2.1 ANACOLUTHON AS TRACE

[1a] My intention here is to establish the merits of beginning with the figure of anacoluthon for the task of discerning the materiality of language in the

[186]

context of Blochian materialism. To do this, I will begin by considering the figure as a trace that is immanent to Bloch’s corpus.

Anacoluthon can be described as a Blochian trace, first, because little of substantive treatment of the figure has been undertaken in the relevant Bloch-scholarship. Those few who have treated of the figure in Bloch’s corpus stand as unworked-out intimations which therefore more or less follow Steiner’s lead (see Introduction) in the sense that, while they touch on the truth of the matter, they fail to systematically unfold the line of thought at play. Three instances of this exist in the relevant literature: Richter’s (2010), Witschel’s (1978), and Landmann’s (1965). I shall briefly survey them. Richter, for instance, suggests that anacoluthon may be related to ‘Bloch’s understanding of non-self-identity, both in the aesthetic and the materialist

utopian sense’ (2010, p. 110; my emphasis). While this assessment is

certainly correct it is not developed at all. Richter does not systematically explain why or how anacoluthon relates to the incognito that is the starting

point of Bloch’s philosophy. I meet this task below by detailing how

anacoluthon relates to matter as pre-categorial That-ness. The second case is that of Witschel’s. Witschel (1978, p. 103) also posits a confluence of utopian matter and anacoluthon, suggesting that anacoluthon ‘reflects [widerspiegelt]’ the reality of which it speaks. But once more the connection is stated only in the manner of a passing comment and merely repeats what—as I show below—Bloch says of the figure: again, the topic remains undeveloped. I meet this task below by showing that anacoluthon does not merely reflect, but expresses, that is, exemplifies the compositional structure of Bloch’s materialism. Finally, there is the much more interesting case of

[187]

Landmann. Landmann’s (1965) remarks on the topic of anacoluthon’s relation to Bloch’s ontology are in fact recollections of a lecture Bloch gave on the subject in Berlin in 1964. In that lecture, anacoluthon is associated with ‘spontaneous language’, with the ‘liveliness of speech’, and it is suggested that ‘reality always breaks through our logically smooth image of it’ (ibid, p. 354). But following the apparent rule, Landmann takes up the same general position as the two commentators above; he fails to move beyond what has already been said concerning the inextricable relation between anacoluthon and Bloch’s ontology of not-yet being. A systematic account is missed. Fulfilling this task is my intention below.127

[1b] Anacoluthon is, however, a trace for a much more immanent reason than the one outlined above, for it is a trace in Bloch’s corpus itself. Together with Landmann’s recollections of the lecture mentioned above, which, incidentally, is itself a type of trace (for no text of the actual lecture exists), the only explicit presence of anacoluthon in Bloch’s corpus is a single essay (situated in the Literary Essays). Beyond this and the abovementioned lecture no explicit evocation of anacoluthon appears in Bloch’s texts. In itself this helps to explain why anacoluthon has been given

127 _{This logic of neglecting anacoluthon also goes the other way. What I mean by this is that while}

some commentators have insightfully treated of language in Bloch’s philosophy, they have failed to bring to bear anacoluthon’s importance to the whole topic. I have already, in the Introduction to this study, mentioned Steiner as a representative of this sort of omission, as too is Holz (1965) mentioned only a moment ago. Another, more recent example is Siebers’ comparative analysis of Bloch’s literary work Traces and Johann-Peter Hebel’s The Treasure Chest (1811). In his analysis, Siebers (2013b, p. 190-1) not only intimates the utopian directedness of language, speaking of the ‘utopian core’ and the ‘utopian horizon’ ‘necessary to human communication’, he also recognises that this temporal, anticipatory, prospective horizon of language emerges from and is only comprehensible within the structure of Bloch’s materialism (ibid., p. 204). What Siebers does not do, however, is incorporate into his discussion the centrality of anacoluthon.

[188]

such scant treatment in Bloch-scholarship: Bloch himself gave it little regard (it seems).128

But it is precisely this, its inconspicuousness, which warrants us to treat of anacoluthon with real seriousness. Although the rhetorical figure occupies a seemingly marginal place in Bloch’s corpus it could in fact count for much more because of its marginality. The importance of that which is marginal and inconspicuous for Bloch’s thought becomes clear by turning to a composition of the parabolic text Traces (Spuren), a text which, as Boella (2012, p. 510) notes, Bloch chose to open his collected works with. In that composition Bloch gives a piece of advice: ‘One should observe precisely the little things, go after them. What is slight and odd often leads the furthest.’ (T, p. 5) The adage bespeaks a realism not of ‘reproductive naturalism’ (that is, mere mirroring), but concentration (PHE, p. 216). In other words, Bloch invites his readers to practice a Spurenlesen—a reading of traces. In and through concentration for inconspicuous traces one finds the incidental though ‘ineffable’ details where hope begins to blossom and, without guarantee, finds its confirmation (PHE, p. 302).

128 _{Incidentally, anacoluthon is not only an inconspicuousness residing both in Bloch’s corpus and in}

commentary on Bloch; anacoluthon is also a neglected figure within the field of rhetoric to which it traditionally belongs. Indication of its omission in this regard is exhibited in the index of rhetorical terms given in Vickers’ otherwise comprehensive study In Defence of Rhetoric (2002). As Sanders’ (2014, p. 490) exception to this rule of omission notes, the reason behind anacoluthon’s universal neglect presumably lies in the fact that neither Donatus nor Priscian nor Quintilian treated of it. Naturally those rhetoricians who followed the masters did not think to either. In this context, there is something vaguely consequential when Bloch writes: ‘In his first attempt at a Latin grammar, M. Terentius Varro is said to have forgotten the future tense; philosophically, it has still not been adequately considered to this day.’ (PHE, p. 6) Indeed, perhaps fondness for the strictures of grammar in itself precipitates against the future tense: that is, against anacoluthon?

[189]

What was that? Something moved! And it moved in its own way. An impression that will not let us come to rest over what we heard. An impression on the surface of life, so that it tears, perhaps. (T, p. 6; my emphasis)

This imperative for concentration, for an eye to the inconspicuous, can be practiced, in immanent fashion, on Bloch’s corpus itself (one should explain the philosophy from out of the philosophy). In this light, the figure of anacoluthon becomes an exemplary node by which to approach the materiality of language within a utopian horizon of speculation such as Bloch’s philosophy affords us. By observing and going after what is slight and odd one can “go the furthest.”129