP, 2002b). The international media attention and widespread concern about personal safety and security resulted in reports of a mass exodus of tourists, with countries‘ moves to evacuate their citizens creating a visible flood of people off the island (Gurtner, 2006). Widespread cancellations and holiday substitutions promptly resulted.

179 Australian media played a prominent role in the immediate aftermath with news coverage easier and cheaper to arrange due to Indonesia‘s geographic proximity. In many instances, Australian stories were picked up by international affiliates. The initial media coverage focused on Australian efforts to protect its injured citizens, with the first aircraft carrying medical personnel taking to the air within six hours of the blasts – half the normal time for a military medical evacuation – and all critically injured patients moved to Australia within 48 hours.

Tourism Response: Although the media focus on Bali rapidly took on a more political flavour, it was nonetheless forewarning of severe impacts that would affect the tourism industry, not only in Bali but also internationally. Many countries issued travel advisories in the aftermath of the bombings although they generally lacked sufficient detail, failing to define the actual extent of the situation and any specific risks to personal safety (Gurtner, 2006). Reports out of London two days after the attacks labelled the event as a ―Devastating blow to Bali tourism‖ (CNN, 2002e), with predictions of thousands of Europeans, Australians and Americans cancelling upcoming trips. For British travellers, the UK Foreign Office issued a prompt advisory not to travel to Bali. Media indicated British tour operators were heeding the advice and it was expected that tour operations in Bali would be scaled down immediately. Initial reports out of Europe indicated a tourism industry uncertain what the full impact of the bombings would be. Its biggest travel group, Touristik International GmbH & Co [TUI]

of Germany, decided not to send any clients to Bali as a precautionary measure, preferring to wait for foreign ministry guidance (CNN, 2002e).

180 The tourism industry was relieved that the bombings didn‘t involve aircraft, drawing parallels with the September 11 attacks (Hotelier, 2003). Inevitably though, the attacks did lead to an immediate backlash against the commercial airline sector for both inbound and outbound movements through Bali. Although airlines cut back services to Bali and Indonesia, they responded by promoting alternative destinations throughout the Asia-Pacific region such as Thailand, Vietnam, Fiji and the Maldives. The island, and Indonesia, knew the importance of tourism and were therefore in no doubt the ramifications of the bombings would hurt business. Internationally, the same conclusions were drawn – Bali‘s reputation as a safe destination had been shattered and the tourism industry anticipated it could take years to recover (CNN, 2002e).

Despite criticism levelled at the Indonesian Government over its handling of the crisis, the support of local authorities for the destination‘s restoration was commended. Bali‘s politicians and opinion leaders ―appreciated the potential volatility of the situation and called for restraint using all available media and Bali‘s network of village councils and urban wards‖ (Hitchcock & Putra, 2005 p.62). Leaders of the Muslim community closed ranks in their condemnation of the bombings, and the prominent local newspaper, the Bali Post, took care to avoid apportioning blame, aware that further conflict could prolong recovery time for tourism. The growing sentiment was that local stakeholders should control the recovery efforts and as Bali‘s sadness was articulated through newspapers and other local media, the voice of Bali began to be heard.

The Balinese adopted cultural and religious strategies to promote harmony and these rituals – comprehended or otherwise – were widely publicised in the international

181 media: reports told of ―ghosts and gods coming calling out of the darkness‖ (Hewett, 2002). References to the bombings peppered cultural shows and events as the use of culture as a weapon to counter the crisis was implemented with ―Bring Back My Bali To Me‖, a popular song in previous decades, played almost continuously on television and radio. Indonesia was being seen to ―weep for its neighbour‖… and an ―uncertain future‖ (Moore, 2002a). Pleas were circulated through the media for the world to recognise that the ―Balinese are innocent‖ (Stevenson & O‘Rourke, 2002). The reactions of the Bali people were reported extensively by local and international media, especially images of plentiful ritual ceremonies to chase away the bad spirits, to prevent evil spirits lashing out again, to rid streets of danger and to cleanse the ground on which people were killed. This coverage presented a reminder to the world of the Balinese culture that was a core attraction for visitors.

The ―Bali model of crisis management – a widespread desire for peace, joint prayers, media restraint and the vocal involvement of opinion leaders‖ – was believed to be having an impact (Hitchcock & Putra, 2005, p.75). However to many, the government and the tourism industry appeared to operate largely as separate entities (Gurtner, 2006).

Numerous websites, slogans, promotional trips and re-branding efforts were initiated by tourism businesses yet most only served to facilitate competitive discounting and lead to greater consumer ambiguity. Rates for accommodation options varied across the industry but were on average 50 percent less than standard rates and at times up to 80 percent down (Indo.com, 2002b). The Baliguide, which promotes itself as a one-stop-shop of information for foreigners, was carrying no terror status report one month on from the bombings, although a news link was provided. As did other sites, Baliguide

182 made a special feature of Bali as a family-friendly destination. Strong travel warnings issued by foreign governments, many of whom had significantly softened their stances by mid-November, were starting to take effect as the number of packaged tours fell. The Indonesian Government and local tourism associations responded to the crisis with a variety of short term measures focused on boosting the domestic market coupled with long term strategies planned to rebalance the economy to be less dependent on unsustainable mass tourism (Entus, 2002). But, the road to recovery remained plagued by the effect of travel advisories.