______________________________________________________________________________ “There is a consensus [within the diplomatic community] that the
Fayyad government has delivered, and the cornerstone of his success is security reform. Improvements in all other sectors, including the gradual economic growth, are utterly dependent on
the performance of the security forces.”
---Western Diplomat in an International Crisis Group interview, January 2010150 ______________________________________________________________________________
Safety and security are basic human needs and individuals will go to great lengths to ensure a sense of security. Achieving security has been a difficult challenge for Palestinians and Israelis because their interests, particularly land, dictate a threat to the other’s sense of security. Both the Israeli and Palestinian governments, however, have demonstrated an understanding of the critical link between delivering a secure environment for their citizens and advancing peace. Security is perceived by Palestinians and Israelis and their governments in different ways, and the different perspectives influence government policies.
Since the establishment of the Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) in 1994, its forces have gradually taken on more responsibilities in areas of the WBGS.151 In recent years, the PA has placed a policy emphasis on the further development of the Palestinian security sector and this chapter will evaluate the implementation of the PA’s security objectives that it laid out in its Ending the
Occupation, Establishing the State reform plan. The complex security situation in the West Bank will be explored in this section, including the ongoing tensions between Israelis and Palestinians; the nonviolent resistance movement; the GoI and its citizens’ role in security in the West Bank; and the
150
International Crisis Group. Squaring the Circle: Palestinian Security Reform Under Occupation. Middle East Report No. 98, International Crisis Group, 2010.
151 In 2007, Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip ousted the Palestinian Security Forces and maintain their own
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PA and GoI’s inclination to value state security over human security for Palestinians. The information in this section almost exclusively relates to security in the West Bank, and does not discuss the vastly different security situation in the Gaza Strip under Hamas rule.
Security Defined
Shaped by historical experiences including the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli occupation of the WBGS, Israelis and Palestinians have fundamentally different concepts of security, which are at odds with each other. Both the PA and the GoI have acknowledged and agreed that a secure environment in Israel and Palestine will not only increase the safety and security of their citizens, but also increase investor and public confidence in their governments, and lead to social, political, and economic progress.
For Israelis, the First (1987-1993) and Second (2000-2005) Intifadas along with the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip left enduring painful memories of Palestinian suicide attacks, barrages of rocket of attacks, and stone-throwing by Palestinians in the WBGS. While the Intifadas have
subsided and the security situation for Israelis has vastly improved in recent years, there continue to be ongoing missile attacks from the Gaza Strip, stone throwing at Israeli soldiers and civilians by Palestinians, and violent clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank.152 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and PSF regularly uncover Palestinian plots to attack Israelis and the
Palestinian suspects and perpetrators are jailed.153
The ongoing violence not only results in physical injuries and the deaths of Israelis, but it also creates an environment of emotional stress and fear that results in negative political and economic implications. Following bouts of violence, tourism suffers and businesses that employ Palestinians traveling from the West Bank into Israel are affected when their employees cannot make
152 The public had a lower, yet still high level of fear of a terrorist attack on themselves or family members at 70% in
2009, which was well down from 92% in 2007.
Meir, Yahuda Ben, and Olena Bagno-Moldavsky. Trends in Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2004-2009. Memorandum No. 106, The Institute for National Security Studies, 2010.
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it to work on time or at all due to increased security screening measures. When Israelis are injured by Palestinians, they grow frustrated with Palestinian leadership and the inability of Israeli security forces and the government to protect them, and demand political action or changes in leadership and are less likely to support a peace process with Palestinians.154
Memories of a volatile past and the experiences of a violent present have made national security the primary concern of the Israeli public. The prevalent perception as touted by the GoI, is perceived pervasive existential threats to the State of Israel and a distrust of regional actors, even avowed peace partners in the region such as Egypt and Jordan. The Israeli government places the security of its citizens as its highest priority, and demands this of Palestinian leaders as well. Hence, Israel maintains a powerful army that actively intervenes to mitigate actual and perceived security threats within Israel and the region and especially in the WBGS and coordinates activities with the PSF.155 For its citizens—whether in Israel, in the WBGS or abroad—the GoI has shown an
exceptional resolve to go to great lengths to ensure their safety, even at the expense of the rights of Palestinians.156
The GoI frames the discussion of security around Israeli security needs and acquires substantial international support to advance its objectives to achieve that aim. While the GoI’s primary security focus is on mitigating threats by Palestinians and Arab states, it also mitigates internal security threats by Jewish extremists, which have increased in recent years.
