After his official recognition the real troubles of the Wali began. It was generally understood that he was a British puppet. This brought him into direct conflict with the family of the late Amir Sher ’Ali. Even with the acceptance of the provisional governorship of Kandahar, Ayub had warned the Wali, by pointing out that 11 ...if Yakub has abdicated, I, the next heir to him, have not
O
done so.11 After the official recognition of the Wali, g
Ayub denounced h im as a "Kafir11. In Kandahar, the mullas also declared him to be a "Kafir" and expressed
10
their willingness to join Ayub against the Wali. The W a l i ’s own brother, Sardar Mohammad Husayn, and his
11
family advised him to oppose the British. But the Wali remained loyal to the British. Only among the Barakzays,
the Wali had a few supporters. They were Sardar G-ul Mohammad (half-brother of the Wali) who held Girishk
(a district on the right b a n k of the Helmand river),
6 PEEA, 109.
7 St. John to Lyall, 20 May 1880, P S L I , 25, 1155. 8 Ayub to Wali Sher ’Ali, 11 Dec 1879, PLEA, 109.
9 Ibid, 110.
10 Kand.D, 1-8 June 1880, PSLI, pt 2, 26, 41. 11 Stewart to Lyall, 12 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1025-
and M i r Afzal, a son of Pirdil Khan (brother of Amir Dost Mohammad) who was the governor of the province of Farah. Although M i r Afzal was anti-British, at home he supported the Wali against Ayub because, being the father of the late A m i r 1s favourite wife, Mir Afzal was opposed to Ayub. But he was too old to be active and soon retired to Meshed. In Kandahar, Sartip Nur Mohammad, a Mohammadzay sardar, was the only influential supporter of the Wali. But his
hostility to the British was so strong that he left the Wali in a critical moment for Ayub.
The task before the Wali was to establish and consoli date his power, but this he found difficult, if not
impossible. On the day of his investiture, the land-owners of the Arghandab valley and Zamindawer (a district on the right bank of the Helmand) defied his authority by refusing to pay revenue. So did the landowners of more remote
districts. Only those G-hilzays in the immediate neighbour hood of Qalat paid their revenue. His own Durrani elders boycotted him, and he was left without adequate advisers. The whole arrangement for Kandahar seemed to have collapsed but the British officials were convinced that eventually
the Wali would be able to establish his authority. From Kabul, General Stewart wrote ,fHis /""the W a l i fs_7 was, and still is, the want of trustworthy advisers and
subordinates, and his principal difficulty in which he is held, and must be held for some time, on account of his
12 fidelity to u s . ft
E arly in June there were strong rumours of an
advance by Ayub on Kandahar, The Wali had to move up to Girishk to fortify his frontiers and to stir up opposition to Ayub, in Earah and Taimani (a district of Herat to the north-west of Zamin d a w e r ) . But the Wali .. .made it
clear that without the support of the British he will be 1^
unable to move beyond G-irishk.ff Late in June, when A y u b ’s advance had been established beyond doubt, a
British force of 2,400 under General Burrows was despatched to the Halmand. But with the arrival of the British force the Wali lost the support of Sartip Nur Mohammad who,
after inciting the troops to rise against the Wali, joined A y u b . ^
The province of Herat comprised an area of about 6,000 square miles, bordering Persia on the west, the Turcoman country on the north, Siestan on the south, and the Hari Rud on the east, was inhabited by a mixed
population of over half a million, wit h the Pashtuns (Sadozays and Ghilzays) in a m i n o r i t y . ^
D u ring the first half of the nineteenth century,
Herat had been in dispute between Persia and Afghanistan, but since 1863 it had formed part of the latter. Early in 1879, following his accession to power in Kabul,
Y a fqub invited his younger brother Ayub to assume the administration of Herat. Until then Ayub had lived in
13 St. John to Lyall, 21 June 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 2, 209. 14 St. John to Lyall, 12 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 2, 216.
1 5 GAH, i-v, 93-110. Hamilton, A., A f g h a n i s t a n , 1906, London, 147-177.
Meshed, fearing that, like Ya*qub, he would be
imprisoned by his father, Sher fAli, if he returned to Afghanistan. At Herat he had no money, the troops were unpaid, and he had to spend a y e a r 1s revenue in advance in order to raise 2,000 horsemen. Because of discord between his Kabuli and Herati troops, his
immediate intended advance on Kandahar had to be post- 17
poned. He then concentrated on building up his army until his pbsiiion improved at the beginning of 1880.
Meanwhile Britain started negotiations wit h Persia over Herat, in complete disregard of Ayub. The view in London was that, unlike Kandahar, Herat should not be
ruled by an Afghan ruler who might easily be influenced by Russia. Persia was, therefore, to be allowed to take possession of Herat provided she accepted indirect
1 R
British control. The British ambassador at Tehran, Ronald Thomson, was instructed to sound out the Shah of Persia as to his willingness to accept Herat.
But the question of Herat was not so easily disposed of, owing to its strategic location and also to the fact that it was beyond the physical control of Britain.
Russia took a keen interest in it. Believing that the new proposed arrangement would give Britain a predominant influence in central Asia, some Russian newspapers
16 BCA, 52. 17 PHEA, 111.
Novoye Vremia (20 January 1880), Golos and the Journal de St. Petersburg - suggested the invasion of Persia itself - an obvious warning to the Shah against his
19
acceptance of Herat.
J
Russia proposed Russo-British joint supervision of Herat and gave an implied warning against any arrangements made in a spirit of hostility20
to Russia. Earlier, in November 1879 > Lord Salisbury, Foreign Secretary, had declined the promise of material support to Persia w hich had been requested by Malcom Khan, Persia's Minister in London, in the event of a Russian attack on Persia. On the other hand, members of the Indian Council were unanimous in objecting to the surrender of Herat to Persia arguing, each on different grounds, that the proposed arrangement would legalise and thereby increase R u s s i a 1s influence in Herat - a
21
threat, from their point of view, to India. Consequently the negotiations with Persia fell into abeyance. About this time the Government of India had decided to offer Kabul to 'Abd al-Rahman and withdraw its forces from northern Afghanistan. Failing w i t h Persia, the Home Government agreed to offer Herat to 'Abd al-Rahman, but at the Zimma meeting 'Abd al-Rahman showed unwilling to accept it because of its control by Ayub.
Considering himself to be the heir to Ya'qub, Ayub aimed at rule over Afghanistan. Early in January 1880
19 Ibid, 127. 20 Ibid.
21 For details see Notes by Members of the Political Committee on the Herat Question, A . 55, IOL, 1880.
he was able to reconcile the two parties of his army. His Kabuli troops were said to be composed of men from
the north-eastern tribes, a loose term and it is difficult to identify them precisely. At any rate, they were anxious to return to their homes. So were his advisers who were connected with Kandahar. Consequently, pressure for an
22
advance on Kandahar was great, especially when the unpopularity of the Wali had become known.
Although Ayub had declared that his purpose was 1f...to commence a religious war and drive the infidels
2*5
out of the country1’ it seems doubtful, as will be discussed later, whether he really intended to oust the British by force of arms. But he must have sent many
24