CASE NAME COURT AND
CASE NUMBER DATE FILED STATUTES BASIS/ISSUE/
RESULT COMMENTARY Chandler v. City of
Lawton
U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D.
Okla.
No. 131082
12/23/2013 ADEA, ADA Charge Processing;
Limitations Parties Reached Settlement
Background: Defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims under the ADEA and ADA because the claims were not filed within 180 days. The plaintiff had filed his charge of discrimination 285 days after the date of the last discriminatory act against him. At the time he filed his charge, the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission, the state FEPA, had been abolished by the Oklahoma legislature and the Oklahoma Office of Attorney General assumed the responsibility of employment discrimination complaints. The Office of Attorney General did not enter into a worksharing agreement with the EEOC and was not designated as a FEPA. As a result, Oklahoma is a jurisdiction having no FEP agency and a charge is only timely filed within 180 days from the date of the alleged violation.
Issue EEOC Addressed as Amicus: The EEOC’s amicus brief addressed the proper limitations period for filing charges of employment discrimination in Oklahoma.
EEOC’s Amicus Brief: The EEOC contends that the plaintiff had 300 days in which to file a charge of discrimination as long as proceedings are timely initially instituted with a state agency, regardless of whether the agency is designated a FEPA by the EEOC.
Here, the EEOC contends that its agreement with the Office of Attorney General satisfies the requirement regarding how proceedings are initially instituted with the state agency since the agencies agreed to send each other copies of all charges of discrimination received within 10 calendar days of receipt. Therefore, the EEOC believes the Oklahoma statute meets the requirements of the relevant statutory provisions to be considered a “deferral state” entitled to the 300-day charge filing period.
Court’s Decision: The plaintiff and defendant reached a settlement agreement that resolved this lawsuit, and the appeal was withdrawn.
3 The information included in Appendix B, including the “FY 2014 Appellate Cases Where the EEOC Filed an Amicus Brief” and “FY 2014—Appellate Cases Where the EEOC Filed as the Appellant” were pulled from the EEOC’s publicly available database of appellate activity available at http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
litigation/briefs.cfm. Appendix B includes select cases from this database.
CASE NAME COURT AND
CASE NUMBER DATE FILED STATUTES BASIS/ISSUE/
RESULT COMMENTARY Chavez v. Credit
Nation Auto Sales, LLC
U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D.
Ga.
No. 13-312
2/14/2014 Title VII Charge Processing,
Limitations, Sex Pro Employer
Background: The plaintiff filed a one-count complaint alleging the defendant deprived her of equal employment opportunities as an employee because of her sex. The defendant moved for summary judgment arguing (1) plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to initiating the lawsuit; and (2) plaintiff failed to establish the defendant violated Title VII.
Issue EEOC Addressed as Amicus: Whether equitable tolling excuses an aggrieved individual’s failure to file a timely charge when the plaintiff attempted to file a charge within the limitations period but the EEOC investigators responsible for charge processing refused to accept the charge.
EEOC’s Amicus Brief: The EEOC contends it mistakenly refused to accept an otherwise timely charge proffered by the plaintiff and, as a result, the plaintiff could not satisfy this condition precedent to filing suit. As a result, the EEOC argues the limitations for the charge-filing requirement should be equitably tolled, both as a matter of fairness to the plaintiff and as a means of securing enforcement of the law. The EEOC contends that when the plaintiff attempted to file a charge, the investigator informed the plaintiff that she could not file a charge because, as a transgender woman, she was “not protected against discrimination on the basis of sex” under Title VII. The plaintiff made a second attempt to file a charge with the EEOC but an investigator again refused to take the charge based on lack of coverage. When the plaintiff was finally able to file a charge, the EEOC dismissed the charge as untimely. The EEOC later reopened its investigation and later issued a dismissal on the merits.
