Against the Autonomy Solution

This subsection raises three objections against the Autonomy Solution.

3.2.1 Theoretical Commitments

The Autonomy Solution relies upon substantive, controversial theoretical commitments concerning autonomy. First, one needs to accept Adequate Range. Second, one needs to think that autonomy is non-derivatively valuable. Let us take these components in turn.

Adequate Range says that, in order for one to enjoy an autonomous choice, one needs to have chosen from an adequate range of valuable options. Some views of autonomy deny this. On these views, whether a choice is autonomous depends only on how the decision was arrived at. Here is a toy view of that sort.

Serena Olsaretti thinks that a choice is not voluntary ‘if it was made because no other acceptable alternative was available’ (Olsaretti 1998, 54). Olsaretti continues that we should distinguish between ‘first-order desires and wishes, which is what we focus on when considering the voluntariness of actions, and autonomy as the second-order capacity to reflect critically over one’s first-order preferences and desires, and to decide which ones to act on’ (Olsaretti 1998, 73). This view of autonomy would say that a choice is autono-mous only if, first, it was not made because no other acceptable alternative was available

171 I end up explaining risk’s moral significance by appeal to something close to security (in my terms, safety).

However, I do not think that safety is itself partly constitutive of wellbeing. See chapter 5, section 4.3. Fur-ther, having security as partly constitutive of wellbeing makes the view vulnerable to the Magnitude of Harm Problem raised below (section 4).

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and, second, because it was consistent with a second-order desire (that itself does not exist because no other acceptable alternatives are available).¹⁷² Given this, one does not actu-ally need an adequate range of valuable options to choose from. Rather, one needs, first, not to have chosen because no other acceptable option was available and, second, one’s choice needs to be consistent with one’s second-order desires. There is no mention of one having an adequate range of options to choose from.¹⁷³ So, it is not obvious that everyone will endorse Adequate Range.

Now for the second restriction to the Autonomy Solution. Some people think that auton-omy is non-derivatively valuable. These people think that autonauton-omy is valuable in and of itself. Others think that autonomy is only derivatively valuable. Suppose that one is a He-donist. It is hard to know what will maximise pleasure for others. Since individuals are best placed to work this out, one might value autonomy. But, on this view, autonomy’s value is derivative upon hedonic value. It is consistent with this view that an individual’s autonomy is frustrated and yet their wellbeing promoted—if the frustration of autonomy brings about more pleasure than would otherwise have been the case. On this view, the frustration of that individual’s autonomy would not, in these circumstances, be harmful.

Returning to risk, if one thinks that autonomy is only derivatively valuable, the Autonomy Solution fails. This is because, in cases of pure risk imposition, we are supposing that the risk does not materialise. But this means that the frustration of the individual’s autonomy does not affect the non-derivative value on which the value of autonomy depends.

The objection raised in this subsection is limited in scope (it was meant only to point out, rather than undermine, the two theoretical commitments) but raises two issues. First, the Autonomy Solution can be appealed to only by those who accept Adequate Range and think autonomy is non-derivatively valuable. Second, we might think that, other things being equal, an answer to the question “Is risk harmful?” is unattractive to the extent that

172 I say “only if” and not “if, and only if,” because there might be other necessary conditions on autonomy.

173 While lacking an adequate range of valuable options will often stop one from making a choice because no other option was available, this is contingent. And, because we are considering pure risk, where one is unaware that one’s options are limited, one’s autonomy will not be frustrated in this way.

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it relies upon controversial normative commitments—the Autonomy Solution relies upon two such commitments.

3.2.2 Non-Autonomous Individuals

The Autonomy Solution implies that risk is harmful only for people who are capable, at that time, of leading autonomous lives. This is because it is only those people who are capable of having their autonomy frustrated in virtue of having valuable options removed.

This precludes, among others, agents with undeveloped, compromised, or damaged ra-tional capacities (for example, very young children, the severely mentally disabled, and those suffering from the later stages of Alzheimer’s disease). We can draw two conclusions from this. First, the Autonomy Solution does not say that risk is harmful for those without autonomy. If the solution to the Problem of Pure Risk lies in risk’s being harmful, this means those without a capacity for autonomy do not have rights against risk of harm. So, the Autonomy Solution does not provide us with a full solution to the Problem of Pure Risk.