The demands made by the Gol through two decades of bilateral peace negotiations with Palestinians aimed at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have helped to clarify their perception
154 (Journal of Palestine Studies 2010)
155 In 2009, Israelis reported higher levels of individual and state security than in previous years, and 80% of those
surveyed trusted that the GoI was capable of coping with security threats. (Meir and Bagno-Moldavsky 2010)
156 Human Rights Watch reports that Israel regularly engages in arbitrary detentions of Palestinians, with 272
Palestinians in administrative detention without charge in 2011. Israeli courts often use coerced statements of children who are arrested and coerced into signing confessions in Hebrew which they don’t understand. More information about ensuring Israeli security at the expense of Palestinian rights will be provided later.
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of security. Israel has sought Palestinian acquiescence in subduing threats of Palestinian violence within the PA’s jurisdiction, a mere 17.2 percent of the West Bank known as Area A.157
While seeking Palestinian participation in security matters, Israel has been reluctant to view Palestinians as fully capable partners in providing security for Israeli citizens and has retained overarching control over security within the WBGS as granted by provisions in the Oslo Accords. Israel has shown skepticism that a peace agreement with Palestinians will result in enhanced security for its citizens. It has insisted upon an improved security environment and security guarantees from Palestinians as a prerequisite to a peace agreement, also known as the Israeli “Security First” objective.158
‘Security first’ encapsulates a set of conditions that Israel has set for Palestinians to meet in order for Israel to engage in peace talks and perhaps a “partial, phased and conditional”
withdrawal.159 Even with a peace deal, Israel has indicated that it intends to maintain a military presence in a Palestinian state.160 At the commencement of Middle East peace talks in September 2010, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s remarks reflect the preeminence Israeli security plays in all Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic considerations. He said: “We left Lebanon, we got terror. We left Gaza, we got terror. We want to ensure that territory we concede will not be turned into a
157 (Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and the World Bank 1999, 39)
158 Khan, Mushtaq H. “‘Security First’ and its implications for a viable Palestinian State.” In Aid Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: The Case of Palestine, edited by Michael Keating, Anne Le More and Robert Lowe, 59-73.
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 2005.
159 Dajani, Omar. “No Security Without Law.” In International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A rights- based approach to Middle East peace, edited by Susan M. Akram, Michael Dumper, Michael Lyk and Iain Scobbie,
184-206. New York: Routledge, 2011.
160 During the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David of July 2000, Israel presented its security proposal for an
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and Palestinian state. With regards to a Palestinian state, Israel proposed maintaining a permanent security presence along 15 percent of the Palestinian-Jordanian border, maintaining the right to deploy the Israeli army in the Palestinian state in the event of an emergency or threat from the East,
stationing an international force in the Jordan Valley (including the eastern strip of the West Bank in the South), and setting up Israeli radar stations permanently inside the Palestinian state and use Palestinian airspace. Further, the Palestinian state would not be permitted to acquire an air force or heavy weapon systems and would be demilitarized with the exception of its paramilitary security forces, which would be required to gain Israeli approval prior to making alliances.