Court’s Decision: The court noted that it is undisputed that the plaintiff failed to submit a valid EEOC charge within the 180-day period. The court held that the statute of limitations period should be equitably tolled because the EEOC mislead the plaintiff about the nature of her rights under Title VII. The record demonstrated that plaintiff attempted to exhaust her administrative remedies in a timely manner but was misled about her rights under Title VII by the EEOC’s misinformation that a transsexual could not bring an actionable sex discrimination claim.
However, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment finding that no reasonable juror could conclude that the plaintiff’s failure to confirm to gender stereotypes motivated the defendant’s decision to terminate her employment.
CASE NAME COURT AND operates a recycling facility and its employees generally work outside the facility. Leadpoint provides subcontracted employees to BFI, and they generally work inside the facility. A written agreement between Leadpoint and BFI states that Leadpoint is the sole employer of the subcontracted employees. The Board’s current joint employer standard is as follows:
“To determine whether two separate entities should be considered joint employers, the Board analyzes whether alleged joint employers share the ability to control or co-determine essential terms and conditions of employment. Essential terms and conditions of employment are those involving such matters as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and direction of employees. However, the putative joint employers’
control over these employment matters must be direct and immediate. The authority to make routine directions of where to do a job, rather than the manner in which to perform the work, is insufficient to support a joint employer finding.” Applying that standard, the regional director held that BFI and Leadpoint are not joint employers. He determined that Leadpoint sets the pay scale; is the sole provider of benefits; has sole authority to control recruitment, hiring, counseling, discipline, and termination, etc. The regional director opined that “[t]o the extent that any BFI employee instructed a Leadpoint employee, the instruction was merely routine in nature and insufficient to warrant a finding that BFI jointly controls Leadpoint employees’
daily work.”
Issue EEOC is Addressing as Amicus: (1) Under the Board’s current joint-employer standard, is the employer the sole employer of the petitioned-for employees? (2) Should the Board adhere to its existing joint-employer standard or adopt a new standard?
What considerations should influence the Board’s decision in this regard? (3) If the Board adopts a new standard for determining joint-employer status, what should that standard be? If it involves the application of a multifactor test, what factors should be examined? What should be the basis or rationale for such a standard? The real issue is whether the Board considers Leadpoint to be the sole employer of the subcontracted employees or whether it considers Leadpoint and BFI to be joint employers.
EEOC’s Amicus Brief: The EEOC urges the Board to adopt the same joint-employer standard the EEOC uses. The EEOC’s Compliance Manual states: “The term ‘joint employer’ refers to two or more employers that are unrelated or that are not sufficiently related to qualify as an integrated enterprise, but that each exercise sufficient control of an individual to qualify as his/her employer.” The EEOC considers the Darden factors,4 such as who hires and fires, who assigns
4 Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
CASE NAME COURT AND
CASE NUMBER DATE FILED STATUTES BASIS/ISSUE/
RESULT COMMENTARY
work, who controls daily activities, who furnishes equipment, where the work is performed, who pays the worker, who provides employee benefits, how the worker is treated for tax purposes, and whether the worker and the putative employer believe that they are creating an employer-employee relationship.
The EEOC’s joint employer definition is flexible and more accurately reflects congressional intent than the Board’s definition.
Court’s Decision: This case is still pending before the National Labor Relations Board.
Grant v. United Cerebral Palsy of NYC, Inc.
U.S. Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit No. 14-1223
7/16/2014 Title VII Retaliation
Pending
Background: Plaintiff claims she was retaliated against after she filed a charge with the EEOC alleging sex discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, reasoning the plaintiff could not establish that at the time she made either her internal complaint or her first formal charge of discrimination, she reasonably believed the defendant violated Title VII.
Issues on Appeal: Did the district court err in granting summary judgment for the defendant?
Issue EEOC is Addressing as Amicus: Did the district court err in relying on the opposition clause standard to conclude that the plaintiff cannot establish that she engaged in protected activity under Title VII?