Second, we can posit the following argument. The Autonomy Solution leaves us with an asymmetry: exposing autonomous individuals to risk is itself harmful, whereas exposing agents with undeveloped, compromised, or damaged rational capacities to risk is not itself harmful. This asymmetry itself is intuitively implausible. This suggests the Autonomy So-lution is implausible.

Let me say a little more about why the Autonomy Solution implies risk is not itself harmful for those without a capacity for autonomy. Suppose that Villain kills someone with severe mental disabilities. Villain does not frustrate this person’s autonomy for they have no au-tonomy for the Villain to frustrate. A fortiori, Villain does not frustrate this person’s auton-omy by exposing them to risk of death. So, subjecting this person to risk is not itself harmful (given the Autonomy Solution).

The same holds if Villain subjects a baby to risk of death. If Villain were to kill the baby, we would not say she frustrates the baby’s autonomy (for, again, the baby has no auton-omy for Villain to frustrate)—and, we certainly would not say that she frustrates the baby’s autonomy in virtue of denying her a valuable range of options to choose from. So, we should not say Villain frustrates the baby’s autonomy by exposing her to risk of death.

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What the Villain may do were she to kill the baby is deny the baby the opportunity of having an autonomous life. However, if the risked harm does not materialise and so the baby lives, Villain does not deny the baby this opportunity. So, she has not interfered with the autonomous life the baby will later come to have. This is related to the objection raised in the following subsection.

3.2.3 Roulette and Autonomy

The Autonomy Solution works by showing that, when one subjects another to risk, one may frustrate the other’s autonomy by stopping them from having an adequate range of valuable options to choose from, independently of whether or not the risk materialises. In Two Doors, Locker frustrates Chooser’s autonomy by removing the option of going through door B. Thereby, he stops Chooser from having an adequate range of valuable options. But this means that the Autonomy Solution applies only to cases in which the risk affects the exercise of a potentially autonomous choice—and it applies only in virtue of stopping that choice from being autonomous. This analysis does not straightforwardly extend to Roulette. Target is asleep. She is not exercising any autonomous choices at the time at which the risk is imposed. And so, it is not obvious that Shooter’s subjecting her to risk removes any valuable options from her in a way that undermines her autonomy.

We can ask, what valuable option does Shooter remove? So, it is not obvious that Auton-omy Solution solves the Problem of Pure Risk.

Now, Shooter risks it being the case that Target does not have “any future choice”, au-tonomous or otherwise. But that itself does not frustrate Target’s autonomy—it merely risks frustrating her autonomy. To see this, consider the following case.

Two Doors (Two Choices). Chooser is faced with a choice. Let choosing be-tween two doors, A and B, stand in for a potentially autonomous choice.

After going through either door, Chooser will then be faced with another choice. Let choosing between A1 and A2 stand in for a potentially auton-omous choice that she would face if she went through door A. Let choos-ing between B1 and B2 stand in for a potentially autonomous choice that she would face if she went through door B. Unbeknownst to Chooser, Locker locks door B. Chooser chooses door A.

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Suppose that Chooser is now choosing between A1 and A2. Is that choice autonomous? It seems so. Before going through the door, Chooser faced two potentially autonomous choices: Choice 1, between doors A and B, and Choice 2, between A1 and A2 or between B1 and B2, depending on which door she went through. If Adequate Range is correct, Locker stops Choice 1 from being autonomous—he does so by stopping Chooser from having an adequate range of valuable options. However, he does not stop Choice 2 from being autonomous. He merely risks Chooser not being able to make that Choice. Simi-larly, in Roulette, though Shooter might stop Target’s choice of going to sleep from being autonomous for example, she does not stop any of Target’s future choices from being autonomous.

In support of the verdict that Choice 2 was autonomous, despite Choice 1 not being tonomous: if Choice 2 is rendered non-autonomous in virtue of Choice 1 not being au-tonomous, this implies a single non-autonomous choice can taint all future choices, ren-dering them non-autonomous. But this is implausible.