not merely over immigration and Islam but specifically the rising
salience of religiously-inspired terrorism.
Perhaps the primary area of interest has been the interaction between religiously or Islamic State (ISIS)-inspired Islamist extremism, and the more politically motivated extreme right which was the initial area of focus of Eatwell. A few years after the publication of his essay, the English Defence League (EDL), which was formed specifically in response to the perceived threat from local Islamist groups in the town of Luton, Hertfordshire, and appeared to lend credence to call for more attention to this interaction. Shortly afterward, between 2009 and 2012, the EDL inspired a number of similar movements across Europe that claimed to be campaigning specifically on a platform of opposition to the ‘Islamification’ of Western societies, and to the specific threat of religiously-inspired terrorism.
The underlying rationale behind this interest in cumulative extremism is to challenge a policy discussion that until now remained principally focused on examining individual forms of extremism in isolation, for example radical Islamismorright-wing extremism, rather than the two in combination. Though some government policies have been careful to discuss different forms of extremism at the same time, notably the UK government’s ‘Prevent’ agenda, critics have often suggested that the emphasis on the extreme right is more tokenistic than sincere. Academics, meanwhile, have continued to work on Eatwell’s initial proposition that it may yet become just as important to consider extremism in a far more holistic sense and to examine the various dynamics that are operating between and across different groups.
Since the initial discussion some researchers have sought to provide greater rigour to the concept of cumulative extremism. One example is work by Jamie Bartlett and Jon Birdwell who argue that cumulative extremism can be applied to varying degrees and types of relationships that two groups can potentially have with one another. These researchers have also shed light on the nature of possible interactions that policy and security communities may want to monitor. There are three interactions that are of interest - mutual radicalisation,recruitment and, at the more extreme end of the spectrum, a spiral of violence.
Considering the first type of interaction, it is often assumed that the relationship between religiously-inspired extremism and political extremism is one-dimensional, namely the political extreme right responding to the perceived threat of the ‘Islamification’ of European societies, or to the actions of a violent Islamist group. Yet as Bartlett and Birdwell note, there is actually very little work on the extent to which the direction of travel may flow the other way. One of the
more notable examples might be Anders Breivik who, while tracing his own violence to the perceived ‘threat’ from Islam and cultural Marxism, was also operating in an environment (i.e. Norway) where he was experiencing little interaction with Muslims or radical Islamist groups. But to what extent might the growing electoral support of populist radical right parties across Europe be contributing to the radicalisation of settled Muslims who might view such trends as evidence that they are not welcome in Western democracies? There is little, if any, research on this question. Similarly, to what extent are the strategies of populist parties and their ideological narratives either inspiring radical Islamists or featuring in their own call to arms?
The second type of interaction concerns recruitment where there is a need for policy and research communities to explore the extent to which, if at all, cumulative extremism assumes a significant role in individual pathways into extremism. For example, in the aftermath of major terrorist attacks, is there a significant surge of recruitment into right-wing extremist groups? And are radical preachers citing radical right groups and their support while encouraging Muslims to become more radical in their views? While there is some anecdotal evidence that hate crimes often surge following a terrorist attack, it is not entirely clear whether there is also a significant increase in the number of people who are pursuing a more radical response by enrolling in an extreme right party or defence league. Clearly, this requires thinking in very different ways about how we collect and analyse data relating to extremism.
The third and more direct form of interaction is the so-called ‘spiral of violence’ whereby different extremist groups engage in a tit-for- tat conflict that escalates into violence. This is often rooted in the observation that while extreme groups publicly distance themselves from violence they also advocate narratives and ideologies that justify or legitimise violence under certain conditions. For example, it has been noted how right-wing extremist groups in Europe often cultivate a narrative of ethnic or white genocide, arguing that the very survival of the once dominant ethnic group is under threat, whether from immigration or Islam. This leads such movements to suggest that unless supporters take urgent and radical action then the survival of their