What type of objectives could the EU and Turkey share in the MENA region? Both sides have declared their support for the rights of the people and
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for democratic values. Yet the EU remains embarrassed by its past record of complicity with authoritarian regimes, while the Turkish model may today be failing in Turkey itself, where the state of some basic freedoms has become a cause for concern. In the economic realm, Turkey appears primarily as a business player, not yet as a donor. It is the issue of regional security that thus presents the most promise in terms of potential common action, particularly in the realms of conflict prevention, by contributing to smooth political transitions and working to prevent violence from degenerating into civil wars.
Each party‟s natural modes of activity can to a certain extent complement the other‟s. The EU has built up a solid institutional frame, while Turkey is more capable of flexible intervention, notably drawing on its exceptional networking capacity. Socializing and mediating remain Turkey‟s major strengths, including with actors such as Iran whose relationships with the EU have progressively deteriorated. In addition, Turkish popularity ratings are still high in the region, while the reputation of some EU member states – notably France – has eroded. Managing reform and institution-building programs over the long run is a strength of the EU, yet Turkey has recently demonstrated a remarkable ability to target aid in a reactive way, as for instance with its support for the organization of elections and training of new (Islamist) Arab elites. When political pressure or military intervention appear as last-resort necessities, the advantage of efficiency seems by contrast to lie more with European states, who may build temporary coalitions with the Turks, as in the Libyan case.
Constraints and principles for joint action
Turkey‟s frustrated EU candidacy casts a long shadow across any attempt at strategic rapprochement. Turkey‟s warning that it might completely freeze its relationship with the EU during the Cypriot EU presidency in the second half of 2012 is not encouraging in that regard. While Turkey views any European demand for joint action in the MENA region as an opportunity to weigh in on the accession process, some European states, notably France, insist on delinking diplomatic cooperation from accession in order to avoid such constant bargaining.
In the future, Turkey‟s effective contribution to the framing of European policies will depend substantially on its capacity to agree on appropriate political directions with leading EU member states. At present, the institutional formalization of EU-Turkey cooperation does not seem realistic. As an example, the currently strained Franco-Turkish relationship has blocked mutual consultation on the Syrian crisis. Confidence-building measures will be necessary if repeated logjams are to be avoided in the future.
While the face-to-face EU-Turkey relationship does not seem very productive today, triangulation with the United States might be a more promising way to foster security cooperation in a larger frame. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, Washington has indeed pushed Turkey to the front line, and has attentively sought to keep its allies working together. The Libyan crisis showed in the summer of 2011 that the EU and Turkey can in fact overcome their divergences and agree on a pattern of joint intervention. Despite tension due to bilateral disagreements between the Turks and several other NATO member states (France, Cyprus), the alliance remains an arena where the Americans can mediate and discipline everyone into dialogue and common action.
Areas and avenues of cooperation
Global exchanges of views concerning the future of the Middle East are certainly needed in order to advance the cause of consistent cooperation, and could act as a confidence-building measure. Yet they remain difficult to organize at the official level. Parallel or second-track diplomacy engineered by civil society organizations and think tanks is very useful in keeping contact active between Turkey and its EU counterparts.
Nonetheless, information sharing and consulting processes at the state level must be maintained at all costs, with or without the mediation of the United States. Ad hoc meetings and conferences, such as those convened to discuss Syria, seem to be the most adequate system for the time being.
Finally, in considering synergies at the level of financial cooperation agencies, pursuing joint activity between the Turkish International Development and Cooperation Agency (TIKA) and Europe‟s DevCo might
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be a practical way to foster political agreement in the longer run. Moreover, humanitarian assistance will definitely be a field where joint action could be plausible in the future, given Turkey‟s geographical location and its specific skills in that field.
References
Pierini, Marc. “Turkey, the EU and the Arab Transition Processes.” Talk at the conference “Turkey and The Arab World: Natural Partners” organized by Ifri, in Brussels, February 14, 2012.
Schmid, Dorothée (ed.). “La Turquie au Moyen-Orient: le retour d‟une puissance régionale?.” Paris: CNRS Editions, 2011.
Soler i Lecha, Eduard. “The EU, Turkey, and the Arab Spring: From Parallel Approaches
to a Joint Strategy?” In Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy
From a Transatlantic Perspective, edited by Nathalie Tocci, Ömer Taşpınar and Henri J. Barkey. Washington, D.C.: GMFUS and IAI, October 2011: 25-35.
Tocci, Nathalie. “Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy in Transatlantic Perspective.” Commentary, Carnegie Endowment, September 12, 2011. Ülgen, Sinan. “How to operationalize foreign policy dialogue between the EU and Turkey.”
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