Acta Apostolicae Sedis , 12 March 1919, 87-100 and 100-101.

foreigners [Protestant missionaries] .152 As Count de Salis’s briefing to the British Foreign Office on the Allocution pointed out, what was remarkable was that the focus of the Pope’s remarks about Palestine was on the question of the Christian Holy Places and who would control them.153 What Pope Benedict had told his Cardinals, at the moment when the full realisation of the breadth of scope of the Zionist project had just become apparent to the Holy See, was that, beyond his concerns for the sufferings of Christians in the former Ottoman empire and especially those of Armenia, he had a deep and overriding concern about the safety and welfare of the Christian Holy Places in Palestine and was concerned that, in the Peace Conferences then taking place in Paris, outcomes should be sought which ensured that those Holy Places remained in Christian hands. Beyond this he wanted to urge the support of the global Catholic community for the Catholic institutions of Palestine, and wanted to counter the growing influence of Protestant missionaries who were taking advantage of the economic and political situation in post-war Palestine to make inroads in that place for their brand of Christianity. There was no mention, in either the Allocution or the Motu Proprio, of the Balfour Declaration, or of Zionism, or of Jewish immigration to Palestine, or of any other matter flowing from the Balfour Declaration such as the impact on the indigenous Palestinian communities. The focus remained on what had been the primary concern of the Holy See for the Holy Land for eight hundred years, the protection of the Christian Holy Places. Zionism had rated not a mention.

The following day Count de Salis reported to the British Foreign Office that “the Vatican raised no question as to the responsibility of His Majesty’s Government for the Sionist proposals and that, while they have not shown themselves uncompromising with regard to Monsieur Sokolow and his views, they are well aware that the movement is under the influence of more extreme tendencies”. De Salis went on to acknowledge that “there is very real anxiety that you are at present considering proposals which will place Zionists in privileged position to [the]

152

2.7.Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 12 March 1919, at 108-109. G.1.3.7. FO 380/24 Telegram No. 34R of 12 March 1919 from Count de Salis to Lord Curzon summarized the contents of the Pope’s Allocution.

153_{G.1.1.3. FO 371/4179 Telegram 34 R of 12 March 1919 from Count de Salis to the British Foreign}

detriment of Christians, while it is feared that your engagements to Baron Sonnino [Italian Foreign Minister at the time] prevent as much as a hearing being given to [the] Vatican case without his consent”.154

Lord Curzon instructed Count de Salis on 12 March 1919 “that you should assure Cardinal Secretary of State that whatever the future of Palestine may be, the Christian Holy Places would have to be permanently safeguarded for Christendom”.155 Count de Salis informed Cardinal Gasparri to this effect on 16 March 1919.156 That the sole overriding concern of the Holy See regarding Palestine at this time was for the security of the Christian Holy Places is strongly suggested by the meeting between Monsignor Cerretti, incoming Apostolic Nuncio to France, with Sir Ronald Graham of the British Foreign Office on 14 March 1919, in which Monsignor Cerretti alluded to the anxiety Pope Benedict felt about the Holy Places,. Cerretti outlined the fact that France was no longer able to be relied upon as Protecting Power, and stated specifically that “the Pope looked rather to His Majesty’s Government than to any other to see that the rights and interests of his Church in the Holy Places were protected”, Sir Ronald Graham noting that “no allusion was made to the Zionists” by Monsignor Cerretti.157 It was only at this precise time that Cardinal Gasparri first raised the matter of the Balfour Declaration with Baron Monti.158

The evidence suggests that the Holy See was now adopting a two-pronged approach to the question of the Holy Land in this volatile period. At the level of the Supreme Pontiff the only issue which would be raised was that of the Christian control of the Holy Places in Palestine, and no direct challenge was to be made to the Zionist project for a Jewish national home in Palestine. However in the background briefing given by the Cardinal Secretary of State for the Holy See to various foreign embassies, Cardinal Gasparri would directly raise the concerns of the Holy See about

154

G.1.1.3. FO 371/4179, telegram from Count de Salis to British Foreign Office of 13/14 March 1919.

155

G.1.3.4. FO 380/21, telegram of 12 March 1919 from Earl Curzon to Count de Salis.

