Achievements and failures of the SSE program under the democratically elected regime 1999–

The achievements of the SSE program under the democratic dispensation era (1999–2004) have not been evaluated by any scholar as at the conclusion of this study. But given the trend of unemployment rates in 2002 which were still high for tertiary graduates in Lagos (24.9%) and the Port Harcourt (23%) areas (MIS 2003), when in fact the overall national rates were slightly declining (CIA 2007), the achievements of the SSE program under the democratically elected regime might not be substantially different from the military dictatorship era. This is particularly so going by the data presented in Table 2.5 that shows agreement with the data reflected in Tables 2.3–2.4. From Table 2.5 there were only *370,000 unemployed tertiary graduates who had trained in the two main schemes (EDP and SYOB) of the SSE program between 1999 and 2004 (NDE 2000; 2001), thus it is indicative that the number of unemployed tertiary graduates interested in these schemes was either declining or exhibiting a backward slide. For instance, there were only 46,850 unemployed graduates who trained in both of the two phases (EDP and SYOB) of the SSE program in 2001 with the exception of the newly-introduced Stabilised Soil Bricks (SSB) project. This suggests a sharp decline of interest on the part of the target group over the SSE program.

Again, under the period (1999–2004), many of the unemployed graduates completed both the EDP and SYOB training schemes, but the numbers who benefited from the loans scheme of the SSE program were undisclosed in the annual reports of the NDE of 2000 and 2001. This is indicative of the Nigerian psyche of ‘business as usual’ irrespective of who is in power. In other words, nothing changed under the civilian administration. However, of 99 SSB trainees in 2001, all except 25 were supplied with machines and tools in lieu of start-up capital (NDE

Year Poverty level (%) Estimated total

population in millions Population in poverty in millions 1980 28.1 65 17.7 1995 46.3 75 34.7 1992 42.7 91.5 39.2 1996 65.6 102.3 67.1

2001). Despite this development, many studies still report that funds were the greatest constraint to programs of the NDE organisation, including the SSE (CASSAD 1999; Ofong 1990; Ogwumike 2002).

Caution is advised in the interpretation of figures presented in Tables 2.3–2.5 because of the lack of reliable statistical data in Nigeria, a fundamental issue that has been stressed in other studies (Okojie 2003; Ohiorbunan 1986; Obadan and Odusola 2000; Okigbo 1986). According to these authors, there is always a wide disparity between the estimated and actual rates of unemployment in Nigeria due to a variety of factors. They contend that only the open recorded unemployment figures are being published in Nigeria by the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) that keeps records (or supposedly charged to conduct surveys and publish data). Many of the unemployed persons who felt frustrated and disenchanted in finding a job don’t bother to register with the FOS, thereby causing the number of unemployed to be grossly underestimated (Ohiorbunan 1986; Okigbo 1986). Again, the Nigerian Labour Force statistical surveys use such concepts that exclude people who are less than 15 and above 55 years of age but are actively working. This is misleading information to say the least in the sense that it is an important factor in under-estimating the unemployment problem in the country (Okigbo 1986). Okigbo’s (1986) report also believes that the problem becomes compounded by other factors such as government documentation that kept on shifting the retirement age, now fixed at 65 years, plus a large proportion of unpaid family workers that the World Bank classify as unemployed or underemployed as well as persons who are considered incapable of working but who are working or are willing to work, for example, people with disabilities (Okigbo 1986).

Table 2.5 The SSE program performances under the democratic regime 1999–2004

Notation symbols: *Official government source; **Unofficial private research source; *NDE 2000 and 2001 Yearly Reports; **MSI (2003); **Interview guide data.

The foregoing case analysis is a mirror image of other government intervention programs implemented in Nigeria in the 1987–1998 and 1999–2004 periods. This study postulates that a better approach could be found with the Nigerian traditional self-help systems (ROSCAs) when combined and integrated with the GB’s joint liability micro-lending strategy to share and manage risks. By creating many self-help groups that become linked with banks, as in many Asian countries, it is the view of the researcher that more jobs and job opportunities will be created and poverty reduced in Nigeria. Clearly this research explores the similarities and dissimilarities of cultural and contextual factors influencing the operations of the GB programs in Bangladesh and the Nigerian ROSCA system with a view to designing a hybrid model suitable for Nigerian conditions. If effectively harnessed and integrated, the resulting hybrid has the potential to create more employment opportunities than the current pursuit of the NDE with the SSE program. This would mean that the acquired hybrid microfinance, if applied to the defective loans scheme of the SSE program operations, can effectively rectify it

Program Year of set up Type of intervention Number of clients trained between 1999 and 2004, and supported with business start-up loans National unemployment rate1999–2004 SSE of the NDE (quasi- microcredit program) Since 1986 Provision of training, loans, and mentor services *370,000 were estimated to have trained in the EDP from 1999–2001

The overall national rate in 2000 was *4% when in fact that of tertiary graduates was around 24.9% in Lagos State areas alone in 2000.

- - - (i) In 2001, *45,000

tertiary-level graduates were trained in the EDP, out of which *1,850 also trained for the SYOB scheme, but only 12 were given loans to commence business.

(ii) In addition *99 tertiary-level graduates were trained in a new scheme they called, Stabilized Soil Bricks (SBB), and 74 of them were given machinery, tools and accessories in lieu of loans.

National unemployment rate for general population in 2001 was estimated at 3.8%. Data for the graduate unemployment rate in the same year was not available.

to function better.

The GB’s group joint liability lending is an asset that has been used practically in Bangladesh to serve as many as 6.6 million poor entrepreneurs with microcredits, of which 96% are said to be poor women (Acher 2006). Several scholars report that the GB’s group microloan schemes (or joint liability microcredit programs) have a strong repayment performance of around 92–98% (Besley and Coate 1995; Hossain 1988; and Morduch 1999a; Morduch 1999b). The program has also been replicated in several developing economies of Asia, Africa, Middle East, South and Central America (Morduch 2000; Martin 2002), and even in the rich advanced economies of Canada and the USA (Taub 1997 and Conlin 1999). Unlike the GB’s original programs in Bangladesh, substantial novelties have been introduced in the newer generations of the GB’s models in a diversity of countries that now place more emphasis on the ‘savings side’ than on the ‘credit side’ (Morduch 2000; Seibel and Parhusip 1990). These days the clients of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in some countries operating the GB’s improved models of joint liability lending have to first supply some proportions of the loan amount sought before credits begin to be offered (Johnson et al. 2002). The Kenyan ASCA model is a good case in point. The similarities and dissimilarities between the GB and ROSCA systems are explored in the next section.

2.6 Comparing the cultural and contextual influencing factors in Bangladesh and