Analyzing the Case of the Academic Boycott in Britain

The academic boycott in Britain case represents the hybrid nature of the movement’s organizational structure and processes. The structure of the union and the processes that took place there were rooted in a vertical style of organizing and decision- making. The strategy of passing motions concerning Israel/Palestine and boycott specifically, was a bottom-up approach, where local branches and associations would discuss the issues and then propose a motion for the annual congress. Proposed motions by local branches would then be discussed by elected regional delegates at congress, and if passed, then implemented by the union’s leadership. As documented in this chapter, these motions included: in 2005 AUT passed motion 7D and 7E, in 2006 NATFHE passed motion 198C, in 2007 UNC passed motion 30, in 2008 UCU passed motion 25, in 2009 UCU passed motion 29, in 2010 UCU reaffirmed motion 29, and in 2011 UCU passed motion 36. The process of discussing and passing these motions were part of the unions’ centralized power structures.

Overall, however, the process of implementing an academic boycott in Britain has been horizontal in the sense that activists there determine how to proceed with and implement an academic boycott of Israel. The movement is operationalized through networks of Palestinians and solidarity activists in a decentralized power structure. In the border-crossing BDS movement, the principles and values of the movement are determined by Palestinians. Specifically in this case, the call for academic and cultural boycott was formulated by PACBI in 2004 with fairly specific guidelines for

implanting boycotts published shortly thereafter. Nonetheless, the actual process of implanting boycotts is largely determined by participants in their own locale. While groups such as BRICUP or BIN may coordinate or seek advice occasionally from the

121 Palestinian BNC or PACBI, their activities and the ways they proceed are not

predetermined or activated through a centralized structure.

In addition, the academic boycott in Britain shows how exercising “lawfare” is a strategy that anti-BDS proponents use for challenging the movement. The Fraser case was important because it represents one of several attempts to legally challenge the ability to discuss or engage in activities surrounding boycotts of Israel. While the Fraser case was fought by UCU’s legal team and not BDS activists, the lawsuit had wider implications for the movement, and free speech more generally. If Fraser’s case would have prevailed, even after an appeal by the union, it would have made

discussion critical of Israel and boycotts very difficult in not only unions, but elsewhere as well. In this way, the case represented an experiment for UK unions’ rights to discuss boycott and promote the BDS movement. 198

In addition, the charge of anti-Semitism and/or the delegitimization of the state of Israel, as either the motivation or effect of boycotts against Israel has been a

powerful accusation driving the lawfare strategy. In BRICUP’s special issue on the matter, Brenna Bhandar, a Lecturer in Property Law, said that attempting to challenge BDS through legal action has an “underlying rationale,” which is that “political criticism of the State of Israel and political action that supports BDS are viewed as anti-Semitic – with inherently so or in particular instances.”199 Due to the potent and sensitive nature in deploying the charge of anti-Semitism, if it were upheld it would at the minimum produce a silencing effect against BDS activism. Clearly, a central tactic of anti-BDS advocates is an attempt to restrict the scope of debate around the Israeli-

198 _{BRICUP, “Union Defeats Legal Challenge Alleging Antisemitism: Right to Advocate Boycott of}

Israel Upheld,” Press Release, 26 March 2013; http://bricup.org.uk/documents/FraserCasePR.pdf.

199 _{Brenna Bhandar, “Debating BDS: Fraser v. UCU,” BRICUP Newsletter Special Issue “Abusing the}

122 Palestinian conflict and the space in which BDS activists can legitimately (legally) operate.

Because the ability to express views critical of Israel and dispense those views through BDS activism is vital to the movement’s growth and expansion, the judgment had border-crossing effects for the movement. In particular, the judgment removed the legitimacy of a legal challenge to BDS on grounds that it is inherently anti- Semitic.200 _{The Fraser case was brought against the UCU, but it set an important}

precedent for the movement as it demonstrated that the allegation of anti-Semitism in the lawfare strategy is not a forgone conclusion in silencing or debilitating the

movement.