EEOC’s Amicus Brief: The EEOC contends the district court should have applied the participation clause of Title VII. The EEOC also argues that under the participation clause, the statute requires only that an individual engage in an identified protected activity, and does not condition protection for participation on any other criteria. The statute accords protection under the participation clause for filing a charge of discrimination “regardless of the validity or reasonableness of the charge.” The statute does not qualify that protection by requiring that the charge must have been meritorious, or that the charging party must have reasonably believed that a Title VII violation occurred. In sum, the EEOC argues that the participation clause should be interpreted broadly to protect Title VII charge filers from retaliation for filing a charge with the Commission, without regard for whether the allegations in the charge are later deemed valid or reasonable.
Court’s Decision: The case is currently pending with the court.
CASE NAME COURT AND
CASE NUMBER DATE FILED STATUTES BASIS/ISSUE/
RESULT COMMENTARY Boyer-Liberto v.
Fontainebleau Corp.
U.S. Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit No. 13-1473
7/8/2014 Title VII Retaliation
Pending
Background: Plaintiff claimed the defendant unlawfully retaliated against her in violation of Title VII when it terminated her following her reports of racial discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiff complained about two racial epithets that occurred at the work place. A panel of justices for the Fourth Circuit initially upheld the district court’s decision, ruling that the plaintiff could not establish that she reasonably believed she suffered from a severe and pervasive hostile work environment. The Fourth Circuit subsequently vacated this judgment, and ordered an en banc hearing.
Issues on Appeal: Did the plaintiff reasonably believe she suffered from a hostile work environment when she made a complaint to her employer regarding two racial epithets?
Issue EEOC is Addressing as Amicus: Did the Fourth Circuit panel incorrectly rule that the plaintiff had no reasonable belief that she suffered from an actionable hostile work environment?
EEOC’s Amicus Brief: The EEOC argued that even if only two incidents of racial epithets over the course of two days was not by itself a hostile work environment under Title VII, the conduct itself was severe enough for the plaintiff to complain to her employer. The EEOC contends that such activity should be protected under Title VII, as employees should be encouraged to report severe and offensive behavior, even if it has not yet risen to the level of an actionable hostile work environment claim.
Court’s Decision: The case is currently pending with the court.
CASE NAME COURT AND
CASE NUMBER DATE FILED STATUTES BASIS/ISSUE/
RESULT COMMENTARY Demasters v.
Carilion Clinic
U.S. Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit No. 13-2278
2/25/2014 Title VII Retaliation
Pending
Background: The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff’s activity was not protected under the participation clause of Title VII because it involved the assistance of an employee’s internal complaint. The district court also held that as an Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) consultant, the plaintiff was merely performing his job when assisting an employee with discrimination complaints and therefore fell under the
“manager rule” exception.
Issue EEOC is Addressing as Amicus: (1) Does an employer violate the opposition clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision when it fires an EAP consultant because he counsels a co-worker to complain to his employer about sexual harassment and then objects to the employer’s response; (2) Does an employer violate the participation clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision when it fires an EAP consultant because of his participation in an employer’s internal investigation and complaint procedures?
EEOC’s Amicus Brief: The EEOC argues that under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the plaintiff’s statements to HR constituted protected opposition to unlawful discrimination. The district court improperly held that the plaintiff’s handling of an employee’s complaint did not constitute opposition conduct under the “manager rule” exception because he was merely doing his job as an EAP counselor. The EEOC argues the rule has no application here, first because the plaintiff’s conduct was viewed by his employer as adverse to the company’s interests, and second because the manager rule, developed in FLSA cases, is inapplicable to Title VII retaliation cases. The EEOC also contends that the plaintiff’s assistance to the employee and criticisms of the employer’s handling of his case also constituted participation in proceedings under Title VII. Proceedings under Title VII include employers’ internal investigations and the plaintiff’s efforts to help the employee instigate an investigation are properly viewed as participation conduct. The EEOC argues the plain language of the statute states that employees are protected when they participate in any proceeding under the statute and internal investigations are necessarily “under” the statute given the strong incentives for employers to create internal procedures for dealing with harassment complaints to limit their liability for supervisory harassment. Thus, the EEOC contends the district court erred in holding that the plaintiff’s actions did not constitute participation under Title VII because the employee had not yet filed a charge or lawsuit.
