Held: The Code is a general law and “incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance (Third Whereas Clause, Administrative Code of 1987) and “embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the people.” (Fourth Whereas Clause, Administrative Code of 1987) The Code is divided into seven (7) books. These books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration, i.e., internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision
and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno])
98. What is administrative power?
Held: Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno])
99. What is an administrative order?
Held: An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno])
100. What is the Government of the Republic of the Philippines?
Answer: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of the government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. (Sec. 2[1], Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)
101. What is a government instrumentality? What are included in the term government instrumentality?
Answer: A government instrumentality refers to any agency of the national government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
The term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2[10], Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No.
292)
102. What is a regulatory agency?
Answer: A regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interest of private persons, the principal powers of which are exercised by a collective body, such as a commission, board or council. (Sec. 2[11], Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)
103. What is a chartered institution?
Answer: A chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State. (Section 2[12], Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)
104. When is a government-owned or controlled corporation deemed to be performing proprietary function? When is it deemed to be performing governmental function?
Held: Government-owned or controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been
created. If the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the function is governmental. Powers classified as “proprietary” are those intended for private advantage and benefit. (Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366, 425, Sept. 11, 1998, En Banc [Purisima])
105. Does the petition for annulment of proclamation of a candidate merely involve the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of canvassers and, therefore, justifies non-observance of procedural due process, or does it involve the exercise of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial function?
Held: Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and governmental instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organizations or coalition, accredit citizen's arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent. (Federico S. Sandoval v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
133842, Jan. 26, 2000 [Puno])
106. Discuss the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (or Prior Resort).
Held: Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in character. It applies “where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.”
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Villaflor v. CA, 280 SCRA 287)
107. Discuss the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. Enumerate exceptions thereto.
Held: 1. Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s jurisdiction is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
This doctrine is disregarded:
1) when there is a violation of due process;
2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5) when there is irreparable injury;
6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding;
10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and 11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
(Paat v. CA, 266 SCRA 167 [1997])
2. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders the action premature, i.e., claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court. (Carale v.
Abarintos, 269 SCRA 132)
THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 108. Define Appointment. Discuss its nature.
Held: An “appointment” to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of the appointing authority. In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court (140 SCRA 22), reiterated in Flores v. Drilon (223 SCRA 568), this Court has held:
“The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power x x x.”
(At p. 579)
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral thereof.
(Bermudez v. Torres, 311 SCRA 733, Aug. 4, 1999, 3rd Div. [Vitug])
109. May the Civil Service Commission, or the Supreme Court, validly nullify an appointment on the ground that somebody else is better qualified?
Held: The head of an agency who is the appointing power is the one most knowledgeable to decide who can best perform the functions of the office. Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer vested with such power according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. Indeed, this is a prerogative of the appointing authority which he alone can decide. The choice of an appointee from among those who possess the required qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the service which can best be made by the head of the office concerned, the person most familiar with the organizational structure and environmental circumstances within which the appointee must function.
As long as the appointee is qualified the Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest to and respect the appointment even if it be proved that there are others with superior credentials. The law limits the Commission’s authority only to whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. If they do then the appointments are approved because the Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority. Neither can we. (Rimonte v. CSC, 244 SCRA 504-505, May 29, 1995, En Banc [Bellosillo, J.])
110. Does the “next-in-rank” rule import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the person next-in-rank must be appointed to the vacancy?
Held: The “next-in-rank rule is not absolute; it only applies in cases of promotion, a process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to another position higher either in rank or salary. And even in promotions, it can be disregarded for sound reasons made known to the next-in-rank, as the concept does not import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the person next-in-rank must be appointed to the vacancy. The appointing authority, under the Civil Service Law, is allowed to fill vacancies by promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement, reemployment, and appointment of outsiders who have appropriate civil service eligibility, not necessarily in that order. There is no legal fiat that a vacancy must be filled only by promotion; the appointing authority is given wide discretion to fill a vacancy from among the several alternatives provided by law.
What the Civil Service Law provides is that if a vacancy is filled by promotion, the person holding the position next in rank thereto “shall be considered for promotion.”
In Taduran v. Civil Service Commission (131 SCRA 66 [1984]), the Court construed that phrase to mean that the person next-in-rank “would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified.” In Santiago, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission (178 SCRA 733 [1989]), the Court elaborated the import of the rule in the following manner:
“One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position x x x”
(Abila v. CSC, 198 SCRA 102, June 3, 1991, En Banc [Feliciano])
111. The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter under R.A. No. 95, as amended. Its charter, however, was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges, etc. With the amendment of its charter, has it been “impliedly converted to a private corporation”?
Held: The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The PNRC was not “impliedly converted to a private corporation” simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges, etc. (Camporedondo v. NLRC, G.R. No.
129049, Aug. 6, 1999, 1st Div. [Pardo])
112. What is a primarily confidential position? What is the test to determine whether a position is primarily confidential or not?
Held: A primarily confidential position is one which denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom from intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. (De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 [1950])
Under the proximity rule, the occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion without fear or embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Withal, where the position occupied is more remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. (CSC v. Salas, 274 SCRA 414, June 19, 1997)
113. Does the Civil Service Law contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges?
Held: By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that “the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office” and not included are “cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary” (Paredes v. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84, 85) or “when respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal.”
(Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 965, 968) In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law “does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges” enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission (192 SCRA 84); Mendez v. Civil Service Commission (204 SCRA 965); Magpale v. Civil Service Commission (215 SCRA 398);
Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority (226 SCRA 207) and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission (237 SCRA 184). (CSC v. Pedro O. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999, En Banc [Pardo])
114. What is preventive suspension? Discuss its nature.
Held: Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated. Thus preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of removal from office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No. 807. While the former may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final disposition of the case. (Beja, Sr. v. CA, 207 SCRA 689, March 31, 1992 [Romero])
115. Discuss the kinds of preventive suspension under the Civil Service Law. When may a civil service employee placed under preventive suspension be entitled to compensation?
Held: There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (Sec. 51, Civil Service Law, EO No. 292) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated (Section 47, par. 4, Civil Service Law, EO No. 292).
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period,
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period,