The last major action of the academic boycott of Israel in Britain was in 2013, when Stephen Hawking announced he would not be attending a conference in Israel. There has been no significant activity with respect to boycott motions in the academic union since the last motion was passed in 2011 as numerous motions are currently in force. As the academic boycott of Israel in Britain has waned in the academic union, it has greatly picked up in the US, although mostly in academic associations. Similar to the motions passed in British academic unions, grassroots organizing takes place among like-minded scholars that build support among the membership of their association. When a significant amount of support is gained, activist-members push for a motion in support of the BDS movement to be passed. Over ten academic associations in the US currently endorse the academic boycott of Israel, though as the case with the academic boycott of Israel in Britain demonstrates, the path forward will be challenging and will be subject to lawfare tactics by BDS opponents.

200 _{Tom Hickey, “Three Moves to Defeat: A Zionist Game Plan That Has Unravelled in the Trade}

123

Conclusion

This case study chapter has critically investigated the academic boycott in Britain to illuminate aspects of the transnational BDS movement. To do this, I first outlined the background of Israeli institutions of higher education and of the academic boycott in Britain that has arisen against them. I then described some of the groups involved in these boycott activities and organizational dynamics of the academic boycott, especially as occurred through the trade union processes. Next, I discussed the significance of these boycotts and the dynamic interaction between academic boycott campaigners and opponents, particularly the Fraser case that was brought against the UCU. I concluded the chapter by ascertaining various features about the campaign case study that demonstrate aspects of the broader BDS movement across borders.

In this regard, the academic boycott in Britain demonstrates the decentralized structure of the movement, along with its vertical and horizontal forms of organizing. The processes that occurred in Britain’s trade unions regarding the academic boycott represent vertical organizing processes from the bottom, up to the union leadership. Though these are specific processes of organizing that stem from codified union procedures, the process of implementing academic boycotts in general has been horizontal. As this case study suggests, the BDS movement is operationalized across borders in ways specific to the places and people that are organizing a particular BDS campaign. This point is further addressed in chapter five on the structure and

organizing in the movement. In addition, the academic boycott in Britain shows how opponents of BDS campaigns use lawfare as a strategy to silence BDS activists and weaken the border-crossing movement. Because the movement is decentralized, these attacks can be daunting for individual, local campaigns, and is considered more in chapter six on the movement’s challenges and limitations. In furnishing evidence on

124 the movement’s scope and organizational structure, this case study contributes to my assertion that the movement is a new and different way of confronting Israel in the Palestinian struggle for justice.

125

Chapter 3 – BDS Case Study: The We Divest Campaign

Introduction

Divestment campaigns within the BDS movement seek to illuminate issues of ethical and socially responsible investment in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Divestment campaigns in the BDS movement want to eliminate investments in businesses that contribute to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories or its violations of Palestinian human rights. The aims of divestment campaigns are twofold: “to curb the profits of Israel’s war and apartheid economy” and to “raise awareness about Israel’s policies.”201 _{The most notable divestments have come from}

Christian churches, universities, banks, and pension funds.

This chapter examines the case of the We Divest campaign as an example of a divestment initiative of the BDS movement. The campaign targets TIAA-CREF, one of the largest retirement fund providers in the US, to divest funds currently held in a number of companies the campaign has identified. The chapter is structured just as the previous and following case study chapters by showing the background of the target (TIAA-CREF) and the We Divest campaign. The chapter describes groups involved in the campaign, organizational dynamics, the significance of We Divest in the BDS movement, and the interaction between challengers (We Divest) and opponents (anti- We Divest) in the development of the campaign. I conclude with an analysis of the case study in which I identify a number of features about the campaign and the movement overall.

126 The first of these features is that similar to the academic boycott in Britain, the We Divest campaign is decentralized, and uses both vertical and horizontal structures and processes for organizing. Information from these chapters is analyzed more in chapter five on the movement’s organizational dynamics. Secondly, the We Divest campaign uses collective action frames such as international law, corporate

complicity, socially responsible investment, etc., which are similar to other BDS campaigns, and are used to mobilize participants and garner support for the movement. These frames parallel those of other contemporary transnational

movements, which I explore more in chapter six where I consider the BDS movement in a global justice framework. By pointing to critical components of the movement – its organizational structure and collective action frames – this case study supports a central claim of this this thesis that the movement is a new and unique way of confronting Israel in the Palestinian struggle for justice.