Analysis of Appendix C, ICPC Records of Conviction 2013-2014

The records of conviction of criminal cases obtained from the ICPC from 2013 to 2014 show the extent of application of plea bargaining as well the manner in which the Commission pursues its cases in various courts across the country.

Unlike the EFCC, the ICPC had only undertaken a few criminal prosecutions and obtained even fewer convictions. The records contained in Appendix C to this chapter record only 93 criminal cases spanning from 2001 to 2014. Contrary to what was found in the records of the EFCC, the ICPC has a number of civil cases. Most significant is that the record from the ICPC scarcely indicate any form of plea bargaining, which further confirms the views of prosecutors of the Commission that the ICPC application of plea bargaining is small compared to that of the EFCC.253 “Even when we do plea bargaining, we tend to be discreet

about it,” reported a prosecutor of the ICPC.254

The records in Appendix C show that of the 54 criminal cases still pending in 2013, there were only four successful convictions, three others were on appeal in the Court of Appeals, while six were pending at the Supreme Court. 2014 saw even fewer convictions; only 3 cases were successfully convicted, six were pending in the Court of Appeals and one in the Supreme Court. In all, in the span of two years, the ICPC obtained only seven convictions, while over 90 per cent of their criminal cases were still pending in various courts across the country, with some still at early stages of prosecution after more than 2 years before the court.255 Another aspect of prosecution by the ICPC is found to be slowness and inefficiency. For example in cases No. 4256 and 7257 and 14,258 the cases were dated 2013 but scheduled

253

In interviews No. 9 and 12 254

Interview No. 9

255 _{See for example FRN v Dr. Alor and Anor. HAB/CPC/2C/2013; FRN v Eze Ubiaru and Anor, HU/36C/2013;} FRN v Nwabueze Chiboyi James, CR/2/2013.

256 _{FRN v Collin C. Martin, CR/99/2013}

257 _{FRN V David Iornem, FCH/ABJ/CR/124/2013} 258

to be mentioned in court in 2015. Similar to the criminal cases mentioned, records of the civil cases show the same pattern. Of the 39 civil cases contained in their records, the majority are still pending in courts.

In all, the approach of the ICPC to prosecution has shown a clear departure from the principle of expediency and efficiency, which the Commissions agenda emphasises. This can be seen in the many instances mentioned. Especially, it can be seen in records where the courts were constrained to strike out cases because the only reason the Commission could give was that accused person has disappeared, and all efforts to trace them had proved abortive.259 There are also cases in the document that were struck out due to a lack of diligent prosecution.260 These different scenarios reveal lucidly that the ICPC, for the most part, is slow and ineffective, lacking the kind of proactive approach of the EFCC.

The records in Appendix B is conclusive evidence of the fact that, even if the ICPC is discreet about the way it applies plea bargaining, as claimed by a prosecutor of the Commission,261 the low number of successful convictions shows a pattern that reveals even fewer cases of plea bargaining.262 This further confirms the overall state of plea bargaining as put by one respondent:

“The system of plea bargaining is not so pervasive, and opinions on whether it is justified or not are sharply divided even among senior officials of the Commission. For the few that are disposed to apply(ing) (sic) plea bargain, they mostly do it in a careful and inconspicuous manner. It is not as common as many people assume. So far, I can say even the bosses in our office (ICPC) sometimes avoid it.”263

Concerning the choice of court, records in Appendix B reveal that most of the cases by the ICPC were instituted in state high courts and very few in federal high courts. This choice of jurisdiction is not unrelated to the fact that, unlike the EFCC which was mandated by law to apply a number of Federal statutes such as the Money Laundering Act 1995, the Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences act, 2006, the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and the Financial Malpractices in Banks Act 1994 (as amended), and the Banks and other

259

See for example FRN v Emmanuel Okeke, ID/414C/2013; FRN v Hon. Philip Shaibu, HC/ICPC/1/2013. 260 _{See for example FRN v Hon. Victor Bamidele and 2 others, HCL/77C/2013; Also FRN v Hon. Basil Ganagana} and 2 others A/ICPC/1C/2014.

261 _{Interview No. 9.}

262 _{In interviews No. 9 and 12} 263

Financial Institutions Act 1991 (as amended), Miscellaneous Offences Act,264 the ICPC, for the most part, applies only the ICPC Act or the provisions of the CCA. Another factor is that the ICPC has a divided role, which involves bureaucratic oversight over governmental institutions and well as public awareness campaigns on anti-corruption initiatives. These are not prosecutorial roles. Putting this into context, one of the prosecutors of the Commission argued, “We are involved in more than prosecution. The Commission also review issues of

due process and ethical standards among governmental and private institutions.”265 It is evident that the Commission places great weight on these oversight functions and in its 2013 official bulletin it proudly claimed success in addressing some of the growing bad practices in institutions of learning and dealing with situations of colleges that have not met licencing standards.266 Hence, the earlier assumption that the ICPC also engages in numerous cases of plea bargaining lacks empirical foundation. From the entire records contained in Appendix C, there was only one case to suggest that plea bargaining took place.267