Court’s Decision: Oral argument has been set for January 29, 2015.
CASE NAME COURT AND
Background: The employer is a company that builds homes and commercial projects. The plaintiff began working as a trim painter in June 2007. She was laid off from work in 2009 but returned to the same position in May 2010. She claims she was harassed verbally by several coworkers. She complained and her supervisor allegedly told her to “ignore it” and said he would speak to the alleged harasser. She was moved to another position so she would not have any contact with the alleged harasser. However, the situation worsened, especially after she began dating a male coworker. Due to the harassment, the plaintiff saw her doctor, who ordered her to take two weeks of medical leave. When she called the employer to inform it about the leave, she claimed that within 20 minutes she was terminated for “misconduct.” She filed an EEOC charge, obtained a Notice of Right to Sue, and filed suit claiming sexual harassment. The district court granted the employer summary judgment because the actions complained of did not meet the “severe or pervasive” conduct per Fourth Circuit precedent; other comments were one-time incidents that did not meet the standard for a hostile work environment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); there was no disparity in power between the harasser and plaintiff as in other Fourth Circuit cases; the hostile work environment was not “hellish.”
Issue EEOC is Addressing as Amicus: Whether the district court erred in holding that the plaintiff did not adduce sufficient evidence of severe or pervasive harassment to survive summary judgment, and in overly relying on various immaterial factors in its analysis?
EEOC’s Amicus Brief: The EEOC argued that the district court erred in treating the most egregious cases and facts as establishing a baseline for actionable harassment. The correct standard is set by the Supreme Court, severe or pervasive. Also, a power disparity has never been held by the Fourth Circuit to be a prerequisite for demonstrating coworker harassment, and this court has never held that an actionable hostile work environment must be “hellish.”
The district court failed to view the evidence in light of the totality of the circumstances, per Harris.
Court’s Decision: The Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Mod-U-Kraf Homes on the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim and remanded for further proceedings, and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Mod-U-Kraf Homes on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim. The court recognized that harassment need not involve touching or be “physically threatening” in order to be actionable. “That there are also arguments that suggest that this conduct may not be sufficiently severe or pervasive does not mean that a reasonable jury could not conclude otherwise.
At bottom, the facts presented in the record are simply too close to that line for summary judgment to be appropriate.” Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Home, LLC, No.
CASE NAME COURT AND
CASE NUMBER DATE FILED STATUTES BASIS/ISSUE/
RESULT COMMENTARY
Thibodeaux-Woody v. Houston Community College
U.S. Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit No. 13-20738
4/8/2014 EPA, Title VII Sex Discrimination Mixed outcome:
Affirmed Pro-Employer Summary Judgment on the Retaliation Claim;
Reversed and Remanded EPA Claim
Background: Plaintiff alleged a violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII alleging that a male employee in the same position received a higher salary. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding the defendant established its affirmative defense that factors “other than sex” determined the salaries at issue.
Issues on Appeal: Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to defendant?
Issue EEOC Addressed as Amicus: Did the district court apply the proper summary judgment standard in evaluating the employer’s affirmative defense?
EEOC’s Amicus Brief: The court improperly granted summary judgment to defendant because it failed to establish its affirmative defense as a matter of law.
Specifically, the EEOC argued that the district court erred when holding that the defendant established that the only reason for the differences in salaries was because the male employee chose to negotiate his compensation. Unlike the McDonnell Douglas framework used for Title VII claims, under which the plaintiff always bears the burden of proof, it is not enough for the employer asserting an EPA affirmative defense simply to offer evidence of a legitimate reason. Instead, the EEOC argued, the employer must offer sufficient evidence to prove the EPA defense as a matter of law, i.e., that no reasonable jury could reach a contrary conclusion.
Court’s Decision: On November 14, 2014, the court, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the retaliation claim, finding the claimant did not establish a causal link between
Court’s Decision: On November 14, 2014, the court, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the retaliation claim, finding the claimant did not establish a causal link between