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third Iranian-sponsored terror enclave aimed at the heart of Israel.”161 It should be noted there is internal dissent within Israel regarding the GoI’s “Security First” model and there are individuals and groups who advocate for a policy based on human security for Israelis and Palestinians.162
On the Palestinian security side, Palestinians and the PA perceive the removal of an Israeli military presence and sovereign control over Palestinian territory as essential for securing Palestinian individual and collective rights, along with security for Israelis. While Palestinian security is a high concern amongst Palestinians, it is not their top concern; rather, issues relating to the economy, specifically “job/money” have consistently been at the top, as reported in public opinion surveys from 2009-2011.163 The stated PA security objectives are to provide security for its citizen and to hold the PSF accountable to the rule of law and to uphold human rights and freedoms. Upon a close evaluation, however, it is evident that providing security to the GoI and its citizens is often times a PA goal that is elevated higher than goals relating to providing individual Palestinian security needs and demands.164
Particularly following the Second Intifada, the PSF in the West Bank has worked in tandem with Israeli police forces to achieve the PA and Israel’s security objectives. While together they have made positive strides toward creating a safer environment for Israelis and Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank, the IDF and PSF have at times forfeited their duty to protect Palestinians’ most basic rights, drawing criticism and resentment amongst Palestinians. While working towards achieving security for Palestinians and Israelis, the underlying motivation of the PA is to achieve its main objective, which as stated above, is to end the occupation of Palestinian lands.
161 The Telegraph. “Netanyahu calls Abbas ‘my partner in peace’.” The Telegraph. September 2, 2010.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/7976636/Netanyahu-calls-Abbas-my-partner-in- peace.html (accessed December 3, 2012).
162
One of the most prominent human rights groups is B'Tselem, an NGO founded in 1989 by Israeli public figures that focuses its efforts on educating the Israeli public about human rights violations in the WBGS and advocates for Israeli policy change in the WBGS.
B’Tselem-The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. http://www.btselem.org/
(accessed January 4, 2013).
163 Palestinian Center for Public Opinion. Poll No. 177. Poll, Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, 2011. 164 (Palestinian National Authority 2009)
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The PA has shown an inability to protect Palestinian citizens from unlawful acts by Israeli citizens and the GoI. On a daily basis, Palestinians, especially those who live in Area C under Israeli jurisdiction, face physical threats and threats to their land and property.
Suspected Israeli perpetrators of violence are subject to Israeli civil and criminal law, though more than 90 percent of all reports of Israeli settler violence are met with impunity by the GoI.165 By contrast, Palestinian suspects are subject to military tribunals, which have a conviction rate of 99.74 percent.166 Thousands of Palestinians who have been convicted of offenses or are being held in administrative detention without charge or trial reside in Israeli jails. Investigations by Israeli-based B’Tselem and bodies indicate cases of inhumane treatment.167
Palestinian civil society has
consistently advocated for the preeminence of Palestinian rights.168 Conversely, the PA does not have the authority to detain or try Israelis for crimes committed against Palestinians. Israelis who have committed crimes in the West Bank and are held accountable by the GoI—with varying degrees of success.
The vast majority of Palestinians do not share Israel’s belief that Israel’s existence is under constant regional threat; rather, they view Israel as a powerful military force that has secured safety for its citizens by signing binding peace agreements with Jordan and Egypt. Palestinians similarly believe that a just peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians that results in an independent and viable Palestinian state will provide security for the two peoples.
165European Union. “EU Note on Settler Violence: Update to the EU Heads of Mission Report on Settler Violence
from April 2011.” The Rights Forum. February 2012, http://www.rightsforum.org/eur2.html (accessed December 3, 2012).
European Union. “EU Heads of Mission: Cover Note.” The Rights Forum. February 2012. http://www.rightsforum.org/eur1.html (accessed December 3, 2012).
166 Levinson, Chaim. “Nearly 100% of all military court cases in West Bank end in conviction, Haaretz learns.” Haaretz. November 29, 2011.http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/nearly-100-of-all-military-court-cases-in-
west-bank-end-in-conviction-haaretz-learns-1.398369 (accessed April 15, 2012).
167 (B'Tselem-The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories n.d.) 168 The Gaza City- based Palestinian Centre for Human Rights advocates for Palestinian rights.