156_{G.1.3.4. FO 380/21, handwritten notation by Count de Salis on telegram of 12 March 1919.} 157

G.1.3.4. FO 380/21, despatch No. 30 (42976/45A) of 14 March 1919 from Mr Gerald Spicer for Lord

Curzon to Count de Salis. This correspondence indicates that the Holy See would pursue the “Roman Question” at the Paris Peace Conference through the good offices of Belgium..

158

some of the aims and intentions of the Zionists in Palestine, for example, telling the Belgian Ambassador to the Holy See on 16 March 1919 that:

The danger we most fear is the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. We would have found nothing wrong in Jews entering the country, and setting up agricultural colonies. But that they be given the rule over the Holy Places is intolerable for Christians. Balfour’s reply to Lord Rothschild unfortunately gives us reason to fear that the British government supports the Zionist claims [and] the Holy See must speak up, because of the rumour that has been spread that it supports the Zionist claims.159

The result of this bifurcated approach by the Holy See, at the end of March of 1919, was that it was seeking to play the longstanding rivalries between France and Italy over protection of Catholic interests in the Middle East against each other in order to counter British policies towards Palestine, the object being to ensure that Zionists not be placed in a privileged position with regard to Palestine, especially with regard to the question of the Christian Holy Places.160 On 21 March 1919 Count de Salis informed the British Foreign Office that Cardinal Gasparri, whilst expressing gratitude for Mr Balfour’s message about “the safeguarding of the Holy Places”, had indicated that the “chief preoccupation of the Vatican is the idea [that] Zionists are to be placed in [a] privileged position as regards Christians” in Palestine, so much so that the Holy See was seeking support from the French and Italian governments for its views.161

A meeting between Cardinal Amette and the French Prime Minister had discussed the possibility of France reasserting its historic claim to a Protectorate over Catholic interests in the former Ottoman territories, and it appears to have suited the

159

Minerbi, 131-132, citing Belgian Ambassador Pierre Van Zuylen letter to Belgian Foreign Minister Hymans of 16 March 1919, No. 57/26 ABRE, St Siege 1919-1920.

160

G.1.3.7. FO 380/24, Telegram No. 38 of 21 March 1919 from Count de Salis to Lord Curzon;

G.1.3.4. FO 380/21 [48530] Despatch No. 311 of 26 March 1919 from Sir George Grahame, British

Minister in Paris, to Earl Curzon.

161_{G.1.2. FO 608/118 Registry No. 4968 Telegram of 21 March from Count de Salis to British Foreign}

Office, Minerbi at 134 indicating that British Foreign Office officials at this time shared Cardinal Gasparri’s concerns about Zionist plans; G.1.3.7. FO 380/24 Telegram No. 38 of 21 March 1919 from Count de Salis to Lord Curzon stating that Cardinal Archbishop Amette of Paris had arrived “in haste” in Rome following a meeting with the French Prime Minister.

negotiating strategy of the Holy See at this time to have the spectre of a French Protectorate lurking in the background as a counter to Britain’s strategy to establish its hold on Palestine and Iraq under League of Nations mandates. Cardinal Gasparri informed Count de Salis on 30 March 1919 that, whilst he thought it would be “absurd” for such a Protectorate to be re-established in competition with the emerging British administration in Palestine, “if [a] protectorate is forced on them they will have to make the best of it”.162

In this meeting Cardinal Gasparri also advised the British Minister to the Holy See of a major approaching change in the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem: “Patriarch [Camassei] who is aged and broken is on his way home and retires probably with a Cardinal’s hat [and] it is possible that [the] Vatican may delay making [an] appointment until they know more of the future regime of Palestine”.163 Count de Salis’s briefing to the British Foreign Office raised the possibility of a British candidate to succeed Monsignor Camassei, the broken and departing Latin Patriarch upon whom Pope Pius X had pinned so many hopes as the “saint for Jerusalem”. The subsequent British machinations for the appointment of a British bishop to the Catholic hierarchy in Palestine would be a recurrent feature of the interaction between the Holy See and the British government for some years to come.

3.14. THE HOLY SEE DEVELOPS ITS OWN RESPONSE TO THE