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Palestinians who engage in violence against Israelis maintain that they are fighting to secure their rights and that peace can only be achieved once Palestinians have attained sovereignty over a recognized Palestinian state.169 Those who engage in violence against Israel, like the militants within Islamic Jihad and Hamas, maintain that forceful resistance is a legitimate means to protest and end the occupation and achieve a recognized Palestinian state on either the 1967 borders or a state in all of historic Palestine, including present day Israel. Such groups are identified as terrorist groups by a handful of powerful countries, including the U.S. and Israel.170
The PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people and does not endorse violence. The PLO and the PA have made strong efforts to reel in groups with violent tactics toward Israel or the PA. In an effort to enhance security and its monopoly over violence, the PA, in tandem with IDF forces, target militant groups in the West Bank. When dealing with individuals suspected of being affiliated with Islamic Jihad and Hamas the PSF at times forfeits its mandate to protect all citizens, targeting, injuring, jailing, or killing those individuals without due process of law.171 Further, the International Crisis Group reports: “The crackdown against the Islamists’ military branch seamlessly broadened into a far more controversial crackdown against its social and political manifestations and other forms of dissent.”172
Palestinians have been reluctant to accept a continued Israeli presence in the WBGS as part of a peace solution. Dennis Ross, an American diplomat, author, and Special Middle
East Coordinator under President Bill Clinton, was a leading negotiator in the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David of July 2000. In his book, The Missing Peace, he commented on Israeli and Palestinian perceptions of security with regards to a future peace agreement saying, “Israelis must
169 (Dajani 2011, 189-193)
170 Although there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, it can be broadly defined as violent acts
directed at civilians that are intended to create fear and terror and are motivated by political, ideological or religious beliefs.
171 (Brown, Are Palestinians Building a State? 2010) 172 (International Crisis Group 2010)
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face the fact that Palestinians will require an independent state in both appearance and reality. Carving up the West Bank, preserving buffer zones, and maintaining an Israeli presence all around the perimeter of the Palestinian state will not produce a solution.”173
Both the GoI and PA have a strong motivation for creating a safe environment. Not only is it their responsibility to keep their citizens’ safe and secure, but strong security in the region also directly contributes to a viable economic environment.
While Palestinians and Israelis both can relate to the strong desire for security, it is important for the sides to recognize how their citizens and governments perceive security and understand each other’s security expectations. Former Israeli President Shimon Peres showed an understanding of the Palestinian security perspective by conveying: “Ultimately, you cannot fool history. If a nation wants one hundred percent security, it has to give its neighbor one hundred percent freedom, because a past enemy can be a future partner.”174
It appears that the current leaders in the GoI underestimate the value Palestinians place on ending the occupation, having an independent state, and the potential security that could be attained with a permanent peace agreement with Palestinians. Palestinians may not understand the deep scars Palestinian attacks have left on the Israeli public and the repercussions, including increased domestic and international support for Israel’s “Security First” model following attacks. Palestinians and Israelis who engage in violence in an attempt to obtain security for
themselves must be held accountable by their governments. The governments should hold accountable the perpetrators of violence while respecting human and legal rights.
The GoI feelings of insecurity manifest themselves in various degrees. Below are some of the more notable of these that are not related to security arrangements with the PA. Israel has not carried out certain obligations by international law such as the compensation of or repatriation of Palestinian
173
Ross, Dennis. The Missing Peace: The Inside Story Of The Fight For Middle East Peace. New York, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004, 774.
174 Gazit, Shlomo. Trapped Fools: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories. Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass
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refugees. Israelis fear the repatriation of Palestinians because a large scale repatriation of millions of refugees would make Israelis a minority in Israel. Israel has invested billions of U.S. dollars in creating and in purchasing advanced weapons technology and uses the security systems and weapons against Palestinians during times of conflict. Further, the GoI mandates required military service for its citizens and it invests in training and collaboration with the PSF. These are all examples of Israeli actions that are motivated by deep rooted security concerns and indicate Israel’s extensive security reach within the WBGS.
Establishing the Palestinian Security Sector
Security considerations played a central role during the Israeli and Palestinian permanent status negotiations in 1999. Omar Dadani highlights its central role, stating, “Security issues were raised by one or both of the parties as a key component of virtually all of the other issues on the table – with respect to the location of borders, the disposition of Israeli settlements, the division of
sovereignty and control over Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees, the allocation of water